Sell‐Side Analyst Research and Stock Comovement

We document that a stock's price around a recommendation or forecast covaries with prices of other stocks the issuing analyst covers. The effect of shared analyst coverage on stock price comovement extends beyond analyst activity days. A stock's daily returns covary with the returns of other stocks with which it shares analyst coverage. These links between stock price comovement and shared analyst coverage are consistent with the coverage‐specific information we find in earnings forecasts; analysts who cover both stocks in a pair expect future earnings of the stocks to be more highly correlated than do analysts who cover only one stock from the pair. Collectively, our evidence indicates that analyst research produces coverage‐specific spillovers that raise price comovement among stocks that share analyst coverage. The strength of these spillovers is comparable to spillovers from broad industry and market information in analyst research.     

Private Interaction Between Firm Management and Sell‐Side Analysts

Although sell‐side analysts often privately interact with managers of publicly traded firms, the private nature of this contact has historically obscured direction examination. By examining a set of proprietary records compiled by a large‐cap NYSE‐traded firm, I offer insights into which analysts privately meet with management, when analysts privately interact with management, and why these interactions occur. I also compare private interaction to public interaction between analysts and managers on conference calls. The evidence suggests that private interaction with management is an important communication channel for analysts for reasons other than firm‐specific forecasting news.     

What Makes a Stock Risky? Evidence from Sell‐Side Analysts' Risk Ratings

We examine the determinants and the informativeness of financial analysts' risk ratings using a large sample of research reports issued by Salomon Smith Barney, now Citigroup, over the period 1997–2003. We find that the cross‐sectional variation in risk ratings is largely explained by variables commonly viewed as measures of risk, such as idiosyncratic risk, size, book‐to‐market, and leverage. In addition, earnings‐based measures of risk, such as earnings quality and accounting losses, also contribute to explaining the cross‐sectional variation in the risk ratings. Finally, we document that the risk ratings can be used to predict future return volatility after controlling for other predictors of future volatility. We conclude that analysts play an important role as providers of information about investment risk.     

Inside the “Black Box” of Sell‐Side Financial Analysts

Our objective is to penetrate the “black box” of sell‐side financial analysts by providing new insights into the inputs analysts use and the incentives they face. We survey 365 analysts and conduct 18 follow‐up interviews covering a wide range of topics, including the inputs to analysts’ earnings forecasts and stock recommendations, the value of their industry knowledge, the determinants of their compensation, the career benefits of Institutional Investor All‐Star status, and the factors they consider indicative of high‐quality earnings. One important finding is that private communication with management is a more useful input to analysts’ earnings forecasts and stock recommendations than their own primary research, recent earnings performance, and recent 10‐K and 10‐Q reports. Another notable finding is that issuing earnings forecasts and stock recommendations that are well below the consensus often leads to an increase in analysts’ credibility with their investing clients. We conduct cross‐sectional analyses that highlight the impact of analyst and brokerage characteristics on analysts’ inputs and incentives. Our findings are relevant to investors, managers, analysts, and academic researchers.     

Sell‐Side Analyst Bias When Investment Banks Have Privileged Access to the Board

Research on analyst bias typically identifies affiliation with reference to a subset of the mandates that could give rise to incentives for bias in a multifunction investment bank. This paper develops a new measure of affiliation based upon the UK practice of corporate broking. An advantage of this approach is that affiliation is no longer restricted to isolated equity issuance events as it is an ongoing activity. This research shows that prior US evidence regarding the “Global Settlement” is robust to this new measure and application in the United Kingdom rather than solely the United States. The paper uses a hazard rate methodology focusing on the timeliness of revisions to address selection bias concerns.     

Determinants of the Method of Payment in Asset Sell‐Off Transactions

Using a sample of asset sell‐off transactions from January 1990 to April 2010, we find that the method of payment used in asset sell‐off transactions is associated with several characteristics cited in the acquisitions research that reflect cash constraints of the bidder. Specifically, bidders facing more stringent cash constraints are more likely to use equity when purchasing assets, while sellers subjected to cash constraints prefer cash when selling assets. Second, we find that the variation in method of payment among asset sell‐off transactions also is partially explained by variables representing asymmetric information. Third, we apply our model to an expanded sample that includes non‐U.S. sellers of assets and find that an equity payment is more likely when sellers are based in countries that have relatively high country risk (more government restrictions), weak shareholder rights, and a weak legal system. Thus, it appears that bidders prefer that sellers share in the risk of the transaction under these conditions.     

Corporate Sell‐offs in the UK: Use of Proceeds,Financial Distress and Long‐run Impact on Shareholder Wealth

This study examines the long‐run return performance following UK corporate sell‐off announcements. We observe significant negative abnormal returns up to five years subsequent to sell‐off announcements. Our finding is robust to various specifications, irrespective of the intended use of proceeds. We also find a significantly positive association between long‐run abnormal returns and the magnitude of cash proceeds for sellers reducing corporate debt as well as for sellers with deeper financial distress or higher growth prospects. Overall, we find that UK corporate sell‐offs are associated with declines in subsequent shareholder wealth.     

Large Shareholders,the Board of Directors and the Allocation of Cash Proceeds from Corporate Asset Sell‐offs

Recent finance literature suggests that managers of divesting firms may retain cash proceeds from corporate asset sell‐offs in order to pursue their own objectives, and, therefore, shareholders' gains due to these deals are linked to a distribution of proceeds to shareholders or to debtholders. We add to this literature by examining the role of various corporate governance mechanisms in the context of the allocation of sell‐off proceeds. Specifically, we examine the impact of directors' share‐ownership and stock options, board composition and external large shareholdings on (1) shareholders' abnormal returns around asset sell‐off announcements, and (2) managers' decision to either retain or distribute (to shareholders or to debtholders) sell‐off proceeds. We find that non‐executive directors' and CEO's share‐ownership and stock options are related to shareholders' gains from sell‐offs for firms that retain proceeds. However, corporate governance mechanisms are not significantly related to shareholders' gains for firms that distribute sell‐off proceeds. Furthermore, we find that the likelihood of a distribution of proceeds, relative to the retention decision, is increasing in large institutional shareholdings, executive and non‐executive directors' share‐ownership and non‐executive representation in the board.     

The Supply‐Side Determinants of Loan Contract Strictness

Using a measure of contract strictness based on the probability of a covenant violation, I investigate how lender‐specific shocks impact the strictness of the loan contract that a borrower receives. Banks write tighter contracts than their peers after suffering payment defaults to their own loan portfolios, even when defaulting borrowers are in different industries and geographic regions from the current borrower. The effects persist after controlling for bank capitalization, although bank equity compression is also associated with tighter contracts. The evidence suggests that recent defaults inform the lender's perception of its own screening ability, thereby impacting its contracting behavior.     

Supply‐Side Policies in the Depression: Evidence from France

The effects of supply‐side policies in depressed economies are controversial. We shed light on this debate using evidence from France in the 1930s. In 1936, France departed from the gold standard and implemented mandatory wage increases and hours restrictions. Deflation ended but output stagnated. We present time‐series and cross‐sectional evidence that these supply‐side policies, in particular the 40‐hour law, contributed to French stagflation. These results are inconsistent both with the standard one‐sector New Keynesian model and with a medium scale, multisector model calibrated to match our cross‐sectional estimates. We conclude that the New Keynesian model is a poor guide to the effects of supply‐side shocks in depressed economies.