Sovereign Defaults,Credit to the Private Sector,and Domestic Credit Market Institutions

Sovereign defaults are associated with declines in foreign and domestic credit to the domestic private sector. This paper analyzes theoretically whether sovereign defaults can lead to this decline, even if domestic agents do not hold sovereign debt. It also studies whether the quality of domestic financial institutions affect the magnitude of this effect. In order to address these issues, the paper embeds the traditional sovereign borrower/foreign creditors relationship of the sovereign debt literature in a macromodel where widespread individual financial constraints limit a country's ability to reallocate resources. The paper finds that sovereign defaults can indeed generate a decline in foreign and domestic credit even if domestic agents do not hold sovereign debt, and that stronger domestic financial institutions can amplify this effect. These findings constitute a new step toward understanding the costs of sovereign defaults.     

Exchange Rate Policy and Sovereign Bond Spreads in Developing Countries

This paper analyzes how exchange rate policy affects the issuance and pricing of sovereign bonds for developing countries. We find that countries with less flexible exchange rate regimes pay higher spreads and are less likely to issue bonds. Changing a free‐floating regime to a fixed regime decreases the likelihood of bond issuance by 5.5% and increases the spread by 88 basis points on average. Countries with real overvaluation have higher spreads and higher bond issuance probabilities. The effects of real overvaluation on sovereign bonds tend to be magnified for countries with fixed exchange rate regimes.     

Separation of Unit of Account from Medium of Exchange

The separation of a unit of account (UoA) from a medium of exchange (MoE) in the commodity–money system is investigated by considering explicitly a seller's choice of UoA in terms of either an MoE or a unit of metal weight. If the likelihood of debasement of an MoE and its rate are high enough, the price is posted in terms of a unit of metal weight rather than an MoE. Interestingly, this MoE–UoA separated equilibrium yields the flexible nominal price, whereas an MoE–UoA integrated equilibrium yields the sticky one. This implies the nominal price rigidity in the fiat‐money system where MoE and UoA are integrated.