A European Geopolitical Subject in the Making? EU,Russia and the Kaliningrad Question

This article engages the recent studies that have treated the European Union (EU) in geopolitical terms, as an empire engaged with enlargement. The article introduces the meta-concept of geopolitical subjectivity. This meta-concept enables us to situate such imperial interpretations of the EU into a theoretically informed, comparative setting. The meta-concept is defined as goal-oriented ordering of territories and political spaces, extending from one's own sphere of sovereign rule to broader regional contexts. It is used to study the EU-Russian interaction in creating order to the Kaliningrad region that is set to become a Russian enclave/exclave within the enlarged EU. The article concludes by arguing that in this case, the EU's geopolitical subjectivity is constituted more strongly by Russia's recognition of this status than by the EU's own identity and interest projects.     

Would NAFTA have been Approved by the House of Representatives under President Bush? Presidents,Parties, and Trade Policy

This paper examines five trade policy votes in the United States House of Representatives, one during each of the last five presidential terms. The paper investigates the determinants of representative voting and shows that Congress members are more likely to support trade liberalization if the President is a member of their own party. The estimation allows a prediction to be made of the likely House trade votes under alternative presidential election outcomes. The model predicts that the probability of NAFTA being approved would have been greatly reduced by a victory for President Bush (41) in the 1992 election. Neither the trade promotion authority granted to President Bush (43) in 2001 nor the CAFTA signed in 2005 would likely have been approved under Democratic Presidents.     

On the relationship among efficiency,capitalization and risk: does management matter in local banking market?

By employing a Granger causality methodology in a panel data framework, this article explores the relationship among efficiency, capitalization and credit risk within the local Italian banking system. Focusing the attention on cooperative banks, we specifically test whether managers take more risks in highly concentrated markets (i.e. monopoly) than in partially competitive markets (i.e. duopoly). The evidence shows that in more concentrated markets, management efficiency generates a decrease in risk-taking (rejecting the bad management hypothesis) with respect to the partially competitive markets. Results are consistent with the idea that banks with less local competition are able to increase their profits by indulging more freely in rent-seeking behaviour, minimizing their risk-taking and, consequently, improving the quality of their assets through additional screening processes. The financial crisis does not seem to affect the conduct of management in terms of bank investment decisions and risk-taking. A series of robustness tests generally confirms our findings.