A two-country model of trade and growth with intersectoral knowledge spillovers

We formulate a two-country, two-good, two-factor endogenous growth model with learning by doing and intersectoral knowledge spillovers. Our model exhibits no transitional dynamics because of constant returns to capital, the existence of only one state variable for each country, and the factor price equalization theorem. By applying our model to the problem of aid and growth, we show that a permanent increase in untied aid raises the common growth rate if and only if the propensity to consume the capital-intensive good in the recipient country is larger than in the donor country.     

Tax Havens,Growth, and Welfare

This paper develops an endogenous growth model featuring tax havens, and uses it to examine how the existence of tax havens affects the economic growth rate and social welfare in high‐tax countries. We show that the presence of tax havens generates two conflicting channels in determining the growth effect. First, the public investment effect states that tax havens may erode tax revenues and in turn decrease the government's infrastructure expenditure, thereby reducing growth. Second, the tax planning effect of tax havens reduces marginal cost of capital and hence encourages capital accumulation so as to spur economic growth. The overall growth effect is ambiguous and is determined by the extent of these two effects. The welfare analysis shows that tax havens are more likely to be welfare‐enhancing if the government expenditure share in production is low, or the initial income tax rate is high. Moreover, the welfare‐maximizing income tax rate is lower than the growth‐maximizing income tax rate if tax havens are present.     

Industrial Targeting and Non‐shiftable Capital in the Harris–Todaro Model*

This paper shows that, in the 2 × 3 sector‐specific capital Harris–Todaro model, capital growth owing to either domestic or foreign investment always enhances the welfare of the country (i.e. non‐immiserizing), and this result of non‐immiserizing foreign investment holds regardless of initial holdings of foreign capital; the policy of industrial targeting via capital investment is more effective vis‐à‐vis the (neoclassical) 2 × 2 mobile‐capital Harris–Todaro model or the Heckscher–Ohlin model; in contrast to the recent generalization by Marjit and Beladi (2003 ), capital growth cannot be immiserizing in the present model, even if it destroys the “envelope theorem.”     

Tied to Capital or Untied Foreign Aid?

A two-country trade model of foreign aid is developed. The aid-receiving country suffers from Harris-Todaro type unemployment. Aid is either untied, tied to sector-specific capital, or tied to intersectorally mobile capital. These types of aid are compared by examining their terms-of-trade and welfare effects to show that (i) welfare paradoxes are possible, (ii) the world as a whole may gain from aid, (iii) a conflict of interest concerning the type of aid may arise between donor and recipient, and (iv) under plausible conditions untied aid is better for the recipient and the world.     

Monopoly,intermediate goods and the pure theory of international trade

Conclusion In a model with two traded good sectors between which intersectoral flows of intermediate goods are allowed and with a monopolized non-traded good sector, the wage rate in terms of two traded goods increases and the rental of capital in terms of two traded goods decreases when the price of relatively more labor intensive traded good sector increases, though nothing definite can be said about the direction of change in the wage rate and rental in terms of the non-traded good. When prices of traded goods are kept constant and labor and/or capital increase(s), output of the non-traded good sector increases provided that the non-traded good is not inferior, having income elasticity of demand less than unity. The factor intensity condition for the traded goods is in general not sufficient for the validity of the Rybczynski theorem to hold with respect to net outputs of the traded goods. We have derived sufficient conditions for the magnification effect to be observed with respect to net outputs of the traded good sectors. Specifically, we have shown that the factor intensity condition (23) is sufficient for the magnification effect to prevail when only labor increases.     

TOURISM,DUTCH DISEASE AND WELFARE IN AN OPEN DYNAMIC ECONOMY*

This paper examines the effects of an expansion in tourism on capital accumulation, sectoral output and resident welfare in an open economy with an externality in the traded good sector. An expansion of tourism increases the relative price of the nontraded good, improves the tertiary terms of trade and hence yields a gain in revenue. However, this increase in the relative price of nontraded goods results in a lowering of the demand for capital used in the traded sector. The subsequent de‐industrialization in the traded good sector may lower resident welfare. This result is supported by numerical simulations.     

Skilled–unskilled wage inequality,product variety,public input and increasing returns: A static general equilibrium analysis

The paper develops a four sector small open economy model with two traded final good sectors, a public intermediate good producing sector and a nontraded good sector producing varieties of intermediate goods. There are three primary factors: capital, skilled labour and unskilled labour. Industrial sector producing a traded good uses capital, intermediate goods and skilled labour as inputs. Intermediate goods producing sector also uses capital and skilled labour. Public input producing sector and the agricultural sector producing the other traded good use capital and unskilled labour as inputs. It is shown that, if production technologies are the same for the agricultural sector and the public input producing sector and if the scale elasticity of output is very low, then an increase in capital stock (unskilled labour endowment) raises (lowers) the skilled–unskilled wage ratio. However, an increase in skilled labour endowment does not produce any unambiguous effect. On the other hand, an increase in the tax rate on industrial output and/or an increase in the price of the agricultural product, armed with the same set of assumptions, lowers the skilled–unskilled wage ratio.     

TIMING OF LUMPY INVESTMENT,PRICING AND TECHNICAL PROGRESS

In equipment‐intensive sectors – such as water utilities, power generation, and gas – billions of dollars are spent in capital equipment. The nature of the investment is often lumpy: at some point a plant has to be replaced and a large investment is required. We characterize the dynamic optimal investment policy of profit‐maximizing and welfare‐maximizing firms. We first show that, when there is no technical progress, the duration of the plant is longer for a profit‐maximizing firm. We then consider technical progress leading to either capacity expansion or to operating costs reduction. We show that duration tends to increase when the installed capacity increases over time, while it tends to decrease when technical progress reduces operating costs, both for profit‐maximizing and welfare‐maximizing firms. Under some conditions, when capacity expands over time the duration of the plant is longer for a profit‐maximizing firm than for a welfare‐maximizing firm.     

Effect of World Fertility Scenarios on International Living Standards

This paper applies a two good, multi‐region Ramsey‐Solow model of the world economy to determine the impact that alternative world fertility rates would have on international capital markets and living standards. Notable features of the model include: relative consumption demands and relative employment efficiencies that vary by age, traded and non‐traded goods, vintage technology, outward‐looking reference consumption, a proportion of non‐optimising rule‐of‐thumb consumers and imperfect capital mobility due to asymmetric information. The model suggests that projected demographic change will imply a flow of international capital from the ageing regions to the younger regions; and that the world interest rate will fall. The lower world interest rate will cause a loss in living standards for ageing regions, the lenders, and a gain for the younger regions, who are borrowers.     

Aid for Trade and Global Growth

Aid for trade increases a recipient's public services, which lower its import and export transport costs. Formulating a two‐country endogenous growth model, we obtain two main results. First, a permanent increase in the donor's aid/gross domestic product (GDP) ratio raises the steady‐state growth rate as well as both countries' long‐run fractions and cost shares of imported varieties if and only if it lowers the product of transport costs. Second, under a plausible condition, there exists a unique interior growth‐maximizing aid/GDP ratio. These results are robust to alternative specifications for congestion and stock‐flow nature of public goods.     

Growth,revenue, and welfare effects of tariff and tax reform: Win–win–win strategies

We examine growth, revenue, and welfare effects of tariff and tax reform with a two-good, two-factor endogenous growth model. Learning-by-doing and intersectoral knowledge spillovers contribute to endogenous growth consistent with incomplete specialization. We obtain two main results. First, trade liberalization raises (or lowers) the growth rate if and only if the import sector is more effective-labor-intensive (or capital-intensive). Second, we can attain growth, revenue, and welfare gains by combining consumer–price–neutral tariff and tax reform for growth enhancement with an additional rise in the consumption tax on the less distorted good.     

Labor Mobility, Trade, and Social Capital

Labor market integration raises welfare in the absence of distortions. This paper examines labor and goods market integration in a general‐equilibrium model with social capital. The findings are: (i) labor market integration has an ambiguous impact on welfare, and raises it if the goods and labor skills are sufficiently different; (ii) compared to Pareto optimum, labor mobility (social capital) is excessively large (depleted); (iii) trade is superior to labor market integration if trading costs are no higher than private migration costs, otherwise the outcome is ambiguous; and (iv) the creation of new institutions in response to labor market integration has an ambiguous impact on welfare.     

International trade and capital accumulation in an overlapping generations model with a public intermediate good

We investigate the effects of a public intermediate good on trade patterns, capital accumulation, and the gains from trade in a two‐country, three‐sector overlapping generations model. A public intermediate good affects not only the productivity of private production but capital accumulation; thus, the results differ from those obtained in previous studies. First, opening to trade may accelerate capital accumulation in the higher‐savings country. Additionally, the country producing a public intermediate good more (which is labor‐intensive) may be the importer of the investment good (which is the most capital‐intensive). Finally, the lower‐savings country may have lower steady‐state welfare under trade.     

Is tied aid bad for the recipient countries?

This paper examines the welfare effects of the exclusivity of foreign aid taking consideration of donor countries' strategic and self-interested economic motivations. Based on an oligopolistic model with strategic interactions between firms and governments providing foreign aid, we demonstrate that a higher exclusivity of foreign aid, taking the form of tied aid, increases the equilibrium amount of aid and the social welfare of the recipient country when the foreign aid policies are decided in a non-cooperative fashion between donor countries. However, when donor countries coordinate aid policies to maximize joint-welfare including recipient country's welfare, the lower exclusivity of foreign aid, taking the form of untied aid, will increase the equilibrium amount of aid and the global social welfare. The results implicate that when a credible enforcement mechanism for the cooperative regime for foreign aid is not available, tied aid is welfare dominant policy for both donor and recipient countries than untied aid.     

财政政策、货币政策与国外经济援助

本文通过把国外经济援助分成直接对私人的经济援助和直接对政府的经济援助来讨论这两类经济援助对政府财政政策和货币政策的影响。我们发现对私人的经济援助的增加可以使得私人消费水平和政府公共消费水平增加 ,但是它也导致政府收入税税率和通货膨胀率的提高 ;另一方面 ,对政府的经济援助增加可以使得均衡时的私人资本存量、私人消费水平和政府公共消费水平增加 ,同时可以使得均衡时的收入税税率和通货膨胀率下降。     

Remittances and the Effectiveness of Foreign Aid

We argue that donors could improve the effectiveness of foreign aid by pursuing complementary and coherent non‐aid policies. In particular, we hypothesize that aid has stronger growth effects if recipients receive more aid from donors who allow for (temporary) worker mobility and (more permanent) migration. We focus on overall remittances paid by the donor countries to proxy for worker mobility and migration. Our empirical results support the hypothesis that higher remittances paid by donor countries strengthen the growth effects of foreign aid.     

Market entry and trade weighted import costs

Trade weighting is a common method of aggregating trade frictions. It will understate changes in these costs when there are non‐ad valorem trade costs and quality differences. Newly traded goods enter at higher trade costs than previously traded ones. Lower import costs shift trade to low‐quality goods with higher measured trade costs. These effects are quantitatively important. U.S. import costs fall more than twice as fast as trade weighted measures from 1974 to 2004 after the impact of shifting quality and newly traded goods is accounted for. Empirical estimates that use trade weighting will underestimate the welfare impact of trade costs.     

Physical capital,knowledge capital,and the choice between FDI and outsourcing

Abstract There exist two approaches in the literature concerning the multinational firm’s mode choice for foreign production between an owned subsidiary and a licensing contract. One approach considers environments where the firm transfers primarily knowledge‐based assets and assumes that knowledge is non‐excludable. A more recent approach takes the property‐right view of the firm and assumes that physical capital is fully excludable. This paper combines both forms of capital assets in a single model. There are subtleties, and added structure is needed to establish what ex ante seems a straightforward testable hypothesis: relatively physical‐capital‐intensive firms choose outsourcing while relatively knowledge‐capital‐intensive firms choose FDI.     

International Factor Mobility, Government Size and Welfare

An examination of the available data reveals that the size of government varies considerably across time and countries. By making use of a simple general equilibrium model, this paper demonstrates that size of government is affected by the availability of capital and labour within an economy. Specifically, this paper utilises a model of a closed economy that produces one-private and one-public good. Both goods are produced by means of capital and labour. Production functions are subject to constant returns to scale and perfect competition prevails in all markets. The elasticity of substitution between the public and the private good is greater than unity and there is no international factor mobility in the initial equilibrium. The size of government is measured by total spending on the public good as a proportion of the total expenditure on the private and public goods. It is shown that capital (labour) inflow can decrease (increase) the size of government. Capital inflow increases welfare if the private good is relatively capital intensive whereas labour inflow increases welfare if the public good is relatively capital intensive.     

The Financial Resource Curse*

In this paper, we present a model of the financial resource curse (i.e., episodes of abundant access to foreign capital coupled with weak productivity growth). We study a two‐sector (i.e., tradable and non‐tradable) small open economy. The tradable sector is the engine of growth, and productivity growth is increasing with the amount of labor employed by firms in the tradable sector. A period of large capital inflows, triggered by a fall in the interest rate, is associated with a consumption boom. While the increase in tradable consumption is financed through foreign borrowing, the increase in non‐tradable consumption requires a shift of productive resources toward the non‐tradable sector at the expenses of the tradable sector. The result is stagnant productivity growth. We show that capital controls can be welfare‐enhancing and can be used as a second‐best policy tool to mitigate the misallocation of resources during an episode of financial resource curse.