The 52-Week High and Momentum Investing

When coupled with a stock's current price, a readily available piece of information—the 52‐week high price–explains a large portion of the profits from momentum investing. Nearness to the 52‐week high dominates and improves upon the forecasting power of past returns (both individual and industry returns) for future returns. Future returns forecast using the 52‐week high do not reverse in the long run. These results indicate that short‐term momentum and long‐term reversals are largely separate phenomena, which presents a challenge to current theory that models these aspects of security returns as integrated components of the market's response to news.     

Price Momentum and Idiosyncratic Volatility

We find that returns to momentum investing are higher among high idiosyncratic volatility ( IVol) stocks, especially high IVol losers. Higher IVol stocks also experience quicker and larger reversals. The findings are consistent with momentum profits being attributable to underreaction to firm‐specific information and with IVol limiting arbitrage of the momentum effect. We also find a positive time‐series relation between momentum returns and aggregate IVol. Given the long‐term rise in IVol, this result helps explain the persistence of momentum profits since Jegadeesh and Titman's (1993) study.     

The 52-week high momentum strategy in international stock markets

We study the 52-week high momentum strategy in international stock markets proposed by George and Hwang [George, T., Hwang, C.Y., 2004. The 52-week high and momentum investing. Journal of Finance 59, 2145-2176.]. This strategy produces profits in 18 of the 20 markets studied, and the profits are significant in 10 markets. The 52-week high momentum profits exist independently from the Jegadeesh and Titman [Jegadeesh, N., Titman, S., 1993. Returns to buying winners and selling losers: implications for market efficiency. Journal of Finance 48, 65-91.] individual stock and Moskowitz and Grinblatt [Moskowitz, T.J., Grinblatt, M., 1999. Do industries explain momentum? Journal of Finance 54, 1249-1290] industry momentum strategies. These profits do not show reversals in the long run. We find that the 52-week high is a better predictor of future returns than macroeconomic risk factors or the acquisition price. The individualism index, a proxy to the level of overconfidence, has no explanatory power to the variations of the 52-week high momentum profits across different markets. However, the profits are no longer significant in most markets once transaction costs are taken into account.     

Momentum,Reversal, and Uninformed Traders in Laboratory Markets

We report the results of three experiments based on the model of Hong and Stein (1999) . Consistent with the model, the results show that when informed traders do not observe prices, uninformed traders generate long‐term price reversals by engaging in momentum trade. However, when informed traders also observe prices, uninformed traders generate reversals by engaging in contrarian trading. The results suggest that a dominated information set is sufficient to account for the contrarian behavior observed among individual investors, and that uninformed traders may be responsible for long‐term price reversals but play little role in driving short‐term momentum.     

Momentum in weekly returns: the role of intermediate‐horizon past performance

Gutierrez and Kelly (2008) recently documented momentum in weekly returns. Using the Australian market as a setting, we find that stocks with high 1‐week returns exhibit a continuation in returns up to 1 year after a brief initial return reversal. However, after controlling for the intermediate‐horizon past performance, the continuation in returns after 1‐week returns disappears. These findings suggest that different past investment horizons contain separate information about price momentum and that intermediate‐term trends dominate short‐term trends in driving future returns. Overall, we show that understanding momentum over different horizons facilitates the design of more profitable trading strategies.     

Acquisitions,Overconfident Managers and Self‐attribution Bias

We examine whether acquisitions by overconfident managers generate superior abnormal returns and whether managerial overconfidence stems from self‐attribution. Self‐attribution bias suggests that overconfidence plays a greater role in higher order acquisition deals predicting lower wealth effects for higher order acquisition deals. Using two alternative measures of overconfidence (1) high order acquisition deals and (2) insider dealings we find evidence supporting the view that average stock returns are related to managerial overconfidence. Overconfident bidders realise lower announcement returns than rational bidders and exhibit poor long‐term performance. Second, we find that managerial overconfidence stems from self‐attribution bias. Specifically, we find that high‐order acquisitions (five or more deals within a three‐year period) are associated with lower wealth effects than low‐order acquisitions (first deals). That is, managers tend to credit the initial success to their own ability and therefore become overconfident and engage in more deals. In our analysis we control for endogeneity of the decision to engage in high‐order acquisitions and find evidence that does not support the self‐selection of excessive acquisitive firms. Our analysis is robust to the influence of merger waves, industry shocks, and macroeconomic conditions.     

The 52-week high strategy and information uncertainty

This paper examines the driver of the 52-week high strategy, which is long in stocks close to their 52-week high price and short in stocks with a price far below their one-year high, and tests the hypothesis that this strategy’s profitability can be explained by anchoring—a behavioral bias. To test the null, we examine whether the 52-week high criterion has more predictive power in cases of larger information uncertainty. This hypothesis is based on the psychological insight that behavioral biases increase in uncertainty. For six proxies of ambiguity, we document a positive relationship to returns of 52-week high winner stocks and a negative relationship to returns of 52-week high loser stocks. The opposite effect of information uncertainty on winner and loser stocks implies that the 52-week high profits are increasing in uncertainty measures. Moreover, the study documents that the six variables have a similar impact on momentum profits. Hence, we cannot reject the hypothesis that anchoring explains the profits of the 52-week high strategy and that it is the driver of the momentum anomaly.     

Trend‐Following Trading Strategies in U.S. Stocks: A Revisit

We show that previous findings regarding the profitability of trend‐following trading rules over intermediate horizons in futures markets also extend to individual U.S. stocks. Portfolios formed using technical indicators such as moving average or channel ratios, without employing cross‐sectional rankings of any kind, tend to perform about as well as the more commonly examined momentum strategies. The profitability of these strategies appears significant, both statistically and economically, through 2007, but evidence of profitability vanishes after 2007. Market‐state dependence, while clearly present, does not explain the post‐2007 reduction in returns to these strategies.     

On the Role of Intangible Information and Capital Gains Taxes in Long‐Term Return Reversals

Prior studies have linked long‐term reversals to the magnitude of locked‐in capital gains suggesting that reversals are driven by tax effects and not overreaction. I find that locked‐in capital gains do not explain the reversals in winners when winner returns are based on intangible information. In fact, the reversals for intangible return winners are long lasting and robust to controls for growth in assets and capital expenditures. To the extent that reversals associated with intangible information stem from investors’ overreaction to intangible information and given the prior results linking reversals only to intangible information, my results suggest that overreaction still explains reversal patterns in US stock returns.     

Momentum,Reversals, and Fund Manager Overconfidence

This paper examines the role of investor overconfidence and self‐attribution bias in explaining the momentum effect. We develop a novel measure of overconfidence based on characteristics and trading patterns of US equity mutual fund managers. Stocks held by more overconfident managers experience greater momentum profits and stronger return reversals than stocks held by less overconfident managers. The difference in momentum profits is not compensation for risk nor is it attributable to stock characteristics that influence momentum. Our results are consistent with Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998) who argue that momentum results from delayed overreaction caused by overconfidence and biased self‐attribution.     

Mandatory audit firm rotation: Fresh look versus poor knowledge

Our aim in this paper is to investigate the effects of mandatory audit firm rotation (MAR) on companies’ investment decision and auditor choice in a capital market setting. We compare a MAR regime with a non-MAR regime in a setting in which auditors’ independence and companies’ opinion shopping are real concerns. To capture auditor independence and opinion shopping, we model auditor biases (a conservative bias or an aggressive bias) and client firms’ incentives to engage auditors with desired biases. We find that when firms engage in opinion shopping, MAR improves investment efficiency for some firms but impairs investment efficiency for other firms. More generally, we contribute to the literature by demonstrating the real effects of auditing on corporate resource allocation decisions.     

European Momentum Strategies,Information Diffusion,and Investor Conservatism

In this paper we conduct an out‐of‐sample test of two behavioural theories that have been proposed to explain momentum in stock returns. We test the gradual‐information‐diffusion model of Hong and Stein (1999) and the investor conservatism bias model of Barberis et al. (1998) in a sample of 13 European stock markets during the period 1988 to 2001. These two models predict that momentum comes from the (i) gradual dissemination of firm‐specific information and (ii) investors’ failure to update their beliefs sufficiently when they observe new public information. The findings of this study are consistent with the predictions of the behavioural models of Hong and Stein's (1999) and Barberis et al. (1998) . The evidence shows that momentum is the result of the gradual diffusion of private information and investors’ psychological conservatism reflected on the systematic errors they make in forming earnings expectations by not updating them adequately relative to their prior beliefs and by undervaluing the statistical weight of new information.     

Bias in estimating the systematic risk of extreme performers: Implications for financial analysis, the leverage effect, and long-run reversals

We show how bias can arise systematically in the beta estimates of extreme performers when long-run return reversals are present and partly, or wholly, due to sign changes in unanticipated factor realizations. Our evidence is consistent with this bias being responsible for the large shifts in the beta estimates of extreme performers, more so than the leverage effect, which has been the predominant explanation in prior literature. Bias in these contemporaneous realized betas, estimated with the same returns that are to be risk adjusted, arises due to the general problem of “overconditioning,” where betas are estimated conditional on information that is not yet known. Several methods for conditioning betas on out-of-sample returns are evaluated and found to be lacking, although some offer improvement under certain circumstances. We also show evidence of this bias in the Fama-French Three-factor loadings of extreme performers. Our findings indicate not only that previous studies of long-run reversals understate contrarian profits but that bias is prevalent in the OLS beta estimates of extreme performers, and this has implications for estimating the cost of capital and measuring long-run performance. We offer recommendations for identifying when this bias is likely present, as well as general methods to correct for it.     

The 52-week high,momentum, and investor sentiment

This paper examines the link between the profitability of the 52-week high momentum strategy and investor sentiment. We hypothesize that investors' investment decisions are subject to behavioral biases when the level of investor sentiment is high, resulting in higher profits for the 52-week high momentum following high-sentiment periods. Our empirical results confirm this prediction. In addition, we find that the significant profit of the 52-week high momentum following high-sentiment periods persists up to five years. Further investigations show that the strong persistence of the 52-week high winners (losers) is concentrated in stocks with higher (lower) earnings surprises, especially during periods following high sentiment. Overall, our results provide supportive evidence for the anchoring biases in explaining the 52-week high momentum, especially when the role of investor sentiment is taken into account.     

The Post‐Cost Profitability of Momentum Trading Strategies: Further Evidence from the UK

This paper examines the post‐cost profitability of momentum trading strategies in the UK over the period 1988–2003 and provides direct evidence on stock concentration, turnover and trading cost associated with the strategy. We find that after factoring out transaction costs the profitability of the momentum strategy disappears for shorter horizons but remains for longer horizons. Indeed, for ranking and holding periods up to 6‐months, profitable momentum returns would not be available to most average investors as the cost of implementation outweighs the possible returns. However, we find post‐cost profitability for ranking and/or holding periods beyond 6 months as portfolio turnover and its associated cost reduces. We find similar results for a sub‐sample of relatively large and liquid stocks.     

Continuous overreaction,insiders trading activities and momentum strategies

The paper investigates the influence and explanatory power of aggregate insiders trading activities on momentum trading strategies. We find that insiders trading activities can predict cross-sectional returns and can strengthen the naı̈ve momentum effects. The risk factors such as size and BM cannot explain the strong momentum effects in our refined momentum strategies. We interpret our findings as that the continuous overreaction causes the mediate term momentum effects and over pricing. In the long term, these overly priced stocks will be corrected with passing time. The correction of over pricing causes long-term reversals.     

Does Investment Horizon Matter? Disentangling the Effect of Institutional Herding on Stock Prices

This study finds that, over short horizons, herding by short‐term institutions promotes price discovery. In contrast, herding by long‐term institutions drives stock prices away from fundamentals over the same periods. Furthermore, while the positive predictability of short‐term institutional herding for stock prices is more pronounced for small stocks and stocks with high growth opportunities, the negative association between long‐term institutional herding and stock prices is stronger for stocks whose valuations are highly uncertain and subjective. Finally, we show that the destabilizing effect of institutional herding persistence documented in the recent literature is entirely driven by persistent herding by long‐term institutions.     

Agency Costs and the Short‐Run Stock Price Response to Capital Expenditures

We estimate the short‐run stock price response to unanticipated capital expenditures. We use association study methodology to avoid the self‐selection bias in event studies and to facilitate construction of a large sample of firm‐years likely to exhibit agency problems. We find that the average price response to routine capital expenditures is negative, and that commonly used agency cost measures explain fully the negative response. Subsample results support the conclusion that the market is skeptical of cash flow financed spending by low‐q firms and even capital spending by high‐q firms when the firm is large and q is only marginally high.     

Long‐term Performance of Greek IPOs

We analyse the long‐run performance of 254 Greek IPOs that were listed during the period 1994–2002, computing buy‐and‐hold abnormal returns (BHAR) and cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) over 36 months of secondary market performance. The empirical results differ from international evidence and reveal long‐term overperformance that continues for a substantial interval after listing. Measuring these returns in calendar time, we find statistical significance with several of the benchmarks employed. We also find that long‐term overperformance is a feature of the mass of IPOs conducted during a pronounced IPO wave. Cross‐sectional regressions of long‐run performance disclose several significant factors. The study demonstrates that although Greek IPOs overperform the market for a longer period, underperformance eventually emerges, in line with much international evidence. Our interpretation is that the persistence of overperformance over a significant interval is due to excessive supply of issues during the ‘hot IPO period’. Results associated with pricing during the ‘hot IPO period’ indicate positive short‐ (1‐year), medium‐ (2‐year) and negative long‐term (3‐year) performance.