Inflation Targeting Matters: Evidence from OECD Economies' Sacrifice Ratios

Using data from OECD economies, we show that inflation targeters suffered smaller output losses during disinflations when compared to nontargeters. We also study why some countries choose to inflation target while others do not and find that higher average inflation and smaller debt levels render the adoption of the regime more likely. Applying Heckman's procedure to control for selection bias does not alter the link between inflation targeting and less costly disinflations.     

Political Regimes and the Cost of Disinflation

This study investigates, using data from 1960 to 1998, whether the nature of political regimes can help explain cross‐national and intertemporal variations in the cost of disinflationary policies, as measured by the sacrifice ratio. We show that, ceteris paribus, right‐wing governments have lower costs of disinflations than left‐wing governments. We argue this is due to a superior credibility, resulting from their stronger anti‐inflation reputations. In addition (and in marked contrast to previous studies), we find that when we control for political regimes, trade openness, and other standard factors in this literature, central bank independence has no significant effect on the sacrifice ratio.     

Inflation targeting: An indirect approach to assess the direct impact

It is quite difficult to assess the benefits of inflation targeting (IT) since its immediate effect will be on inflation expectations, an unobserved variable. Due to lack of comprehensive data on inflation expectations, most studies so far concentrated on the impact of IT either on observable variables like output, unemployment, and inflation or compared post-IT surveys of IT countries with non-IT countries. In our study, we focus on a yet unanswered question, i.e., how the expectations change with the adoption of IT. We suggest that heterogeneous inflation expectations lead to long memory in actual inflation, and IT, if successful, should decrease this persistence by concentrating the public’s expectations toward the announced target. Empirical results confirm our hypothesis with a reduction in inflation memory after the adoption of IT in almost all eight developed countries in our sample.     

Real Wage Rigidities and the Cost of Disinflations

This paper analyzes the cost of disinflations under real wage rigidities in a micro-founded New Keynesian model. The conventional view is that real wage rigidities can be a useful mechanism to generate a slump in output after a credible disinflationary policy because they prevent the immediate adjustment of inflation. This view is flawed, since it depends on analyzing the model in a linearized framework. Once nonlinearities are taken into account, the results change both qualitatively and quantitatively. Disinflations actually lead to a permanently higher level of output, and real wage rigidities increase the output during the adjustment to the new steady state.     

Inflation targeting,credibility, and non-linear Taylor rules

In this paper we systematically evaluate how central banks respond to deviations from the inflation target. We present a stylized New Keynesian model in which agents' inflation expectations are sensitive to deviations from the inflation target. To (re-) establish credibility, monetary policy under discretion sets higher interest rates today if average inflation exceeded the target in the past. Moreover, the central bank responds non-linearly to past inflation gaps. This is reflected in an additional term in the central bank's instrument rule, which we refer to as the ”credibility loss.” Augmenting a standard Taylor (1993) rule with the latter term, we provide empirical evidence for the interest rate response for a sample of five inflation targeting (IT) economies. We find, first, that past deviations from IT feed back into the reaction function and that this influence is economically meaningful. Deterioration in credibility (ceteris paribus) forces central bankers to undertake larger interest rate steps. Second, we detect an asymmetric reaction to positive and negative credibility losses, with the latter dominating the former.     

Does inflation targeting improve fiscal discipline?

We explore the performances of inflation targeting (IT) adoption in terms of fiscal discipline (FD), while most existing studies focus exclusively on the role of FD as a precondition for IT adoption. Using a sample of developing and developed countries, we show that IT adoption exerts a positive and significant effect on FD, a result robust to a wide variety of alternative specifications. In addition, this effect is statistically significant only in developing countries, a result that may fuel the current debate regarding the relevance of IT adoption in general, and particularly for developing countries.     

Deconstructing credibility: The breaking of monetary policy rules in Brazil

Can political interference deconstruct credibility that was hardly-earned through successful stabilization policy? We analyze the recent switch in the conduct of monetary policy by the Central Bank of Brazil (BCB). Brazil is the largest Emerging Market Economy to formally target inflation, having adopted the Inflation Targeting (IT) regime in 1999. In the early years of IT, the BCB engaged in constructing credibility with price setting agents and succeeded to anchor inflation expectations to its target even under adverse conditions such as exchange rate crises. We argue that this effort to maintain IT rules-based policy ended in 2011, as a new country president and BCB board came to power. We then discuss the consequences of this credibility loss. Our main results can be summarized as follows: (i) we provide strong empirical evidence of the BCB’s shift toward looser, discretionary policy after 2011; (ii) preliminary evidence suggests that this shift has affected agents’ inflation expectations generating social and economic costs.     

Flexible inflation targets,forex interventions and exchange rate volatility in emerging countries

Emerging economies with inflation targets (IT) face a dilemma between fulfilling the theoretical conditions of “strict IT”, which imply a fully flexible exchange rate, or applying a “flexible IT”, which entails a de facto managed-floating exchange rate with foreign exchange (forex) interventions to moderate exchange rate volatility. Using a panel data model for 37 countries we find that, although IT lead to higher exchange rate instability than alternative regimes, forex interventions in some IT countries have been more effective to lower volatility than in non-IT countries, which may justify the use of “flexible IT” by policymakers.     

Monetary policy, taxes, and the business cycle

This paper analyzes the interaction of inflation with the tax code and its contribution to aggregate fluctuations. We find significant effects operating through the tax on realized nominal capital gains. A tax on nominal bond income magnifies these effects. Our innovation is to combine monetary policy shocks with non-indexed taxes in a model where the central bank implements policy using an interest rate rule. Monetary policy had important effects on the behavior of the business cycle before 1980 because policymakers did not exert effective control over inflation. Monetary policy reform around 1980 led to better control, and with more stable inflation, the effect of the interaction between monetary policy and the nominal capital gains tax has become negligible.     

The Most Beautiful Variations on Fair Wages and the Phillips Curve

This paper explores the connection between inflation and unemployment in two different models with fair wages in both the short and the long runs. Under customary assumptions regarding the sign of the parameters of the effort function, more inflation lowers the unemployment rate, albeit to a declining extent. This is because firms respond to inflation—which spurs effort by decreasing the reference wage—by increasing employment, thus maintaining the effort level constant as implied by the Solow condition. A stronger short‐run effect of inflation on unemployment is produced under varying as opposed to fixed capital, given that in the former case the boom produced by a monetary expansion is reinforced by an increase in investment. Therefore, I provide a new theoretical foundation for recent empirical contributions that find negative long‐ and short‐run effects of inflation on unemployment.     

Does Inflation Targeting Affect the Dispersion of Inflation Expectations?

In this paper, we examine the effect of having an inflation targeting framework on the dispersion of inflation forecasts from professional forecasters. We use a panel data set of 25 countries—including 14 inflation targeters—with 16 years of monthly information. We find that the dispersion of long-run inflation expectations is smaller in targeting regimes after controlling for country-specific effects, time-specific effects, the level and the variance of inflation, disinflation periods, and global inflation. On average, the full effect is not observed until the third year after implementation of inflation targeting. When we differentiate between developed and developing countries, the dispersion of inflation expectations after inflation targeting is smaller and statistically significant only in developing countries.     

Optimal monetary policy in an economy with incomplete markets and idiosyncratic risk

This study investigates an incomplete markets economy in which the saving behavior of a continuum of infinitely lived agents is influenced by precautionary saving motives and borrowing constraints. Agents can use two types of assets (interest bearing IOUS and money) to smooth consumption. Money is valued because of a timing friction in the bond market. In particular, the bond market closes before agents observe their idiosyncratic productivity shock. I find that the Friedman rule is not optimal for this economy. The results indicate that the optimal allocation has a rate of inflation of 10%, and a positive amount of private credit held by the government. A positive inflation rate transfers resources from agents with big endowments to those holding bonds which improves risk sharing, and therefore, welfare. However, for higher rates of inflation, agents economize on money holdings, offsetting the insurance effects, and causing a reduction in welfare. Furthermore, higher rates of inflation discourage agents from borrowing, and the endogenous lower bound on bond holdings is higher than the exogenous borrowing limit. High rates of inflation, therefore, exacerbate frictions in the bond market.     

Testing the transparency benefits of inflation targeting: Evidence from private sector forecasts

Using inflation forecast data for 11 IT adoption countries, IT adoption is found to promote convergence in forecast errors, suggesting that it enhances transparency. This result, which is subjected to several robustness checks and found to be robust, supports Morris and Shin's (2002) contention that better public information is most beneficial for forecasters with bad private information. However, it does not support their hypothesis that better public information could make private forecasts less accurate.     

The impact of central bank independence on the performance of inflation targeting regimes

This paper examines the effects of inflation targeting on inflation in both advanced and emerging economies. We do not detect significant effects in advanced economies and only find small benefits in emerging economies, in line with previous studies. However, when we differentiate the impact of inflation targeting based on the degree of central bank independence, we find large effects in emerging economies with low central bank independence. Our results therefore suggest that central bank independence is not a prerequisite for countries to experience significant declines in inflation following the adoption of inflation targeting. Furthermore, we provide evidence that one channel through which inflation targeting lowers inflation more in countries with low central bank independence is the reduction of budget deficits following the adoption of an inflation target.     

Do Actions Speak Louder Than Words? Household Expectations of Inflation Based on Micro Consumption Data

Survey data on household expectations of inflation are routinely used in economic analysis, yet it is not clear how accurately households are able to articulate their expectations in survey interviews. We propose an alternative approach to recovering households' expectations of inflation from their consumption expenditures. We show that these expectations measures have predictive power for consumer price index (CPI) inflation. They are better predictors of CPI inflation than household survey responses and more highly correlated with professional inflation forecasts, except for highly educated consumers, consistent with the view that more educated consumers are better able to articulate their expectations. We also document that households' inflation expectations respond to inflation news, as measured by the unpredictable component of inflation predictions in the Survey of Professional Forecasters. The response to inflation news tends to increase with households' level of education, consistent with the existence of constraints on household's ability to process this information.     

Alternative Monetary Policy Rules in the Turkish Economy Under an Inflation-Targeting Framework

This study analyzes alternative monetary-policy rules in Turkey under inflation targeting (IT) using a small-scale structural macroeconomic model. The alternatives are the Taylor rule, the monetary conditions index (MCI) rule under strict IT, and the MCI rule under flexible IT. Using the MCI rule under strict IT produces slightly better results than under flexible IT and, thus, is preferable. The results also indicate that the economy stabilizes much more quickly, and shows significantly less volatility, in the second alternative. Following the Taylor rule should definitely be avoided. However, in open economies, ignoring exchange rates when setting inflation targets is certainly not an optimal solution.     

The Output Effect of a Transition to Price Stability When Velocity Is Time Varying

This paper explores the effect of time‐varying velocity on output responses to policies for reducing/stopping inflation. We study a dynamic general equilibrium model with sticky prices in which we introduce time‐varying velocity. Specifically, we endogenize time‐varying velocity into the model developed by Ireland (1997) for analyzing optimal disinflation. The nonlinear solution method reveals that, depending on velocity, the “disinflationary boom” found by Ball (1994) may disappear even under perfect credibility and that early output losses may be much larger than previously thought. Indeed, we find that a gradual disinflation from a low inflation may even be undesirable.     

Model Uncertainty and Delegation: A Case for Friedman's k-Percent Money Growth Rule?

Model uncertainty affects the monetary policy delegation problem. If there is uncertainty with regards to the determination of the delegated objective variables, the central bank will want robustness against potential model misspecifications. We show that with plausible degree of model uncertainty, delegation of the Friedman rule of increasing the money stock by k percent to the central bank will outperform commitment to the social loss function (flexible inflation targeting). The reason is that the price paid for robustness under flexible inflation targeting outweighs the inefficiency of money growth targeting. Imperfect control of money growth does not change this conclusion.     

Optimal monetary policy under low trend inflation

In the monetary policy literature it is common to assume that trend inflation is zero, despite overwhelming evidence that zero inflation is neither empirically relevant nor a practical objective for central bank policy. We therefore extend the standard New Keynesian model to allow for positive trend inflation, showing that even low trend inflation has strong effects on optimal monetary policy and the dynamics of inflation, output and interest rates. Under discretion, the efficient policy deteriorates and there is no guarantee of determinacy. Even with commitment, targeting non-zero trend inflation leads to substantial welfare losses. Our results serve as a warning against indiscriminate use of models assuming zero trend inflation.     

Quantitative Goals for Monetary Policy

We study empirically the macroeconomic effects of an explicit de jure quantitative goal for monetary policy. Quantitative goals take three forms: exchange rates, money growth rates, and inflation targets. We analyze the effects on inflation of both having a quantitative target and hitting a declared target. Our empirical work uses an annual data set covering 42 countries between 1960 and 2000, and takes account of other determinants of inflation (such as fiscal policy, the business cycle, and openness to international trade) and the endogeneity of the monetary policy regime. We find that both having and hitting quantitative targets for monetary policy is systematically and robustly associated with lower inflation. The exact form of the monetary target matters somewhat (especially for the sustainability of the monetary regime) but is less important than having some quantitative target. Successfully achieving a quantitative monetary goal is also associated with less volatile output.