Information Disclosure and Stock Liquidity: Evidence from Borsa Italiana

This article examines the effect of increased corporate information disclosure on stock liquidity. Using the adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in Italy as a natural experiment we extend previous work examining the effect on one measure of liquidity—bid‐ask spreads—to others, specifically depth and the price impact of transactions (or effective bid‐ask spreads). Consistent with previous research we find that bid‐ask spreads of stocks decline following the introduction of IFRS, which implies that stock liquidity increases for small traders. However, we also provide evidence that depth at the best quotes declines, which challenges the proposition that liquidity increases for large trades following an increase in disclosure. In additional tests, we find that effective bid‐ask spreads of block trades also decline following the introduction of IFRS. Overall, this evidence confirms that stock liquidity for both small and large trades increases following an increase in corporate information disclosure.     

The Effect of Crossing‐Network Trading on Dealer Market's Bid‐Ask Spreads

This article provides new insights into market competition between traditional exchanges and alternative trading systems in Europe. It investigates the relationship between the trading activity of a crossing network (CN) and the liquidity of a traditional dealer market (DM) by comparing data from the SEAQ quote‐driven segment of the London Stock Exchange (LSE) and internal data from the POSIT crossing network. A cross‐sectional analysis of bid‐ask spreads shows that DM spreads are negatively related to CN executions. Risk‐sharing benefits from CN trading dominate fragmentation and cream‐skimming costs. Further, risk‐sharing gains are found to be related to dealer trading in the CN.     

A Comparison of Centralized and Fragmented Markets with Costly Search

How does quotation transparency affect financial market performance? Biais's irrelevance proposition in 1993 shows that centralized markets yield the same expected bid–ask spreads as fragmented markets, other things equal. However, de Frutos and Manzano demonstrated in 2002 that expected spreads in fragmented markets are smaller and market participants prefer to trade in fragmented markets. This paper introduces liquidity traders' costs of searching for a better quote into the Biais model and derives opposite conclusions to these previous studies: expected spreads in centralized markets are smaller and liquidity traders prefer centralized markets, while market makers prefer fragmented markets.     

The Sarbanes‐Oxley Act of 2002 and Market Liquidity

Investors rely heavily on the trustworthiness and accuracy of corporate information to provide liquidity to the capital markets. We find that the rash of financial scandals caused a severe deterioration in market liquidity in the form of wider spreads, lower depths, and a higher adverse selection component of spreads vis‐à‐vis their benchmark levels. Regulatory responses including the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) had inconsequential short‐term liquidity effects but highly significant and positive long‐term liquidity effects. These liquidity improvements are positively associated with the improved quality of financial reports, several firm‐specific variables (e.g., size), and market factors (e.g., price, volatility, volume).     

Does good corporate governance reduce information asymmetry around quarterly earnings announcements?

We examine the relationship between the quality of corporate governance and information asymmetry in the equity market around quarterly earnings announcements. We use the change in market liquidity (i.e., bid–ask spreads and depths) around the announcements as a proxy for information asymmetry. We use principal components analysis to identify three factors, board independence, board structure and board activity, that capture the information in the eight individual corporate governance variables we examine. We then use ordinary least squares and two-stage least squares to estimate the relations between market liquidity changes and the following four explanatory variables: directors’ and officers’ percentage stock holdings, board independence, board structure, and board activity. Our results indicate that changes in bid–ask spreads at the time of earnings announcements are significantly negatively related to board independence, board activity, and the percentage stock holdings of directors and officers. We also find that depth changes are significantly positively related to board structure, board activity, and directors’ and officers’ percentage stock holdings. Our results are consistent with the hypothesis that firms with higher levels of corporate governance have lower information asymmetry around quarterly earnings announcements.     

Stock Splits and Liquidity: The Case of the Nasdaq-100 Index Tracking Stock

In an attempt to disentangle the signaling effect from the liquidity effect of stock splits, I examine the liquidity changes following the two‐for‐one split of the Nasdaq‐100 Index Tracking Stock. Since there can be no signaling with an index stock split, any difference between pre‐ and postsplit trading may be driven by liquidity but not signaling effects. I find that though the postsplit relative bid‐ask spread is higher and daily turnover is unchanged, the frequency, share volume, and dollar‐volume of small trades all increased after the split, indicating that the split improved liquidity for small trade‐sizes.     

The contribution of market makers to liquidity and efficiency of options trading in electronic markets

This paper examines the contribution of market makers to the liquidity and the efficiency of the options market in a unique setup of an order-driven computerized trading system, in which market makers and other participants operate under equitable conditions. The main findings are: (1) liquidity increased – a 60% increase in trading volume and a 35% decrease of bid–ask spreads; (2) the efficiency of shekel–euro options trading improved – deviations from put–call parity decreased significantly by 12%, and skewness decreased by about 30%. We also find that the net cost to the exchange is out weighted by the benefit to the trading public and that the presence of market makers encouraged trading between other participants far beyond their own trading.     

Liquidity and Returns to Target Shareholders in the Market for Corporate Control: Evidence from the US Markets

In this paper we analyze how stock market liquidity affects the abnormal return to target firms in mergers and tender offers. We predict that target firms with poorer stock market liquidity receive larger announcement day abnormal returns based on the following considerations. First, target firms with poorer stock market liquidity receive greater liquidity improvements after a merger or tender offer. Second, deals that involve less liquid targets are less anticipated and/or more likely to be completed. Third, less liquid stocks have more diverse reservation prices across shareholders and thus require a higher takeover return. Consistent with these expectations, we show that abnormal returns to target firms’ shareholders are significantly and positively related to the difference in liquidity (measured by the bid‐ask spread) between acquirers and targets as well as the magnitude of target firms’ liquidity improvement.     

The relationship between bid–ask spreads and holding periods: The case of Chinese A and B shares

The Chinese stock markets for A (domestic) shares and B (foreign) shares were completely separated. This study examines the relationship between spreads and holding periods across these segmented markets on the same set of firms. Our major findings are as follows. (1) There is a positive relationship between holding periods and bid–ask spreads in the Chinese stock market. (2) Investors' sensitivity toward liquidity is approximately the same in the A and B share markets, even though bid–ask spreads are substantially different across the two markets. These results provide strong support for the theoretical argument of Amihud and Mendelson [Amihud, Y., & Mendelson, H. (1986). Asset pricing and the bid–ask spread. Journal of Financial Economics, 17, 223–249.] that stocks with higher spreads tend to be held by long-term investors. Evidence also suggests that liquidity has a role in explaining the B share discount, although the results are less than conclusive.     

The relationship between bid–ask spreads and holding periods: The case of Chinese A and B shares

The Chinese stock markets for A (domestic) shares and B (foreign) shares were completely separated. This study examines the relationship between spreads and holding periods across these segmented markets on the same set of firms. Our major findings are as follows. (1) There is a positive relationship between holding periods and bid–ask spreads in the Chinese stock market. (2) Investors' sensitivity toward liquidity is approximately the same in the A and B share markets, even though bid–ask spreads are substantially different across the two markets. These results provide strong support for the theoretical argument of Amihud and Mendelson [Amihud, Y., & Mendelson, H. (1986). Asset pricing and the bid–ask spread. Journal of Financial Economics, 17, 223–249.] that stocks with higher spreads tend to be held by long-term investors. Evidence also suggests that liquidity has a role in explaining the B share discount, although the results are less than conclusive.     

Mandatory Disclosure,Voluntary Disclosure,and Stock Market Liquidity: Evidence from the EU Bank Stress Tests

We use the EU stress tests and the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis to study the consequences of supervisory disclosure of banks’ sovereign risk exposures. We test the idea that a mandatory one‐time disclosure induces an increase in voluntary disclosures about sovereign risk in the following periods and, through the shift in the voluntary disclosure equilibrium, increases the liquidity of banks’ shares. First, we find that the timing and content of different mandatory disclosure events helps explain the levels of stress‐test banks’ voluntary disclosures about sovereign risk. Second, although the bid‐ask spreads of stress test participants generally increased after the mandatory stress test in 2011, our results suggest that the decrease in market liquidity is entirely attributable to those stress‐test participants that did not commit to voluntarily maintaining the disclosures of sovereign risk exposure.     

An empirical analysis of the supply of liquidity by locals in futures markets: Evidence from the Sydney Futures Exchange

Contrary to the received view of market makers in theoretical literature, this study provides direct evidence that locals on the Sydney Futures Exchange (SFE) do not trade exclusively as passive market participants. In fact, rather than act purely as market makers, locals as a group are almost as likely to demand as supply liquidity. Further, locals trading on the floor of the SFE are less likely to supply liquidity when bid–ask spreads, trading frequency and price volatility are high, as well as around information announcements. These findings are consistent with aggressive trading by locals on the basis of a short-lived information advantage. This study also documents considerable diversity in the propensity of locals to supply liquidity, finding that it is related to the quantity, frequency and average size of their trading activity.     

Executive Network Centrality and Stock Liquidity

We examine the relationship between stock market liquidity and the network centrality of firm executives. We find that firms whose executive officers are more central in the network of executives have narrower bid‐ask spreads. We use an exogenous network centrality shock of executive turnover and report that liquidity improves after firms hire executives with greater centrality. We present evidence that improved liquidity is attributable to efficient information flows around executives in more advantageous network positions.     

Market Illiquidity and Conditional Equity Premium

We examine the time‐series relation between aggregate bid‐ask spreads and conditional equity premium. We document that average marketwide relative effective bid‐ask spreads forecast aggregate market returns only when controlling for average idiosyncratic variance. This control allows us to document the otherwise elusive relation between illiquidity and returns. The reason is that idiosyncratic variance correlates positively with spreads but has a negative effect on conditional equity premium, causing an omitted variable bias. Our results are robust to standard return predictors, alternative illiquidity measures, and out‐of‐sample tests. These findings are important because they provide strong support for the literature's conjecture that marketwide liquidity is an important asset pricing risk factor.     

Analyst Coverage,Market Liquidity and Disclosure Quality: A Study of Fair-value Disclosures by European Real Estate Companies Under IAS 40 and IFRS 13

Disclosures in notes have been criticized by practitioners for being unwieldy and contributing little to the quality of the financial information. This study presents evidence on the association between disclosure quality, analyst following and liquidity in the real estate sector. More specifically, we study the disclosure of the methods and significant assumptions applied in determining fair values of investment properties under IAS 40 and IFRS 13. We find that disclosure quality is significantly higher under IFRS 13. Furthermore, we show that the quality is associated with analyst following and bid-ask spreads. However, the improved disclosures following the adoption of IFRS 13 are not associated with any significant positive economic consequences. This result indicates that the revised disclosure requirements in IFRS 13 did not solve any market imperfections.     

Liquidity of emerging markets

Emerging markets are characterized by volatile, but substantial returns that can easily exceed 75% per annum. Balancing these lofty returns are liquidity costs that, using the bid–ask spread as a basis, range from 1% for the Taiwanese market to over 47% for the Russian market. However, the paucity of bid–ask spread information across countries and time requires the use of liquidity estimates in emerging markets even though little is known about the efficacy of these estimates in measuring bid–ask spread costs. Using firm-level quoted bid–ask spreads as a basis, I find that price-based liquidity measures of Lesmond et al. [Review of Financial Studies 12 (1999) 1113] and Roll [Journal of Finance 39 (1984) 1127] perform better at representing cross-country liquidity effects than do volume based liquidity measures. Within-country liquidity is best measured with the liquidity estimates of either Lesmond, Ogden, and Trzcinka or, to a lesser extent, Amihud (2002). Examining the impact of legal origin and political institutions on liquidity levels shows that countries with weak political and legal institutions have significantly higher liquidity costs than do countries with strong political and legal systems, even to the exclusion of legal origin or insider trading enforcement. Higher incremental political risk is associated with a 10 basis point increase in transaction costs, using the Lesmond, Ogden, and Trzcinka estimate, or a 1.9% increase in price impact costs, using the Amihud estimate.     

Impact of a tick size reduction on liquidity: evidence from the Sydney Futures Exchange

This paper examines the impact of a reduction in the minimum price increment on liquidity and execution costs in a futures market setting. In 2006, the Sydney Futures Exchange halved the minimum tick in the 3 Year Commonwealth Treasury Bond Futures. Results indicate that bid‐ask spreads are significantly reduced after the change. Quoted depth, both at the best quotes and visible in the limit order book, is significantly lower after the tick reduction. Further analysis reveals that execution costs are significantly reduced after the change. We conclude that a tick size reduction improves liquidity and reduces execution costs in a futures market setting.     

Trading and liquidity in the catastrophe bond market

We provide first insights into secondary market trading, liquidity determinants, and the liquidity premium of catastrophe bonds. Based on transaction data from TRACE (Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine), we find that cat bonds are traded less frequently during the hurricane season and more often close to maturity. Trading activity indicates that the market is dominated by brokers without a proprietary inventory. Liquidity is high in periods of high trading activity in the overall market and for bonds with low default risk or close to maturity, which results from lower order processing costs. Finally, using realized bid–ask spreads as a liquidity measure, we find that on average, 21% of the observable yield spread on the cat bond market is attributable to the liquidity premium, with a magnitude of up to 141 bps for high-risk bonds.     

Intraday futures market behaviour around major scheduled macroeconomic announcements: Australian evidence

This paper examines intraday futures market behaviour around major scheduled macroeconomic information announcements on the Sydney Futures Exchange (SFE). Prior literature analysing intraday price behaviour around announcements is extended to trading volume and quoted bid–ask spreads. The analysis of price volatility, trading volume and quoted bid–ask spreads indicates that the majority of adjustment to new information occurs rapidly, within 240 seconds of the scheduled time for major announcements, with some evidence of abnormal activity prior to announcements. Analysis of quoted bid–ask spreads suggests that they significantly widen in the 20 seconds prior to announcements and remain significantly wider for 30 seconds following announcements. The increase in quoted spreads is related to both expected and unexpected volatility, implying that market participants increase quoted spreads around information announcements as a consequence of adverse selection costs.     

The impact of aggressive orders in an order-driven market: a simulation approach

This article investigates resiliency in an order-driven market. On basis of a vector autoregressive model capturing various dimensions of liquidity and their interactions, I simulate the effect of a large liquidity shock, measured by a very aggressive market order. I show that, despite the absence of market makers, the market is resilient. All dimensions of liquidity (spread, depth at the best prices and order book imbalances) revert to their steady-state values within 15 orders after the shock. For prices, a long run effect is found. Furthermore, different dimensions of liquidity interact. Immediately after a liquidity shock, the spread becomes wider than in the steady state, implying that one dimension of liquidity deteriorates, while at the same time, depth at the best prices increases, meaning an improvement of another liquidity dimension. In subsequent periods, the spread reverts back to the steady-state level but also depth decreases. Also, I find evidence for asymmetries in the impact of shocks on the ask and bid side. Shocks on the ask side have a stronger impact than shocks on the bid side. Finally, resiliency is higher for less-frequently traded stocks and stocks with a larger relative tick size.