增长失衡与政府责任:基于社会性支出角度的分析

There exists a kind of growth imbalance in China’s current development process, which is essentially characterized by the imbalance between the nation’s wealth and the people’s welfare. This paper points out that growth imbalance results mostly from insufficient government social spending on people’s welfare. Consequently, the government should shoulder the basic responsibility for the provision of education, health and social security, quicken the transformation of government expenditure structure and increase the share of social spending, in order to improve the people’s welfare and achieve the rebalancing of growth. The increase in social spending can also promote the accumulation of human capital, which will help the conversion of economic growth pattern and the realization of sustainable and healthy economic development. Translated from Jingji Yanjiu 经济研究 (Economic Research Journal), 2006, (10): 4–17     

Sociology of economics or sociology of economy? theoretical-methodological arguments for sociological economics

This paper makes a proposal for reintroducing sociological or social economics into contemporary economic science. Such a reintroduction is proposed to be substantive, by analyzing the social structuring of the economy, and formal, by including sociological/social economics in the current (JEL) classification system of economic disciplines (code A.15). Both epistemological and ontological arguments can be presented to support the proposal. Epistemological arguments invoke the presence of essential components of sociological economics in the development of economic thought, and ontological arguments stress the role of social factors in economic life. In this paper I present primarily epistemological (theoretical-methodological) arguments for sociological economics, and secondarily ontological ones. I show that the present designation, sociology of economics, is something different from sociological or social economics in that the former refers to economic epistemology (knowledge) and the latter to economic ontology (reality). I conclude that, in addition to a sociology of economic science, we need a sociology of economic life. There is nothing surprising in the habit of economists to invade the sociological field. A major part of their work—practically the whole of what they have to say on institutions and on the…[social] forces which shape economic behavior—inevitably overlaps the sociologist’s preserves. In consequence, a no man’s land or everyman’s land has developed that might conveniently be called economic sociology … [or sociological economics] (Schumpeter 1956:134). The author is grateful to two anonymous referees for their constructive comments on an earlier version of this article.     

Social capital and social economics

The “discovery” of social capital in the early 1990s led to an upsurge of research into the economic impact of social cohesion and governmental effectiveness. This paper outlines key developments in the social capital literature over the past 13 years. It then examines theory and evidence of the links between social cohesion, quality of governance, economic performance and human welfare. The literature indicates that social capital makes a measurable contribution to economic development and overall wellbeing, particularly in developing countries. Partly in response to this emerging body of evidence, there has been increased interest in the application of community development principles to economic development initiatives. This paper argues that the advent of social capital theory represents a partial convergence between social economics and mainstream economics, and signifies an increased acceptance that economic activity cannot be meaningfully “disembedded” from social and political context.     

Out of a slave contract: the analysis of pre-Hobbesian anarchists in the Old Testament

Buchanan’s constitutional economics takes social conflict (the ‘Hobbesian jungle’, ‘Hobbesian anarchy’) as the starting point for the analysis of social contract. Buchanan argues that in the presence of social conflict either some social contract (e.g. some system of formal laws) or some generally shared moral precepts are needed to resolve the predicament that social conflict presents. The present paper argues that a social conflict model also served the Old Testament as an analytical starting point. However, contrary to both standard theological interpretation and Buchanan’s explicit claims, I argue that the Old Testament had already made an attempt to model ‘Hobbesian anarchy’ in order to approach social conflict in an essentially modern, non-metaphysical manner. I argue that figures like Adam and Eve or Jacob, in the tradition of Hobbesian anarchists, questioned godly authority and the associated imposed, authoritarian, metaphysical social contract. In this way, one can detect a modern, contractarian constitutional economics in pre-Enlightenment literature (and in Genesis, specifically) in direct contrast to Buchanan’s claims.     

The approach to transforming the traditional agricultural economy: a research on the multiple paths of poverty alleviation and transformation in rural China

Transforming a traditional agricultural economy into a modern economy is one of the main themes in economic development. Through theoretical and empirical analysis, this paper finds out that the key to transformation is to raise the economic value of people, to improve human capital investment and to match the stocks of physical and human capital. China’s rural economy is on the edge of economic take-off, and different zones may pursue different paths for transformation. The source of rural poverty is not the scarcity of income or consumption, but the deficiency of education, social security, medical care and economic opportunity, which we define as “capability poverty”. __________ Translated from The Journal of World Economy (世界经济), 2005,(2) (in Chinese)     

Buchanan’s constitutional political economy: exchange vs. choice in economics and in politics

This article discusses the methodological foundations of Buchanan’s constitutional political economy. We argue that Buchanan is a constitutional economist because he is an economist or a political economist. In other words, Buchanan is a constitutional economist—he insists on the necessity of focusing on constitutions and to analyze the “rules of the social game”—because he defines economics as a science of exchange. Buchanan’s definition of economics is not only specific, it is also opposed to the definition of economics that other economists retain and, above all, opposed to the definition of economics that many public choice theorists use. The latter have, in effect, adopted the Robbins 1932 definition of economics as a science of choice that Buchanan criticizes and rejects. Buchanan’s constitutional economics can be a branch of public choice only under certain conditions.

Reconsidering social capital: a latent class approach

Social capital has proven to be a useful concept, but has not been well-measured in the economics literature. We motivate and demonstrate the application of latent class models to measure social capital, based on the idea that social capital is an unobservable multidimensional construct. We explain and show the construction of latent classes that measure an individual’s social capital using data from the General Social Survey. Our method generates meaningfully different conclusions about the accumulation of social capital than those obtained by previous research. We present evidence that higher income influences social capital accumulation because of a higher opportunity cost of time. We also find evidence of complementarities in social capital accumulation within an individual’s peer group. Finally, we show that community heterogeneity influences the likelihood that individuals adhere to certain social norms independent of their propensity to participate in voluntary organizations.     

Economics,Democracy, and the Distribution of Capital Ownership

This article holds that widespread, practical access to capital acquisition is essential for sustainable widespread economic prosperity and democracy. The founders of the U.S.A. agreed that sustainable democracy required widespread ownership of land to provide a viable earning capacity sufficient to support robust participation in democratic government. The importance of widespread land ownership to individual prosperity and sustainable democracy was supported not only by the prevailing philosophical views of property, it was also apparent to the common man and woman. Compared to Europe, America offered widespread access to land ownership, higher wages, better work conditions, cheaper staples and greater individual freedom, equal opportunity, prosperity, and political participation. This conviction that widespread access to ownership is a necessary condition for widespread prosperity and sustainable democracy continued throughout most of the nineteenth century, but today public discourse reveals virtually no trace of this once universally held opinion. This article suggests that the disappearance of this conviction can be traced to an erroneous view shaped by neoclassical economics and Keynesian economics. According to this view, (1) the disappearance of the American frontier and industrialization made the goal of widespread capital ownership either impractical or of little or no economic significance and (2) by way of technological advance, sufficient earning capacity and consumer demand to promote growth and sustain democracy can be achieved, without widespread ownership, primarily through jobs and welfare. Although differing in many respects, both mainstream schools, along with Adam Smith’s classical economics, share one common but unstated economic assumption: the broader distribution of capital acquisition (in itself) has no fundamental relationship to the fuller employment of people and capital, the broader distribution of greater individual earning capacity, and growth. Contemporary thinking, shaped by these economic schools, also tacitly assumes that widespread capital ownership is not essential for the sustainable individual earning capacity needed to support robust democracy. This erroneous “ownership-neutrality assumption” (1) contradicts both the views of America’s founders and the colonial experience, and (2) provides theoretical justification for structuring capital markets and capital acquisition transactions to unfairly and dysfunctionally favor existing owners at the expense of broader ownership distribution, more widely shared prosperity, greater efficiency, ecologically friendly growth, and a vital democracy. America’s conscientious founders would be shocked by the diminished importance of the distribution of ownership in the mainstream analysis of prices, efficiency, production, growth, and democracy. Rather than enhancing democracy, they would view the “ownership-neutrality assumption” of mainstream economics as contributing to its deterioration and corruption. They would openly search for economic analysis built on an alternate assumption more consistent with their understanding of the requisite conditions for sustainable democracy. This article advances an economic analysis that suspends the ownership-neutrality assumption, replaces it with a “broader-ownership-growth assumption,” and suggests a voluntary market strategy for substantially broadening capital ownership, enhancing individual earning capacity, and providing the widespread economic prosperity needed for robust democracy.     

Exchange and evolution

This paper offers an extension of the distinction of [Kohn, Cato Journal, 24:303–339 (2004)] between the two paradigms of modern economic theory—value and exchange—as derived from the generic–operant framework of [Dopfer and Potts, The general theory of economic evolution, Routledge, London, (2007)]. I argue that Austrian and evolutionary economics can be analytically unified about a general framework of rule coordination and change that I shall call the generic value paradigm. This is an analytic generalization of Kohn’s “exchange paradigm” that will allow us to redefine his conception of the “value paradigm” as the operational value paradigm in terms of the economics of known and fully exploited opportunities. The generic value paradigm, in turn, underpins the economics of the growth of knowledge and the evolution of the economic order as an open-system process due to the origination, adoption, and retention of novel generic rules. Austrian economics is then circumscribed as a special case of the more general “generic” analysis of the coordination and evolution of economic rules.      

How Do Neighbors Influence Investment in Social Capital? Homeownership and Length of Residence

This paper uses individual data from Japan to explore how the circumstances of where a person resides is related to the degree of their investment in social capital. Controlling for unobserved area-specific fixed effects and various individual characteristics, I found (1) not only that homeownership and length of residence are positively related to investment in social capital, but also that rates of homeownership and long-time residency in a locality increase an individual’s investments in social capital. Also, (2) the effects of local neighborhood homeownership and local length of residence are distinctly larger than those of an individual’s homeownership or length of residence.     

Beyond virtues and vices: Antonio Genovesi's and Adam Smith's “science of relationships”

ABSTRACT

Some recent literature has rediscovered the Italian tradition of “civil economy”. This literature has underlined how the discourse about virtues and vices was fundamental in order to establish how, in a political and economic context, a harmonious order could be established. On the basis of this main focus on virtues and vices, it was stated that Genovesi's thought is essentially different from Smith's one. In this article, I argue that the direct focus on questions of virtues and vices does not help capture the novelty introduced by these authors and the relational value of their agency theory.     

Darwinism in economics: from analogy to ontology

Several social scientists, including ‘evolutionary economists’, have expressed scepticism of ‘biological analogies’ and rejected the application of ‘Darwinism’ to socio-economic evolution. Among this group, some have argued that self-organisation is an alternative to biological analogies or Darwinism. Others have seen ‘artificial selection’ as an alternative to natural selection in the socio-economic sphere. Another objection is that Darwinism excludes human intentionality. It is shown that all these objections to ‘biological analogies’ and ‘Darwinism’ are ungrounded. Furthermore, Darwinism includes a broad theoretical framework for the analysis of the evolution of all open, complex systems, including socio-economic systems. Finally and crucially, Darwinism also involves a basic philosophical commitment to detailed, cumulative, causal explanations. For these reasons, Darwinism is fully relevant for economics and an adequate evolutionary economics must be Darwinian, at least in these fundamental senses. However, this does not undermine the need for auxiliary theories and explanations in the economic domain.     

Personalist economics is human economics because it puts the human person at the center of economic affairs

The hard core of conventional economics consists of a set of four main premises regarding the economy. Simply put they are the law of nature, the individual, certainty, and contracts. Juxtapositioned to these four premises of conventional economics, there are four from personalist economics: institutions, the person, uncertainty and status. In sharp constrast with the overwhelming majority of our contemporaries in economics whose views on economic affairs are grounded in individualism, we think about economic affairs in a market system in terms of personalism. Personalist economics is human economics because it puts the human person at the center of economic affairs. Here our presentation focuses on three central economic activities: consumption, work and leisure. In addressing these activities we emphasize that (1) human persons are materialized spirits and (2) human nature is two dimensional — individual and social. In our remarks we rely heavily on Emmanuel Mounier and John Paul II. Mayo Research Institute In the field of scientific research, a positivistic mentality took hold which not only abandoned the Christian vision of the world, but more especially rejected every appeal to a metaphysical or moral vision. It follows that certain scientists, lacking any ethical point of reference, are in danger of putting at the centre of their concerns something other than the human person and the entirety of the person's life. Further still, some of these, sensing the opportunities of technological progress, seem to succumb not only to a market-based logic, but also to the temptation of a quasi-divine power over nature and even over the human being [John Paul II, 1998, sect. 46].     

The origins of meso economics

The paper starts from Schumpeter’s proposition that entrepreneurs carry out innovations (the micro level), that swarms of followers imitate them (meso) and that, as a consequence, ‘creative destruction’ leads to economic development ‘from within’ (macro). It is argued that Schumpeter’s approach can be developed into a new—more general—micro-meso-macro framework in economics. Center stage is meso. Its essential characteristic is bimodality, meaning that one idea (the generic rule) can be physically actualized by many agents (a population). Ideas can relate to others, and, in this way, meso constitutes a structure component of a ‘deep’ invisible macro structure. Equally, the rule actualization process unfolds over time—modelled in the paper as a meso trajectory with three phases of rule origination, selective adoption and retention—and here meso represents a process component of a visible ‘surface’ structure. The macro measure with a view to the appropriateness of meso components is generic correspondence. At the level of ideas, its measure is order; at that of actual relative adoption frequencies, it is generic equilibrium. Economic development occurs at the deep level as transition from one generic rule to another, inducing a change of order, and, at the surface level, as the new rule is adopted, destroying an old equilibrium and establishing a new one.     

Situational logic in social science inquiry: From economics to criminology

Karl R. Popper proposed that the method of explanation in economics, or situational logic, should become the general model for analyses across the social sciences. This article makes good Popper's proposal by extending situational logic to a social problem outside the traditional scope of economics: crime. Specifically, the discussion reviews models developed by economist Gary S. Becker and criminologist Ronald V. Clarke. Becker's ‘economic approach’ to crime incorporates essential features of situational logic. Clarke's ‘situational crime prevention’ offers an even better demonstration; it explicitly incorporates the ideas of piecemeal social engineering and unintended social repercussions. Popper took situational logic from Menger and the Austrians, making this emerging area of criminology an extension of Austrian economics.

Menger’s causal-realist analysis in modern economics

Carl Menger pioneered a unique theoretical research method which served as the foundation of the early Austrian school of economics. Menger’s causal-realist analysis was revived and formalized just before and after World War 2 by Ludwig von Mises as the “praxeological method.” Murray Rothbard, a student of von Mises’, utilized the method in formulating a comprehensive system of economic theory in his treatise, Man Economy, and State published in the early 1960s. Rothbard’s treatise became the foundational work for the “Austrian revival” in the 1970s. In this paper, we address several issues related to the role of Menger’s method in modern economics. First, ample evidence is adduced that von Mises and Rothbard each expressed a surprising ambivalence with respect to his own work in relation to the early Austrian school. Second, von Mises viewed Rothbard’s treatise as beginning a new epoch in economic theory. Third, contrary to the conventional view, a careful analysis of his treatise shows that Rothbard drew heavily on the contemporary neoclassical literature in developing his theoretical system and that his intent was never to set up a heterodox movement to challenge mainstream economics. Rather, his main aim was to consistently apply the praxeological method to rescue economics from what he considered the alien methodology of positivism, which was imported into economics after World War 2. Lastly, I will tentatively suggest that the term “Austrian economics” as the designation for the intellectual movement that coalesced in the early 1970s may now have outlived its usefulness. This term, which initially served an important strategic purpose in promoting the revival of the broad Mengerian tradition, may have come to obscure the meaning and importance of the praxeological research paradigm that Menger originated.     

Towards Sustainability Economics: Principles and Values

Synopsis  Radical alternatives, in terms of our ideas about science in society, about economics, ideology and institutional arrangements, should be included among possibilities considered within the scope of a pluralistic philosophy. While all these aspects of our mental maps are interrelated and important, economics plays a key role in attempts to get closer to a sustainable society. Mainstream neoclassical economics is not enough. The tendency to exclusively rely on this particular theory is considered part of the problems faced. A ‘sustainability economics’ more in line with dominant ideas of democracy is proposed, emphasizing the ethical, ideological and political elements. Reference is made to institutional theory but the principles and concepts suggested are in many ways similar to other kinds of heterodox economics and developments in other social sciences. Neoclassical economics is used as a point of reference in pointing to alternative ideas about human beings, organizations, markets, decision- making, efficiency, rationality, progress in society and institutional change processes. Predilection for such an alternative conceptual framework (or for neoclassical economics) is not exclusively a scientific choice but as much a matter of political and ideological preferences. One paradigm may be dominant at a time, but because of the ideological specificity of each paradigm, competing theoretical perspectives should be accepted and even encouraged in a democratic society.      

Corporate Social Responsibility,Values, and Cooperation

Lately, some questions relating to Corporate social responsibility (CSR) have become relevant. The European Commission defines CSR as the enterprises’ contribution to sustainable development. In the field of cooperation, there are numerous examples of enterprises very closely engaged in sustainable development that apply very strict ethical codes to their regular operations. This work tries to think about: (1) the necessity of taking upon, again, the moral teachings of some fathers of economics as Adam Smith or Robert Owen, most of which were scorned since the triumph of utilitarianism and rationalism; (2) the slide of society through post-modern values; and (3) the role of cooperative principles and values in the new cultural environments.

Conceptions of property rights and norms

The social norm literature in law and economics fails to account for the differences between the two major conceptions of property rights. The differences between the two conceptions affect people’s utility function by affecting how increases in property rights are perceived. This paper discusses how the modern, in rem, conception evolved from an older, in personam, conception; it also discusses how economics has absorbed the modern, in rem, conception. The paper demonstrates that if people do not perceive the benefits of modern property rights, they will follow their social norms if the government or planner imposes modern property rights on them. In the end, this allows one to make a fuller discussion of why norms economize information. This discussion has various consequences ranging from developmental economics to financial market economics and cannot be ignored.