中小企业发展的障碍与对策分析

中小企业目前面临着许多障碍,包括融资性障碍,制度性障碍,等,它们都制约着中小企业的进一步发展。为此,必须结合实际,采取有力措施,推动小企业的进一步发展。     

埃及扶持中小企业发展的举措

目前埃及国家工业现代化发展计划的重点是：积极扩大国际合作，向私营中小企业提供更有力的技术支持，以提高其在技术和经营管理方面的水平。埃及在与欧盟合作制定的工业合作发展计划中提出要在加工技术、产品质量、国际竞争能力、增长出口、市场信息、生产规划、生产投资、产品设计、管理技能、项目合作、专利技术、投资机会等方面进行国际合作，旨在促进埃及工业的改造和发展，摆脱经济困境。１．大力发展埃及的民族工业是推动埃及经济发展，增加就业机会的基本出路。因此工业主管机构将统一部署，统一调配物力和财力，制定有力措施来促进…     

湖北省中小企业发展的社会支持机制

湖北省中小企业是湖北经济发展的一大主体,在其经济快速增长的同时,也面临阻碍,突出表现为湖北省政府为中小企业经营所营造的环境与中小企业在国民经济中的作用、发展速度等存在一定差距.为此,本文提出应以政府为主导,采取有力措施消除对不利于中小企业的管制和待遇,为湖北省中小企业进一步发展营造公平竞争环境.     

德国政府支持科技型中小企业的政策措施

德国中小企业不仅创出了享誉世界的“德国制造”品牌，同时更在经济增长、解决就业等方面扮演重要作用。但是，资金短缺始终是制约德国中小企业快速发展的瓶颈。因此。为保证和推动中小企业发展，通过政策性银行加大对创新中小企业的扶持力度。就成为德国政府支持中小企业发展的重要举措之一。     

中小企业融资难的再认识

中小企业融资难几乎已成了各界的共识。深刻剖析造成中小企业融资难的本质原因并开出“治病良方”是研究者的责任。目前的许多分析虽很全面,但很多都没抓住症结所在,有必要对中小企业融资难的流行分析进行再认识。 再认识之一:企业规模制约论 许多专家学者认为:中小企业规模较小是其融资难的一个根本原因。不可否认,企业的规模一定程度上与风险抵抗能力和资金吸     

中小企业融资难的化解之道

随着我国加入WTO和经济全球化进程的加快,我国政府可以用来保护产业的手段将大大减少,我国的企业将面临激烈的市场竞争压力,而作为我国最具竞争力的劳动密集型中小企业,有着很大的发展空间,但中小企业融资难仍是一个亟待解决的问题。一、中小企业融资困难的主要原因中小企业存在先天不足。具体表现为信用度低,难以通过信贷市场融资。大部分中小企业信用等级比较低,3B或3B以下信用等级的企业占多数,企业财务管理不健全,抗风险能力比较弱,市场风险很大,造成企业在贷款中抵押担保难,银行跟踪监管难,债权维护难。金融体制存在缺陷。金融体制和…     

为中小企业提供更好的发展平台

近年来,我国虽然制定了一些与扶持中小企业发展相关的政策文件,2002年6月,全国人大常委会还通过了《中华人民共和国中小企业促进法》,并于今年起正式实施。但时至今日,各地多未有相应的配套法规出台,以至融资难、支持体系不完善等问题依然存在,制约其发展,亟待引起有关方面重视并尽快加以解决。     

关于中小企业发展的政府支持因素分析

占我国企业总数99％的中小企业在吸纳就业,增加产值和税收,扩大出口等方面都起着重要作用,然而,短缺经济条件下诞生的中小企业难以适应当过剩的经济形势,它的生存与发展需要政府在政策,服务等方面的大力扶持。     

金融支持中小企业发展之路

中小企业融资难是一个世界性的问题。要想解决中小企业融资难问题，离不开金融的强有力支持。探索金融支持中小企业发展之路，从金融政策的制定到金融机构的执行等方面提供全方位服务。     

论我国企业的国际化战略定位

中国的现代化离不开企业的国际化,加入WTO使中国企业国际化面临新的形势。阐述了企业国际化是中国企业的又一次革命,提出"相对优势"是确定我国企业国际化战略的依据,分析了我国企业国际化的类型和方式以及制定我国企业国际化战略应注意的问题。     

从人口老龄化角度重新审视我国的生育政策

按照国际通行标准,我国1999年就已经进入人口老龄化社会阶段,并且表现出高速、高龄、老年人数量大等一系列特征.人口老龄化给我国这样一个并不富裕的国家的社会经济发展带来了许多新的问题和挑战.而导致我国人口老龄化的一个重要原因是我国的计划生育政策.为了减少人口老龄化对我国社会经济的负面影响,应该重新审视我国的生育政策,将其进一步完善.     

Endogenous Lobbying Positions

This paper develops a two-country, two-firm model to study equilibrium lobbying positions in intra-industry trade. A firm chooses either a protectionist position or a free-trade position. The model predicts that taking the free-trade lobbying position is an efficient firm's dominant strategy. If two firms have high costs (or when the demand is very weak), there exist two equilibria: either both firms take the free-trade position or both take the protectionist lobbying position. In other cases, both firms taking the free-trade lobbying position is a unique equilibrium.     

十大股权之争2001年

牛顿把现实理解为一座永不停息的钟,它的运动来源于预定之力的推动。那么,在生生不息的股权之争中,究竟什么是它的推动力呢?     

A Methodological Note on Long-Period Positions

This brief paper seeks to overcome a number of methodologicaldisagreements among economists who use the long-period methodof analysis. In particular, it attempts to clarify the key distinctionsbetween convergence and stability, convergence and gravitationand chronological and theoretical persistence. The conclusionis that the theoretical soundness of the long-period methoddepends on the convergence of actual magnitudes towards theirlong-period counterparts, an empirical issue to which theoreticalconsiderations of stability are irrelevant.     

Policy Positions, Information Acquisition and Turnout

This paper explores the relationship between policy positions, information acquisition and turnout. In particular, information acquisition and turnout choices are characterized as a function of citizens' policy positions. It is found that middle‐of‐the‐road citizens are the most likely to both acquire political information and abstain. Comparative‐statics analysis of the information technology indicates that an increase in the effectiveness of information has a higher (positive) impact on information and turnout than a comparable decrease in the cost of information. Furthermore, following a polarization, information and abstention are found to increase.     

Eliciting Preferences to Assign Positions and Compensation

We describe strategy-proof rules for economies where an agent is assigned a position (e.g., a job) plus some of a divisible good. For the 2-agent–2-position case we derive a robust characterization. For the multi-agent–position case, many “arbitrary” such rules exist, so we consider additional requirements. By also requiring coalitional strategy-proofness or nonbossiness, the range of a solution is restricted to the point that such rules are not more complex than those for the Shapley–Scarf housing model (no divisible good). Third, we show that essentially only constant solutions are immune to manipulations involving “bribes.” Finally, we demonstrate a conflict between efficiency and strategy-proofness. The results extend to models (without externalities) in which agents share positions. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D70.     

委托－代理视角下的农地征用困境

城镇化能否健康可持续发展,关键在于土地资源的合理利用。而现阶段我国建设用地的需求量迅猛上升,耕地面积减退迅速,农地使用状况非常不乐观,农民土地权益无法得到有效保障。可以借助委托－代理理论的分析视角阐述我国农地征用过程中各利益主体之间的关系,结合现实情况就当前农地征用委托－代理失灵的困境进行制度分析。并以此为依据,优化我国土地征用制度,从而探索摆脱农地征用的困境的方法。     

Dynamic Reserve Adjustment Under Varying Balance of Payments Positions

Most studies on dynamic reserve demand assume that countries respond symmetrically to positive and negative deviations of actual From desired reserves. The present study demonstrates that for a sample of developed countries (DCs), balance of payments deficits induce a faster response (higher speed of adjustment) than do surpluses. The opposite is true for the sample of developing countries (LDCs) tested. However, the size of the gap rather than whether excess demand is positive or negative seems to be the determining factor of adjustment speeds in the case of the LDC sample. [F 31]     

Long-period Positions and Economic Change. A rejoinder

Roncaglia and Nell have criticised the interpretation of Sraffa's normal prices as centres of gravitation for actual prices. Roncaglia mainly focuses on the interpretation of the notion of gravitation in Smith and on the meaning of the ‘given outputs’ in Sraffa. Nell attempts to confine the relevance of Sraffa's theory to specific historical circumstances and to find a role for Sraffa's prices in his version of post-Keynesian price theory. This rejoinder criticises the case made by both Roncaglia and Nell, and defends Sraffa's centre of gravitation view.