Does corporate social responsibility matter in the food industry? Evidence from a nature experiment in China

Using the melamine contamination incident in China as an exogenous shock, this paper studies how the investors respond to corporate social responsibilities (CSRs) of listed firms in food industry. We find that investors’ or consumers’ concerns for CSR in the food industry could be significantly influenced by the mounting attention given to CSR-related events. This study offers important policy implications. First, the government, as well as supervisors, should release appropriate policies to improve various firms’ activities on CSR, especially in the food industry. Second, firms, particularly those in the food industry, can obtain long-term benefits by strengthening their CSR-related activities.     

Product recalls,corporate social responsibility,and firm value: Evidence from the Chinese food industry

Product recalls frequently occur in the Chinese food industry, which is closely linked to public health and social security and attracts significant attention from the government, media, and public. We manually collect food recalls from listed firms in China from 2008 to 2016 and use an event study methodology to investigate the economic consequences of product recalls. First, we find that product recalls result in significantly negative abnormal returns for listed firms. Second, the level of corporate social responsibility (CSR) mitigates the negative effect of food recalls on the wealth of shareholders. Our results are robust to different specifications and measures. This study provides timely evidence and important policy implications for the ongoing food safety crisis in China. The government should release appropriate policies to improve firms’ product quality and activities on CSR in the food industry, which in turn helps the firms obtain benefits.     

Institutional framework,corporate ownership structure,and R&D investment: an international analysis

We combine agency theory with the law and finance approach to analyze how the legal protection of investors and the corporate ownership structure affect corporate investment in research and development (R&D). We use information from 956 firms from the five most R&D-intensive industries in 19 developed countries. Our results show that better protection of investors’ rights by the institutional environment has a positive influence on corporate R&D. We also find that corporate ownership concentration works as a substitute for legal protection. This finding means that R&D investment of the firms in the countries with poor legal protection increases as ownership becomes more concentrated. Our results also show that the identity of shareholders has a relevant effect: Whereas banks and nonfinancial institutions as shareholders result in lower R&D, institutional investors as shareholders increase corporate investment in R&D.     

How do institutional investors react to local shocks during a crisis? A test using the COVID-19 pandemic

We examine how institutional investors reacted to geographically dispersed local shocks during the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic. A sample of real estate investment trusts (REITs) enables us to link two layers of geography: the locations of the assets in which the REITs were invested and the headquarters locations of institutional investors who owned REIT shares. We find that the institutional ownership of firms with an economic interest in the investors’ home markets declined more if those markets were heavily affected by the pandemic. In addition, the ownership responses to the COVID-19 shock were larger in those markets in which REITs had larger portfolio allocations and in markets that were home to the investors. Importantly, we find that nonpassive and short-term investors may have overreacted to the local shocks because their REIT portfolios subsequently underperformed relative to passive and long-term investors. Our study highlights the importance of geography in the formation of investors’ expectations during market crises.     

红色战略还是灰色战略——针对我国制度转型中企业战略迷失的实证研究

我国制造业公司目前陷入了战略迷失:在重视市场的红色战略和利用正式制度漏洞来寻租的灰色战略两者之间应该选择哪一个?基于我国的制度转型情境,我们采用战略均衡三角理论,通过我国制造业所有上市公司2000—2010年15620个公司年的数据,研究了近十年制度转型过程中企业战略迷失问题的形成以及作用机制。研究表明,政府不正确的、过度的干预,不仅会影响企业行为的获利回报,而且会导致企业战略行为选择的错位。同时指出,在战略均衡的三角中,制度观视角比产业观、资源观视角更能够解释我国企业的战略行为,且与后两者属于不同维度。本研究加深了人们对我国企业关系型战略、战略与商务模式匹配、政府角色等问题的理解。     

The Dynamics of REIT Pricing Efficiency

We study the dynamics of pricing efficiency in the equity REIT market from 1993 to 2014. We measure pricing efficiency at the firm level using variance ratios calculated from quote midpoints in the TAQ database. We find four main results. First, on average, the market is efficient, with variance ratios close to one. However, in any given year, there is considerable cross‐sectional variation in variance ratios, suggesting at least some firms are priced inefficiently. Second, higher institutional ownership by active institutional investors is related to better pricing efficiency, while passive ownership does not reduce pricing efficiency. Third, REITs that are included in the S&P 500 and S&P 400 are priced more efficiently than other REITs. For the S&P 500 firms, we find evidence that this was purely driven by sample selection, while for S&P 400 firms, we find evidence that it is inclusion in the index that drives efficiency. Finally, we find evidence that firm investment, analyst coverage and debt capital raising activity can influence pricing efficiency.     

Firm Patenting,Innovations, and Government Institutional Support as a Double‐Edged Sword

In 2012, China was ranked fourth in patent filing by region of origin. However, firm innovation quality is not comparable to such quantity. Evidence of this is that no Chinese organization was named as a Thomson Reuters 2011 or 2012 Top 100 Global Innovators. This paradox of firm patenting and innovations in China challenges the traditional understanding of the role of government in industrial innovation. This paper provides a theoretical lens through which to examine traditional protective and strategic patenting motives. Based on institutional theory and the ultimate goals of patenting motives, the paper posits that protective patenting motives are directly law‐based while strategic patenting motives are largely law‐derived. The paper also aims to empirically examine three questions: (1) What is the relative importance of various patenting motives to firm patenting behaviors? (2) What effects do patenting behaviors have on firm product and process innovations? (3) How, if at all, does governmental institutional support affect firm patenting and innovations? This paper uses dominant analysis, structural equation modeling, and regression analysis to analyze the survey data collected from a sample of 270 firms in China. The empirical results provide new evidence about firm patenting, innovations, and government institutional support. First, the order of relative importance of patenting motives to patenting behaviors was found to be (in the descending order of importance) reputation, exchange, blocking, and protection. Second, patenting behaviors were more relevant to product innovations than to process innovations. Third, more importantly, while government institutional support can enhance the effects of protective patenting motives on patenting behaviors, it can mitigate the effects of strategic patenting motives on patenting behaviors. Moreover, government institutional support reduces the positive effect of patenting behaviors on product innovations. These findings suggest that firm patenting and innovations are distinct activities, and that government institutional support acts as a double‐edged sword in firm patenting and innovations: On the one hand government institutional support—an extralegal formal institution—may work alongside the patent system—a law‐based formal institution—to advance science and technology, but on the other hand government institutional support may distract firms from commercializing patented knowledge into new products. This paper primarily contributes to institutional theory, new product development literature, and innovation management practice by revealing the dynamics between two different types of formal institutions—patent system and government institutional support—by establishing an institution‐based view of patenting motives, by empirically distinguishing firm patenting and innovations, and more interestingly by uncovering a double‐edged role of government institutional support in firm patenting and innovations.     

Food safety and product liability

This paper focuses on the U.S. product liability system for food poisoning cases and makes six key points. First, current legal incentives to produce safer food are weak, though slightly stronger in outbreak situations and in markets where foodborne illness can be more easily traced to individual firms. Far less than 0.01% of cases are litigated and even fewer are paid compensation. Second, even if potential plaintiffs can overcome the high information and transaction costs necessary to file lawsuits, monetary compensation provides only weak incentives to pursue litigation. Firms paid compensation in 56% of the 294 cases examined in this study and the median compensation was only $2,000 before legal fees. Third, indirect incentives for firms may be important and deserve more research. For example, firms may be influenced by costly settlements and decisions against other firms in the same industry. Fourth, confidential settlements, health insurance, and product liability insurance distort legal incentives to produce safer food. Fifth, the ambiguity about whether microbial contamination is “natural” or an “adulterant” hinders the legal system from effectively dealing with food safety issues. Sixth, a brief comparison of the incentives from U.S. and English legal systems suggests that more research is needed to understand the strengths, weaknesses, and relative impact of each country's legal system on the incentives to produce safer food.     

Who Initiates Recalls and Who Cares? Evidence from the Automobile Industry

In this paper, we investigate two questions. First, we explore which entity (the NHTSA or the manufacturer) is more likely to initiate a given auto safety recall campaign. Second, we analyze the determinants of owner response rates to safety recalls. Our data spans nineteen years (1980–1998) for the six largest auto manufacturers. We find evidence that the government initiates larger, less hazardous recalls involving older models and financially weak firms. Inexpensive recalls are more likely to be manufacturer initiated. The largest owner repair responses are associated with newsworthy hazardous defects of new domestic vehicles in their inaugural model year.     

Windfalls of emperors' sojourns: Stock market reactions to Chinese firms hosting high‐ranking government officials

Research summary: We contribute to the corporate political activity (CPA ) literature by showing that investors value companies that host visits of high‐ranking government officials (P resident and P remier). We argue that investors may value host official visits for two reasons: (1) the signal received about possibility of firm accessing government‐controlled resources via promotion or protection; and (2) the certification effect from such high‐powered visitors elevating the firm's reputation and legitimacy. Results from an event study analysis of 84 high‐ranking government official visits in C hina from 2003 to 2011 indicate that investors responded positively to host firms as reflected by stock market performance. Furthermore, the greatest positive reactions accrued to firms experiencing weaker prior period financial performance and to firms that are privately compared to state‐controlled . Managerial summary: Do visits by high‐ranking government officials influence firm stock market performance? Studying a sample of C hinese public firms that hosted 84 visits by the C hinese P resident and the P remier from 2003 to 2011, we find that investors reacted positively to such visits compared with a group of non‐host firms from the same industry and with similar financial performance and size. In addition, firms with weaker prior financial performance and private firms benefit the most from hosting such visits. Our findings imply that hosting visits of high‐ranking government officials can signal future government‐controlled resource inflows and boost host firms' reputation and legitimacy . Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

When institutional logics meet: Alignment and misalignment in collaboration between academia and practitioners

This paper explains the institutional logics of academia, and of practitioners within industry and government, as well as the alignment and misalignment that occurs when these actors collaborate. This is achieved by building on the theories on alignment and misalignment and institutional logics, whilst conducting an explorative case study of a circular economy cluster from the Tampere Region of Finland. This paper offers three main contributions: First, convergence and divergence of institutional logics by industry, government, and academic actors can lead to alignment and misalignment at three levels: actor-type, relationship, and system levels. Second, partial alignment and misalignment are found to be in-between modes of alignment, which challenges the idea that alignment and misalignment are dichotomous. Instead, alignment and misalignment should be seen as the two ends of a continuum. Third, alignment and misalignment are dynamic by nature, because institutional logics change and modify during collaboration. For practice, this paper gives advice on how collaboration between academia and practitioners can be advanced to achieve alignment and avoid misalignment.     

The dark side of institutional intermediaries: Junior stock exchanges and entrepreneurship

Research Summary : Our study shows how institutional intermediaries established to foster the creation of new firms might hinder new firm growth instead. We show that intermediaries can reduce new firm growth rates due to institutional conflict. To analyze this idea, we examine the setting of junior stock exchanges, which are commonly formed to facilitate entrepreneurial growth. The introduction of these exchanges focused investment into new technology firms, reduced investment in other sectors, and led to diminishing new firm growth. Our findings demonstrate how institutional conflict causes unintended effects and reveals the complexity of influencing entrepreneurship with institutional intermediaries. Managerial Summary : Investors and entrepreneurs face uncertainty when deciding what firms to start and fund. We show that an intermediation effort to make entry easier for entrepreneurs increases the uncertainty that entrepreneurs and investors face. For investors, the enthusiasm for technology firms engendered by the new exchange can motivate investment in marginal firms to maintain as desired deal flow. However, lower firm growth and less liquidity in the future is likely. For entrepreneurs, our results indicate that it is more challenging to manage technology firm growth as well as there is potential opportunity to investigate other industries. Finally, for policy‐makers and supporters of the new exchanges, our results imply that investment flows are altered as intended, but unless listing standards remain high, the virtuous cycle of investment upon which a healthy entrepreneurial climate rests may be disrupted, muting the intended effects of the new exchange.     

CEO career horizon,corporate governance,and real options: The role of economic short‐termism

Research Summary: Combining studies on real options theory and economic short‐termism, we propose that, depending on CEOs’ career horizons, CEOs have heterogeneous interests in strategic flexibility, and thus, have different incentives to make real options investments. We argue that compared to CEOs with longer career horizons, CEOs with shorter career horizons will be less inclined to make real options investments because they may not fully reap the rewards during their tenure. In addition, we argue that long‐term incentives and institutional ownership will mitigate the relationship between CEOs’ career horizons and real options investments. U.S. public firms as an empirical setting produced consistent evidence for our predictions. Our study is the first to theoretically explain and empirically show that a CEO's self‐seeking behavior will impact real options investments. Managerial Summary: This article helps to explain how a CEO's self seeking‐behavior may shape a firm's real option investment, which could result in different level of strategic flexibility. We argue that CEOs with short career horizons have less time to exercise their firms’ real options, which should lower the investments in the firms’ real options portfolios relative to CEOs with long career horizons. We study a sample of U.S. public firms and find strong evidence that a CEO's expected tenure in the firm is positively related to the real options investments at the firm level. We find that this agency issue can be mitigated by adopting appropriate corporate governance mechanisms such as long‐term incentives and institutional investors.     

Is regulatory adoption ceremonial? Evidence from lead director appointments

Research Summary: Regulatory bodies often wrestle with the thorny question of whether to mandate a governance practice or allow for organic adoption. While mandates afford rapid diffusion, we theorize that they also result in ceremonial adoptions. Leveraging a quasi‐natural experiment, we compare adoption outcomes for a governance practice—lead director adoption—that was mandated by the NYSE but not the NASDAQ. We find that NYSE firms are more likely than NASDAQ firms to have installed a lead director as a symbolic management tactic, so their lead directors are less effectual. We also find that transient institutional investors are deceived by this symbolic management, but dedicated institutional investors are not. Managerial Summary: Shareholders and analysts often desire to see companies introduce strict governance measures, such as proxy access and independent boards. Consequently, regulatory bodies often wrestle with the thorny issue of whether and when to mandate such practices for all companies. What they might not realize is that mandates may not work as well as they seem. Although more companies adopt reform under a mandate, they do so merely as a symbolic gesture. We look at one governance reform—appointing a lead director—finding that companies who introduce this reform as a result of a mandate appoint someone that is relatively toothless. We also find, though, that savvy investors are not actually fooled by this tactic and will trade out of firms that attempt such symbolic management.     

Independent boards and the institutional investors that prefer them: Drivers of institutional investor heterogeneity in governance preferences

Institutional investors report that they prefer to invest in firms with greater board independence despite the fact that researchers have been unable to demonstrate a link between board independence and firm performance. We investigate whether differences among institutional investors affect these preferences. We find that trading strategies have some effect but that mutual funds—facing the strongest institutional pressures—have significantly stronger preferences for firms with greater board independence than do other types of institutional investors. This suggests that institutional investor preferences for independent boards are at least partially driven by institutional pressures rather than anticipated reductions in agency costs. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Angel investors’ selection criteria: A comparative institutional perspective

Despite the important role of angel investors as critical financial providers for new ventures, little is known regarding how the institutions present in very different institutional environments impact their investment decisions. While angel investors might be expected to make decisions based on similar selection criteria, they are also embedded within and affected by different institutional settings in which they invest, and as a result they give these criteria weight that are different from those of other investors. We compare angel investors’ selection criteria in China and Denmark utilizing a comparative institutional perspective. Utilizing a policy-capturing approach to understanding their decision criteria, we find that angel investors in China, embedded within relationship-based institutions, tend to rely more on strong ties such as family and friends in the management team. They also give risks less weight as compared with angel investors in Denmark, which operate within more rule-based institutional contexts. As with venture capitalists, angel investors modify their decision criteria to fit the local institutional conditions.     

Individual actors and embeddedness in business-to-business interactions

Individual actors are hardly ever considered in business-to-business marketing literature. This paper uses Service-dominant Logic and Neo-institutional Theory as the bases for twelve case studies. These case studies provide a better understanding of how individuals who represent firms make sense of the social rules, norms, procedures, values, and beliefs of the network (i.e. institutional logics) where they are embedded and how the business interaction is shaped by those influences, through the individual behaviour.This paper makes two main contributions. First, we develop an empirical model of how individuals consider the institutional logics of the network in interactions with suppliers. Second, we present three patterns of individual behavior in interactions, different from what is often assumed by business-to-business researchers. Managerial contributions are also pointed out.     

北极能源开发新动向

北极能源开发出现了几个新动向:一是俄罗斯与美国加快联合开发北极大陆架的合作,并力图吸引更多外资投入俄罗斯主导的北极能源开发中;二是相关北极国家正形成排外的“既得利益集团”,企图垄断北极事务.为应对以上局面,中国应联合相关国家倡导在北极事务上实行包容性互利共赢发展,并从以下方面努力:一是寻求加强与对华友好的北极国家合作,提高中国在北极事务上的地位;二是重新定位参与北极能源开发的角色,以北极能源战略买家的身份与加拿大、美国与俄罗斯合作;三是与北极国家加强极地科研技术合作,为中国参与北极合作夯实硬件与软件基础;四是利用民间力量加大对北极开发事务的参与,构建中国北极维权平台.     

Small is beautiful: firm size,prevention and food safety

Food safety crises have led governments to increase food firms’ responsibility by asking them to voluntarily implement prevention efforts. In this article, we explore the relationship between food firms’ size and their level of prevention efforts. We show that when cross-contamination between units is unlikely, small firms undertake greater prevention efforts than large firms. But when cross-contamination between units is possible, the effort-size curve is an inverted U-shape. Using these results, we discuss food safety laws in Europe and in the US, which differ in how they deal with the size of food firms’ operations.     

Consumers’ valuation for food traceability in China: Does trust matter?

Food safety is a very important topic in China. We investigate Chinese consumers’ preferences and willingness to pay (WTP) for food traceability using a choice experiment. Given that consumers’ trust in the food system may affect their preferences and WTP, we also assess the interaction between consumers’ trust in government’s supervision of food safety and food labels and consumers’ preferences for traceable food products. Using data collected from a choice experiment on Fuji apples in a face-to-face survey in six Chinese cities, the results show that (i) consumers are willing to pay for traceable food but their valuations can differ upon the degree of their trust in government’s supervision of food safety and food labels; (ii) consumers are willing to pay for traceability with strong evidence of preference heterogeneity; (iii) government is not the most trusted safety inspection and certificate authority as found in prior studies using animal food products in China.