移动商务身份认证评价指标体系研究

移动商务身份认证机制的评价主要为形式化分析方法的安全性证明和简单的性能比较,缺乏移动商务身份认证评价指标体系对认证机制进行全面的评价,影响了移动商务身份认证机制的选择.本文通过分析无线通信网络和移动终端的特点,提出移动商务身份认证评价指标体系的设立原则,设计包含安全性、适用性和成熟性三大指标的总体架构,并逐层细化确定其各指标项.在此基础上,运用模糊综合评价法对移动商务身份认证机制进行建模,首先确定评价因素集、评语集和权重,然后建立模糊矩阵,最后根据确定的各级评价因素集对体系的各项指标进行定量或定性分析,从安全性、适用性和成熟性得到机制的评价结果,实现对移动商务身份认证机制的综合评价和分析比较.     

A note on one-shot public mediated talk

Lehrer and Sorin (1997, Games Econ. Behav. 20, 131–148) use a one-shot public mediated talk model to show that, given any probability distribution on the outcomes of a finite normal-form game, there exists a public mediated talk mechanism that simulates that distribution, provided the probabilities on outcomes are rational numbers. It is shown here that a minor amendment of the very same model allows a much stronger conclusion: any distribution on the outcomes, whether the probabilities are rational numbers or not, can be obtained as the outcome of a one-shot public mediated talk mechanism.     

Modelling a dynamic market potential: A class of automata networks for diffusion of innovations

Innovation diffusion processes are generally described at aggregate level with models like the Bass Model (BM) and the Generalized Bass Model (GBM). However, the recognized importance of communication channels between agents has recently suggested the use of agent-based models, like Cellular Automata. We argue that an adoption or purchase process is nested in a communication network that evolves dynamically and indirectly generates a latent non-constant market potential affecting the adoption phase.Using Cellular Automata we propose a two-stage model of an innovation diffusion process. First we describe a communication network, an Automata Network, necessary for the “awareness” of an innovation. Then, we model a nested process depicting the proper purchase dynamics. Through a mean field approximation we propose a continuous representation of the discrete time equations derived by our nested two-stage model. This constitutes a special non-autonomous Riccati equation, not yet described in well-known international catalogues. The main results refer to the closed form solution that includes a general dynamic market potential and to the corresponding statistical analysis for identification and inference. We discuss an application to the diffusion of a new pharmaceutical drug.     

高新技术企业研发团队沟通行为对自主创新绩效的影响——以知识吸收能力为中介变量

在知识经济时代,知识是企业发展和创新的源泉与重要资源。研发团队沟通行为是影响高新技术企业自主创新绩效的重要因素,探究其对自主创新绩效的影响机制具有重要意义。以社会认同、知识共享等理论为基础,以知识吸收能力为中介变量,分析高新技术企业研发团队沟通行为与自主创新绩效的关系,运用逐步回归分析法对288份有效样本进行实证分析。研究发现：研发团队合作性沟通对团队产品创新绩效和工艺创新绩效有正向影响;研发团队竞争性沟通和回避性沟通对团队产品创新绩效和工艺创新绩效有负向影响;知识吸收能力在研发团队合作性沟通、竞争性沟通与自主创新绩效的影响中起显著中介作用,但是在研发团队回避性沟通对自主创新绩效影响的中介作用不显著。结论为提升高新技术企业研发团队自主创新绩效提供了新的方法与路径,对企业提高知识共享与创新能力,开展创新活动具有重要启示。     

新一代通信网的发展前景

本文首先简要地回顾了国际上现有三类通信网的实际运用情况，分析推动通信网结构革新的主要因素。然后着重介绍了国际上对新世纪初准备实现的新一代国家通信网基础结构的具体设想，其中包括以分组为基的核心网和各种宽带接入网。     

外语能力的培养研究

我国的外语教育面临着社会的需求和学生的要求,因此培养能胜任对外交流,具有国际竞争能力的人才,以满足我国科技、经济和文化等发展的需要,提出把原先以培养学生单一的阅读能力为重点转变到全面发展学生的听、说、读和写能力,切实提高学生的综合外语能力是十分必要的。     

Market potential dynamics in innovation diffusion: Modelling the synergy between two driving forces

The presence of a slowdown in new product life cycles has recently received notable attention from many innovation diffusion scholars, who have tried to explain and model it on a dual-market hypothesis (early market-main market). In this paper we propose an alternative explanation for the slowdown pattern, a dual-effect hypothesis, based on a recent co-evolutionary model, where diffusion results from the synergy between two driving forces: communication and adoption. An analysis of the synergistic interaction between communication and adoption, based on the likelihood ratio order or on a weak stochastic order, can inform us of which of the two had a driving role in early diffusion. We test the model on the sales data of two pharmaceutical drugs presenting a slowdown in their life cycle and observe that this is identified almost perfectly by the model in both cases. Contrary to the general expectation, according to which communication should precede adoption, our findings show that adoptions may be the main driver in early life cycle; this may be related to the drug's specific nature.     

Are newsgroups extending "invisible colleges" into the digital infrastructure of science?

This paper contributes to the debate on the influence of electronic communication on the informal exchange of information among scientists and practitioners. The research is focused on an empirical analysis of three specialised Newsgroups in "speech technology" (comp.speech, comp.speech.research and comp.speech.users), over the period 1992-2000. Looking at these discussion forums as electronic systems of social interaction, it is appropriate to ask whether they are extending the traditional social networks of "invisible colleges" into the digital age? This paper concludes that this is indeed occurring. First, to a significant extent these electronic environments support international and inter-sectoral remote collaboration. Secondly, these forums support the creation of key properties of "invisible colleges", persistent interaction among peers and a "division of labour" in the accumulation of expertise. Both of these properties are supported by a longitudinal network analysis of the forums. Further opportunities for inquiry are discussed in the concluding section.     

A note on a value with incomplete communication

The Myerson's models on partial cooperation have been studied extensively [SIAM J. Discrete Math. 5 (1992) 305; Math. Methods Operations Res. 2 (1977) 225; Int. J. Game Theory 19 (1980) 421; 20 (1992) 255]. In [Game Econ. Behav. 26 (1999) 565], Hamiache proposes a new solution concept for communication situations. In this work, we analyze this value making some deficiencies clear and generalize this value to union stable cooperation structures emphasizing the differences in the extension.     

Communication in repeated games with costly monitoring

We study repeated games with discounting where perfect monitoring is possible, but costly. It is shown that if players can make public announcements, then every payoff vector which is an interior point in the set of feasible and individually rational payoffs can be implemented in a sequential equilibrium of the repeated game when the discount factor is high enough. Thus, efficiency can be approximated even when the cost of monitoring is high, provided that the discount factor is high enough.     

Communication equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with imperfect monitoring

We characterize the set of communication equilibrium payoffs of any undiscounted repeated matrix-game with imperfect monitoring and complete information. For two-player games, a characterization is provided by Mertens, Sorin, and Zamir (Repeated games, Part A (1994) CORE DP 9420), mainly using Lehrer's (Math. Operations Res. (1992) 175) result for correlated equilibria. The main result of this paper is to extend this characterization to the n-player case. The proof of the characterization relies on an analogy with an auxiliary 2-player repeated game with incomplete information and imperfect monitoring. We use Kohlberg's (Int. J. Game Theory (1975) 7) result to construct explicitly a canonical communication device for each communication equilibrium payoff.     

论高校辅导员与学生家长的有效沟通

家庭教育在大学生思想政治工作中起着重要作用,是大学教育的有益补充。文章分析了当前高校与学生家庭之间欠缺互动的现状及原因,提出高校辅导员要创新与学生家长沟通的方式,利用现代通讯技术加强与学生家长的交流互动,以达到共同教育的目的,促进大学生健康成才。     

Perfect communication equilibria in repeated games with imperfect monitoring

This paper introduces an equilibrium concept called perfect communication equilibrium for repeated games with imperfect private monitoring. This concept is a refinement of Myerson's [Myerson, R.B., 1982. Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal agent problems, J. Math. Econ. 10, 67–81] communication equilibrium. A communication equilibrium is perfect if it induces a communication equilibrium of the continuation game, after every history of messages of the mediator. We provide a characterization of the set of corresponding equilibrium payoffs and derive a Folk Theorem for discounted repeated games with imperfect private monitoring.     

跨文化交际能力培养相关因素之分析

跨文化交际（intercultural communication）是指不同文化背景的人们（people from different cultures）之间的交际。由于交际双方文化背景不同、社会环境各异、思维方式和交际方式有别，因此会对同一词、同一句话、非语言行为和事物产生不同的理解。为了消除跨文化交际障碍，在目的语的学习过程中，我们要清楚地了解跨文化交际所涉及的因素，在跨文化交际过程中，树立正确的跨文化意识，加强对词语文化内涵的理解，理解非语言行为的社会语用功能，学会正确、得体地处理文化差异和文化冲突的方法，从而达到跨文化交际的真正目的。     

整合营销——全新营销理念的遗传密码

本文在分析整合营销兴起的基础上，研究了整合营销的两大特征；系统性与有效宣传，并以微软视窗95为例，对软件业整合营销的运作模式加以探讨。     

Letting third parties who suffer from petty corruption talk: Evidence from a collusive bribery experiment

Following a recommendation by Transparency International, we conduct a laboratory experiment to gauge the impact of a specific type of grassroots participation on petty corruption. Participants play a one-shot, three-person sequential bribery game that, depending on the treatment, either gives or does not give passive third parties suffering from corruption the opportunity to send a publicly visible message to potential bribers and bribees. We find that messaging opportunities deter bribe offers (i.e., the extensive margin of bribe), but affect neither the size of the offered bribe (i.e., the intensive margin) nor bribe acceptances. We conjecture that the different impact of the treatment on bribe-givers and bribe-takers may be due to the order of play.     

Reputational cheap talk with misunderstanding

We consider a cheap talk game with a sender who has a reputational concern for an ability to predict a state of the world correctly, and where receivers may misunderstand the message sent. When communication between the sender and each receiver is private, we identify an equilibrium in which the sender only discloses the least noisy information. Hence, what determines the amount of information revealed is not the absolute noise level of communication, but the extent to which the noise level may vary. The resulting threshold in transmission noise for which information is revealed may differ across receivers, but is unrelated to the quality of the information channel. When information transmission has to be public, a race to the bottom results: the cut-off level for noise of transmitted information now drops to the lowest cut-off level for any receiver in the audience.     

Voice matters in a dictator game

We conducted a laboratory experiment to study the effects of communication in a dictator game, while maintaining subjects’ anonymity. In the experiment, the recipient has an opportunity to state a payoff-irrelevant request for his/her share before the dictator dictates his/her offer. We found that the independence hypothesis that voice does not matter is rejected. In particular, if the request is for less than half of the pie, the dictator’s offer increases as the recipient’s request increases. Additionally, there is no dictator who is other-regarding and, at the same time, does not react to the recipient’s request.

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