Reconciling the irreconcilable: The global economy and the environment

This paper focusses on the relationship among structural adjustment policies and practices, the business activities of transnational corporations and what Robert Reich has called the coming irrelevance of corporate nationality. The argument presented is that the force of these combined factors makes environmental sustainability impossible.Dr. Deborah Poff is a professor of philosophy and the Dean of Arts and Science at the University of Northern British Columbia. Professor Poff has published extensively in the areas of feminism, equity, violence and applied ethics. She is the editor of theJournal of Business Ethics.     

Can there be a social contract with business?

Professor Donaldson in his book Corporations and Morality has attempted to use a social contract theory to develop moral principles for regulating corporate conduct. I argue in this paper that his attempt fails in large measure because what he refers to as a social contract theory is, in fact, a weak functionalist theory which provides no independent basis for evaluating business corporations. I further argue that given the nature of a morality based on contract and the nature of the modern corporation, it is highly unlikely that any plausible contract theory of business ethics can be developed.Dr. Hodapp is an associate professor of philosophy at The University of Northern Colorado where he teaches courses in business ethics and legal philosophy. He earned a doctorate at Washington University, St. Louis. Dr. Hodapp also has a law degree from The University of Denver and practices law with a Denver law firm specializing in management labor relations.     

Corporations,minors, and other innocents — A reply to R. E. Ewin

R. E. Ewin has argued that corporations are moral persons, but Ewin describes them as being unable to think or to act in virtuous and vicious ways. Ewin thinks that their impoverished emotional life would not allow them to act in these ways. In this brief essay I want to challenge the idea that corporations cannot act virtuously. I begin by examining deficiencies in Ewin's notion of corporate personhood. I argue that he effectively reduces corporations to the status of incompetent patients. I shall make use of a richer notion of corporate personhood as I explore the logical relationship between corporate action and the quality of the corporate emotional life. After discussing an alternate methodology for making moral assessments of action I consider briefly two corporate disasters: the crash on Mt. Erebus, the Imperial Foods plant fire. These cases are used to show the inadequacy of Ewin's thesis that only corporate managers are capable of displaying vice.P. Eddy Wilson taught philosophy full time for two years after graduation at the University of the South and he was a participant in Peter French's 1990 NEH Summer Seminar. He is currently employed as a member of the Department of Philosophy and Religion of Shaw University to teach philosophy at their High Point CAPE Center in High Point, North Carolina. He is interested in philosophy of religion, process philosophy, and ethics. Two of his articles have been accepted for publication by theJournal of Social Philosophy.     

Corporate property rights

Corporate property rights present an interesting challenge to the liberal conception of property rights, for it is unclear that the self-respect of individuals is promoted by the existence of a system of property rights for corporations. I argue that it is difficult even to identify who the individuals are who are the owners of large corporations, and why these individuals should be given the same claims, protections and immunities as other property rights holders since the liabilities of corporate property rights holders are not the same as of those, for instance, who own their own homes. In this paper I first try to understand who it is who owns the large corporation. Secondly, I show that the limited liability of these corporate property owners makes the justification of corporate property rights quite difficult, from the classical liberal perspective. I end with a few brief remarks on changes in legal policy which would be consistent with my arguments on the nature and justification of corporate property rights. Larry May is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Purdue University. He was awarded with the Exxon Education Foundation Grant during the Summer of 1982. His most important publications are Vicarious Agency and Corporate Responsibility (Philosophical Studies 43, pp. 69–82, 1983), On Conscience (American Philosophical Quarterly 20, pp. 57–67, 1983), Professional Actions and the Liabilities of Professional Associations (Business and Professional Ethics Journal 2, pp. 1–14, Fall 1982), and Sexual Harassment (Social Theory and Practice 6, pp. 249–280, 1980).     

Corporate democracy and the rights of shareholders

Some have argued that because of weaknesses in corporate democracy, there is widespread abuse of shareholders' rights in American securities markets. I describe a number of horror stories that shareholders might tell to support this claim. Then I argue that despite appearances to the contrary, there is not widespread abuse of shareholders' rights in American securities markets. This is because (i) corporations, when doing things that look abusive, are generally violating neither the legal rights nor the charter rights of shareholders and (ii) shareholders — in their role as shareholders — have no other rights than these. William B. Irvine is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Wright State University. He is the author of The Ethics of Investing, Journal of Business Ethics, vol. 6, no. 3.     

Can we afford international human rights?

In a recent important book,The Ethics of International Business, Tom Donaldson argues that multinational corporations (as well as individuals and nationstates) must, at a minimum, respect international human rights. For a purported right to be such a fundamental right it must satisfy three conditions. Donaldson calls the third condition the fairness-affordability condition. The affordability part of this condition holds that moral agents must be capable of paying for the burdens and responsibilities that a proposed human right would impose. If this is impossible, then the purported right is not an international human right.I argue that Donaldson's affordability condition is subject to four objections which reveal its untenability as one of the conditions upon which identification of international human rights must rest. I offer another way of treating problems of affordability and capability when it comes to such rights that all moral agents must respect.George G. Brenkert is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Tennessee/Knoxville. He has recently completed a book,Political Freedom, to be published by Routledge. His current research focuses on issues in business ethics.     

Dismemberment,divorce and hostile takeovers: A comment on corporate moral personhood

We can explain our intuitions about corporate takeover cases by appeal to Peter French's picture of the corporation as a moral person. He argues that corporations are persons in much the same sense as you and I, and are entitled to the same rights as humans. On this analysis, takeovers are murders, attempted murders, attempts to enslave, etc. I want to explore the consequences of this view for corporate takeovers. I shall argue that, though French can explain why our moral intuitions seem to arise in response to some concern about the corporations themselves, his analysis commits us to the wrong intuitions in some cases. I shall then offer an account of these intuitions which focuses on the character of corporations.Rita C. Manning is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at San Jose State University. She has published widely — on Artificial Intelligence, Ancient Philosophy, Ethics, Philosophy of Law, Social and Political Philosophy, and Informal Logic, in addition to Business Ethics. She is currently working on a Feminist critique of Moral Philosophy.     

Hostile takeovers and methods of defense: A stakeholder analysis

During the last decade, there has been a wave of mergers and hostile takeovers throughout the corporate world. This wave has been accompanied by various defensive strategies of managers to defend target firms from these takeovers. These include: greenmail, golden parachutes, and leveraged management buyouts. This paper examines hostile takeovers and defenses against them from a stakeholder point of view; that is, from a consideration of the various obligations a firm has to the different groups that have a stake in the firm. I conclude that many stakeholders, such as workers and communities, have unjustly suffered as a result of hostile takeovers and the associated defenses, and that their rights as stakeholders have been violated. Finally, I suggest some possible reforms to protect these stakeholders in the future.Ken Hanly is an Associate Professor of Philosophy, at Brandon University. His interests are in business ethics and social philosophy. Recent publications include The Ethics of Rent Control in JBE 10(3) (1991), and a review ofBusiness Ethics, by R. De George, inCanadian Philosophical Reviews, Vol xi(3) (June, 1991). An article on The Moral Responsibility of Corporations is upcoming in Dialogue.     

The moral responsibility of corporate executives for disasters

This paper examines whether or not senior corporate executives are morally responsible for disasters which result from corporate activities. The discussion is limited to the case in which the information needed to prevent the disaster is present within the corporation, but fails to reach senior executives. The failure of information to reach executives is usually a result of negative information blockage, a phenomenon caused by the differing roles of constraints and goals within corporations. Executives should be held professionally responsible not only for trying to prevent negative information blockage, but for succeeding. It is concluded that executives are professionally responsible for fulfilling their moral obligation to prevent disasters.John D. Biship has a Ph.D. in moral philosophy from Edinburgh University (1979), and an MBA from McMaster University. He has worked for several years for two multi-national computer corporations. In 1987 he read a paper on Greed; The Limits of Selfishness in a Free Enterprise Economy at Trent University.     

Drug testing and corporate responsibility: The “ought implies can” argument

Most of the debate about drug testing in the workplace has focused on the right to privacy. Proponents of testing have had to tackle difficult questions concerning the nature, extent, and weight of the privacy rights of employees. This paper examines a different kind of argument — the claim that because corporations are responsible for harms committed by employees while under the influence of drugs, they are entitled to test for drug use. This argument has considerable intuitive appeal, because it seems, at least at first glance, to bypass the issue of privacy rights altogether. The argument turns, not on rights, but on the nature and conditions of responsibility. We may therefore call it an ought implies can argument.In spite of its initial appeal, however, the argument does not succeed in circumventing the claims of privacy rights. Even responsibility for the actions of others does not entitle us to do anything at all to control their behavior; we must look to rights, among other things, to determine what sorts of controls are morally permissible. In addition, the argument rests on unjustified assumptions about the connection between drug testing and the prevention of drug-related harm. Jennifer Moore is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Delaware. She does teaching and research in business ethics and business law and is co-editor of the anthology, Business Ethics: Readings and Cases in Corporate Morality, published by McGraw-Hill.     

The individual investor in securities markets: An ethical analysis

In this paper we consider whether one type of individual investor, which we call at risk investors, should be denied access to securities markets to prevent them from suffering serious financial harm. We consider one kind of paternalistic justification for prohibiting at risk investors from participating in securities markets, and argue that it is not successful. We then argue that restricting access to markets is justified in some circumstances to protect the rights of at risk investors. We conclude with some suggestions about how this might be done.Robert E. Frederick is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Bentley College and Assistant Director of the Center for Business Ethics. Before coming to Bentley College he worked at a large financial institution for nine years, where he was Vice President for Administrative Services. Dr. Frederick has authored or co-authored over fifteen articles and has co-edited four books. He has consulted on business ethics for several major corporations. W. Michael Hoffman is the founding Director of the Center for Business Ethics, and Professor and Chair of the Department of Philosophy at Bentley College, Waltham, MA. He was President of the Society for Business Ethics in 1989. He has authored or edited ten books, including Business Ethics: Readings and Cases in Corporate Morality (McGraw-Hill, 1984; 1990) and published over thirty articles. He has consulted on business ethics for many major corporations and institutions of higher learning, and he serves on the board of several journals.     

Unredistributable corporate moral responsibility

Certain cases of corporate action seem especially resistant to a shared moral evaluation. Conservatives may argue that if bad intentions cannot be demonstrated, corporations and their managers are not blame-worthy, while liberals may insist that the results of corporate actions were predictable and so somebody must be to blame. Against this background, the theory that sometimes a corporation's moral responsibility cannot be redistributed, even in principle, to the individuals involved, seems quite attractive.This doctrine of unredistributable corporate moral responsibility (UCMR) is, however, ultimately indefensible. I show this in several steps. After first locating UCMR in the context of the evolving debate about corporate moral agency, the paper reexamines cases cited in defense of UCMR and takes up the attempt to defend it by identifying corporate moral agency with corporate practices. A further section explores the claim that UCMR is a convention distinct from, yet compatible with, traditional natural notions of responsibility. The final section develops a notion of combined akratic agency to provide an alternate explanation, compatible with rejection of UCMR, of the phenomena which make the doctrine attractive. Jan Edward Garrett is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Western Kentucky University, with major interests in business ethics, the metaphysics of social organizations, and ancient philosophy. He has published on Aristotle's conception of techne (craft) in The Modern Schoolman (1987) and his article Persons, Kinds and Corporations: An Aristotelian View has appeared in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. He attended Peter French's NEH Summer Seminar on Corporate Responsibility in 1983.     

Do corporations have moral rights?

My aim in this paper is to explore the notion that corporations have moral rights within the context of a constitutive rules model of corporate moral agency. The first part of the paper will briefly introduce the notion of moral rights, identifying the distinctive feature of moral rights, as contrasted with other moral categories, in Vlastos' terms of overridingness. The second part will briefly summarize the constitutive rules approach to the moral agency of corporations (à la French, Smith, Ozar) and pose the question of the paper. The third part will argue that, since the moral agency of corporations is dependent on the choices of those whose acceptence of the relevant rules constitutes the corporation as a moral agent, the rights of corporations are conventional; that is, they exist because they are so created. Thus, as a first answer, corporations do not have moral rights. But this raises a further question which we must explore. Once a corporation has been constituted, by the acceptance of the relevant rules by the relevant persons, does the corporation then have rights which endure? Can those who have constituted a corporation with certain rights morally change or cancel those rights in medias res without doing some sort of moral violence to the corporation? Do corporations at least have a moral right to persist in the conventional rights with which they were constituted? The balance of the paper will explore this question. I shall speak of the overriding character of a corporation's claim that its conventional rights persist, and also the important way in which such a moral claim is non-conventional, if such a claim can be made at all. But I shall argue in conclusion that corporations do not have such a right. But I shall also argue that those persons whose acts have originally constituted the corporation as a moral agent may well have rights which would be violated if the conventional rights of the corporation were changed or terminated without their participation.     

Technological risk and small probabilities

Many scientists, businessmen, and government regulators believe that the criteria for acceptable societal risk are too stringent. Those who subscribe to this belief often accept the view which I call the probability-threshold position. Proponents of this stance maintain that society ought to ignore very small risks, i.e., those causing an average annual probability of fatality of less than 10^–6.After examining the three major views in the risk-evaluation debate, viz., the probability-threshold position, the zero-risk position, and the weighted-risk position, I focus on the arguments for the first of these views, since it is the position which currently undergirds most public policy (especially in the U.S.) regarding acceptable risk. After analyzing Arrow's argument from decision theory, Comar's and Gibson's argument from ontology, and Starr's and Whipple's argument from epistemology, I conclude that these defenses of the probability-threshold position err in a variety of ways. Most commonly, they fail because they tacitly accept the assumption that magnitude of probability, alone, provides a sufficient condition for judging the acceptability of a given risk. In the light of these errors, I suggest that it might be more desirable for risk assessors, decision theorists, and policymakers to weight various risk-cost-benefit parameters according to alternative ethical criteria, rather than to evaluate risks solely in terms of mathematical considerations. Kristin Shrader-Frechette is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Florida. Previously she was Professor at the University of California, Santa Barbara. She has held an NSF Scholar's Award in History and Philosophy of Science, a Woodrow Wilson Fellowship and an NSF Fellowship. She is the author of four books: Nuclear Power & Public Policy; Environmental Ethics; Science Policy, Ethics and Economic Methodology and Risk Analysis & Scientific Method. She also has published about 50 articles on philosophy of physics, philosophy of economics, and technology assessment and public policy.     

The moral responsibilities of stockholders

This paper attempts to address the question of the ethical obligations of stockholders. Having presumed a rather narrow conception of the nature of property, and citing the limitations on stockholders rights and/or power, some have suggested that stockholders have no significant moral responsibilities. Others say that stockholders have moral responsibilities which they derive from the fact that the shareholders of a corporation are the legal owners of it. This article first of all, contests the view that stockholders have no responsibilities regarding the moral or immoral activities of the corporation in which they invest. It will be maintained, however, that while stockholders have moral responsibilities to monitor corporate decisions and perhaps, to actively try to influence the corporation to act morally, such ethical obligations cannot be derived solely from the stockholders' legal ownership of the corporation. The true ground of the moral obligations of stockholders is a social/political one and one which embraces a broadened conception of the nature of property. Richard J. Klonoski is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Scranton. His most important publications are: Being and Time Said All at Once: An Analysis of Section 42, Tulane Studies in Philosophy: The Thought of Martin Heidegger 32; and Setting and Characterization in Plato's Euthyphro, Dialogos 19.     

The Texaco incident

The topic of this paper concerns corporate responsibility and worker safety. In particular it focuses on the notions of willing and intending and how these relate to risk-taking in the workplace. I discuss the metaphysical status of the corporation, the distinction between willing and intending and the motivations of each, and Austin's distinction between accidents and mistakes in light of a single industrial accident which occurred at the Texaco Oil Refinery, Port Arthur, Texas, in October, 1982. My aim is to argue that corporations do not alleviate themselves from moral responsibility in the workplace solely because they might not intend to produce harm in a given situation. Joan Catherine Whitman Hoff is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Bentley College. She has been given the NEH 1983 Summer Seminar for College Teachers award and the Northern Kentucky University 1985 Faculty Summer Fellowship. Her most important publications, with J. Ferrante Wallace, Women in Sports and The Black Athlete, appear in Sports History: Selected Materials from Colleges and Universities (eds. D. A. Novern and L. E. Ziewarz).Many sincere thanks to the NEH for having provided the time and money for this research, to Dr. Peter French for his helpful seminar, and to Mr. Peter Applebome for his stimulating comments.     

Global distributive justice and the corporate duty to aid

This article challenges an argument from Tom Donaldson's recent bookThe Ethics of International Business with a claim that distributive justice, deemed in many circles to impose a duty of mutual aid on individuals and nations, establishes a basis for holding multinational corporations to such a duty as well. The root idea I advocate is that Rawls' theory of justice can be deployed — beyond its original intent yet in line with its spirit — to underwrite aprima facie obligation of international business to render aid to ameliorate suffering on behalf of the inhabitants of developing countries in which they operate.Kevin T. Jackson is Assistant Professor of Ethics in the Department of Legal and Ethical Studies at the Graduate School of Business, Fordham University in New York City. He holds a J.D. degree and a Ph.D. degree in Philosophy. Formerly a Legal Aid attorney, Visiting Assistant Professor at Georgetown University, and a business consultant, Dr. Jackson currently teaches courses in business ethics and legal philosophy.     

Power and values in corporate life

The role of power and its relation to values has become a topic of growing interest in business ethics as well as in the literature of management and the sociology of organizations. Though there is more interest in the role and potential for abuse of power in corporations, the concept of power drawn from classical political theory and initial behavioral studies of power in organizations is inadequate for understanding the place, complexity and ethics of power in the corporation. Analyses of power drawn from recent political theory can provide a more fine-grained and illuminating understanding of power than has been available from classical political theory and social science literature. I distinguish three approaches: the behavioral model commonly employed, the ideological model which comes out of the political theory of certain neo-Marxists, and what I call the disciplinary model drawn form Michel Foucault's analysis of modern forms of power. I suggest areas of working life and ethical issues about the relation between power and values that can be illuminated by these alternate analyses. David R. Hiley is Associate Professor at the Philosophy Department of Memphis State University. His articles have been published in several journals and he has recently written a book: Philosophy in Question: Essays on a Pyrrhouian Theme (forthcoming, University of Chicago Press).     

Rational interaction for moral sensitivity: A postmodern approach to moral decision-making in business

Moral dissensus is a distinct feature of our time. This is not only true of our post-modern culture in general, but also of business culture specifically. In this paper I start by explaining how modernist rationality has produced moral dissensus without offering any hope of bringing an end to it in the foreseeable future. Opting for a form of post-modernist rationality as the only viable way of dealing with moral dissensus, I then make an analysis of a number of ways proposed by both specialists in the field of business ethics, as well as philosophers to deal with moral decision-making in this situation of moral dissensus. The conclusion reached is that none of these attempts succeeds in coming to terms with moral dissensus. I then formulate an alternative approach to moral decision-making which I call: Rational interaction for moral sensitivity. After explaining this approach, I defend it against some of the most obvious objections that might be raised against it in a business environment.

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Characteristics and practices of “Christian-based” companies

There is a sizeable group of self-described Christian companies which have declared their belief in the successful merging of biblical principles with business activities. As these companies have become more visible, an increasing number of anecdotal newspaper and magazine articles about these companies have appeared. Surprisingly, no rigorous research has been conducted prior to our recent study. This article provides national estimates of the size and predominant characteristics of self-identified Christian companies. In addition, the study investigated the types of relationships these companies maintained with their employees, customers, communities, and suppliers.Nabil Ibrahim is an Assistant Professor of Business Administration at Augusta College, Augusta, Georgia. He has published articles, case studies, and professional papers in the areas of business policy and strategy.Dr. Leslie W. Rue is Professor of Management in the College of Business Administration at Georgia State University. He is the author of over forty articles, cases, and papers that have appeared in academic and practitioner journals. He has coauthored eight textbooks in the field of management.Dr. Patricia P. McDougall is an Assistant Professor of Management at Georgia State University. Her research focuses primarily on new venture strategies and international entrepreneurship and has been published in several academic journals. Dr. G. Robert Grenne is an Associate Professor of Management at Old Dominion University, Norfolk, Virginia where he teaches strategic management and entrepreneurship. He is a Contributing Editor to Spiritual Fitness in Business and has published articles in various academic and practitioner journals.