Monetary Union in West Africa: An Agency of Restraint for Fiscal Policies?

Could a monetary union in West Africa (either an informal monetaryunion of the non-CFA countries, or a possible future monetaryunion of all ECOWAS members) be an effective ‘agency ofrestraint’ (Collier, 1991) on fiscal policies? We discussthe ways, both positive and negative, that monetary union couldaffect fiscal discipline and the arguments for explicit fiscalrestraints considered in the literature about the European MonetaryUnion (EMU), and consider their applicability to West Africa.The empirical evidence, EMU literature and CFA experience allsuggest the possibility that monetary union could create thetemptation for fiscal profligacy through prospects of a bail-out,or costs that are diluted through the membership. We concludethat a monetary union in West Africa can be an effective agencyof restraint on fiscal policies only if the hands of the fiscalauthorities are also tied by a strong set of fiscal restraintcriteria, applicable not just for accession to monetary union,but throughout the life of the union.     

Fiscal discipline in the European monetary union

This paper explores the question of how national fiscal policies could be conducted within the European Monetary Union. The discussion touches upon this issue in relation to the theory of optimum currency areas; presents the debt sustainability issue in the context of a monetary union; examines briefly the determinants of debt dynamics; and interprets the restraints imposed on national fiscal policies by the Maastricht Treaty. The tentative conclusion is that the creation of the EMU will be associated with smaller size national government sectors.Invited Address at the Thirty-Seventh International Atlantic Economic Conference, Athens, Greece, March 8–15, 1994. Financial support by the Economic Research Center of the Athens University of Economics and Business is gratefully acknowledged.     

Macroeconomic Policy Interaction under EMU: A Dynamic Game Approach

In this article, we study macroeconomic stabilization in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) using a dynamic game approach. With the aid of a stylized macroeconomic model, this article analyzes the transmission and interaction of national fiscal policies and monetary policy of the European Central Bank (ECB) in the EMU. A special focus is on the effects of labor market institutions in the participating countries and of the introduction of fiscal stringency criteria like those imposed in the Stability and Growth Pact.     

Globalization as a Development Strategy in Latin America?

The swinging of the pendulum toward policies that enhance Latin America’s insertion into the world economy diverted attention from domestic policies that continue to be essential for growth and development broadly defined. Six domestic policy areas are identified here: increasing domestic savings, implementing countercyclical fiscal policies, mobilizing public resources, investing in education, promoting employment, and reducing income inequality. The opportunity cost of not having devoted due attention to these issues throughout the 1990s is surely enormous, and for those countries still underplaying domestic variables, the longer the delay the greater the costs. The imperative of devoting more political capital to domestic strategies of development cannot be overstated––whether international financial institutions choose to emphasize them or not.     

Monetary policy in the Euro area – lessons from the first years

This paper investigates in a consistent semi-structural empirical framework three current issues of monetary policy in the euro area. First, regarding policy transmission we offer a three-stage procedure to combine the estimation of economic structure prior to EMU with current ECB monetary policy. Second, we test whether the regime change leads – before or after – EMU to structural instability. Third, we investigate the stance of monetary policy in Europe. We compare a counterfactual ECB reaction function based on average interest rates prior to EMU with actual ECB policy. Furthermore, we analyse actual ECB policy with interest rate projections using Bundesbank reaction functions and euroland data.We thank two anonymous referees, participants of the Royal Economic Society Conference in 2003, the Money, Macro, and Finance Annual Conference in 2002, research seminars at the Universities of Augsburg, Bochum, Bonn, Frankfurt and Bloomington/Indiana for helpful comments. Obviously, we are responsible for all remaining shortcomings.     

Fiscal Policy Effectiveness in Japan

The effectiveness of fiscal policy in Japan over the past decade has been a matter of great controversy. We investigate the effectiveness of Japanese fiscal policy over the 1976–1999 period using a structural VAR analysis of real GDP, tax revenues, and public expenditures. We find that expansionary fiscal policy, whether in the form of tax cuts or of public works spending, had significant stimulative effects. Using a new method of computing policy multipliers from structural VARs, we calculate that the multiplier on tax cuts is about 25% higher at a four-year horizon than that on public works spending, though both are well in excess of one. A historical decomposition reveals that Japanese fiscal policy was contractionary over much of the 1990s, and a significant proportion of the variation in growth can be attributed to fiscal policy shocks; accordingly, most of the run-up in public debt is attributable to declining tax revenues due to the recession. Examining savings behavior directly, we find limited evidence of Ricardian effects, insufficient to offset the short-term effects of discretionary fiscal policy. J. Japan. Int. Econ., December 2002, 16(4), pp. 536–558. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, New York, and Institute for International Economics, Washington, DC. © 2002 Elsevier Science (USA).Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: E62, E65, E21.     

With what should the present rules of the Stability Pact be replaced?

An increasing number of statements – by economists, governments and even from the European Commission – argue that the euro zones present fiscal policy rules need to be changed. Naturally, deciding to change rules as soon as they become a constraint and a nuisance entails the risk of losing credibility. France and Germany may well see their fiscal deficits exceed 4% of GDP in 2003 and 2004. However, in this study, we would like to explore various approaches that could be used to replace the current rules by more sensible ones.     

Budgetary Consolidation in Europe: Quality, Economic Conditions, and Persistence

In this article we study the importance of the quality of fiscal adjustments and macroeconomic conditions for the persistence of budgetary consolidations. In contrast to previous work in this area, we do not arbitrarily predefine a measure of persistence to evaluate consolidation “success.” By employing duration analysis techniques, the length of a consolidation spell is rather determined endogenously. Our results based on a sample of industrialised OECD countries show that “consolidation fatigue” and the quality of fiscal consolidations are indeed important determinants of their longevity. Moreover, high debt–GDP ratio and fiscal tightening in other OECD countries raise the likelihood of consolidations to persist. Applying our results to European countries in the 1990s provides only weak evidence suggesting that the Maastricht process contributed much to the fiscal consolidations observed in Europe during the 1990s. J. Japan. Int. Econ., December 2002, 16(4), pp. 512–535. ZEI, University of Bonn, Bonn, Germany, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana; and CEPR; Strathclyde University, Glasgow, Scotland; and CEPR; and ECB, Kaiserstrasse 29, D-60311 Frankfurt a.M., Germany; and ZEI. © 2002 Elsevier Science (USA).Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: E61, E62, E65.     

Designing Fiscal Institutions in a Monetary Union

This article explores the policy and wealth consequences of alternative institutional arrangements through which fiscal policy interacts with monetary policy in a monetary union such as the EMU. The central issue of the article is the design of the appropriate monetary and fiscal institutions through a comparison of alternative arrangements to distribute power over monetary and fiscal authorities between the central authority of the union and the individual members of the union and evaluating their performance. The main results of this article reveal that delegation of the fiscal policy to a council of country representatives and the monetary policy to a council of governors is the appropriate institutional design to reduce inflation bias and better stabilize regional, idiosyncratic supply and demand shocks in a monetary union.     

Lessons from historical monetary unions - is the European monetary union making the same mistakes?

This article examines three historical monetary unions: the Latin Monetary Union (LMU), the Scandinavian Monetary Union (SMU), and the Austro-Hungarian Monetary Union (AHMU) in an attempt to derive possible lessons for the European Monetary Union (EMU). The term ‘monetary union’ can be defined either narrowly or broadly depending on how closely it conforms to Mundell’s notion of ‘Optimal Currency Area’. After examining each of the historical monetary unions from this perspective, the article concludes that none of them ever truly conformed to Mundell’s concept, nor does the EMU. Nevertheless, the article argues that some lessons may be learned from these historical experiences. First, it is necessary that there exist robust institutions such as a common central bank and a unified fiscal policy in order to withstand external shocks. The three early unions could not withstand the shock of WWI. Another important lesson is that continuing national rivalries can undermine any monetary union.     

Stability and Growth Pact: issues and lessons from political economy

The paper analyses the EU fiscal rules from a political economy perspective and derives some policy lessons. Following a literature survey, the paper stresses the importance of appropriate incentives for rule compliance in an environment where national fiscal sovereignty precludes the option of centralised enforcement. In addition, the paper stresses the importance of clear and simple rules and in particular the 3% deficit limit in anchoring expectations of fiscal discipline and facilitating public and market monitoring of public finances. This, in turn, strengthens incentive for rule compliance. Moreover, the paper discusses the interests of the most important players in European fiscal rule formation and the importance of choosing the appropriate time for initiating a reform debate.Non-technical summary The EU fiscal framework as laid down in the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP, the Pact) aims to preserve fiscal sustainability while allowing room for automatic fiscal stabilisation. These two objectives are also at the heart of the ECB’s interest in the EU fiscal framework because their attainment facilitates monetary policy making in the short and long run.The paper analyses the EU fiscal rules from a political economy perspective and derives some policy lessons. The literature review of the first part reveals that fiscal rules can help solve deficit/debt biases and time inconsistency problems by constraining the behavior of policy makers. But rules can also mitigate biases if they facilitate financial market and public scrutiny of fiscal policies.Thereafter, the paper analyses the institutional environment in which EU fiscal rules are applied. It argues that EU rules reflect a “contract” amongst countries that retain sovereignty on fiscal policies. Enforcement, therefore, ultimately has to be undertaken by the contracting parties. Due to this constraint, the rules can also be characterised as “soft” law (with the 3% limit being nevertheless a much “harder” constraint than the other elements). But this does not necessarily imply that the rules are ineffective (or “dead”). Soft law reduces political transaction costs (by improving transparency and providing a forum for peer pressure). Moreover, if well-designed, such law can boost incentives towards making the rules “self-enforcing”. Evidence speaks in favour of this view: while EU fiscal rules were bent in a number of cases and compliance is undeniably of concern, major and rapid fiscal balance deteriorations have been largely prevented since the start of EMU.The paper also looks at potential trade-offs between “complex” rules where a “fine-tuned” economic rationale may boost acceptance of the rules versus simple and clear rules that allow easy monitoring. It is argued that clarity and simplicity of rules are important especially when formal enforcement is limited (“soft law”) and public monitoring becomes more important. By facilitating public and market monitoring of compliance, clear and simple rules are also more costly to breach.The benefits of “complexity”, and in particular the use of administrative discretion to fine tune the rules to country situations have limits, in particular when it comes to the excessive deficit procedure (EDP). It is argued that the 3% deficit limit and the time frame for correcting excessive deficits already provide some room to accommodate economic circumstances. The 3% limit must be clear, simple and strictly implemented to anchor expectations of fiscal discipline and to facilitate public and market monitoring. Further discretion and relaxation would conflict with this need. From this angle, other risks (e.g., efforts not materializing, structural reforms producing surprise costs etc) are hard to justify as a reason for extending deadlines to correct excessive deficits.The preventive arm of the Pact with its requirement of close-to-balance-or-in-surplus budgetary positions defines sound medium term budget positions and adjustment paths. This may be appropriately fine-tuned to address concerns about the Pact’s underlying economic rationale. For example, a symmetric application in good and bad times and less time inconsistency would be desirable.Finally, the timing of a debate on fiscal rules needs to be carefully chosen. In the EU context (and perhaps in other contexts as well), there seems to be much inherent pressure to make the rules more “complex”. Moreover, for the debate initiated in summer 2004, there was also no willingness by countries to give up sovereignty nor was there a sense of urgency to strengthen public finances via tighter rule implementation and enforcement. In such an environment, it is likely that changes to fiscal rules make them more complicated, discretionary and, thereby, potentially less enforceable.The views expressed are those of the author and not of the ECB. Comments by Vitor Gaspar, Mark Hallerberg, Steven Keuning, Jose Marin, Richard Morris, Gilles Noblet, Hedwig Ongena, Luca Onorante, Rolf Strauch, Juergen von Hagen, an anonymous referee and valuable assistance by Anna Foden are much appreciated.     

The stability and growth pact, fiscal policy institutions and stabilization in Europe

Ever since its inception, the EMU has been subject to controversy. The fiscal policy rules embedded in the Maastricht Treaty, and clarified in the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), are probably the most contentious. The SGP has constantly been accused of being too rigid and of forcing procyclicality in fiscal policy. However, in an influential paper Galí and Perotti (2003) concluded that discretionary fiscal policy has actually become more countercyclical in EMU countries since the Maastricht Treaty. This paper argues that this conclusion stands up to several robustness tests using ex-post data, including the use of institutional variables, but not to the use of real-time data. Using ex-post data, there is some evidence pointing to a more countercyclical use of discretionary fiscal policy (or at least to less use of procyclical discretionary fiscal policy). However, the use of real-time data for the period 1999–2006 reveals that discretionary fiscal policy has been designed to be procyclical. Hence, the actual acyclical behaviour of discretionary fiscal policy in the period after 1999 seems to be simply the result of errors in forecasting the output gap, and not the result of a change in the intentions of policy-makers. As a result, there is no evidence to support the view that Maastricht rules have forced euro-area policy-makers to change their behaviour and design countercyclical discretionary fiscal policies.     

The assessment: macroeconomic policy after EMU

In this paper we discuss the emergence of the new European macroeconomicstructure within EMU. We focus on three important elements:the wage-fixing authorities in each country, the fiscal authoritiesin each country, and the single European Central Bank (ECB).We identify serious problems which might arise in coordinatingboth the wage-setters and the fiscal authorities, and arguethat these problems could be exacerbated if the ECB conductsmonetary policy inappropriately. In the light of this we providerecommendations for the conduct of monetary policy by the ECB.The paper also briefly discusses financial stability issuesand the interaction between the countries in EMU and the restof the world.     

Fiscal decentralization, revenue and expenditure assignments, and growth in China

Theory suggests that a close match between revenue and expenditure assignments at sub-national levels benefits allocative efficiency, and hence economic growth. That is, a convergence of revenue and expenditure assignments at sub-national levels of government should, according to the theory, be positively associated with a higher growth rate. In the case of China, this paper shows, divergence, rather than convergence, in revenue and expenditures at the sub-national level of government is associated with higher rates of growth. A panel dataset for 30 provinces in China is used to examine the relationship between fiscal decentralization and economic growth over two phases of fiscal decentralization in China: (1) 1979–1993 under the fiscal contract system, and (2) 1994–1999 under the tax assignment system. The seeming contradiction between the theory and evidence in the China case is reconciled by taking into account the institutional arrangements that prevailed during the two phases of fiscal decentralization, in particular the inconsistency between the assumptions of the theory of fiscal decentralization and the institutional reality of China.     

Factor decomposition of sub-provincial fiscal disparities in China

With the help of fiscal statistics on sub-provincial public finances in the second half of the 1990s, this paper explores the hotly debated issues pertaining to fiscal disparities in China during this period, and the various factors driving the changes in fiscal disparities. Among them are economic factors (e.g., GDP per capita, economic structure), and institutional factors (e.g., urban–rural dichotomy, ethnic issues).We adopt Morduch and Sicular's general, regression-based approach to decompose fiscal disparity with respect to per capita fiscal expenditure (Morduch & Sicular, 2002). The empirical results indicate that among all the statistically significant factors, GDP per capita and urban–rural dichotomy are the two most important variables that affects fiscal disparities, with a total contribution of 60%. Other relatively important factors are economic structure and population density. Several features of fiscal expenditure in China identified by our empirical findings together with their corresponding policy implications are discussed.     

Real exchange rate, agglomerations, and irreversibilities: macroeconomic policy and FDI in EMU

Fiscal policy in EMU has to be evaluated in the light of thechanging nature of capital mobility in Europe and its effectson growth. Most arguments about the effects of fiscal policyin EMU assume that we live in a perfect competition world witha unique natural rate of output for each country. The removalof barriers to foreign direct investment (FDI) accompanied bythe prevalence of imperfect competition mean that the naturalrate of output is to be determined by locational competition.We show that FDI is influenced by relative costs and is attractedby agglomerations, and that the level of technology dependson the stock of FDI. Sustained expansionary fiscal policieswill raise costs and make locations less attractive. Agglomerationscould be destroyed by these higher costs, and the size of thenation will shrink. These effects will constrain policy-makersmuch more than the Stability Pact.     

EMU Stability: Direct and Indirect Risk Sharing

Our paper aims to analyze the effectiveness of different risk-sharing mechanisms in providing stability to a monetary union. We select two stylized tools with extreme and opposite features. The first is an expansionary but conventional monetary policy that is used to help EMU’s most fragile member states manage their public debts; the second is a centralized fiscal policy that allows for the transfer of a portion of these public debts from EMU’s most fragile member states to those considered EMU’s “core”. By a stylized periphery-core model of a monetary union, we compare the strengths and weaknesses of these two tools in order to reach some welfare implications in terms of union stability.     

Fiscal Policy in Emu: Towards a Sustainability and Growth Pact?

This paper takes stock of the academic and policy discussionson the fiscal institutions of EMU, confronts the framework inplace with what is known of the desirable properties of fiscalpolicy in a monetary union, and discusses possible improvements.We start with a discussion of three requirements for the fiscalframework of a monetary union: it should be conducive to publicfinance sustainability, leave room for stabilization at thenational level, and encourage structural reform. We then examinehow the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) measures up to theserequirements and find that it has mostly failed on all threeaccounts. Whether the 2005 reform of the SGP fixes those deficienciesremains an open issue. To this end, we propose five buildingblocks towards an effective SGP: a better concept of sustainability;harmonized general government balance sheets; appropriate targets;refined procedures; and better institutions. Footnotes ¹ E-mail addresses: benoit.coeure{at}free.fr; jpf{at}bruegel.org     

Fiscal discipline and flexibility in EMU: the implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact

Fiscal discipline to safeguard the credibility of the singlemonetary authority and fiscal flexibility to respond to country-specificshocks are two core principles governing budgetary policy inEMU. The Stability and Growth Pact aims at ensuring the firstobjective. To comply with the requirements of the pact, EU membersneed to achieve a 'close to balance or surplus' position andchange their budgetary behaviour in periods of cyclical upturnsby refraining from spending the 'growth dividend'. Past experienceshows that fiscal laxity does not buy more effective stabilization.Once EMU countries have achieved their medium-term target, theirautomatic stabilizers will be able to operate fully, thus helpingin smoothing out cyclical fluctuations. The main potential problemsin the implementation of the pact may arise in the early yearsof EMU, during the transition to a balanced budget, in the eventof a slow-down in economic activity.     

Regional currency arrangements: insights from Europe

This paper focuses on the requirements and features of a successful monetary union on the basis of the optimum currency area theory, the “logical roadmap” for integration as proposed by Balassa as well as the economic and institutional framework of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). The analysis suggests that monetary union is contingent upon high economic integration and strong political commitment. However, political union is not an ex-ante requirement. Outside factors such as systemic shocks and globalization seem to speed up the pooling of sovereignty in the economic domain. A firm commitment to stability-oriented monetary and fiscal policies is a precondition for gaining credibility and trust within and outside a monetary union. Last, but not least, convergence criteria, fiscal rules and strong institutions are necessary to help ensure and monitor the participants’ compliance. However, the European experience is not a blueprint for regional integration that can be directly and entirely applied to other regions.