Tainted portfolios: How impairment accounting rules restrict security sales

Contrary to claims that fair value accounting exacerbated banks’ securities sales during the recent financial crisis, we present evidence that suggests – if anything – that the current impairment accounting rules served as a deterrent to selling. Specifically, because banks must provide evidence of their ‘intent and ability’ to hold securities with unrealized losses, there are strong incentives to reduce, rather than increase, security sales when market values decline to avoid ‘tainting’ their remaining securities portfolio. Validating this concern, we find that banks incur greater other‐than‐temporary impairment (OTTI) charges when they sell more securities. We then find that banks sell fewer securities when their security portfolios have larger unrealized losses (and thus larger potential impairment charges), and these results are concentrated in banks with homogenous securities portfolios, expert auditors, more experienced managers, and greater regulatory capital slack. Overall, our results suggest that – contrary to critics’ claims – the accounting rules appear to have reduced banks’ propensity to sell their securities during the financial crisis.     

Measuring Mutual Fund Performance with Characteristic-Based Benchmarks

This article develops and applies new measures of portfolio performance which use benchmarks based on the characteristics of stocks held by the portfolios that are evaluated. Specifically, the benchmarks are constructed from the returns of 125 passive portfolios that are matched with stocks held in the evaluated portfolio on the basis of the market capitalization, book-to-market, and prior-year return characteristics of those stocks. Based on these benchmarks, “Characteristic Timing” and “Characteristic Selectivity” measures are developed that detect, respectively, whether portfolio managers successfully time their portfolio weightings on these characteristics and whether managers can select stocks that outperform the average stock having the same characteristics. We apply these measures to a new database of mutual fund holdings covering over 2500 equity funds from 1975 to 1994. Our results show that mutual funds, particularly aggressive-growth funds, exhibit some selectivity ability, but that funds exhibit no characteristic timing ability.     

Portfolio rebalancing and the transmission of large-scale asset purchase programs: Evidence from the Euro area

The European Central Bank's large-scale asset purchase program targeted safe assets, but also aimed to impact prices of risky assets. The mechanism for this is the “portfolio rebalancing channel”, where financial institutions’ portfolio decisions impact financial prices more broadly. We examine this mechanism using cross-sectional heterogeneity in how the financial portfolios of different sectors of the European economy were affected around the purchase program. We find evidence of rebalancing. In vulnerable countries, where macroeconomic unbalances and relatively high risk premia remained, we document rebalancing towards riskier securities. In less vulnerable countries, based on granular information for large European banks, we document rebalancing toward bank loans.     

Analysts' Roundtable on Integrating ESG into Investment Decision‐Making

In this third of the three discussions that took place at the SASB 2016 Symposium, practitioners of a broad range of investment approaches—active as well as passive in both equities and fixed‐income—explain how and why they use ESG information when evaluating companies and making their investment decisions. There was general agreement that successful ESG investing depends on integrating ESG factors with the methods and data of traditional “fundamental” financial statement analysis. And in support of this claim, a number of the panelists noted that some of the world's best “business value investors,” including Warren Buffett, have long incorporated environmental, social, and governance considerations into their investment decision‐making. In the analysis of such active fundamental investors, ESG concerns tend to show up as risk factors that can translate into higher costs of capital and lower values. And companies' effectiveness in managing such factors, as ref lected in high ESG scores and rankings, is viewed by many fundamental investors as an indicator of management “quality,” a reliable demonstration of the corporate commitment to investing in the company's future. Moreover, some fixed‐income investors are equally if not more concerned than equity investors about ESG exposures. ESG factors can have pronounced effects on performance by generating “tail risks” that can materialize in both going‐concern and default scenarios. And the rating agencies have long attempted to reflect some of these risks in their analysis, though with mixed success. What is relatively new, however, is the frequency with which fixed income investors are engaging companies on ESG topics. And even large institutional investors with heavily indexed portfolios have become more aggressive in engaging their portfolio companies on ESG issues. Although the traditional ESG filters used by such investors were designed mainly just to screen out tobacco, firearms, and other “sin” shares from equity portfolios, investors' interest in “tilting” their portfolios toward positive sustainability factors, in the form of lowcarbon and gender‐balanced ETFs and other kinds of “smart beta” portfolios, has gained considerable momentum.     

THE CROSS-AUTOCORRELATION OF SIZE-BASED PORTFOLIO RETURNS IS NOT AN ARTIFACT OF PORTFOLIO AUTOCORRELATION

Prior studies find evidence of asymmetric size-based portfolio return cross-autocorrelations where lagged large firm returns lead current small firm returns. However, some studies question whether this economic relation is independent of the effect of portfolio return autocorrelation. We formally test for this independence using size-based portfolios of New York Stock Exchange and American Stock Exchange securities and, separately, portfolios of Nasdaq securities. Results from causality regressions indicate that, across all markets, lagged large firm returns predict current small firm returns, even after controlling for autocorrelation in small firm returns. These cross-autocorrelation patterns are stronger for Nasdaq securities.     

Funding conditions and insurance stock returns: Do insurance stocks really benefit from rising interest rate regimes?

We examine funding conditions and U.S. insurance company stock returns. Although constrained funding conditions, signaled by restrictive Federal Reserve monetary policy, correspond with increases in the future payouts of fixed‐income securities held by insurance firms and potentially provide value through the liability side of insurer balance sheets, they also decrease the values of securities currently held in insurer portfolios. Prior research finds that restrictive policy has a negative effect on equity returns in general. Our results suggest the negative impacts of constrained funding environments outweigh the potential positives, as insurance company stock returns are significantly lower during periods of constrained funding. This effect varies within a given funding state and also across insurer type. The effect is strongest during the first 3 months of a constrained funding environment and for life and health insurers—insurer types with longer portfolio durations. For property and liability (P&L) insurers, lower stock return performance only exists in the first 3 months of a constrained funding environment. In the subsequent months, P&L insurers actually have higher stock returns during constrained periods, consistent with their typically shorter duration asset portfolios, which are more quickly rolled over into new higher‐yielding securities.     

Systemic Bank Risk in Brazil: A Comprehensive Simulation of Correlated Market, Credit, Sovereign and Inter-Bank Risks

In this study we present a comprehensive forward‐looking portfolio simulation methodology for assessing the correlated impacts of market risk, private sector and Sovereign credit risk, and inter‐bank default risk. In order to produce better integrated risk assessment for banks and systemic risk assessments for financial systems, we argue that reasonably detailed modeling of bank asset and liability structures, loan portfolio credit quality, and loan concentrations by sector, region and type, as well as a number of financial and economic environment risk drivers, is required. Sovereign and inter‐bank default risks are increasingly important in the current economic environment and their inclusion is an important model extension. This extended model is demonstrated through an application to both individual Brazilian banks (i.e., 28 of the largest banks) and groups of banks (i.e., the Brazilian banking system) as of December 2004. When omitting Sovereign risk, our analysis indicates that none of the banks face significant default risk over a 1‐year horizon. This low default risk stems primarily from the large amount of government securities held by Brazilian banks, but also reflects the banks' adequate capitalizations and extraordinarily high interest rate spreads. We note that none of the banks which we modeled failed during the very stressful 2007‐2008 period, consistent with our results. Our results also show that a commonly used approach of aggregating all banks into one single bank, for purposes of undertaking a systemic banking system risk assessment, results in a misestimate of both the probability and the cost of systemic banking system failures. Once Sovereign risk is considered and losses in the market value of government securities reach 10% (or higher), we find that several banks could fail during the same time period. These results demonstrate the well known risk of concentrated lending to a borrower, or type of borrower, which has a non‐zero probability of default (e.g., the Government of Brazil). Our analysis also indicates that, in the event of a Sovereign default, the Government of Brazil would face constrained debt management alternatives. To the best of our knowledge no one else has put forward a systematic methodology for assessing bank asset, liability, loan portfolio structure and correlated market and credit (private sector, Sovereign, and inter‐bank) default risk for banks and banking systems. We conclude that such forward‐looking risk assessment methodologies for assessing multiple correlated risks, combined with the targeted collection of specific types of data on bank portfolios, have the potential to better quantify overall bank and banking system risk levels, which can assist bank management, bank regulators, Sovereigns, rating agencies, and investors to make better informed and proactive risk management and investment decisions.     

Integration of Lending and Underwriting: Implications of Scope Economies

Informational scope economies provide a cost advantage to universal banks offering “one‐stop shopping” for lending and underwriting that enables them to “lock in” their clients' subsequent business. This market power reduces universal banks' incentive, relative to that of specialized investment banks, to apply costly underwriting efforts; consequently, universal banks are less successful in selling their clients' securities. Our results suggest that an integrated financial services market is less innovative than one with specialized intermediaries. Our analysis also identifies economy, intermediary, and firm characteristics that motivate either the integration or segmentation of bank lending and underwriting.     

Cash-Flow Valuation and Value at Risk

The cash-flow valuation method (CFVM) has been developed in Canada for the valuation of insurance company annuity products. Its range of application is expected to be extended shortly to the valuation of most other life insurance company products. The CFVM is based on the use of “best-guess” assumptions, supplemented by specific provisions for adverse deviations. In this paper, special attention is paid to the calculation of the provision for adverse deviations with respect to the interest rate risk. We show that the determination of this provision is the analog for life insurance and annuity policy liabilities of the calculation by banks of Value at Risk (VaR) with respect to portfolios of securities held for trading.     

The Client Is King: Do Mutual Fund Relationships Bias Analyst Recommendations?

This paper investigates whether the business relations between mutual funds and brokerage firms influence sell‐side analyst recommendations. Using a unique data set that discloses brokerage firms’ commission income derived from each mutual fund client as well as the share holdings of these mutual funds, we find that an analyst's recommendation on a stock relative to consensus is significantly higher if the stock is held by the mutual fund clients of the analyst's brokerage firm. The optimism in analyst recommendations increases with the weight of the stock in a mutual fund client's portfolio and the commission revenue generated from the mutual fund client. However, this favorable recommendation bias toward a client's existing portfolio stocks is mitigated if the stock in question is highly visible to other mutual fund investors. Abnormal stock returns are significantly greater both for the announcement period and, in the long run, for favorable stock recommendations from analysts not subject to client pressure than for equally favorable recommendations from business‐related analysts. In addition, we find that, subsequent to announcements of bad news from the covered firms, analysts are significantly less likely to downgrade a stock held by client mutual funds. Mutual funds increase their holdings in a stock that receives a favorable recommendation but this impact is significantly reduced if the recommendation comes from analysts subject to client pressure.     

Internal ratings systems,implied credit risk and the consistency of banks’ risk classification policies

This paper aims at improving our understanding of internal risk rating systems (IRS) at large banks, of the way in which they are implemented, and at verifying if IRS produce consistent estimates of banks’ loan portfolio credit risk. An important property of our work is that the size of our data set allows us to derive measures of credit risk without making any assumptions about correlations between loans, by applying Carey’s [Carey, Mark, 1998. Credit risk in private debt portfolios. Journal of Finance LIII (4), 1363–1387] non-parametric Monte Carlo re-sampling method.We find substantial differences between the implied loss distributions of two banks with equal “regulatory” risk profiles; both expected losses and the credit loss rates at a wide range of loss distribution percentiles vary considerably. Such variation will translate into different levels of required economic capital. Our results also confirm the quantitative importance of size for portfolio credit risk: for common parameter values, we find that tail risk can be reduced by up to 40% by doubling portfolio size.Our analysis makes clear that not only the formal design of a rating system, but also the way in which it is implemented (e.g. a rating grade composition; the degree of homogeneity within rating classes) can be quantitatively important for the shape of credit loss distributions and thus for banks’ required capital structure. The evidence of differences between lenders also hints at the presence of differentiated market equilibria, that are more complex than might otherwise be supposed: different lending or risk management “styles” may emerge and banks strike their own balance between risk-taking and (the cost of) monitoring (that risk).     

Liquidity risk,leverage and long-run IPO returns

We examine the risk-return characteristics of a rolling portfolio investment strategy where more than 6000 Nasdaq initial public offering (IPO) stocks are bought and held for up to 5 years. The average long-run portfolio return is low, but IPO stocks appear as “longshots”, as 5-year buy-and-hold returns of 1000% or more are somewhat more frequent than for non-issuing Nasdaq firms matched on size and book-to-market ratio. The typical IPO firm is of average Nasdaq market capitalization but has relatively low book-to-market ratio. We also show that IPO firms exhibit relatively high stock turnover and low leverage, which may lower systematic risk exposures. To examine this possibility, we launch an easily constructed “low-minus-high” (LMH) stock turnover portfolio as a liquidity risk factor. The LMH factor produces significant betas for broad-based stock portfolios, as well as for our IPO portfolio and a comparison portfolio of seasoned equity offerings. The factor-model estimation also includes standard characteristic-based risk factors, and we explore mimicking portfolios for leverage-related macroeconomic risks. Because they track macroeconomic aggregates, these mimicking portfolios are relatively immune to market sentiment effects. Overall, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the realized return on the IPO portfolio is commensurable with the portfolio's risk exposures, as defined here.     

What Drives Sell‐Side Analyst Compensation at High‐Status Investment Banks?

We use proprietary data from a major investment bank to investigate factors associated with analysts’ annual compensation. We find compensation to be positively related to “All‐Star” recognition, investment‐banking contributions, the size of analysts’ portfolios, and whether an analyst is identified as a top stock picker by the Wall Street Journal. We find no evidence that compensation is related to earnings forecast accuracy. But consistent with prior studies, we find analyst turnover to be related to forecast accuracy, suggesting that analyst forecasting incentives are primarily termination based. Additional analyses indicate that “All‐Star” recognition proxies for buy‐side client votes on analyst research quality used to allocate commissions across banks and analysts. Taken as a whole, our evidence is consistent with analyst compensation being designed to reward actions that increase brokerage and investment‐banking revenues. To assess the generality of our findings, we test the same relations using compensation data from a second high‐status bank and obtain similar results.     

An Investment Management Methodology for Publicly Held Property/Casualty Insurers

Investment officers of publicly held property/casualty companies wrestle with the question of how best to contribute to shareholder value. Should they view themselves as managers of a closed‐end investment company that happens to be funded by insurance underwriting? Or should they instead be investing funds primarily to defease the firm's liabilities and thus support the operations of a company whose principal value derives from its insurance activities? The authors of this article suggest that the investment policy of most insurance companies should have two primary objectives: (1) immunizing insurance reserves with a fixed‐income portfolio and (2) earning “abnormal returns” on surplus in “a responsible and disciplined” way. The latter means adhering to an asset allocation approach that takes account of the risk‐reward tradeoffs presented by a broad variety of investment types as well as the accounting treatment of investment income. Both accounting and economic considerations lead the authors to suggest that after‐tax net investment income (“NII”), as defined by U.S. GAAP, is the best benchmark of performance. While focusing mainly on the fixed income part of the portfolio, the authors suggest active management and portfolio approaches that aim to produce a growing, but relatively stable NII. Consistent with GAAP's treatment of NII (which includes interest income but excludes most capital gains) as “recurring income,” the authors argue that the market appears to assign significantly higher multiples to NII than to other sources of reported income.     

“Rookies to the stock market: A portrait of new shareholders”

This study examines individuals entering the stock market, “rookies.” The study uses unique ownership data, containing investor holdings of all listed Swedish firms over the sample period from 2004 to 2010, to examine rookies’ stock portfolios. In addition, this study explores investor sophistication among rookies, based on individual characteristics and portfolio composition. Although the average shareholder is aging and leaving the stock market, this study shows there are signs of rejuvenation, with rookies entering the stock market. The results show that the majority of rookies hold under-diversified stock portfolios and choose one large firm as their first stock market investment. Rookie characteristics display gender differences, in which the average female rookie has lower income, is older, but holds a larger stock portfolio than her male counterpart.     

Nontraditional banking activities and bank failures during the financial crisis

We test whether income from nontraditional banking activities contributed to the failures of hundreds of U.S. commercial banks during the financial crisis. Estimates from a multi-period logit model indicate that the probability of distressed bank failure declined with pure fee-based nontraditional activities such as securities brokerage and insurance sales, but increased with asset-based nontraditional activities such as venture capital, investment banking and asset securitization. Banks that engaged in risky nontraditional activities also tended to take risk in their traditional lines of business, suggesting that deregulation was neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for bank failure during the crisis.     

Brand portfolio options for the UK retail banks

Following deregulation in the late 1980s, many financial service companies rapidly grew their product portfolios. Developing these extensive portfolios has raised complex issues for financial service companies regarding how the new products and services should be marketed and, in particular, how they should be branded. This paper seeks to identify the relevant issues concerning the marketing and branding of large portfolios of financial service products. Using the brand portfolio model developed by Aaker and Joachimsthaler,¹ the paper analyses the brand portfolio strategies adopted by the UK's leading retail banks (Barclays, Lloyds TSB, NatWest/RBS and HSBC). The paper concludes that given the complexity of branding as a concept and in predicting how consumers will respond, ultimately all financial services need to experiment more both with how individual brands are positioned and advertised and what portfolios are optimal.     

HOW MANY SMALL FIRMS ARE ENOUGH?

Individual investors are undiversified, holding on average less than four securities in their personal portfolios. The small firm literature focuses on CAPM (systematic risk, full diversification concept) premia, and the actual performance of small firm portfolios held by investors is overstated because of the presence of unsystematic risk. This paper illustrates the magnitudes of total risk for small and large firms, and the behavior of such measures as portfolio size is altered. Small firms contain more risk as shown by the finding that a diversified portfolio of small firms has greater variability than a single, typical large firm. While small firms outperform large firms, investors should be aware of the implications for small firm undiversified portfolios. Because small firms contain large amounts of unsystematic risk, diversification is important if investors are going to capture the small firm premia reported in the literature.     

基于期权平价原理的内幕交易管制设计

根据期权平价原理,股票、零息国债、欧式股票的买权与卖权等四类资产之间存在一种等价关系,因此每种资产都可由其他三个变量的投资组合来进行等价的表达。某些高管人员利用政府对分属于不同领域的投资组合的管制差异,以等价的期权投资组合替代股票交易从而进行变相内幕交易。中国证券监管部门有必要对管制制度安排进行优化,将衍生证券交易也纳入到内幕交易管制系统中来。     

On the importance of retail banking relationships

We use proprietary data to analyze the importance of retail banking relationships to commercial banks and their depositors when banks underwrite securities. We find lead underwriters’ retail customers benefit as they demand and end up with significantly more of the highly underpriced issues. We find it is actual underpricing beyond that predicted by grey markets that drive the differential demand from the lead bank retail clientele, suggesting that banks pass on information about underpriced initial public offerings to their retail depositors. We analyze banks’ incentives for such behavior and find evidence of banks benefiting through retail cross-selling—both brokerage accounts and consumer loans increase significantly.