Pension Benefit Security: A Comparison of Solvency Requirements,a Pension Guarantee Fund,and Sponsor Support

Developed countries apply different security mechanisms in regulation to protect pension benefits: solvency requirements, a pension guarantee fund (PGF), and sponsor support. We compare these mechanisms for a generalized form of hybrid pension schemes. We calculate the expected log return for the beneficiaries, the shortfall probability, that is, the likelihood of the pension payment falling below the promised level and the expected loss given shortfall. Comparing solvency requirements to a pension guarantee system or sponsor support involves trading off risk and return. Additional spending on default insurance reduces the shortfall probability and the expected loss given shortfall but also lowers the probability of high positive returns as are feasible under solvency requirements.     

HOW SHOULD PENSION FUNDS MANAGE RISK?

Despite recent advances in risk management techniques, pension funds are still struggling with the concept of risk and with the practical challenges of managing and measuring it in useful ways. This article addresses this problem by showing that pension fund managers must manage two types of risk that affect a pension fund balance sheet's funded ratio. The most important of the two is asset policy risk, which arises from the choice of an asset mix policy that does not match the accrued pension liabilities. The other risk results from the decision to implement the chosen asset mix using active rather than passive management strategies.
This article shows how both types of risk can be measured and managed through an adapted value at risk (VAR) metric: the funded ratio VAR. A study of the performance of 98 pension funds during the period 1992–1995 shows that the funds were adequately compensated, on average, for taking on the policy risk, but not for implementation risk.     

“On the Merger of Two Companies,” Hans Gerber and Elias S. W. Shiu,July 2006

Abstract

Bankruptcy risk falls to pension plan participants if a plan sponsor fails when a defined benefit (DB) pension plan is underfunded. This article examines the incidence of that risk and how it changes when public policy provides a guarantee fund. Although government-based guarantee funds are in a unique position to provide pension protection, primarily because of the extent to which the risk of sponsor default is systematic in nature, a looming question is the extent to which such guarantees are exposed to moral hazard. The article focuses on that question using data from four Canadian provinces, including one (Ontario) that operates a guarantee fund for pensions. The findings show that plan assets per DB-plan participant increase with the earnings of workers and decrease with higher unemployment, and that level of assets also is moderated by the influence of taxes, with higher plan assets observed when and where tax rates are higher. Plans in Ontario had on average $20,035 less in asset value per participant, and Ontario plans covered by the guarantee fund had an average of $16,497 less per participant than other Canadian DB plans not backed by a guarantee fund. A separate model finds the presence of a guarantee fund to be one of a very small number of variables significant in explaining variability in the plans’ funded ratios. These empirical results are consistent with the existence of moral hazard.     

Risk Allocation in Retirement Plans: A Better Solution

The corporate world is reconsidering the cost‐effectiveness of defined benefit pension plans while contemplating a change to defined contribution plans. This article begins by examining the three primary risks faced by sponsors of most DB pension plans—investment risk, interest rate risk, and longevity risk—and shows how shifting these risks to employees through a DC plan would affect both the corporation and the individual. Although DC plans clearly help companies manage risks, they provide at best an incomplete solution for individual participants. This article describes an innovation in pension design—the Retirement Shares Plan (RSP)—that combines many of the best features of DB and DC plans. An RSP provides:

• ? predictable and stable cost to the plan sponsor, with little chance of unfunded liabilities;
• ? lifetime income, guaranteeing that retirees will never outlive their benefits;
• ? a benefit accrual pattern comparable to that of traditional pension plans that preserves value for older, long‐service employees; and
• ? potential inflation protection for retirees.

The RSP accomplishes this by allocating risk to sponsors and individuals differently than either a traditional DB plan or a DC plan. Unlike most DB plans, the RSP shifts investment and interest rate risks from plan sponsors to participants. Unlike DC plans, the RSP keeps longevity risk with the sponsor.     

An analysis of risk-taking behavior for public defined benefit pension plans

This paper presents the first comprehensive study on the determinants of public pension fund investment risk and reports several new important findings. Unlike private pension plans, public funds undertake more risk if they are underfunded and have lower investment returns in the previous years, consistent with the risk transfer hypothesis. Furthermore, pension funds in states facing fiscal constraints allocate more assets to equity and have higher betas. There also appears to be a herding effect in that CalPERS equity allocation or beta is mimicked by other pension funds. Finally, our results suggest that government accounting standards strongly affect pension fund risk, as higher return assumptions (used to discount pension liabilities) are associated with higher equity allocation and portfolio beta.     

A Termination Rule for Pension Guarantee Funds

A termination rule based on a critical funding ratio is proposed for a pension guarantee fund (PGF) that considers closing an underfunded pension plan. This ratio is determined by solving an expected utility maximization problem on behalf of plan beneficiaries subject to two constraints designed to preserve the PGF's viability. The first is an upper bound on the PGF's annual intervention probability; the second, a restriction on the expected shortfall of an underfunded pension plan that is not closed. Both too low and too high critical funding ratios hurt beneficiaries’ interests, depending on their degree of risk aversion.     

Do Managers of U.S. Defined Benefit Pension Plan Sponsors Use Regulatory Freedom Strategically?

We use historical particularities of pension funding law to investigate whether managers of U.S. corporate defined benefit pension plan sponsors strategically use regulatory freedom to lower the reported value of pension liabilities, and hence required cash contributions. For some years, pension plans were required to estimate two liabilities—one with mandated discount rates and mortality assumptions, and another where these could be chosen freely. Using a sample of 11,963 plans, we find that the regulated liability exceeds the unregulated measure by 10% and the difference further increases for underfunded pension plans. Underfunded plans tend to assume substantially higher discount rates and lower life expectancy. The effect persists both in the cross‐section of plans and over time and it serves to reduce cash contributions. We further show that plan sponsor managers use the freed‐up cash for corporate investment and that credit risk is unlikely to explain the finding.     

What determines corporate pension fund risk-taking strategy?

Corporate sponsors of defined benefit pension plans generally assume low investment risk when they have low funding ratios and high default risk, consistent with the risk management hypothesis. However, for financially distressed sponsors and sponsors that freeze, terminate, or convert defined benefit to defined contribution plans, the risk-shifting incentive (moral hazard) dominates. Pension fund risk-taking is also affected by labor unionization and sponsor incentives to maximize tax benefits, restore financial slack, and justify the accounting choices of pension assumptions. Sponsors shift toward an aggressive risk strategy when their pension plans emerge from underfunding, bankruptcy risk is reduced, or marginal tax rate decreases. Overall, we show that corporate sponsors adopt a dynamic risk-taking strategy in their pension fund investments.     

Pension regulation and the market value of pension liabilities: A contingent claims analysis using Parisian options

We analyze the market-consistent valuation of pension liabilities in a contingent claim framework whereby a knock-out barrier feature is applied to capture early regulatory closure of a pension plan. We investigate two cases which we call “immediate closure procedure” and “delayed closure procedure”. In an immediate closure procedure, when the assets value hits the regulatory boundary, the pension plan is terminated immediately. Whereas in a delayed closure procedure, a grace period is given to the pension fund for reorganization and recovery before premature closure is executed. The framework is then used to construct fair pension deals. Furthermore, we provide rules for deriving the optimal recovery period in pension regulation using utility analysis and interconnect the recovery period to the regulatory liquidation probability.     

通货膨胀预期对居民基本养老保险的影响测算

我国基本养老保险的个人账户部分根据政策规定,每年参考银行同期存款利率计息。但由于我国的存款利率长期以来低于通货膨胀率水平,再考虑到养老金负债的长期性,这使得我国养老基金面临较大的通胀风险。本文建立了个人账户通胀风险的精算模型,并对记账利率和通货膨胀率进行估计来分析个人账户的通胀风险。本文的结论是,在当前制度下,我国养老保险个人账户部分存在较大的通胀风险,但随着通胀率的上升,通胀风险的增度会下降。     

Underfunding pension obligations while paying dividends: evidence of risk transfers

This research examines the differential effects of earnings, dividends, and cashflows on increases and decreases in pension liabilities. Of the 1700 firms in the Value Line Investment Survey (1997a), there were 189 firms with pension liabilities—88 (101) firms with increasing (decreasing) pension liabilities that serve as research observations. For firms with increasing pension liabilities, there is a significant correlation between the increase in pension liabilities and earnings, cashflows, and dividends. However, none of these relationships exist for firms with decreasing pension liabilities. The underfunding of pension funds is a unilateral decision by management that effectively transfers risk away from stockholders and imposes it on employees and potentially on the society at large. This risk transfer is not associated with any compensatory returns and suggests social and regulatory policies should be reconsidered.     

Asset Funding in der betrieblichen Altersversorgung

In Germany, the most widespread funding method for occupational pension schemes is self-funding via book reserve. The term “asset funding” applies to situations when the company sets aside separate assets to fund these liabilities. This is a significant factor for a company’s risk management. International accounting standards and the requirements of Basel II are helping to make asset funding of book reserves more and more attractive. This article represents a first step towards a full-scale scientific analysis of this complex of issues. In particular, it provides a systematic classification of the various methods of asset funding and presents corresponding investment strategies.     

Spinoff/Terminations and the Value of Pension Insurance

This paper derives the value of Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation (PBGC) pension insurance under two scenarios of interest. The first allows for voluntary plan termination, which appears to be legal under current statutes. In the second scenario, termination is prohibited unless the firm is bankrupt. Empirical estimates of PBGC liabilities are calculated. These show that prospective PBGC liabilities greatly exceed current reserves for plan terminations, that even under a bankruptcy-only termination rule, PBGC liabilities still would be quite sensitive to discretionary funding policy, and that the increasingly common practice of pension spinoff/terminations, substantially increases the present value of the PBGC's contingent liabilities.     

Developments in pension reform: the case of Dutch stand-alone collective pension schemes

Corporate defined-benefit plans suffer from a number of serious weaknesses, including credit risk of the sponsor, ambiguous ownership of the surplus and back-loading of benefits. Also defined-contribution plans feature drawbacks. Individuals are not well equipped to make the complex financial decisions involved, transaction costs are substantial and various risks are not managed properly over the life cycle. Stand-alone collective pension schemes offer an attractive third way between corporate defined-benefit schemes and individual defined-contribution schemes. The members of the fund are the risk bearers and the funds manage risk aimed at providing an adequate income level during retirement at low costs. Dutch pension funds are evolving into such stand-alone pension schemes. Some directions for future reforms are sketched.     

The Pension Protection Fund*

We develop a model of the Pension Protection Fund (PPF), a defined benefit pension guarantee system for the UK, based on an analogy between pension liabilities and corporate debt obligations. We show that the PPF is likely to face many years of low claims interspersed irregularly with periods of very large claims. There is a significant chance that these claims will be so large that the PPF will default on its liabilities, leaving the government with no option but to bail it out. The cause of this problem is the double impact of a fall in equity prices on the PPF: it makes sponsor firms more likely to default and it makes defaulted plans more likely to be underfunded. We use our model to derive a fair premium for PPF insurance under different circumstances, to estimate the extent of cross‐subsidies in the PPF between strong and weak sponsors, and to show that risk‐rated premiums are unlikely to have a substantial effect on either the size or the lumpiness of claims. We argue that for the PPF to operate effectively, it should be introduced in tandem with strong minimum funding requirements and a lower level of benefit guarantee than at present.     

Do a firm's equity returns reflect the risk of its pension plan?

This paper examines the empirical question of whether systematic equity risk of US firms as measured by beta from the capital asset pricing model reflects the risk of their pension plans. There are a number of reasons to suspect that it might not. Chief among them is the opaque set of accounting rules used to report pension assets, liabilities, and expenses. Pension plan assets and liabilities are off-balance sheet and are often viewed as segregated from the rest of the firm, with its own trustees. Pension accounting rules are complicated. Furthermore, the role of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation clouds the real relation between pension plan risk and firm equity risk. The empirical findings in this paper are consistent with the hypothesis that equity risk does reflect the risk of the firm's pension plan despite arcane accounting rules for pensions. This finding is consistent with informational efficiency of the capital markets. It also has implications for corporate finance practice in the determination of the cost of capital for capital budgeting. Standard procedure uses de-leveraged equity return betas to infer the cost of capital for operating assets. But the de-leveraged betas are not adjusted for the risk of the pension assets and liabilities. Failure to make this adjustment typically biases upward estimates of the discount rate for capital budgeting. The magnitude of the bias is shown here to be large for a number of well-known US companies. This bias can result in positive net present value projects being rejected.     

Discretion in accounting for pensions under IAS 19: using the ‘magic telescope’?

We use a panel data set of UK-listed companies over the period 2005–2009 to analyse the actuarial assumptions used to value pension plan liabilities under IAS 19. The valuation process requires companies to make assumptions about financial and demographic variables, notably discount rate, price inflation, salary inflation and mortality/life expectancy of plan members/beneficiaries. We use regression analysis to analyse the relationships between these key assumptions (except mortality, where disclosures are limited) and company-specific factors such as the pension plan funding position and duration of pension liabilities. We find evidence of selective ‘management’ of the three assumptions investigated, although the nature of this appears to differ from the findings of US authors. We conclude that IAS 19 does not prevent the use of managerial discretion, particularly by companies whose pension plan funding positions are weak, thereby reducing the representational faithfulness of the reported pension figures. We also highlight that the degree of discretion used reflects the extent to which IAS 19 defines how the assumptions are to be determined. We therefore suggest that companies should be encouraged to justify more explicitly their choice of assumptions.     

Allocating Shareholder Capital to Pension Plans

This article discusses the corporate challenge of providing retirement income to employees while limiting the costs and risks of pension plans to the companies themselves by addressing five main questions:

• ? What are the major issues and challenges surrounding pensions? Although the pension shortfalls have been the focus of attention, the author argues that the more serious concern is the risk stemming from the mismatch between pension assets and pension liabilities— that is, the funding of debt‐like liabilities with equity‐heavy asset portfolios.
• ? To what extent do the equity market and equity prices reflect the shortfall in value and the mismatch in risk? While the author describes some evidence of the market's ability to capture pension risk, analysts' P/E multiples and management's assessments of cost of capital may still be distorted by failure to take full account of the risks associated with pension assets.
• ? How should management analyze and formulate strategic solutions? Without offering specific solutions, the author presents a framework for analyzing the problem from a strategic perspective that can be used in formulating a company's pension policy. In particular, the article recommends that companies take an integrated perspective that views pension assets and liabilities as parts of the corporate balance sheet, and the pension asset allocation decision as a critical aspect of a corporate‐wide enterprise risk management program.
• ? If a company chooses to make a major change in its pension policy, such as a partial or complete immunization accomplished by substituting bonds for stocks, how would you communicate the new policy to the rating agencies and investors?
• ? What are the major issues to be thinking about when contemplating a change from a DB plan to a defined contribution, or DC, plan? The author argues that DC plans without some corporate oversight or responsibility for results are not a long‐term solution.

     

Regime switching based portfolio selection for pension funds

This paper shows how a mean variance criterion can be applied to a multi period setting in order to obtain efficient portfolios in an asset and liability context. The optimization model allows for rebalancing activities, transaction costs, stochastic volatilities for both assets and liabilities. Furthermore, a general framework for the projection of pension fund liabilities as well as for the generation of asset returns is given. In a further step the dynamics of the liability maturity structure is modeled as customized index, whose volatility and correlation with asset returns become integral components of the applied regime switching approach. The numerical results illustrate the diversification of the assets and its risk return pattern in dependency of the liability dynamics.