节税收益、破产成本与最优资本结构

本文在正确定义债务的节税收益和破产成本的基础上,运用实物期权定义并定量描述了破产成本,进而建立了确定最优资本结构的ZZ杠杆模型。将自变量的典型值代入模型得出的最优债务比率与以往的实际调查数据非常接近,从而使一些长期难以解释的"资本结构之谜",例如"财务保守行为"等得到了一个合理的解释。     

Optimal Capital Structure,Endogenous Bankruptcy,and the Term Structure of Credit Spreads

This article examines the optimal capital structure of a firm that can choose both the amount and maturity of its debt. Bankruptcy is determined endogenously rather than by the imposition of a positive net worth condition or by a cash flow constraint. The results extend Leland's (1994a) closed-form results to a much richer class of possible debt structures and permit study of the optimal maturity of debt as well as the optimal amount of debt. The model predicts leverage, credit spreads, default rates, and writedowns, which accord quite closely with historical averages. While short term debt does not exploit tax benefits as completely as long term debt, it is more likely to provide incentive compatibility between debt holders and equity holders. Short term debt reduces or eliminates “asset substitution” agency costs. The tax advantage of debt must be balanced against bankruptcy and agency costs in determining the optimal maturity of the capital structure. The model predicts differently shaped term structures of credit spreads for different levels of risk. These term structures are similar to those found empirically by Sarig and Warga (1989). Our results have important implications for bond portfolio management. In general, Macaulay duration dramatically overstates true duration of risky debt, which may be negative for “junk” bonds. Furthermore, the “convexity” of bond prices can become “concavity.”     

农村人力资本投资结构与内生经济增长

本文从理论上构建了农村人力资本投资结构(包括私人和公共)对农村经济增长影响的模型,运用我国四大经济地区面板数据分析了农村私人和公共教育投资与健康投资对人力资本增量的促进作用,以及人力资本增量对农村经济增长的内在影响并加以检验.结果主要表明:农村人力资本投资结构对人力资本增量,人力资本增量对农村经济增长都具有一定的正向作用;农村私人和公共人力资本投资相对强调了教育投资而轻视了健康投资;私人人力资本投资产出效率高于公共人力资本投资产出效率;四大地区农村人力资本投资额与结构都存在较为明显的差距.     

Bank Capital Requirements, Capital Structure and Regulation

This paper studies the impact of capital requirements, deposit insurance and franchise value on a bank’s capital structure. We find that properly regulated banks voluntarily choose to maintain capital in excess of the minimum required. Central to this decision is both firm franchise value and the ability of regulators to place banks in receivership stripping equity holders of firm value. These features of our model help explain both the capital structure of the large mortgage Government Sponsored Enterprises and the recent increase in risk taking through leverage by financial institutions. The insights gained from the model are useful in guiding the discussion of financial regulatory reforms.     

资本结构、产权结构与公司治理

资本结构也就是财产所有权的结构安排,而财产所有权往往最终与收益权对应,所以资本结构又牵系着产权安排,或者说资本结构决定了产权安排结构。这样作为股权资本与债券资本比例关系的资本结构,反映的是市场经济条件下企业的金融关系,即以资本和信用为纽带,通过投资与借贷构成的股东、债权人和经营者之间相互制约的利益关系。     

Perquisites,Risk, and Capital Structure

In a corporate agency problem, perquisites and risk interact to produce novel, complex comparative statics. For example, even if additional debt induces risk-neutral insiders to increase risk, they never seek to increase the market value of their stock; instead, insiders decrease the present value of their subsequent, conditionally optimal perquisites. Also, the firm's optimal capital structure includes a risky bond with an agreement to remove insiders whenever the bond defaults. However, the optimal sharing rule between corporate claimants cannot be supported solely by standard securities such as bonds, stocks, options, and their hybrids.     

Capital Structure, Compensation and Incentives

This article illustrates an incentive-aligning role of debtin the presence of optimal compensation contracts. Owing toinformation asymmetry, value-maximizing compensation contractsallow managerial rents following high investment outcomes. Themanager has an incentive to increase these rents by choosinginvestments that generate greater information asymmetry. Anaptly chosen debt level mitigates this incentive, because investmentsthat generate greater information asymmetry have more volatileoutcomes. The greater volatility would make the debt risky,causing the shareholders to focus on high outcomes and thereforecompensation contracts that reduce managerial rents. At theoptimum, the manager avoids opportunistic investments, and theshareholders offer value-maximizing compensation contracts.Empirically, the analysis predicts a negative relationship betweenleverage and market-to-book that is reversed at extreme market-to-bookratios, a negative relationship between leverage and profitability,a negative relationship between leverage and pay-for-performance,and a positive relationship between pay-for-performance andinvestment opportunities.     

Industry Structure and Ripple Effects of Bankruptcy Announcements

The market structure of an industry plays an important role in determining the stock market performance of surviving firms during intra-industry bankruptcy announcements. On evaluating the announcement effects of a survivor sample from each of two industries with very different market structures, namely the airline industry and the railroad industry, we find that the airline sample received significant abnormal returns (positive ripple) while the railroad sample experienced significant abnormal losses (negative ripple). Furthermore, the differences of the abnormal returns from the two samples also are statistically significant. These findings demonstrate support for the market structure hypothesis (MSH), but cast doubt on the contagion effect hypothesis (CEH).     

Access to Capital, Capital Structure, and the Funding of the Firm

Based upon a large data set of public and private firms in the United Kingdom, I find that compared to their public counterparts, private firms rely almost exclusively on debt financing, have higher leverage ratios, and tend to avoid external capital markets, leading to a greater sensitivity of their capital structures to fluctuations in performance. I argue that these differences are due to private equity being more costly than public equity. I further examine the private firms subsample to show that private equity is more costly than its public counterpart due to information asymmetry and the desire to maintain control.     

资本结构、股权结构与中小企业成长性——基于中小企业板数据的实证分析

本文以中小企业板上市企业2004-2009年数据为基础,以资产市值账面比衡量企业成长性,分析了我国中小上市企业资本结构和股权结构对成长性的影响。实证结果表明,资产负债率和长期负债率均对成长性具有显著正向影响,意味着较高的负债能降低外部权益成本,有利于中小上市企业的成长。成长性与股权集中度显著正相关,表明股权集中有利于股东对管理层进行监督,降低代理成本并能促进中小上市企业成长。管理层持股比重的改变对中小上市企业的成长性无显著影响。     

垄断性质、国有产权与企业人力资本贡献

企业是人力资本与非人力资本的特别契约,企业人力资本对于企业产出到底带来怎样的效应却并不确定,本文利用上市公司年报披露数据研究企业职工教育水平与企业业绩的关系。研究发现：在我国上市公司,企业职工的综合教育水平对于企业业绩有着正向的影响,人力资本对于业绩有着较大贡献,且中等学历（大专及本科）对于企业业绩的贡献最大,低等学历的职工对于企业业绩贡献为负。进一步研究发现。企业性质和行业垄断性影响着二者的关系：国有企业,特别是垄断行业的国有企业,职工教育水平对于业绩的贡献并不明显。这从侧面显示了国有企业特别是国有垄断企业人力资源配置的不合理性。     

国有商业银行人力资本产权与公司治理结构设计

国有商业银行人力资本产权的作用日益突出,人力资本产权直接影响国有商业银行公司治理结构。要充分肯定商业银行公司治理结构发展的“路径依赖”特征,在原有制度的运行基础上充分体现商业银行的特殊性——人力资本产权,对现有公司治理结构进行渐近式的边际调整,最终在引入人力资本产权的基础上形成国有商业银行公司治理结构设计。     

人力资本、产业发展与经济增长

本文利用中国30个省级单位2001~2014年的面板数据,对人力资本和经济增长之间的关系进行实证分析,实证结果显示:人力资本和经济增长之间呈现出显著的"倒U型"关系:当人均劳动力受教育年限低于8.9年时,人力资本促进了经济增长速度;当人均劳动力受教育年限高于8.9年时,人力资本放缓了经济增长速度.进一步研究人力资本对三次产业发展的影响,本文发现人力资本和第一、第二产业比重之间呈现出显著的"倒U型"关系,而与第三产业比重呈现出显著的"U型"关系.这说明前期人力资本主要通过对第二产业的推动作用来促进经济增长;后期人力资本抑制了第二产业发展,而拉动第三产业发展潜力还没凸显,导致了人力资本增长给经济增长带来了负面效应.     

Capital Structure, CEO Dominance, and Corporate Performance

We use agency theory to investigate the influence of CEO dominance on variation in capital structure. Due to agency conflicts, managers may not always adopt leverage choices that maximize shareholders’ value. Consistent with the prediction of agency theory, the evidence reveals that, when the CEO plays a more dominant role among top executives, the firm adopts significantly lower leverage, probably to evade the disciplinary mechanisms associated with debt financing. Our results are important as they demonstrate that CEO power matters to critical corporate outcomes such as capital structure decisions. In addition, we find that the impact of changes in capital structure on firm performance is more negative for firms with more powerful CEOs. Overall, the results are in agreement with prior literature, suggesting that strong CEO dominance appears to exacerbate agency costs and is thus detrimental to firm value.     

Agency Costs, Risk Management, and Capital Structure

The joint determination of capital structure and investment risk is examined. Optimal capital structure reflects both the tax advantages of debt less default costs (Modigliani and Miller (1958, 1963)), and the agency costs resulting from asset substitution (Jensen and Meckling (1976)). Agency costs restrict leverage and debt maturity and increase yield spreads, but their importance is small for the range of environments considered. Risk management is also examined. Hedging permits greater leverage. Even when a firm cannot precommit to hedging, it will still do so. Surprisingly, hedging benefits often are greater when agency costs are low.     

资本结构选择偏好、成长性与公司绩效

本文通过基于不同资本结构选择偏好和成长性分类对上市公司资本结构和绩效的关系进行研究,研究发现:我国上市公司资本结构与绩效整体呈负相关;考虑内生性基础上,资本结构对绩效的负面影响提高了;不同负债水平下,资本结构对绩效的影响存在显著差异,且负债水平越高,资本结构对公司绩效的影响越大;在不同成长性水平下,资本结构与绩效都是负相关的,且成长性越低负面影响越大。     

制度环境、产权性质与资本结构

以沪、深两市2004-2009年上市公司为研究对象,将制度环境与产权性质纳入统一分析框架,深入研究了我国各地区制度环境差异对公司资本结构的影响以及上述影响在不同产权性质公司间的差异。研究表明:市场化程度高的地区具有相对较低的负债水平,而政府部门能够通过行政干预帮助公司获取银行贷款,政府干预程度与资产负债率显著正相关;随着法律环境的改善,公司倾向于降低资产负债率水平;相对于非国有控制公司,在国有控制公司,市场化程度、法律环境对资产负债率的负向影响更大,而政府干预程度对资产负债率的正向影响也更大。这一研究结果不仅丰富了国内外学者关于资本结构影响因素的经验研究,而且有助于深入理解我国公司资本结构不合理的制度根源。     

金融错配、资产专用性与资本结构

当前金融错配显著存在于我国金融市场运行中,金融错配模糊了债务融资的市场治理结构属性,从而扭曲了资产专用性与资本结构之间的关系。本文通过选取2009-2013年我国沪深两市A股上市公司为样本,检验金融错配的存在性以及金融错配对资产专用性与资本结构关系的影响。研究结论表明:金融错配对上市公司资产专用性与资本结构的关系的影响呈现所有制上的差异性。国有上市公司存在的金融错配问题,引发其资产专用性治理结构属性变迁,资产专用性与资本结构正相关;民营上市公司不存在金融错配问题,资产专用性与资本结构负相关。     

货币政策、信贷渠道与资本结构

我国金融市场以银行体系为主,在企业融资研究中,考察货币政策的影响具有重要的现实意义。依据"信贷观"下的贷款渠道及信贷配给理论,分析表明,当货币政策变化影响到信贷供给时,未受约束企业的资本结构在政策紧缩时受影响较小,而受约束企业的杠杆率随着政策的紧缩(宽松)而减小(增大)。考察我国2003-2009年的非金融类上市公司的资本结构,在政策紧缩时经验证据与理论分析一致;但在政策宽松时资本结构的调整与"信贷观"并不一致,受约束企业的杠杆仍然较小,未受约束企业的权益及债务均较大。研究结论对于解释我国货币政策效应及企业融资决策,改进金融监管均具有重要的借鉴。     

Public Debt,Human Capital Formation,and Dynamic Inefficiency

The present paper considers public debt in an economy where human capital formation sustains long-run per capita income growth. It shows that contrary to what has been obtained in other types of endogenous growth economies public debt may benefit current and future generations by removing dynamic inefficiency.