Bargaining over an Uncertain Value: Arbitration Mechanisms Compared

This article explores the theoretical and behavioral impactof conventional arbitration and final-offer arbitration (FOA)when parties are bargaining over an uncertain value. In thiscontext, one player receives a fixed payment while the otherplayer receives the uncertain residual. Although both formsof arbitration have identically sized contract zones, we showtheoretically that in FOA the contract zone shifts in favorof the residual claimant. In addition, as the variance of thepossible values rises, the contract zone shifts further in favorof the residual claimant. In laboratory testing, the contractzone roughly reflects the central tendencies of behavior; however,both forms of arbitration increase conflict relative to a no-arbitrationbaseline. This is caused by residual claimants being more aggressivewhen arbitration is available while fixed-payment recipientsare not. However, both parties play a role in the conflict escalationdue to the increased proposal variation.     

Bargaining Outcomes with Double-Offer Arbitration

Increasingly, arbitration is becoming used to resolve bargaining disputes in a variety of settings. Reducing dispute rates is often listed as a main goal in designing arbitration mechanisms. Conventional arbitration and final-offer arbitration are two commonly used procedures, but theoretical examinations of these arbitration procedures show that disputants’ final bargaining positions do not converge and disagreement is likely. This article contains results from a set of experiments designed to compare bargaining outcomes under the two commonly used arbitration procedures with outcomes under an innovative procedure called “double-offer” arbitration (Zeng et al., 1996). This procedure requires that disputants make two final offers at impasse: a primary and a secondary offer. The arbitrator evaluates the pairs of offers using a linear criterion function, and theory suggests the secondary offers converge to the median of the arbitrator’s preferred settlement distribution. Because the procedure’s rules are that convergence of offers generates a settlement at those offers, this theoretical convergence result implies that arbitration is not needed in the end. Experimental results indicate that dispute rates in double-offer arbitration are, on average, about the same as dispute rates in conventional arbitration. However, other results show reason to favor double-offer arbitration. Specifically, in repeated bargaining, there is concern over whether use of an arbitration procedure becomes addictive and makes bargainers more likely to use the procedure in the future-a “narcotic effect.” The data show that double-offer arbitration is non-addictive, whereas both conventional and final-offer arbitration are.     

A Model of Final Offer Arbitration in Regulation

I study a regulatory process in which both the regulator and the regulated firm propose prices that, in case of disagreement, are settled through final-offer arbitration (FOA)—a practice currently used in Chile for setting prices in the water sector. Rather than submitting a single offer, each party simultaneously submits an offer for each of the firms cost units (e.g., cost of raw water, capital cost). While a multiple-offers scheme allow the arbitrator to better approximate her ideal settlement, it may induce parties to submit widely divergent offers. This divergence, however, does not affect the arbitrators ability to learn from the offers.     

Bargaining with Voluntary Transmission of Private Information: Does the Use of Final Offer Arbitration Impede Settlement?

We identify two features of final offer arbitration (FOA) whichmay impede settlement in a bargaining game where asymmetricinformation drives the failure to settle. First, under FOA theinformed party has an incentive to conceal private informationabout the expected outcome in arbitration from his bargainingpartner. Revealing this information allows the previously uninformedparty to submit a more advantageous offer to the arbitratorto the detriment of the informed party. Second, in a two-typemodel, the uninformed player may choose to arbitrate all cases,a result which never occurs in a simple litigation game. Eachplayer's offer directly affects the outcome of arbitration underFOA, and it is this feature that generates impediments to settlementthat are not observed in a simple litigation game. Both impedimentsto settlement are removed if bargaining is allowed to take placeafter potentially binding offers have been submitted to thearbitrator.     

Alternating-offer games with final-offer arbitration

I analyze an alternating-offer model that integrates the common practice of having an arbitrator determine the outcomes if both playersʼ offers are rejected. I assume that the arbitrator uses final-offer arbitration (as in professional baseball). I find that if the arbitrator does not excessively favor one player, then the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium always coincides with the subgame-perfect equilibrium outcome in Rubinsteinʼs infinite-horizon alternating-offer game. However, if the arbitrator sufficiently favors the player making the initial offer, then delay occurs in equilibrium.     

Demystifying the Meese–Rogoff puzzle: structural breaks or measures of forecasting accuracy?

Structural breaks have been suggested by several economists as a possible explanation for the Meese–Rogoff puzzle, in the sense that an exchange rate model can outperform the random walk in terms of the out-of-sample forecasting error if the period under investigation is free of structural breaks. The results indicate that structural breaks cannot explain the inability of the flexible price monetary model to outperform the random walk. The only plausible explanation for the Meese–Rogoff puzzle is that forecasting accuracy is traditionally assessed by magnitude-only measures. When forecasting accuracy is assessed by alternative measures that do not rely exclusively on the magnitude of error, the monetary model can outperform the random walk regardless of the presence or otherwise of structural breaks.     

非内国仲裁理论及其国际实践

仲裁作为解决国际民商事争端的有效方式,而广为运用已是不争之实。伴随着各国的仲裁实践,非内国仲裁理论逐渐发展并为一些国际仲裁实践所采用。本文拟在考察非内国仲裁的理论基础及国际实际运用基础上,对该理论的优缺点及实质作简要评价。     

Bridging the gap in creative economy and ICT research: a regional analysis in Europe

ABSTRACT

Following Florida’s seminal work on the ‘creative class’ there is a great deal of interest concerning whether creativity, as an input, is important for regional growth. Answering this question requires developing a production framework that can distinguish creativity from other inputs. With data from Europe, this paper integrates the concept of information and communications technology (ICT) and the creative class into a theoretical production function. Findings reveal that not only is there a positive and interactive relationship between creative workers and ICT, but the combination of creative workers and ICT leads to higher levels of GVA growth. Moreover, creative workers were found to have a larger impact on growth in comparison with traditional human capital measures (i.e. graduates). Thus, findings from this research suggest that the creative class should not only pay attention to socio-economic preferences of individuals, but it must include wider social resources, such as ICT.     

Time preferences,cognitive abilities and intrinsic motivation to exert effort

The experimental literature has found a positive relationship between patience and performance in cognitive tests that are not incentivized by money. It has also been shown that unincentivized cognitive tests capture not only cognitive ability (CA), but also intrinsic motivation related to the test takers’ personality traits. In order to determine whether the relationship between patience and test scores is driven by intrinsic motivation or CA, we run an experiment in which subjects take either incentivized or unincentivized cognitive tests. We find that while incentivized test scores positively correlate with patience, the unincentivized scores are not related to the time preferences of our subjects. The observed correlation between patience and cognitive test scores therefore seems to be driven by CA rather than by intrinsic motivation related to personality traits.     

Research Ethics Education in Economics

Abstract

In this paper, we report the findings from the data we collected from a survey in order to measure how common research ethics education in economics is. We have found out that (1) research ethics is taught in only a very few economics departments around the globe; (2) topics related to research ethics are not taught in courses on economics and ethics; and (3) the number of papers published in specialised peer-reviewed journals on economics education is only a tiny fraction of the number of papers published in these journals. There has been no evidence in economics showing that economics departments have taken strong initiative on teaching research ethics to undergraduate and graduate students.     

Searching for the sunk cost fallacy

We seek to isolate in the laboratory factors that encourage and discourage the sunk cost fallacy. Subjects play a computer game in which they decide whether to keep digging for treasure on an island or to sink a cost (which will turn out to be either high or low) to move to another island. The research hypothesis is that subjects will stay longer on islands that were more costly to find. Eleven treatment variables are considered, e.g. alternative visual displays, whether the treasure value of an island is shown on arrival or discovered by trial and error, and alternative parameters for sunk costs. The data reveal a surprisingly small sunk cost effect that is generally insensitive to the proposed psychological drivers. Electronic Supplementary Material Supplementary material is available in the online version of this article at . Jel Classification C91, D11     

It's all about mechanisms – what process-tracing case studies should be tracing

ABSTRACT

Process-tracing (PT) as a distinct case-study methodology involves tracing causal mechanisms that link causes (X) with their effects (i.e. outcomes) (Y). We trace causal mechanisms whereby a cause (or set of causes) produces an outcome to both: (1) make stronger evidence-based inferences about causal relationships because the analysis produces within-case evidence of each step of the causal process (or absence thereof) in between a cause and outcome, and (2) because tracing mechanisms gives us a better understanding of how a cause produces an outcome. Yet, when we look at the methodological literature on PT, there is considerable ambiguity and discord about what causal mechanisms actually are. The result of this ambiguity and discord about what mechanisms are clearly maps onto existing applications of PT, with most PT case studies completely ignoring the underlying theoretical causal processes. In the few PT applications where mechanisms are unpacked, they are typically only developed in a very cursory fashion, with the result that there is considerable ambiguity about what theoretical process the ensuing case study actually is tracing. If we want to claim we are tracing causal mechanisms, the causal processes in between X and Y need to be unpacked theoretically. How can we claim we are tracing a causal ’process’ when we are not told what the process (i.e. mechanism) actually is? To alleviate this problem, the article attempts to develop a clearer definition of causal mechanisms to provide scholars with a framework for theorising mechanisms in a fashion that is amenable to in-depth empirical analysis using PT.     

Dissertation abstract: Experiments on fairness and reputation

The three dissertation essays investigate different aspects of reputation in games where fairness is an important consideration. The first essay studies the effects of reputation on indirect reciprocity in different dictator games. The first experiment places dictators in two environments where they can either give money to the paired player or take money away from them: in one treatment the paired player is a stranger and in the other treatment the dictator has information on the paired player’s reputation. Contrary to anecdotal evidence, the statistical tests show that the dictators’ behavior towards a stranger is not statistically significantly different from their behavior towards an individual with an established reputation. The findings arise because a high proportion of dictators acted purely in their own self interest in both treatments. The data also provides evidence that dictators are more generous when they know that their choices (but not their identities) will be revealed in the future. In the second experiment the dictators’ choices were restricted to only generous actions. In such environment the dictators sent more money on average to recipients with a reputation for being generous than to recipients without a reputation. The second essay explores the ways in which information about others’ actions affects one’s own behavior in a dictator game. The experimental design discriminates behaviorally between three possible effects of recipient’s within-game reputation on the dictator’s decision: reputation causing indirect reciprocity, social influence, and identification. The separation of motives helps to identify the mechanisms of social transmission of impulses towards selfish or generous behavior. The data analysis reveals that the reputation effects have a stronger impact on dictators’ actions than social influence and identification. In the third essay¹ we examine the reputation effects in a labor market setting by analyzing the influence of negative technological shocks on long run relationships between firms and workers. The positive correlation between wage and effort in static conditions has been demonstrated in many experimental studies and has been one of the prominent explanations for the existence of wage rigidity. We subject these findings to further tests in a non-stationary environment that better corresponds to outside-the-lab market conditions. We observe the positive correlation of wages and effort but do not find support for downward wage rigidity in our data. Once the shocks occur, firms lower the wages and relationships often break down. The workers who accept a lower wage respond with exerting a lower effort. JEL Classification C70, C91, D63, D64 ¹Co-authored with Ninghua Du. Dissertation Committee: Dissertation Advisor: James C. Cox Martin Dufwenberg, Price V. Fishback, Ronald L. Oaxaca     

A network experiment in continuous time: The influence of link costs

In recent work on non-cooperative network formation star-shaped networks play an important role. In a particular theoretical model of Bala and Goyal (2000) center-sponsored stars are the only strict Nash networks. In testing this theoretical model, Falk and Kosfeld (2003) do not find experimental evidence that players select the center-sponsored star. Based on a slight modification of Bala and Goyal’s model, we design a network formation experiment in which, depending on link costs, periphery-sponsored stars and the empty network are the only strict Nash networks. We observe that almost all groups not only reach a strict Nash network once but also switch the center player in periphery-sponsored stars several times. The main innovation in our experiment is to use a continuous time framework which we believe to be a more realistic setting to study behavior in network formation situations and which makes coordination on stars much easier than simultaneous strategy adaptation in discrete time. Electronic Supplementary Material Supplementary material is available in the online version of this article at http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10683-006-9125-1. JEL Classification C72 · C92 · D81     

On the prevention of manipulation via endowments

Postlewaite (1979) has argued that all individually rational, Pareto optimal resource reallocation mechanisms are vulnerable to manipulation via endowments. In this paper we propose an ‘arbitration rule’ which renders such manipulation unprofitable.     

Freedom of Choice and Poverty Alleviation

The Capability Approach (henceforth CA) views poverty as a multidimensional phenomenon that is not only characterised by lows levels of achievement in the various dimensions but also by a restricted opportunity to choose among different ways of life. The CA thus puts a lot of emphasis on (limited) freedom of choice as a crucial aspect of poverty. If poverty is seen in this way there are two ways to improve the situation of the poor: by broadening the set of opportunities open to them or by strengthening their ability to choose. The paper concentrates on the latter. Although the CA discusses several possibilities for strengthening the ability to choose it does not explicitly consider the role of enhancing the capability of choosing as a means of poverty alleviation. The paper summarizes which circumstances are seen in the CA as suitable for strengthening freedom of choice. Namely, the paper discusses the market as an institution that trains the ability to choose, democracy as a political institution that is based on freedom of choice and participatory methods as an attempt to build explicitly on freedom of choice of the participants. Two shortcomings in the theoretical conceptualization of freedom of choice in the CA are identified by discussing these institutions and circumstances: first, the interplay between social structures and individual agency is not modelled in much detail within the CA. Second, the CA does not provide an explicitly temporal model of agency. The paper takes a closer look at these shortcomings from a sociological perspective since the questions they raise are core questions of sociology. The problems are intertwined. In order to tackle the problem of social embedding in the CA one needs to introduce time and processes as well. Sociological approaches show how social structures evolve from the interaction of individuals. The paper gives an example of how sociological concepts of this interaction can be used for drawing a model of social work for strengthening the agency of the poor. The paper proceeds as follows: first the view of poverty as capability deprivation is presented. The second section gives an overview of the areas in which the CA discusses the strengthening of individual choice: the market, democracy and participatory projects. The third section elaborates on the shortcomings of the CA identified in the preceding section from a sociological perspective and introduces a concept of social work developed in a similar theoretical context. The conclusion summarizes the lessons and outlines further lines of research.     

Does truth win when teams reason strategically?

We study behavior in the race game with the aim of assessing whether teams can create synergies. The race game has the advantage that the optimal strategy depends neither on beliefs about other players nor on distributional or efficiency concerns. Our results reveal that teams not only outperform individuals but that they can also beat the “truth-wins” benchmark. In particular, varying the length of the race game we find that the team advantage increases with the complexity of the game.     

国家实验室体系构建与制度创新：理论依据与实施机制

国家实验室是国家科技创新体系的重要组成部分,在国家发展战略中发挥着重要作用。目前,鲜有研究针对国家实验室体系构建进行理论阐述及体制机制探讨。以我国布局国家实验室体系为研究背景,探讨国家实验室体系构建的现实逻辑,结合国家创新系统理论、协同创新理论和合作博弈理论,剖析国家实验室制度创新的理论依据。结果表明：(1)国家创新系统理论是国家创新驱动发展战略的行动指南,也是推动国家实验室发展的重要依据;(2)协同创新理论强调各类创新要素协调合作与相互作用,有助于国家实验室体系实现整体效应最大化;(3)合作博弈理论探讨决策主体均衡问题,对于实验室与外部单位建立良好互信决策机制大有裨益。基于理论分析,围绕政策引导、运行成长、利益共享和风险分担4个方面体制机制创新,提出国家实验室体系构建的政策建议。未来,国家实验室体系研究需要进一步围绕基础理论和实证研究(驱动因素、运行成效和科学评价)等进行深入探讨。     

Delphi forecasting: Future issues in grievance arbitration

For the time period 1974–1977 there has not existed a list of new and future arbitration issues, ranked or otherwise. This research was conducted to contribute to an update of the literature on the major new and future issues in grievance arbitration. A Delphi survey was selected as the data collection instrument. This article will focus on the predicted future issues in grievance arbitration.     

Conflict,Cooperation and Competition in Anarchy

Caplan and Stringham (2002) attempt to rebut the paradox of cooperation (Cowen and Sutter 1999) as it applies to libertarian anarchy. The paradox in the context of anarchy implies that if private defense agencies can cooperate to avoid conflict they can also collude to reestablish coercion. Caplan and Stringham argue that arbitration is self-enforcing while collusion requires solution of a prisoners dilemma. We agree that collusion requires more cooperative efficacy than arbitration, but maintain that arbitration requires considerably more organization than a simple coordination game. If a network of protection agencies can organize sufficiently to arbitrate disputes, they can also create a barrier to entry by refusing to arbitrate with entrants.