Financial Dampening

We propose a novel mechanism, “financial dampening,” whereby loan retrenchment by banks attenuates the effectiveness of monetary policy. The theory unifies an endogenous supply of illiquid local loans and risk sharing among subsidiaries of bank holding companies (BHCs). We derive an instrumental variable (IV) strategy that separates supply-driven loan retrenchment from local loan demand by exploiting linkages through BHC internal capital markets across spatially separate BHC member banks. We estimate that retrenching banks increase loan supply substantially less in response to exogenous monetary policy rate reductions. This relative decline has persistent effects on local employment and thus provides a rationale for slow recoveries from financial distress.     

The relationship between house prices and house purchase loans: The Spanish case

This paper looks at recent developments in house purchase loans and house prices in Spain and the linkages between them. It aims at identifying deviations of these variables from their equilibrium levels, and for this purpose, we estimate a vector error-correction model. The results show that both variables are interdependent in the long-run and that both variables were above their equilibrium level by the end of the sample period (2009:Q1). The paper also offers insight into how overvaluation (overindebtedness) in house prices can lead to a false sense of no overindebtedness (house prices overvaluation).     

Implications of bank ownership for the credit channel of monetary policy transmission: Evidence from India

Using bank-level data from India, we examine the impact of ownership on the reaction of banks to monetary policy, and also test whether the reaction of different types of banks to monetary policy changes is different in easy and tight policy regimes. Our results suggest that there are considerable differences in the reactions of different types of banks to monetary policy initiatives of the central bank, and that the bank lending channel of monetary policy is likely to be much more effective in a tight money period than in an easy money period. We also find differences in impact of monetary policy changes on less risky short-term and more risky medium-term lending. We discuss the policy implications of the findings.     

Did the crisis induce credit rationing for French SMEs?

This paper focuses on the access of independent French SMEs to bank lending and analyzes whether the observed evolution of credit to SMEs over the recent period was “demand driven” as a result of the decrease in firms’ activity and investment projects or was “supply driven” with an increase in credit “rationing” stemming from a more cautious behavior of banks. Based on a sample of around 60,000 SMEs, we come to the conclusion that, despite the stronger standards used by banks when granting credit, French SMEs do not appear to have been strongly affected by credit rationing since 2008. This result goes against the common view that SMEs suffered from a strong credit restriction during the crisis but is perfectly in line with the results of several surveys about the access to finance of SMEs recently conducted in France.     

How do banks respond to shocks? A dynamic model of deposit-taking institutions

This paper proposes a dynamic model of the optimal choices of a bank that benefits from market power and takes into account the impact of the deposit generation process. Interbank lending/borrowing emerges as a buffer that assists the bank in smoothing intertemporal adjustments in interdependent loan and deposit choices. The bank smooths the impact of interest-rates shocks on its customers to minimize the adjustments over time of the stocks of deposits and loans. It does not, however, provide insurance against negative shocks of real origin that increase its expected default costs. The predictions of the model help to shed light on the available empirical evidence and to analyze some recent developments of the banking industry.     

The eurosystem money market auctions: A banking perspective

This paper analyzes the individual bidding behavior of German banks in the money market auctions conducted by the ECB from the beginning of 2000:IIIQ to the end of 2001:IQ. Our approach takes a variety of characteristics of the individual banks into account, particularly variables that capture the different use of liquidity and the different attitude towards liquidity risk of the individual banks. It turns out that these characteristics are reflected in banks’ bidding behavior. Thus, our study contributes to a deeper understanding of the way liquidity risk is managed in the banking sector.     

The macroeconomic sources of systemic risk in the banking sectors of five new EU member states

Rapid credit growth has been one of the most pervasive developments in recent years in Central and Eastern Europe. Our estimates support the hypothesis that the growth of credit and the amount of available finance might harm banking performance and deteriorate non-performing loans (NPL) dynamics, most probably due to the overheating of economies in the five NMSs. The procyclicality of banking sector performance and high economic activities growth is a signal of an economy overheating and therefore a slowdown in economic activity is likely to accelerate the growth of the NPL ratio.     

Bank-specific shocks and the real economy

Governments often justify interventions into the financial system in the form of bail outs or liquidity assistance with the systemic importance of large banks for the real economy. In this paper, we analyze whether idiosyncratic shocks to loan growth at large banks have effects on real GDP growth. We employ a measure of idiosyncratic shocks which follows Gabaix (forthcoming). He shows that idiosyncratic shocks to large firms have an impact on US GDP growth. In an application to the banking sector, we find evidence that changes in lending by large banks have a significant short-run impact on GDP growth. Episodes of negative loan growth rates and the Eastern European countries in our sample drive these results.     

Bank profitability during recessions

This paper contributes to the literature on the relation between bank profitability and economic activity. When allowing for stronger co-movement of bank profit with economic activity during deep recessions, we find a much larger impact of output growth on bank profitability than commonly found in the literature. Among the different components of bank profit, loan losses are the main driver of this result. We also find long-term interest rates in previous years to be important determinants of bank profit in times of high economic growth. Our findings are robust to the use of aggregate or individual bank data.     

The Roles of Corporate Governance in Bank Failures during the Recent Financial Crisis

We analyze the roles of bank ownership, management, and compensation structures in bank failures during the recent financial crisis. Our results suggest that failures are strongly influenced by ownership structure: high shareholdings of lower‐level management and non‐chief executive officer (non‐CEO) higher‐level management increase failure risk significantly. In contrast, shareholdings of banks’ CEOs do not have a direct impact on bank failure. These findings suggest that high stakes in the bank induce non‐CEO managers to take high risks due to moral hazard incentives, which may result in bank failure. We identify tail risk in noninterest income as a primary risk‐taking channel of lower‐level managers.     

Preferential Regulatory Treatment and Banks' Demand for Government Bonds

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the impact of preferential regulatory treatment on banks' demand for government bonds. Using unique transaction‐level data, our analysis suggests that preferential treatment in microprudential liquidity and capital regulation significantly increases banks' demand for government bonds. Liquidity and capital regulation also seem to incentivize banks to substitute other bonds with government bonds. We also find evidence that this “regulatory effect” leads banks to reduce lending to the real economy.     

Lending behavior and real estate prices

The willingness of banks to provide funding for real estate purchases depends on the creditworthiness of borrowers. Besides other factors, this creditworthiness depends on the development of real estate prices. Real estate prices, in turn, depend on the demand for homes which is influenced by the supply of mortgages. I develop a theoretical model which explains this circular relationship. I show how different kinds of expectation formations can lead to fluctuations in real estate prices. Furthermore, I show that banks make above-average profits in the upswing phase of the real estate cycle but suffer high losses when the market turns.     

Unstable banking

We propose a theory of financial intermediaries operating in markets influenced by investor sentiment. In our model, banks make, securitize, distribute, and trade loans, or they hold cash. They also borrow money, using their security holdings as collateral. Banks maximize profits, and there are no conflicts of interest between bank shareholders and creditors. The theory predicts that bank credit and real investment will be volatile when market prices of loans are volatile, but it also points to the instability of banks, especially leveraged banks, participating in markets. Profit-maximizing behavior by banks creates systemic risk.