Informational Feedback,Adverse Selection,and Optimal Disclosure Policy

Faceless trading in a secondary stock market not only redistributes wealth among investors but also generates information that feeds back to real decisions. Using this observation we re‐evaluate the “leveling‐the‐playing‐field” rationale for disclosure to secondary stock markets. By partially preempting traders' information advantage established from information acquisition, disclosure reduces private incentives to acquire information, resulting in two opposite effects on firm value. On one hand, this narrows the information gap between informed and uninformed traders and improves liquidity of firm shares. On the other hand, this reduces the informational feedback from the stock market to real decisions. This tradeoff determines the optimal disclosure policy. The model explains why firm value can be higher in an environment that simultaneously promotes disclosure and private information production and why growth firms are endogenously more opaque than value firms.     

Local Risk,Local Factors,and Asset Prices

Firm location affects firm risk through local factor prices. We find more procyclical factor prices such as wages and real estate prices in areas with more cyclical economies, namely, high “local beta” areas. While procyclical wages provide a natural hedge against aggregate shocks and reduce firm risk, procyclical prices of real estate, which are part of firm assets, increase firm risk. We confirm that firms located in higher local beta areas have lower industry‐adjusted returns and conditional betas, and show that the effect is stronger among firms with low real estate holdings. A production‐based equilibrium model explains these empirical findings.     

Real Options,Volatility, and Stock Returns

We provide evidence that the positive relation between firm‐level stock returns and firm‐level return volatility is due to firms’ real options. Consistent with real option theory, we find that the positive volatility‐return relation is much stronger for firms with more real options and that the sensitivity of firm value to changes in volatility declines significantly after firms exercise their real options. We reconcile the evidence at the aggregate and firm levels by showing that the negative relation at the aggregate level may be due to aggregate market conditions that simultaneously affect both market returns and return volatility.     

Does Greater Firm‐Specific Return Variation Mean More or Less Informed Stock Pricing?

Roll [1988] observes low R² statistics for common asset pricing models due to vigorous firm‐specific return variation not associated with public information. He concludes that this implies “either private information or else occasional frenzy unrelated to concrete information”[p. 56]. We show that firms and industries with lower market model R² statistics exhibit higher association between current returns and future earnings, indicating more information about future earnings in current stock returns. This supports Roll's first interpretation: higher firm‐specific return variation as a fraction of total variation signals more information‐laden stock prices and, therefore, more efficient stock markets.     

The impact of corporate fraud on director‐interlocked firms: Evidence from bank loans

We examine the impact of corporate fraud committed by one firm (the “fraudulent firm”) on other firms with interlocking directors (the “interlocked firms”), focusing on the debtholder side. We argue that the revelation of a fraudulent firm's fraud can damage the reputation of the interlocked firms because corporate governance can propagate via director interlocks. Empirically, we find that the interlocked firms' cost of debt is higher and the loan covenants become stricter after the fraud cases of the fraudulent firms are revealed. Consistent with the corporate governance propagation explanation, our results are weaker (stronger) for interlocked firms that have better (worse) pre‐event corporate governance standards. Our findings suggest that corporate fraud of fraudulent firms can affect other firms through director‐interlocks beyond shareholder value.     

How Big is the Tax Advantage to Debt?

This paper uses an option valuation model of the firm to answer the question, “What magnitude tax advantage to debt is consistent with the range of observed corporate debt ratios?” We incorporate into the model differential personal tax rates on capital gains and ordinary income. We conclude that variations in the magnitude of bankruptcy costs across firms can not by itself account for the simultaneous existence of levered and unlevered firms. When it is possible for the value of the underlying assets to jump discretely to zero, differences across firms in the probability of this jump can account for the simultaneous existence of levered and unlevered firms. Moreover, if the tax advantage to debt is small, the annual rate of return advantage offered by optimal leverage may be so small as to make the firm indifferent about debt policy over a wide range of debt-to-firm value ratios.     

Economic growth potential creating a real put and the resulting valuation of the firm

What do innovative new firms in our dynamic economy do to the value of existing firms? Using Schumpeter’s creative destruction idea, we expand the valuation model to incorporate these dynamics. Our model shows that these dynamics should have a greater effect on smaller firms, those in closer to perfect product market competition and those with less financial market following, as they get less market feedback for warning of new competition. This additional consideration in valuation is named the “real put” as it is an optionagainst value. Simply stated, it is an amount subtracted from a firm’s market value of capitalized earnings, plus any growth potential (that might create destructive competition against other producers) to get its net value. Following Schumpeter, new entrepreneurs and larger firms that mimic existing entrepreneurs are the innovators of new products and services. They create the real put against value in their potential competitors. We empirically test this using Morningstar’s “moat” classification of firms. We find firms with “wider moats” meaning greater product market power have much lower delisting rates that indicate smaller puts against value being exercised. While we are not the first in finance to view Schumpeter’s ideas, this is the first paper to consider its direct effect on valuation.     

Financial Intermediary Versus Production Approach to Efficiency of Marketing Distribution Systems and Organizational Structure of Insurance Companies

An examination of the efficiency of the marketing distribution channel and organizational structure for insurance companies is presented from a framework that views the insurer as a financial intermediary rather than as a “production entity” which produces “value added” through loss payments. Within this financial intermediary approach, solvency can be a primary concern for regulators of insurance companies, claims‐paying ability can be a primary concern for policyholders, and return on investment can be a primary concern for investors. These three variables (solvency, financial return, and claims‐paying ability) are considered as outputs of the insurance firm. The financial intermediary approach acknowledges that interests potentially conflict, and the strategic decision makers for the firm must balance one concern versus another when managing the insurance company. Accordingly, we investigate the efficiency of insurance companies using data envelopment analysis (DEA) having as insurer output an appropriately selected (for the firm under investigation) combination of solvency, claims‐paying ability, and return on investment as outputs. These efficiency evaluations are further examined to study stock versus mutual form of organizational structure and agency versus direct marketing arrangements, which are examined separately and in combination. Comparisons with the “value‐added” or “production” approach to insurer efficiency are presented. A new DEA approach and interpretation is also presented.     

Biomarker of Quality? Venture‐backed Biotech IPOs and Insider Participation

Corporate financial managers of biotech firms need long‐term financing to reach key milestones, and that requires a long‐ term capital structure. They must balance a mix of investors with different objectives and different investment horizons that includes traditional venture capitalists and also hedge funds and mutual funds. This study helps practitioners understand the complex role of exit decisions, as venture capitalists seek better exit strategies and performance. IPOs are financing but not “exit” moves. In addition to certifying firm value, insider purchasing of shares in the IPO offering has two major consequences. First, venture capitalists reallocate large sums of capital from early‐stage to late‐stage deals that are expected to have lower risk (but also lower expected return) and shorter time to exit. Second, the speed at which VCs exit after the IPO depends on the firm ownership structure after the IPO and the stock liquidity. Going public with a significant participation by venture capitalists will probably increase the post‐IPO ownership and decrease the free float of the stock, implying a delay of the exit and the realization of the capital gains from the investments. Although this study has focused exclusively on the biotechnology industry, insider participation is not unique to it. Biotech's venture brethren in the software and technology industries also have insider participation in IPOs. During 2003–2015, approximately 41 venture‐backed firms outside of the biotechnology sector had insider participation.     

Return predictability and the real option value of segments

Theory suggests that firm value should include the value of real options; that is, firms have the option to expand more profitable businesses and liquidate less profitable businesses. In a diversified firm, each segment has its own real options. Applying real options theory to a diversified firm at the firm level neglects the value of segment-level options. If investors overlook segment-level options, mispricing will occur. Using data from 1981 to 2013, we find that a hedge portfolio buying diversified firms in the highest decile of the estimated real option value of segments (RVS) and selling those in the lowest RVS decile earns a significant 0.79% size-adjusted monthly return. The hedge returns are more significant for firms whose growth opportunities mainly lie in the more profitable segments. We also find that the predictive power of RVS is stronger for firms with high growth, lower analyst coverage, and stronger corporate governance. Further investigation links improved operating performance to the exercise of segment-level real options.     

A Dynamic Model of Characteristic‐Based Return Predictability

We present a dynamic model that links characteristic‐based return predictability to systematic factors that determine the evolution of firm fundamentals. In the model, an economy‐wide disruption process reallocates profits from existing businesses to new projects and thus generates a source of systematic risk for portfolios of firms sorted on value, profitability, and asset growth. If investors are overconfident about their ability to evaluate the disruption climate, these characteristic‐sorted portfolios exhibit persistent mispricing. The model generates predictions about the conditional predictability of characteristic‐sorted portfolio returns and illustrates how return persistence increases the likelihood of observing characteristic‐based anomalies.     

Is there a dark side to exchange traded funds? An information perspective

We examine whether an increase in ETF ownership is accompanied by a decline in pricing efficiency for the underlying component securities. Our tests show an increase in ETF ownership is associated with (1) higher trading costs (bid-ask spreads and market liquidity), (2) an increase in “stock return synchronicity,” (3) a decline in “future earnings response coefficients,” and (4) a decline in the number of analysts covering the firm. Collectively, our findings support the view that increased ETF ownership can lead to higher trading costs and lower benefits from information acquisition. This combination results in less informative security prices for the underlying firms.     

Moral Hazard in Lending and Labor Market Volatility

When the economy experiences a sharp economic downturn, credit spreads widen and project financing costs for firms rise as funding sources begin to dry up. The economy experiences a lengthy recovery, with unemployment rates slow to return to “full employment” levels. We develop a model that displays these features. It relies on an interaction between labor search frictions and firm‐level moral hazard that is accentuated during recessions. The model is capable of addressing the “Shimer puzzle,” with labor market variables exhibiting significantly more volatility on average as a result of the heightened moral hazard concerns during these episodes that significantly deepen and prolong periods of high unemployment, as vacancy postings fall dramatically and the job‐finding rate declines. Our mechanism is also found to induce internal shock propagation causing the peak response of output, unemployment, and wages to occur with a several quarter delay relative to a model without such frictions. Many other labor market variables also show slower recovery—their return to preshock level occurs at a slower pace for a number of periods after the peak response.     

Information asymmetry,leverage and firm value: Do crisis and growth matter?

Drawing on pecking order and agency cost theories, we assess the extent to which information asymmetry is an important determinant of firm value and the extent to which this relationship is conditional on the leverage level of firms. We also assess the impact of information asymmetry on firm value during the pre and post 2007/09 financial crisis period and for high and low growth opportunity firms. Using a large sample of UK firms, our empirical findings suggest that information asymmetry adversely impacts firm value, and that this effect decreases with firm's leverage. We also find that leverage has a negative effect on firm value, and that the marginal effect of leverage is lower for information asymmetric firms. Further, we find that the relation between information asymmetry and firm value is more pronounced in the post-crisis period than the pre-crisis period. Finally, we show that the impact of information asymmetry on firm value is higher (lower) for firms with high (low) growth opportunities.     

Adopting a Label: Heterogeneity in the Economic Consequences Around IAS/IFRS Adoptions

This study examines liquidity and cost of capital effects around voluntary and mandatory IAS/IFRS adoptions. In contrast to prior work, we focus on the firm‐level heterogeneity in the economic consequences, recognizing that firms have considerable discretion in how they implement the new standards. Some firms may make very few changes and adopt IAS/IFRS more in name, while for others the change in standards could be part of a strategy to increase their commitment to transparency. To test these predictions, we classify firms into “label” and “serious” adopters using firm‐level changes in reporting incentives, actual reporting behavior, and the external reporting environment around the switch to IAS/IFRS. We analyze whether capital‐market effects are different across “serious” and “label” firms. While on average liquidity and cost of capital often do not change around voluntary IAS/IFRS adoptions, we find considerable heterogeneity: “Serious” adoptions are associated with an increase in liquidity and a decline in cost of capital, whereas “label” adoptions are not. We obtain similar results when classifying firms around mandatory IFRS adoption. Our findings imply that we have to exercise caution when interpreting capital‐market effects around IAS/IFRS adoption as they also reflect changes in reporting incentives or in firms’ broader reporting strategies, and not just the standards.     

Conservatism, growth, and return on investment

Return on Investment (ROI) is widely regarded as a key measure of firm profitability. The accounting literature has long recognized that ROI will generally not reflect economic profitability, as determined by the internal rate of return (IRR) of a firm’s investment projects. In particular, it has been noted that accounting conservatism may result in an upward bias of ROI, relative to the underlying IRR. We examine both theoretically and empirically the behavior of ROI as a function of two variables: past growth in new investments and accounting conservatism. Higher growth is shown to result in lower levels of ROI provided the accounting is conservative, while the opposite is generally true for liberal accounting policies. Conversely, more conservative accounting will increase ROI provided growth in new investments has been “moderate” over the relevant horizon, while the opposite is true if new investments grew at sufficiently high rates. Taken together, we find that conservatism and growth are “substitutes” in their joint impact on ROI.     

Prominence and consumer search

This article examines the implications of “prominence” in search markets. We model prominence by supposing that the prominent firm will be sampled first by all consumers. If there are no systematic quality differences among firms, we find that the prominent firm will charge a lower price than its less prominent rivals. Making a firm prominent will typically lead to higher industry profit but lower consumer surplus and welfare. The model is extended by introducing heterogeneous product qualities, in which case the firm with the highest‐quality product has the greatest incentive to become prominent, and making it prominent will boost industry profit, consumer surplus, and welfare.     

What's in a “China” Name? A Test of Investor Attention Hypothesis

We study whether a firm's name affects investor attention and firm valuation. Some Chinese firms listed on US stock exchanges have the word “China” included in their company names (“China‐name stocks”), while others do not (“non‐China‐name stocks”). During the 2007 China stock market boom, we find that China‐name stocks significantly outperform non‐China‐name stocks. This is not due to differences in firm characteristics, risk, or liquidity. The “China‐name effect” is largely consistent with the investor attention hypothesis that price pressure caused by increased investor attention on China‐name stocks during the boom period drives up China‐name stocks more than non‐China‐name stocks.     

Growth Opportunities,Technology Shocks,and Asset Prices

We explore the impact of investment‐specific technology (IST) shocks on the cross section of stock returns. Using a structural model, we show that IST shocks have a differential effect on the value of assets in place and the value of growth opportunities. This differential sensitivity to IST shocks has two main implications. First, firm risk premia depend on the contribution of growth opportunities to firm value. Second, firms with similar levels of growth opportunities comove with each other, giving rise to the value factor in stock returns and the failure of the conditional CAPM. Our empirical tests confirm the model's predictions.     

Liquidity risk,leverage and long-run IPO returns

We examine the risk-return characteristics of a rolling portfolio investment strategy where more than 6000 Nasdaq initial public offering (IPO) stocks are bought and held for up to 5 years. The average long-run portfolio return is low, but IPO stocks appear as “longshots”, as 5-year buy-and-hold returns of 1000% or more are somewhat more frequent than for non-issuing Nasdaq firms matched on size and book-to-market ratio. The typical IPO firm is of average Nasdaq market capitalization but has relatively low book-to-market ratio. We also show that IPO firms exhibit relatively high stock turnover and low leverage, which may lower systematic risk exposures. To examine this possibility, we launch an easily constructed “low-minus-high” (LMH) stock turnover portfolio as a liquidity risk factor. The LMH factor produces significant betas for broad-based stock portfolios, as well as for our IPO portfolio and a comparison portfolio of seasoned equity offerings. The factor-model estimation also includes standard characteristic-based risk factors, and we explore mimicking portfolios for leverage-related macroeconomic risks. Because they track macroeconomic aggregates, these mimicking portfolios are relatively immune to market sentiment effects. Overall, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the realized return on the IPO portfolio is commensurable with the portfolio's risk exposures, as defined here.