Local fiscal policy after a bailout: austerity or soft budget constraints?

Do higher-level governments enforce austerity after bailing out indebted subnational governments or are bailouts a free lunch for the recipients? Analyzing this question empirically is difficult because bailouts are not granted randomly. This paper suggests a method to evaluate the fiscal consequences of subnational bailouts that does not rely on institutional details to obtain quasi-exogenous variation. The main idea is to combine matching and difference-in-differences designs. In a second step, I apply this method to study how bailouts affect the fiscal policy of recipient municipalities in the German federal state of Hesse. Combining disaggregated budget data with data on bailout payments over more than a decade, I find that municipalities consolidate their budgets after they receive a bailout from the state government. While this finding is specific to the German federal context, the proposed methodology can be used, due to its flexibility, to study the fiscal consequences of bailouts in various other settings.     

Evaluating the sustainability of Italian public finances

Are Italy’s primary-surplus policies compatible with the sustainability of government debt? We address the question by examining historical budget data in post-unification Italy, from 1861 to 2016. Controlling for temporary output, temporary spending and world war-time periods in assessing whether primary surpluses significantly reacted to changes in debt, we find the following results: (i) the hypothesis of nonlinearity in the surplus-debt relationship significantly outperforms the hypothesis of linearity; (ii) there exists a threshold level in the debt-GDP ratio, approximately equal to 105 percent, above which Italian fiscal policy makers are concerned with corrective actions to avoid insolvency; (iii) the robustly positive reaction of primary surpluses to debt beyond the trigger point ensures fiscal sustainability.     

Models of democracy in spatial investments

Governance regarding spatial investments meets or even creates institutional tensions that process management finds difficult to cope with. Traditional democracy is confronted with new ways of policy making. New practices include multi-level governance, public?–?private partnerships and citizen participation. Central government and parliamentary control have to adapt to such practices. This article studies institutional tensions in two cases of spatial investment, using representative and participatory democracy as models of political regime and policy implementation. The analysis also links governance to characteristics of space. The authors make recommendations to combine ‘representative’ and ‘participatory’ elements of governance in a way that reduces institutional tensions in processes of spatial investment.     

Fiscal Policy in the New Open Economy Macroeconomics and Prospects for Fiscal Policy Coordination

Abstract.  This paper reviews the literature on the effects of fiscal policy in new open economy macroeconomics (NOEM) models, complementing it with additional results that attempt to clarify the importance of the exchange rate regime (fixed or flexible) and of the type of policy (balanced budget or debt‐financed). Fixed exchange rates only seem to postpone the costs from the short to the long run, but the type of policy is crucial in determining the welfare impact of fiscal expansions. The paper also reviews the recent literature on fiscal policy coordination and shows that there is already some evidence that the gains from coordination in this area can be potentially large but draw attention to the need for reflecting more on the role of fiscal policy as a stabilization tool and on possible interactions between fiscal and monetary policy.     

US deficit sustainability: a new approach based on multiple endogenous breaks

Recent empirical work has questioned the consistency of US fiscal policy with an intertemporal budget constraint. Empirical results have tended to indicate that the deficit process has undergone at least one structural shift during recent decades, with the deficit becoming either unsustainable or sustainable in only a weak sense in the post‐shift period. In this paper, we re‐examine sustainability using a new approach, based on a cointegration model with multiple endogenous breaks. A Bayesian methodology is applied, incorporating Markov chain Monte Carlo simulators. In contrast to previous analyses, we find evidence of a sustainable deficit process over the 1947–1992 period, despite the occurrence of breaks during the 1970s and 1980s. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Do independent fiscal institutions cause better fiscal outcomes in the European Union?

This paper explores the budgetary implications of the independent fiscal institutions (IFIs) in the European Union (EU). We employ a dynamic panel model for the period 2000–2019 and find that these fiscal watchdogs have a positive and significant influence not only on government budget balance for the EU member states, resulting in smaller government budget deficits, but also on countries’ compliance with fiscal rules, results that hold across alternative fiscal balances. IFIs appear to have a beneficial impact on fiscal performance and compliance with numerical targets in countries with poorly designed fiscal responsibility norms but weaker influence when fiscal rules are less binding (well-designed fiscal rules). The findings remain significant regardless the year of accession to the EU (old vs. new members) or euro-area status (euro-area vs. non-euro-area members). However, we document that IFIs play a larger role in countries that established these monitoring bodies before 2013, indicating that experience matters in IFI performance. Also, our findings show that the influence of IFIs remains if we take into account institutional reforms in which their mandates were extended with different powers and tasks, which has a positive and significant effect on fiscal balances. Moreover, we find that, under the circumstance of systemic and banking crises, these institutions are associated with improved fiscal outcomes, reflecting their increased concern about the path of public finances and their role in reducing budgetary forecasting biases. Our results are robust to a variety of specifications and models, including alternative measures of the government budget balance and after controlling for a set of institutional characteristics and for potential endogeneity in the estimations.     

中国现代财政制度构建的目标、进程与现状评估

按照财政改革目标,2020年是我国现代财政制度基本建成之年.在本轮改革中,直接税比重提升有限,税收结构有待优化,地方税体系尚未建立;支出结构有待优化,政府职能转变尚未体现.预算制度中,全面规范尚待提升,公开透明尚需加强;绩效管理仍需扎实推进,预算标准尚待完善.财政体制在维持既有财力分配的同时,划分了事权和支出责任,但地...     

In Praise of Expansionary Fiscal Contraction

Textbook orthodoxy maintains that increases in the cyclically adjusted budget balance (i.e. reductions in the deficit) withdraw demand from an economy. Those Keynesian economists who believe that fiscal policy is the most powerful single influence on changes in demand expect ‘fiscal contraction’ to be accompanied by below‐trend growth or even declines in output. This article, a response to Martin Wolf's 2013 Wincott Memorial Lecture, considers this Keynesian view. Using a database prepared by the International Monetary Fund, it shows that since the 1980s ‘expansionary fiscal contractions’ have been the norm and not the exception in the USA and the UK. Keynesian support for fiscal activism is unsupported by a large body of recent evidence.     

Is the UK government pursuing the correct fiscal plan?

• The Autumn Statement saw the Chancellor reaffirm his objective of achieving a budget surplus in the next Parliament and he followed this by introducing a binding target to balance the structural current budget by 2017–18.
• But this places even more policy weight on the ‘output gap’ – a variable which cannot be measured with any certainty and which, as a concept for dictating policy, has serious flaws. If the OBR is too pessimistic on spare capacity, the outcome will be an unnecessarily tight fiscal squeeze.
• Meanwhile, a fiscal surplus requires that another sector of the economy runs a deficit. So committing to this objective implies more control over the public finances than governments actually enjoy.
• Returning the public finances to the black would be positive for fiscal sustainability. But it could have some undesirable consequences if the counterpart to a stronger fiscal position is, as expected, the household sector moving further into the red.
• Furthermore, our detailed analysis of the government's latest spending plans concludes that the scale of the planned cuts to departmental spending will be impossible to deliver, particularly given the commitments to protect spending on health, international development and parts of the education budget.
• As such, in a departure from our normal practice, our UK macroeconomic forecasts assume that the planned spending cuts will be reined back, regardless of who wins the next election.

     

On the speed and boundaries of structural adjustment when fiscal policy is tight

Governments of transition economies are subject to fiscal constraints (e.g. credit constraints). However, exaggerated fiscal discipline might feed into the structural adjustment process. The government designs and times the privatisation programme, yet may find itself in a fiscal squeeze because restructuring moves costs from firms to the public budget. This paper models this problem in a simple dynamic set-up. Several distinct reform strategies, which differ in the speed and level of structural adjustment, are identified. Tight fiscal discipline in early stages of transition may delay or halt privatisation. A different sequencing of policy or different taxation, benefits, and privatisation sales rules, can rectify this problem.     

审计监督的财政治理效应研究——基于省以下地方审计机关人财物管理改革的准自然实验

审计监督是党和国家监督体系的重要组成,财政审计能对政府财政收支的真实性、合法性和效益性进行有效监督。以省以下地方审计机关人财物管理改革这一试点政策为准自然实验,从地方政府财政治理视角出发,运用双重差分法分析提升地市级审计机关独立性对地方政府财政支出效率的影响。研究发现,审计机关人财物管理改革能够有效提高地方政府财政支出效率,试点地区财政支出效率提高1.87个百分点。异质性分析结果发现,审计独立性的治理效应在财政透明度低、距离省会城市远和财政自主程度高的城市更大。通过进一步的机制分析,发现试点政策通过提高审计监督质量和优化财政支出结构两条路径提高地方政府财政支出效率。研究表明提高地方审计机关独立性可以对地方政府财政支出产生积极的治理效应。     

Fiscal policy and stock market efficiency: Evidence for the United States

This paper examines the extent to which fiscal policy actions affect the stock market's behavior for the US during 1968–2005. The findings are consistent with the hypothesis that past budget deficits negatively affect current stock returns thus suggesting that the market is inefficient with respect to information about future fiscal policy actions. One interpretation of this ‘disturbing’ result is that market participants do not place much faith on news about the budget deficits as they do not believe that deficits could adversely impact the stock market. Instead, what the market considers most important is news about monetary policy.     

国际金融危机与中国财政政策设计：功能、目标、力度

本文结合国际金融危机,从理论和实践两方面探讨了中国财政政策设计和实施中存在的一些重要问题。一是从财政政策的维持和纠偏两方面,揭示了财政政策的基本功能,提出财政政策应该分为稳定和再稳定两类政策;二是从财政政策的经济和社会目标两方面,分析了财政政策目标错位问题,提出了财政政策目标应从实现经济增长调整为促进充分就业;三是从财政政策力度计量方面,考察了政府预算账户存在的问题,提出了单独设立稳定账户的设想。     

Restoring Credible Economic Governance to the Eurozone

This paper discusses new institutional rules for a stable and lasting European Monetary Union (EMU). We propose a return to a strict and sustainable economic governance framework, which is mainly driven by market forces within a smart rule‐based environment. Our recommendations are: (a) ex ante conditionalities with a tough monitoring process to avoid moral hazard in the future; (b) further enhancement of the Stability and Growth Pact; and (c) ultimo ratio punishment to be able to respond to the unique constellation of fiscal–monetary interaction and new rescue facilities. Countries violating fiscal rules for more than four years in a row will thus lose their fiscal sovereignty or will have to resign from the Eurozone. After fulfilling the ex ante conditionalities as well as all required criteria, the country either will recover its fiscal sovereignty, or, in case of exclusion, will be given the option to rejoin EMU under certain conditions.     

Do Good Institutions Promote Countercyclical Macroeconomic Policies?

The literature has argued that developing countries are unable to adopt countercyclical monetary and fiscal policies due to financial imperfections and unfavourable political‐economy conditions. Using a world sample of up to 112 industrial and developing countries for 1984–2008, we find that the level of institutional quality plays a key role in countries’ ability and willingness to implement countercyclical macroeconomic policies. Countries with strong (weak) institutions adopt countercyclical (procyclical) macroeconomic policies, reflected in extended monetary policy and fiscal policy rules. The threshold levels of institutional quality at which policies are acyclical are found to be similar for monetary and fiscal policy.     

A Political Economy Approach to the Neoclassical Gradualist Model of Transition

Abstract.  A political economy approach to the neoclassical gradualist model of transition requires the exposition of what I define the primary elements of the model, which are economic analysis, definition of a good society, speed, political structure, ideological structure and whether the initial conditions were incorporated in the model. After the identification of the primary elements of the neoclassical gradualist model the next step is to identify secondary elements, the desired changes with respect to price liberalization-stabilization, privatization, institutional structure, monetary policy and the financial system, fiscal policy, international trade and foreign aid and social policy. The analytical framework developed makes possible to understand the neoclassical gradualist model from a new and more enlightening perspective. We are better able to comprehend the complexities involved and the disagreements about the reform process. The adoption of a gradual process of transition did not only involve specifying the required policies of a successful transition but also entailed a process, a sequence by which the reforms should be introduced. As such, a process of transition consistent with the policies recommended by the neoclassical gradualists economists is developed. The conclusion reveals the inconsistencies in the model.     

Sovereign debt composition and time-varying public finance sustainability

We compute time-varying responses of the sovereign debt ratio to primary budget balances for 13 advanced economies between 1980 and 2012, and assess how fiscal sustainability reacts to different characteristics of government debt. We find that the sustainability time-varying coefficient increases and countries become more fiscally sustainable if they contract a higher share of long-term public debt, if more debt is held by the central bank or if it is easily marketable in capital markets.     

Fiscal performance and elections in the context of a transition economy

It is widely accepted that, in democratic societies, incumbent governments may use various means, such as discretionary spending, to increase their chances of re-election. In the context of potential budget constraints (e.g., large debt), the incumbent might consider alternative means. Tax collection performance could be one such means that is prone to incumbents’ electoral manipulation, particularly in transition countries with a weak institutional framework. Investigating Albania, we show that fiscal performance, measured by monthly tax revenues, is poor before elections, especially in elections that result in political change. Before all elections, we observe a reduction in tax collection ranging from 3.2 percentage points in the twelve months before elections to 4.0 percentage points in the six months before elections. This implies a drop of more than half in fiscal performance compared with its long-term “natural” or average rate. Moreover, the deterioration in performance is considerably larger, by two- to threefold, before “change elections” (i.e. elections that result in a change of the governing party). After these elections, fiscal performance improves. The key to reducing deterioration in fiscal performance associated with elections is to establish rules and institutional oversight (independent or bipartisan) that reduce the discretion of tax authorities.     

科学发展观背景下城市公共治理的挑战与对策

在科学发展观背景下我国城市发展面临新要求、新导向和新约束,目前大规模、高速度的城市化已不能适应新形势的需要.如何因地制宜,探索可持续城市化的道路是每个城市政府必须面对的机遇和挑战.本文着重探讨目前我国城市发展公共治理体制方面的问题,认为影响可持续城市发展的体制因素包括国家目标和政绩考核对发展的要求、城市政府的财政压力、以及对城市政府资源配置权缺乏有效制约.针对以上问题,论文以公共治理创新的角度,从国家制度建设和地方实践两个方面提出实现新型、可持续城市化模式政策建议.     

Fiscal forecasting performance in an emerging economy: An empirical assessment of Brazil

This study makes use of Brazilian data to analyze government budget balance forecast errors. Besides the analysis of the quality and efficiency of budget balance forecasts, economic, political, and institutional and governance dimensions are explored. The findings show that the data forecasts have low quality and efficiency. Furthermore, it is observed that the budget forecast error is subject to a backward-looking effect, a bias in the economic growth forecasts, as well as cyclical fluctuations. Finally, electoral cycles represent a source of overestimated forecasts, and strong institutions and governance supported by the public are able to suppress opportunistic motivations in budget forecasts.