FDI and environmental regulation: pollution haven or a race to the top?

Increasing foreign direct investment (FDI) flows accompanied with globalization have raised the concern of a “race to the bottom” phenomenon in environmental protection. This is because footloose investors of “dirty” industries tend to relocate to “pollution havens” of the developing world. However when pollutant is transboundary (as in the case of greenhouse gases), the source country’s incentive to relocate and the recipient country’s willingness to host such industries are not straightforward. This article studies the relationship between FDI and environmental regulation using a North–South market share game model in a two-country setting, when pollution is transboundary. Contrary to the pollution haven hypothesis, our model shows that if market sizes of the two countries are small, FDI will raise the emission standard of the host country, resulting in a “race-to-the-top” phenomenon; but if market sizes are large enough, FDI will not change the emission standard of the South (from its laxest form), a finding that is consistent with the “regulatory chill” argument. Equilibrium FDI is contingent on the fixed cost of FDI, as the traditional proximity–concentration tradeoff theory predicts.     

The political economy of constitutional restraints

Constitutions are multidimensional objects with non-trivial implications on the structure of the political environment and, therefore, on the policy outcomes. This paper models constitutions as sets of “restraints” on the authority’s choice freedom (absolute and democracy restraints). We argue that even if both kinds of restraints seem to be serving the same purpose (increase social welfare), “democracy restraints” prolong the “life” of a constitution while “absolute restraints” not. We moreover use the proposed way of modelling constitutions in order to explain the dominance of intermediate (in terms of tightness of “democracy restraints”) constitutions in the real world.     

Is H.A. Simon a theoretician of decentralized planning? A comparison with F.A. Hayek on planning,market, and organizations

Herbert A. Simon acknowledged Friedrich A. Hayek as a founder of the notion of bounded rationality; yet Simon considered Hayek’s perspective incomplete, and, more in general, their views on market mechanisms, planning, and organization exhibit considerable differences. The comparison between these authors sheds light on Simon’s interpretation of planning, which emerges within his theory of organization (and not in traditional debates on socialism). Contrary to Hayek, he maintained that planning, in specific circumstances, is more advantageous than the market; and in both administration and organization, it involves a decentralized structure based on near independent sub-units. Decentralization of decisions also appears in social planning, which evolves through continuous interactions among planners (i.e., agents and institutions), and it is a process connoted by the absence of “fixed goals”. Finally, Simon defined modern economies more in terms of “organizational economies” than in those of “market economies” and this highlights a further difference with respect to the Austrian economist. This leads to analysis of the nature of organizations as hierarchical and “near-decomposable” structures, which refers to Simon’s theory of complexity and gives an epistemological explanation to the relation between centralization and decentralization.     

Specialists and citizens all: A reply to Boettke,Koppl, and Holcombe

Peter Boettke (2007) argues that economists need not act pluralistically in order for pluralism to thrive in the marketplace of economic ideas. From a market process perspective, Boettke sees intellectual diversity and openness as catallactic outputs, not inputs—emergent by-products of academic specialization and trade. To expect individual scholars to behave in a pluralistic manner is unnecessary and “completely inappropriate” since it detracts from their central task: “to commit themselves to an approach and pursue it doggedly, even in the face of great doubt and resistance by one’s peers” (Boettke 2007). This paper proposes a Smithian revision of Boettke’s position. The author argues that scholarly pluralism is best understood as a constitutional rule of academic life—a virtue ethic that promotes learning and intellectual freedom by mitigating tyranny and autarky in the republic of science. Drawing from the writings of Adam Smith, Friedrich Hayek, Deirdre McCloskey, Bruce Caldwell, James Buchanan, Don Lavoie, and Boettke himself, the author argues that scholarly pluralism has been, and continues to be, a necessary condition for the flourishing of Austrian economists as free, responsible, efficacious thinkers.     

Corporate social responsibility and the ‘game of catallaxy’: the perspective of constitutional economics

The paper examines the issue of corporate social responsibility (CSR) from the perspective of constitutional economics, focusing on the distinction between a political community’s constitutional choice of the rules of the “market game,” and the market players’ sub-constitutional choice of strategies within these rules. Three versions of CSR-demands are identified and discussed, a “soft,” a “hard”, and a “radical” version. The soft version is concerned with the issue of how “socially responsible” corporations ought to play the market game within existing rules. The hard version is about how the rules of the market ought to be changed in order to induce “socially responsible” corporate behavior. And the radical version questions the compatibility of CSR and the logic of the market game, calling in effect for adopting some alternative economic regime.

The product innovation process and GDP dynamics

In this paper, we explain GDP dynamics through an analysis of the forces that modify the structure of the economy. These forces are represented by the entry of new firms and product innovations. Our model is inspired by Bak’s sand pile model, and the entry of a new firm or innovation is comparable to dropping a grain of sand in Bak’s model. The resulting model involves the insights of both Keynes and Schumpeter. It could be defined as Keynesian because the aggregate output is demand driven. That said, the model can mainly be labeled as Schumpeterian for several reasons: (i) innovations have a key role, (ii) credit is involved in supporting the innovation process, (iii) innovations partially destroy old industries, and finally (iv) without innovations, the system gradually approaches its stationary state. In this simple model, the change in the number of sectors (products) of the economy is the decisive factor with the following results: (1) the aggregate production has an increasing trend; (2) fluctuations are asymmetric; (3) recessions have a “creative destruction” explanation; (4) “classical” cycles are gradually replaced by “growth” cycles.     

Menger’s causal-realist analysis in modern economics

Carl Menger pioneered a unique theoretical research method which served as the foundation of the early Austrian school of economics. Menger’s causal-realist analysis was revived and formalized just before and after World War 2 by Ludwig von Mises as the “praxeological method.” Murray Rothbard, a student of von Mises’, utilized the method in formulating a comprehensive system of economic theory in his treatise, Man Economy, and State published in the early 1960s. Rothbard’s treatise became the foundational work for the “Austrian revival” in the 1970s. In this paper, we address several issues related to the role of Menger’s method in modern economics. First, ample evidence is adduced that von Mises and Rothbard each expressed a surprising ambivalence with respect to his own work in relation to the early Austrian school. Second, von Mises viewed Rothbard’s treatise as beginning a new epoch in economic theory. Third, contrary to the conventional view, a careful analysis of his treatise shows that Rothbard drew heavily on the contemporary neoclassical literature in developing his theoretical system and that his intent was never to set up a heterodox movement to challenge mainstream economics. Rather, his main aim was to consistently apply the praxeological method to rescue economics from what he considered the alien methodology of positivism, which was imported into economics after World War 2. Lastly, I will tentatively suggest that the term “Austrian economics” as the designation for the intellectual movement that coalesced in the early 1970s may now have outlived its usefulness. This term, which initially served an important strategic purpose in promoting the revival of the broad Mengerian tradition, may have come to obscure the meaning and importance of the praxeological research paradigm that Menger originated.     

Social Change versus Transition: The Political Economy of Institutions and Transitional Economies

The “transition” process in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (EEFSU) was one of the most dramatic non-marginal adjustments in economic systems ever experienced. During the transition process, elements of centrally administered socialism and embryonic market relations co-existed. This made traditional economic theory irrelevant. The purpose of this paper is to discover policy concerns and outcomes that orthodox “transition” literature ignores. Stanfield’s contribution to the economic literature, a cultural-holistic approach of radical institutionalism, makes it possible to understand the “transition” process from a new and more enlightened perspective. Stanfield provides a better understanding of the complexities involved, since the nature of change in the EEFSU is social and ever-lasting, not an end-state in the form of “transition”. Students of transition and of international development would benefit from this novel approach, which dismisses “transition” and substitutes “social change”, as the proper designation and manifestation of what actually took place in EEFSU.     

Downstream price-cap regulation and upstream market power

Under “partial separation,” it is increasingly common for a utility’s upstream affiliate (e.g., an electric generation supplier) to be unregulated while its downstream affiliate (e.g., the distribution company offering retail service) is subject to regulation. When choosing the optimal form of downstream regulation, regulators may be confronted with the potential exercise of market power by the upstream affiliate. This paper finds that the imposition of a downstream price cap with an appropriate profit-sharing rate can eliminate the upstream affiliate’s exercise of market power. However, it is less desirable to fully mitigate affiliate market power when upstream rivals also behave strategically.      

Coping with Preference Anomalies in Cost–Benefit Analysis: A Market-Simulation Approach

This paper proposes a methodological strategy for cost–benefit analysis (CBA) which does not require the assumption that individuals’ preferences satisfy standard coherence conditions, and so renders CBA immune to the problems generated by preference anomalies. The proposal treats CBA as an exercise in market simulation, based on the measurement of surplus. Anomalies occur when surplus measurements vary according to the hypothetical payment mechanism used. In such cases, the mechanism that is the “closest market analogue” should be used. This approach is used to resolve problems associated with some familiar anomalies, including inconsistencies between “citizen” and “consumer” valuations, and endowment effects. JEL classifications: D61, D63, Q51     

Global environment and dynamic games of environmental policy in an international duopoly

This paper examines a differential game model of international pollution control in which polluting oligopolists compete in a third country market. Two alternative policy instruments (emission taxes and command-and-control regulations) are considered. A tougher emission policy in the home country enhances the foreign firm’s competitiveness because of the static “rent-shifting” effect. The foreign country also enjoys a future improvement of the global environmental quality by “free riding” on the home country’s emission reduction effort. Because of these strategic effects, the levels of environmental policy determined in the noncooperative policy game are distorted away from the socially optimal level. Moreover, the emission tax game produces a more distortionary outcome than that in the command-and-control game; it generates more pollution and lower welfare.      

Different employment of capitals in vertically integrated sectors: Smith after the Austrians

The Austrian notion of stages of production and the related principle of the greater productivity of roundabout methods, plus the neo-Austrian notions of vertical integration and vertical division of labour, are utilized in this paper in an attempt to reconstruct Smith’s convoluted arguments on the different employment of capitals in chapter 5, book 2, of the Wealth of Nations. Smith’s arguments are first clarified in the light of the two concepts of capital (money capital and productive capital), of the two aspects of productive labour (living labour and dead labour) and of the two viewpoints (of an individual and of society) on which Smith’s theory is based. The results of this clarification are then used to prove that, independently of Smith’s own words but in consistency with his theory, the notions of “quantity” and “productivity” of productive labour have a “vertical”, as well as a “horizontal”, dimension so that they fit both the input–output scheme and the Austrian framework of time-consuming methods of production.     

Worksharing and Access Discounts in the Postal Sector with Asymmetric Information*

This paper analyzes the optimal worksharing and access amounts granted to mailers and entrants in a liberalized postal sector when there is asymmetric information about the Post Office’s (PO) costs. I show that when the regulator is unable to ascertain which part of the total cost of sorting has to be attributed to each sorting facility, the optimal “access discount” given to entrants is set in a pro-competitive way. This facilitates the entry of firms that are less efficient than the PO. However, the optimal “worksharing discount” may prevent the entry of mailers that are more efficient than the PO.     

Sustainable recursive social welfare functions

What ethical criterion for intergenerational justice should be adopted, e.g., when faced with the task of managing the global environment? Koopmans’ axiomatization of discounted utilitarianism is based on seemingly compelling conditions, yet this criterion leads to hard-to-justify outcomes. The present analysis considers a class of sustainable recursive social welfare functions within Koopmans’ general framework. This class is axiomatized by means of a weak equity condition (“Hammond Equity for the Future”) and general existence is established. Any member of the class satisfies the key axioms of Chichilnisky’s “sustainable preferences”. The analysis singles out one of Koopmans’ original separability conditions (his Postulate 3′a), here called “Independent Present”, as particularly questionable from an ethical perspective.     

A report on the development of China’s market economy 2005

This paper dicusses on the issue of the development of China’s market economy from six aspects. (1) Basic Content and Conclusions on the development of China’s market economy. (2) Further progress in building market-oriented economy in China. (3) Assessment of the degree of market economy development in China. (4) New progress in 2004 in developing market economy in China. (5) A general analysis of twelve key questions concerning market economy. (6) Resolution of the “non-market economy” issue: a win-win option. Notes: This project was presided by LI Xiaoxi and finished by Institute of Economic and Resources Management, Beijing Normal University.     

Economics,Democracy, and the Distribution of Capital Ownership

This article holds that widespread, practical access to capital acquisition is essential for sustainable widespread economic prosperity and democracy. The founders of the U.S.A. agreed that sustainable democracy required widespread ownership of land to provide a viable earning capacity sufficient to support robust participation in democratic government. The importance of widespread land ownership to individual prosperity and sustainable democracy was supported not only by the prevailing philosophical views of property, it was also apparent to the common man and woman. Compared to Europe, America offered widespread access to land ownership, higher wages, better work conditions, cheaper staples and greater individual freedom, equal opportunity, prosperity, and political participation. This conviction that widespread access to ownership is a necessary condition for widespread prosperity and sustainable democracy continued throughout most of the nineteenth century, but today public discourse reveals virtually no trace of this once universally held opinion. This article suggests that the disappearance of this conviction can be traced to an erroneous view shaped by neoclassical economics and Keynesian economics. According to this view, (1) the disappearance of the American frontier and industrialization made the goal of widespread capital ownership either impractical or of little or no economic significance and (2) by way of technological advance, sufficient earning capacity and consumer demand to promote growth and sustain democracy can be achieved, without widespread ownership, primarily through jobs and welfare. Although differing in many respects, both mainstream schools, along with Adam Smith’s classical economics, share one common but unstated economic assumption: the broader distribution of capital acquisition (in itself) has no fundamental relationship to the fuller employment of people and capital, the broader distribution of greater individual earning capacity, and growth. Contemporary thinking, shaped by these economic schools, also tacitly assumes that widespread capital ownership is not essential for the sustainable individual earning capacity needed to support robust democracy. This erroneous “ownership-neutrality assumption” (1) contradicts both the views of America’s founders and the colonial experience, and (2) provides theoretical justification for structuring capital markets and capital acquisition transactions to unfairly and dysfunctionally favor existing owners at the expense of broader ownership distribution, more widely shared prosperity, greater efficiency, ecologically friendly growth, and a vital democracy. America’s conscientious founders would be shocked by the diminished importance of the distribution of ownership in the mainstream analysis of prices, efficiency, production, growth, and democracy. Rather than enhancing democracy, they would view the “ownership-neutrality assumption” of mainstream economics as contributing to its deterioration and corruption. They would openly search for economic analysis built on an alternate assumption more consistent with their understanding of the requisite conditions for sustainable democracy. This article advances an economic analysis that suspends the ownership-neutrality assumption, replaces it with a “broader-ownership-growth assumption,” and suggests a voluntary market strategy for substantially broadening capital ownership, enhancing individual earning capacity, and providing the widespread economic prosperity needed for robust democracy.     

Military Expenditures and Industrialization in Africa

My purpose here is to strengthen Karl Polanyi’s work through critique of and extension to abductive processes. Polanyi presented history woven into a new paradigm for analysis of socioeconomic systems, demonstrated discovery similar to abductive processes, and extended abduction into a holistic context. One of Polanyi’s most important contributions to socioeconomic analysis is the explanation of three integrated network models of socioeconomic reciprocity. They are coadjuvancy, redistribution, and market exchange. Polanyi extended abductive reasoning in two ways. First, he extended it beyond the cognitive logic of a person to inferences and societal belief changes of institutions. Second, he showed that, in the real world, beliefs are not only fixed like an abductive process, they are fixed in law. Throughout Polanyi’s historical presentation, market beliefs are being revised, thus serving as a demonstration of the abductive process. I make both positive and negative critique of a number of Polanyi’s concepts, with special attention to reciprocity, the double movement, and freedom. This critique and abduction extension strengthens Polanyi’s paradigm for future socioeconomic analysis with his integrative network models.     

In search of an evolutionary edge: trading with a few, more, or many

Consider a population of farmers who live around a lake. Each farmer engages in trade with his m adjacent neighbors, where m is termed the “span of interaction.” Trade is governed by a prisoner’s dilemma “rule of engagement.” A farmer’s payoff is the sum of the payoffs from the m prisoner’s dilemma games played with his ^m/₂^m/_2 neighbors to the left, and with his ^m/₂^m/_2 neighbors to the right. When a farmer dies, his son takes over. The son who adheres to his father’s span of interaction decides whether to cooperate or defect by considering the actions taken and the payoffs received by the most prosperous member of the group comprising his father and his father’s m trading partners. Under a conventional structure of payoffs, it is shown that a large span of interaction is detrimental to the long-run coexistence of cooperation and defection, and conditions are provided under which the social outcome associated with the expansion of trade when individuals trade with a few is better than that when they trade with many. Under the stipulated conditions it is shown, by means of a static comparative analysis of the steady state configurations of the farmer population, that an expansion of the market can be beneficial in one context, detrimental in another.     

Labor theory of value and the uncertainty in capitalist economy

This article aims to offer a reply to Steedman’s critique of Marx’s labor theory of value. Although this critique having been there for about three decades, the anti-critiques from Marxists are up to date flawed with fatal limitation, losing sight of an important dimension of labor theory of value, i.e., without taking it as a theoretical tool of understanding the uncertainty rooted in capitalist mode of production. The first part of this article reviews the controversy initiated by Steedman. Part 2 discusses Marx’s dual theory of market value and Rubin’s interpretation. Our view is that, if Rubin’s interpretation is accepted, a refutation of Steedman’s critique towards Marx will be impossible. Part 3 of this article explores the possible reconstruction of market value in the perspective of the dynamics in the pivoting of market value. We concludes that, the relationship between the standard condition of production and value is not, as argued by Steedman, of deterministic and one-directional character. For Marx, labor theory of value is applied to analyze the uncertain relation between the means and the end, the condition and the result of capitalist production. Meanwhile, another reply is attempted towards the negative comment on labor theory of value made by contemporary evolutionary economist such as Hodgson. In our view, Marx’s labor theory of value is not irrelevant as claimed by Hodgson to the main topics of evolutionary economics such as variety and “natural selection.” It is through labor theory of value that Marx explains the co-evolution of technology and economy.     

Conditional correlations in the returns on oil companies stock prices and their determinants

The identification of the forces that drive stock returns and the dynamics of their associated volatilities is a major concern in empirical economics and finance. This analysis is extremely important for determining optimal hedging strategies. This paper investigates the stock prices’ returns and their financial risk factors for several integrated oil companies, namely Bp (BP), Chevron-Texaco (CVX), Eni (ENI), Exxon-Mobil (XOM), Royal Dutch (RD) and Total-Fina Elf (TFE). We measure the actual co-risk in stock returns and their determinants “within” and “between” the different oil companies, using multivariate cointegration techniques in modelling the conditional mean, as well as multivariate GARCH models for the conditional variances. The distinguishing features of this paper are: (i) focus on the determinants of the market value of each company using the cointegrated VAR/VECM methodology; (ii) specification of the conditional variances of VECM residuals with the Constant Conditional Correlation (CCC) multivariate GARCH model of Bollerslev [(1990) Review of Economics and Statistics 72:498–505] and the Dynamic Conditional Correlation (DCC) multivariate GARCH model of Engle [(2002) Journal of Business and Economic Statistics 20:339–350]; (iii) discussion of the performance of optimal hedge ratios calculated with the DCC estimates. The “within” and “between” DCC indicate time-varying interdependence between stock return volatilities and their determinants. Moreover, DCC models are shown to produce more accurate hedging strategies.