Rain or Shine: Where is the Weather Effect?

There is considerable empirical evidence that emotion influences decision‐making. In this paper, we use a database of individual investor accounts to examine the weather effects on traders. Our analysis of the trading activity in five major US cities over a six‐year period finds virtually no difference in individuals’ propensity to buy or sell equities on cloudy days as opposed to sunny days. If the association between cloud cover and stock returns documented for New York and other world cities is indeed caused by investor mood swings, our findings suggest that researchers should focus on the attitudes of market‐makers, news providers or other agents physically located in the city hosting the exchange. NYSE spreads widen on cloudy days. When we control for this, the weather effect becomes smaller and insignificant. We interpret this as evidence that the behaviour of market‐makers, rather than individual investors, may be responsible for the relation between returns and weather.     

Managerial Opportunism? Evidence from Directors' and Officers' Insurance Purchases

We analyze a sample of 72 IPO firms that went public between 1992 and 1996 for which we have detailed proprietary information about the amount and cost of D&O liability insurance. If managers of IPO firms are exploiting superior inside information, we hypothesize that the amount of insurance coverage chosen will be related to the post-offering performance of the issuing firm's shares. Consistent with the hypothesis, we find a significant negative relation between the three-year post-IPO stock price performance and the insurance coverage purchased in conjunction with the IPO. One plausible interpretation is that, like insider securities transactions, D&O insurance decisions reveal opportunistic behavior by managers. This provides some motivation to argue that disclosure of the details of D&O insurance decisions, as is required in some other countries, is valuable.     

社会互动对家庭商业保险参与的影响——来自中国家庭金融调查(CHFS)数据的实证分析

本文基于中国家庭金融调查(CHFS)数据,探讨了社会互动对家庭商业保险购买行为的影响。研究发现:社会互动显著提高了家庭商业保险参与的可能性与参与程度,并且在控制了内生性之后,这种促进作用依然显著;同时本文通过金融知识和商业保险信任度等变量验证了社会互动影响家庭商业保险参与行为的两种作用渠道;异质性分析表明,社会互动对于东部和中部地区、中等学历、高收入水平、低参与率社区中家庭的促进作用更大。本文的研究为我国商业保险市场的发展提供了一个新的社会特征视角,重视社会互动的促进作用,加强保险业诚信建设,以此推动我国商业保险业健康快速发展。     

Flood Hazards, Insurance Rates, and Amenities: Evidence From the Coastal Housing Market

This study employs the hedonic property price method to examine the effects of flood hazard on coastal property values. We utilize Geographic Information System data on National Flood Insurance Program flood zones and residential property sales from Carteret County, North Carolina. Our results indicate that location within a flood zone lowers property value. Price differentials for flood risk and the capitalized value of flood insurance premiums are roughly equivalent—both exhibiting a nonlinear relationship in flood probability. Our results support the conclusion that flood zone designation and insurance premiums convey risk information to potential buyers in the coastal housing market.     

Flood Insurance Coverage in the Coastal Zone

We explore determinants of flood insurance demand in the coastal zone using micro‐data for nine Southeastern counties. Overall estimates indicate price inelastic demand, though subsidized policyholders have greater coverage and are more price sensitive. Mortgage borrowers exhibit no greater coverage; only 12 percent in 100‐year flood zone indicate flood insurance was required by their lender. Flood insurance demand is increasing in the levels of flood and erosion risk. We find a positive correlation between household income and coverage, but the effect is not monotonic. Community‐level erosion hazard mitigation projects influence flood insurance coverage, with beach replenishment acting as a complement.     

国民经济核算视角下的保险产出及中国的实证

保险公司在生产什么？保险投资是不是保险生产活动？保险产出应采用“总额法”还是“净额法”计量？这些保险经济学的基础性问题,至今仍存在着计量分歧和理论争议。本文综合运用国民经济核算、保险学和经济学的知识体系,搭建了保险生产的创新理论框架和核算方法。在对我国两阶段的保险企业会计科目对比分析的基础上,测算了我国2003-2015年的保险产出,得出两种保险产出数据存在显著差异的结论。     

An Analysis of the Effect of Tax Policy on Health Insurance Purchases by Risk Group

There is an extensive body of literature dealing with the welfare loss associated with generous levels of health insurance as a function of the tax subsidy. The theoretical discussion in this study considers the effect of the tax subsidy on pooling within plans, and suggests the hypotheses that the tax subsidy will have a disproportionately positive effect on the likelihood that a high‐risk worker will be eligible for and participate in employment‐based coverage, while the effect of the tax subsidy on plan generosity will be greatest for low‐risk employees. If coverage of high‐risk individuals enhances social welfare, this result may offset, at least in part, the welfare loss associated with generous plans. Data from the 1987 National Medical Expenditure Survey are used to test these hypotheses. The results provide evidence that the subsidy works to expand risk pools in the employment‐based health insurance market.     

Institutions and Deposit Insurance: Empirical Evidence

Do banks’ responses to changes in deposit insurance vary across countries even if the countries have comparable institutions? If so, by how much? Using data on the financial performance of large banks in 15 financially and economically developed countries, we find that where deposit insurance has an effect, it is large and varies depending on the level of economic freedom, rule of law and corruption in the bank’s home country. As in prior papers, we show that during stable economic periods, increases in deposit insurance are associated with higher bank risk, both problem loans and leverage. In most, but not all, cases stronger institutions temper these effects. The institutions’ effects are substantial. For example, average changes in the rule of law double the impact of a change in deposit insurance on bank leverage. We contribute to the substantial literature in this area by showing that the institutional effects are significant even across a set of countries with comparable institutions; by conducting a careful calibration of the economic significance of the effects; by providing evidence that during stable periods changes in deposit insurance only affect bank risk and not other measures of performance; and finally by showing that the effects of both deposit insurance and institutions vary across stable and crisis economic periods. The stable period results are consistent with the moral hazard effects of deposit insurance, while the crisis period results are consistent with endogeneity concerns that poor bank performance could drive changes in regulations.     

Flow Effects of Central Bank Asset Purchases on Sovereign Bond Prices: Evidence from a Natural Experiment

We estimate the response of sovereign bond prices to net supply shocks caused by purchase operations under the ECB's Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP). To avoid simultaneity bias in the estimated relationship between prices and purchases, we exploit a PSPP feature that renders securities temporarily ineligible for reasons unrelated to their prices. Using these purchase restrictions as an instrument to identify exogenous variation in purchase volumes, we find that PSPP causes statistically significant and economically relevant upward price impacts. The impacts are short-lived and concentrated in securities issued by higher yield jurisdictions and characterized by higher maturity and lower liquidity.     

Incentive Effects of Community Rating in Insurance Markets: Evidence from Massachusetts Automobile Insurance

Rate regulations in insurance markets often impose cross-subsidies in insurance premiums from low-risk consumers to high-risk consumers. This paper develops the hypothesis that premium cross-subsidies affect risk taking by insurance consumers, and tests this hypothesis by examining the marginal impact of premium subsidies and overcharges on future insurance costs. The empirical analysis uses 1990–2003 rating cell-level data from the Massachusetts automobile insurance market, in which regulation produced large cross-subsidies across cells. Consistent with the hypothesized effects, premium subsidies are found to be significantly related to higher future insurance costs, and the opposite effects are found for premium overcharges.     

Deciding Whether to Invest in Mitigation Measures: Evidence From Florida

Prior research provides theoretical insight into factors likely to impact the decision to mitigate such as the degree of risk aversion, the cost of market insurance, and the cost of self‐insurance. We provide empirical evidence related to several hypotheses from the self‐insurance literature on the decision to mitigate.     

补充医疗保险对居民消费的影响——来自城乡居民大病保险的证据

促进消费对我国稳定经济增长和构建新发展格局至关重要。本文基于中国家庭追踪调查数据(CFPS),利用地级市层面实施城乡居民大病保险的时间差异,运用双重差分法估计了大病医疗保险对居民消费的影响。结果表明,大病保险使家庭人均消费显著增长了约6%。使用了事件分析法、置换检验、改变回归样本和控制变量等一系列检验后,结论仍保持一致,且这一效果在期初住院率高、储蓄率高以及收入较高的家庭中更明显。进一步地,本文检验了大病保险对居民消费的三种可能影响渠道,发现降低家庭对未来医疗支出风险的预期是大病保险促进家庭非医疗消费进而影响家庭总消费的主要渠道,印证了我国居民对高额医疗支出的担忧是影响消费意愿的重要因素。本文研究对于完善多层次医疗保障体系和促进居民消费具有启示意义。     

基于DFA方法的中国洪水保险定价研究

对洪水保险进行精确有效的定价十分困难.动态财务分析模型(DFA)能够有效的将多种因素综合在一起进行分析,弥补了以往洪水保险定价方法以单一时点统计数据作为定价基础的缺陷;再保险安排是洪水保险计划中的一个重要组成部分,购买60%比例再保险是最适当的;购买再保险能够极大的降低洪水保险计划的破产概率.     

基于居民支付意愿的洪水保险定价研究

洪水保险的合理定价是制约洪水保险建立和推广的瓶颈之一,以往的洪水保险定价研究都是从供给的角度考虑的,而供给与需求之间存在差异。为了探索居民对于洪水保险的需求价格,从居民的洪水保险支付意愿出发,运用条件价值评估法(CVM法),借助调查问卷,实证分析得出:我国居民洪水保险支付意愿价格为81元,并分析了对于支付意愿的影响因素。     

Participation in the National Flood Insurance Program: An Empirical Analysis for Coastal Properties

A perennial question about the National Flood Insurance Program is: how can participation be increased? An empirical analysis of individual‐level data reveals that in a sample of coastal areas the participation rate is 49 percent of eligible properties. Participation responsiveness to price is inelastic, but it has been increased by the mandatory purchase requirements for mortgage borrowers. Easing conditions for participation in the program would probably not reduce flood control measures, such as seawalls, which may degrade beach conditions and coastal ecosystems.     

Disability Insurance: Theoretical Trade-Offs and Empirical Evidence*

Disability insurance provides protection against health shocks that limit the ability to work. In most countries, these programmes are large and growing, both in expenditure and in number of recipients. We discuss the traditional trade-off between insurance and incentives in providing this insurance, with a focus on the US and UK experiences. There is substantial evidence on the extent of the labour supply incentive costs of disability insurance, but there has been a lack of evidence on the insurance value until very recently. Further, evidence on errors in the disability insurance process suggests false rejections of genuine claimants is a substantial problem, and these are more serious than false acceptances of healthy applicants. We provide a life-cycle framework for understanding the trade-offs and to evaluate the welfare implications of policy reforms. We argue that reforms should be focused on reducing false rejections and supporting labour market attachment. The difficulty in considering reform is that the design of disability insurance has many aspects that interact and impact on outcomes.