披露内部控制自我评价与鉴证报告会降低资本成本吗?——来自中国A股上市公司的经验证据

管理层对内部控制的自我评价能够释放企业内部控制有效性的信息,有助于企业外部利益相关者的决策;而由审计师出具的内控鉴证报告则是对管理层所披露的内控信息公允性的鉴证。本文以2007至2010年期间沪深主板上市的A股公司年度报告或独立公告中披露的内部控制自我评价和鉴证报告为对象,研究其披露是否会降低企业资本成本。研究表明,在控制其他因素的情况下,披露内控自我评价报告的公司资本成本相对较低,且进一步披露内控鉴证报告的公司资本成本更低。这一结论对于国有和非国有控股公司同样成立。本文的结论对政策制定者进一步推进内控披露制度具有一定参考价值,同时为公司管理层的内控披露决策提供支持依据。     

Internal capital market efficiency and the diversification discount: The role of financial statement comparability

This paper investigates how financial statement comparability affects the efficiency of internal capital markets and diversification discounts in multi‐segment firms through monitoring mechanisms. Previous studies suggest that financial statement comparability improves transparency and reduces the cost of information processing, mitigating information asymmetry between managers and shareholders. Using measures of comparability and internal capital efficiency, we find that financial statement comparability has a strong positive influence on internal capital market efficiency. Further, we find that by improving the efficiency of internal capital markets, financial statement comparability indeed mitigates diversification discounts. Especially, the effect of financial statement comparability is more pronounced for firms with high information asymmetry or operating environment volatility. The results support our arguments that financial statement comparability enhances the efficiency of internal capital markets and increases firm value in diversified firms by mitigating agency problems via monitoring and corporate control mechanisms.     

Corporate Financial Control Mechanisms and Firm Performance: The Case of Value-Based Management Systems

Abstract:  We examine the performance of 84 firms that adopt value-based management (VBM) systems during the period 1984-1997. The typical firm significantly improves matched-firm-adjusted residual income after adopting VBM. This improvement persists for the five post-adoption years studied. After controlling for possible sample bias, we find that large firms show less improvement than small firms. We find a negative relation between tying compensation to VBM and post-adoption performance. We also find that firms reduce capital expenditures following VBM adoption, but that the reductions in spending do not differ based on the firms' growth opportunities. Overall, the evidence suggests that VBM improves economic performance and the efficient use of capital.     

Controlling shareholder share pledging and the cost of equity capital: Evidence from China

We propose and test the incentive view—that the margin call pressure and ownership-control discrepancy associated with insider share pledging increase investors’ perceived risk, and thus also the cost of equity capital, in an emerging market. Using a controlling shareholder share pledging sample for Chinese listed firms, we find that firms with share pledging have a cost of equity capital that is 23.7 basis points higher than firms without share pledging. Further, share pledging increases the cost of equity capital through the information risks and agency conflicts channels. Cross-sectional analyses show that share pledging has a stronger effect on the cost of equity capital in non-state-owned enterprises, firms without monitoring of multiple large shareholders, firms with controlling shareholders assuming the position of chairperson, and firms with a weak institutional environment. In addition, using the global financial crisis and the outbreak of the coronavirus (COVID-19) as quasi-natural experiments, we disentangle the potential confounding effect of firm fundamentals and show that share pledging is positively associated with the cost of equity capital. Overall, the results are consistent with our incentive view that share pledging increases the cost of equity capital in an emerging market.     

Social trust and corporate financial asset holdings: Evidence from China

This study examines the impact of social trust on firms’ holdings of non-currency financial assets using a large sample of firms in China’s real sector. We find that firms in regions of the high social trust hold fewer financial assets, consistent with the notion that credibility in high-trust regions reduces information asymmetry and transaction cost among market participants. This leads to better access to formal and informal financing and higher profitability for the real economy, eventually depressing firms’ financial asset allocations. We also find that the negative effect of social trust on financial asset holdings is more prominent for private firms and firms with weak internal monitoring from large shareholders, suggesting that corporations rely more on trust in these cases; it is less pronounced when firms are in regions with good legal systems, proving social trust to be a substitute for formal institutions.     

Corporate Pyramids,Conservatism and Cost of Debt: Evidence From Taiwan

This study investigates the extent to which the span of corporate pyramids (as measured by the number of ownership layers) is associated with higher agency costs of debt, and whether conservatism can moderate the agency cost. Consistent with corporate pyramids generating higher agency costs and information asymmetries between corporate insiders and outside creditors, we find a positive association between the number of investment layers and cost of debt. However, we also find that multi-layered firms mitigate organizational opaqueness through increased financial reporting conservatism, which results in lower cost of debt capital. These findings provide new insights into the relationship between organizational structure and financial reporting quality.     

Policy and oversight of corporate political activities and the cost of equity capital

This paper investigates the effect of voluntary adoption and disclosure of policies/oversight of corporate political activities/spending on the cost of equity capital for S&P 500 firms over the period 2015–2018. Using the CPA-Zicklin Index to measure the level of policies, oversight, and disclosure of corporate political activities, we find that firms with a greater level of policies and oversight enjoy a lower cost of equity capital. We also document that a higher index is associated with higher stock liquidity. The negative relation is more pronounced among firms with higher exposure to political risk and firms with higher dependence on government spending. We also find that a firm’s information environment plays an important role in moderating the relation between policies and oversight of corporate political activities and the cost of equity capital. Our findings suggest that voluntary adoption and disclosure of policies and oversight mitigates risks and uncertainties related to firms’ political activities, thereby reducing information asymmetry and the cost of equity capital.     

Information disclosure,firm growth,and the cost of capital

We study how information disclosure affects the cost of equity capital and investor welfare in a dynamic setting. We show that a firm’s cost of capital decreases (increases) in the precision of public disclosure if the firm’s growth rate is below (above) a certain threshold. The threshold growth rate is higher when the firm’s cash flows are more persistent, or when other firms in the economy are growing at low rates. While current shareholders always prefer maximum public disclosure, future shareholders’ welfare decreases (increases) in the precision of public disclosure if the firm’s growth rate is below (above) the threshold.     

Corporate governance,SFAS 157 and cost of equity capital: evidence from US financial institutions

This study examines the association between fair value measurements and the cost of equity capital under different fair value valuation methods, and assesses the impact of corporate governance on this relationship for US financial firms. We find that firms’ cost of equity capital is negatively associated with more verifiable fair value assets and positively related to less verifiable fair value assets. Furthermore, the positive association between less verifiable fair value assets and the cost of equity capital is mitigated under better corporate governance. The differential impact between more and less verifiable assets becomes smaller for firms with stronger governance. Our findings contribute to the ongoing debate on fair value regulation by investigating the economic consequences of adopting Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 157, Fair Value Measurements (SFAS 157) and the importance of audit committee financial expertise on fair value reporting. We also provide evidence on the importance of board independence, internal control strength, auditor industry specialists, and audit committee financial experts in fair value reporting.     

Multiple large shareholders, control contests, and implied cost of equity

In this paper, we examine whether the presence of multiple large shareholders alleviates a firm's agency costs and information asymmetry manifested in the cost of equity financing. Using data for 1165 corporations from 8 East Asian and 13 Western European countries, we find evidence that the implied cost of equity decreases with the presence, number, and voting size of large shareholders beyond the controlling owner. We also find that the identity of the second largest shareholder is important in determining the risk of corporate expropriation in family-controlled firms. Our regional analysis reveals that, mainly in East Asian firms, multiple large shareholders structures exert an internal governance role in curbing private benefits and reducing information asymmetry, perhaps to sidestep deficiencies in the external institutional environment.     

Social capital and capital allocation efficiency

Based on the social norms and structural theories of social capital, this study examines the relationship between community social capital and the firms’ capital allocation efficiency. We hypothesize and find that the community social capital of a firm's headquarter area has a negative and statistically significant impact on its capital allocation inefficiency, which is robust to alternative proxies for community social capital and capital allocation inefficiency, propensity score matching and instrumental variable regressions. In addition, we find that the effect of community social capital is more pronounced for firms with poor internal ethical culture and weak network connections to outside executives and directors, implying that community social capital becomes important in these situations. This finding links prior social norms and networks literature to capital allocation studies in that the norms and networks components of community social capital discipline self-interested managers’ behavior and reduce information asymmetry-two channels of capital allocation efficiency. Overall, community social capital works as a compensatory monitoring and information transfer mechanism and improves the firms’ capital allocation efficiency.     

Cross-Border M&As Involving an Emerging Market

This study analyzes Korean firms’ motives for cross-border M&As, Asia’s representative emerging capital market, from the perspective of financial attributes, and defines the effects of group attributes of cross-border M&As on the wealth of acquiring firms’ shareholders. As for the group attributes of cross-border M&As, shareholders of small firms with high ROA do not like cross-border M&As, because the shareholders of small acquiring firms with sufficient internal growth factors are reluctant to transfer their present wealth to shareholders of foreign target firms. We also verify that the diversification effect with regard to cross-border M&As is accompanied by the diversification discount, but that firms with ample internal funds due to their high ROA like entering into new industries through cross-border M&As. Lastly, when target companies are listed in countries with highly uncertain GDP growth rates, acquiring firms’ value decreased.     

Relationship Between Controlling Shareholders’ Participation in Share Pledging and Accounting Conservatism in China

This study examines the relationship between controlling shareholders’ participation in share pledging and accounting conservatism in the Chinese stock market. Share pledging introduces risks to controlling shareholders and leads to severe information asymmetry between controlling shareholders and outside minority shareholders. This, in turn, results in competing incentives with regard to financial reporting. We find that controlling shareholders’ participation in share pledging negatively affects accounting conservatism, especially for firms located in regions with weak legal enforcement and poor investor protection. Our study shows that controlling shareholders’ share‐pledging behaviour negatively influences firms’ reporting quality, especially in areas with weak legal systems.     

Internal Funds Allocation and the Ownership Structure: Evidence from Korean Business Groups

We examine the relationship between the controlling shareholder’s cash flow rights and the funds transfer in the internal capital market within Korean business groups (chaebols) during the period from 1998 to 2001. We find that the funds allocation in the firms where controlling shareholders have high cash flow rights is better aligned with the investment opportunities and therefore, more efficient than in the firms where they have low cash flow rights. This effect is stronger when they have controlling powers large enough to expropriate minority shareholders. However, during the financial crisis period, funds simply move toward the firms where controlling shareholders have high cash flow rights. The results evidence the tunneling behavior in the internal capital market within a chaebol that the ownership structure distorts the allocation of internal funds in such a way as to benefit the controlling shareholders.JEL Classification: G31, G30     

An examination of the impact of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act on the attractiveness of U.S. capital markets for foreign firms

We examine whether voluntary deregistrations after the passage of Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) were intended to benefit common shareholders by avoiding firms’ costs of complying with SOX or to protect the control rents of managers or controlling shareholders (MCOs). We find that, compared with foreign firms that maintained their SEC registrations, foreign firms that voluntarily deregistered on average had weaker corporate governance, had a significantly less negative stock market reaction when SOX was passed, and suffered a significant price decline when they announced their decision to deregister. We also find evidence indicating that the deregistrations were (to a lesser extent) motivated by firms’ compliance costs related to SOX. Taken together, our results suggest that both agency costs (that is, private benefit of control of the MCOs) and the compliance cost of SOX play a role in motivating foreign firms to withdraw from the U.S. market.     

Association between Big 4 auditor choice and cost of equity capital for multiple‐segment firms

Prior studies document a negative association between Big 4 auditor choice and the implied cost of equity capital, suggesting that Big 4 auditors mitigate information asymmetry (IA) between shareholders and managers. This study extends this line of research and reports that the negative association is more pronounced in multiple‐segment firms, where IA is more severe than in single‐segment firms. We also find that the association between Big 4 auditor choice and the cost of equity capital becomes more negative as the number of segments increases. Taken together, our findings suggest that the role of Big 4 auditors in reducing the cost of equity capital becomes more significant when greater IA exists.     

Does international experience of managers bring financing benefits? Evidence from the cost of equity capital

Using a sample of Chinese firms, this study examines whether and how managers’ overseas experience affects a firm’s cost of equity capital. We document a negative association between managers’ overseas experience and the cost of equity capital. Mechanism analyses indicate that companies with returnee managers have better information quality and lower systematic risk; more institutional investors, media reports, and analysts following; and higher stock liquidity, all of which lead to a lower cost of equity capital. Further analyses show that chief executive officers (CEOs) with foreign experience have a more significant impact on the cost of capital than non-CEO managers with foreign experience and that managers’ overseas work experience has a more significant impact on the cost of capital than their overseas education. We also find that the impact of managers’ overseas experience is more pronounced when that experience is gained in common law countries compared to code law countries but weaker for state-owned enterprises and firms that are cross-listed or have foreign institutional investors. Overall, the results suggest that managers’ knowledge, skills, and ethical values imprinted from overseas experience, plus eyeball effects from media and analyst attention, can reduce the cost of equity capital.     

Corporate Twitter use and cost of equity capital

This paper investigates whether firms that communicate information on social media have a lower cost of equity capital. Using a hand-collected dataset comprising the full universe of all firms listed on the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ since the inception of Twitter, I show that firms that use Twitter have a lower cost of equity capital. Furthermore, firms that face the greatest information asymmetries; namely, smaller companies, companies with few analyst followings, and companies with the least institutional holdings, benefit particularly from tweeting financial information. For identification, I employ a difference-in-difference analysis based on the staggered adoption of Twitter, and a propensity score match (PSM) of tweeting and non-tweeting firms.     

A theory of voluntary disclosure and cost of capital

This paper explores the links between firms’ voluntary disclosures and their cost of capital. Existing studies investigate the relation between mandatory disclosures and cost of capital and find no cross-sectional effect but a negative association in time-series. In this paper, I find that when disclosure is voluntary firms that disclose their information have a lower cost of capital than firms that do not disclose, but the association between voluntary disclosure and cost of capital for disclosing and nondisclosing firms is positive in aggregate. I further examine whether reductions in cost of capital indicate improved risk-sharing or investment efficiency. I also find that high (low) disclosure frictions lead to overinvestment (underinvestment) relative to first-best. As average cost of capital proxies for risk-sharing but not investment efficiency, the relation between cost of capital and ex ante efficiency may be ambiguous and often irrelevant.     

Financial centers and ownership concentration: When is ownership concentration value relevant? Evidence from an emerging market

Does the location of a firm’s headquarter effect ownership concentration? Do stock market participants value ownership concentration differently for firms located at different geographic locations? Using data from India, this paper shows that firms headquartered in Mumbai, the main financial center of a country, have lower ownership concentration than firms headquartered elsewhere. We argue that clustering of firms in the financial center reduce information asymmetries and lower the incentives for concentrated ownership. Our results also show that as the extent of analyst following increase, the difference between ownership concentration of firms headquartered in Mumbai and firms headquartered elsewhere goes up. We argue that higher analyst coverage reduces information asymmetries quicker for firms headquartered in the financial center and results in larger difference between the two groups. In addition, we also show that ownership concentration is value relevant only for firms headquartered in the non-financial centers. We show no relationship between ownership concentration and firm performance and valuation in the financial centers. This paper provides evidence that location of a firm’s headquarter in the financial center can significantly alter its information environment. Reduced information asymmetries lower the incentives for concentrated ownership in the financial centers.