Strategic focus of incumbents in the European telecommunications industry: The cases of BT,Deutsche Telekom and KPN

This study investigates the internal and external strategic choices that telecommunications firms, operating in a dynamic network environment, make to adapt to changes and to respond quickly in order to create or to sustain their competitive advantage. In particular, in the European telecommunications industry incumbent firms have faced important challenges from new technologies, liberalization and the convergence of markets. The leading European telecommunications companies initially focused on new markets and new businesses, emphasizing their plans to become major players in relevant markets. However, after the telecommunications euphoria companies were more restrained due to their huge burden of debt and their market value. Through refocusing or restructuring, these companies have tried to streamline their businesses in order to restore their value and to improve their competitiveness. Insight into the specific strategic actions of traditional telecommunications companies in Europe to the recent developments in the industry is provided from the analysis of three leading traditional telecommunications companies: BT, Deutsche Telekom and KPN.     

Investigating the intertwining impact of wholesale access pricing and the commitment to net neutrality principle on European next-generation access networks private investment plans: An options-game application for capturing market players' competitive interactions

Whilst the deployment of next generation access networks (NGANs) is undoubtedly beneficial to the economy, new legal developments in the United States (US) regarding the issue of net neutrality (NN) pose a new challenge not only to policy makers but to telecommunication providers as well, that could justify a fresh approach when assessing NGANs investments. In particular, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) subverted extant NN rules in the US and if the European Union (EU) decides to follow a similar deregulatory path in the future it could change the way telecommunications providers on both sides of the Atlantic lay down their optical-fibre network infrastructure investment plans. For instance, if traffic prioritization is allowed then diversification of revenue sources can be achieved by charging customers for privileged data delivery to their premises. Currently, NGANs roll-out throughout EU is an ongoing process in a setting whereby access regulation in the form of network element unbundling is already imposed. As a result, these legal developments form a new context within which it makes sense to assess the role of NGANs wholesale access pricing in tandem with the degree of commitment to NN rules so as to i) determine their combinatorial impact on private telecommunications operators' financial figures and ii) capture their competitive interactions. Towards this end, an important aspect of particular value to market players (i.e. incumbents and competitive providers – CPs), and policy makers (i.e. National Regulatory Authorities – NRAs) that this article aims to examine is how to employ the option-game (OG) analysis, that reflects the intersection of game theory (GT) and real options (ROs), to model the competitive interactions between participants in a particular competition game set-up by means of deriving possible Nash-equilibrium (NE) outcomes within a regulatory setting part of which is the commitment or non-commitment to the NN principle. This, hybrid, evaluation tool is applied on top of a conventional discounted cash flow (DCF) techno-economic analysis assessment of an NGAN investment opportunity.     

Market power,regulatory convergence,and the role of data in digital markets

The increased economic importance of digital services has profoundly changed the power structure in telecommunications and media markets. Although these services sometimes directly compete with traditional telecommunications services, the regulatory obligations for both players differ significantly. This article discusses three important areas deemed relevant in order to define a coherent regulatory framework and to account for the specific peculiarities of digital markets: First, challenges associated with assessing market power in digital markets. Second, challenges in harmonizing different regulatory obligations for digital services, and third, the vital role of data and data protection in the context of data-driven business models.     

The impact of trade liberalization in telecommunications services: The case of APEC countries

This paper examines the impact of liberalizing the telecommunications services sector on investment and output in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) countries by estimating a system of four structural equations that takes into account the causal relationship between national income and telecommunications infrastructure. The degree of openness to trade in telecommunications is represented by a carefully constructed index that reflects a country’s trade and investment policy in terms of market access, national treatment and regulatory principles. One interesting finding from the empirical analysis is that the effects of trade liberalization depend on the risk rating of a country. In countries with relatively high risk ratings liberalization reduces investment in telecommunications.     

The US communications consumer and FCC policies: The AT & T position on the proposed legislation

Recent FCC decisions constitute a threat to the traditional principles of US telecommunications policy. Having outlined those principles, the author considers the issue of competition, stresses the need for a unified system, and describes the economic effects of a continuation of FCC policies. Division of responsibility, duplication of facilities, and increases in rates for basic telephone service are seen as consequences which will militate against the efficiency and availability of US telecommunications.     

The disruptive potential of PWLAN at the country-level: The cases of Germany,the UK,and the USA

This paper analyzes the impact of WLAN technologies for incumbent MNOs based on an empirical cross-country study of the players in the public WLAN-hotspot market using the theory of disruptive innovation and theoretical extensions for the industry- and country-level. The main research question to be analyzed is whether and why PWLAN has shown a disruptive or sustaining impact trend for incumbent MNOs in the hotspot markets of Germany, the UK, and the USA in recent years. The results imply that incumbent MNOs and new entrants have taken advantage of the opportunity provided by PWLAN, but the market success of both types of players varies between the countries analyzed. Incumbent MNOs dominate in Germany but not in the UK and the USA. The reasons for these country-specific differences were further investigated, and the results suggest that the analysis of disruptive potential in telecommunications needs to include country- and firm-specific factors, which are, again, largely influenced by the local regulation.     

STRATEGIC DIFFERENTIATION AND STRATEGIC EMULATION IN GAMES WITH UNCERTAINTY*

When players who choose a common strategy face a common shock, while players who choose different strategies face independent or imperfectly correlated shocks, equilibrium choices exhibit differentiation (respectively emulation) when the sign of the cross‐partial derivative of the firms' profit functions with respect to the realizations of the uncertain variables is negative (respectively positive). I consider a variety of applications, including technology choice, brand investments, and R&D races, many of which can be characterized as two‐stage games. In such games I demonstrate that differentiation is more likely to occur when the second stage game is a game of strategic substitutes.     

企业战略联盟中多人多产品合作生产的成本分摊研究

合作博弈理论在企业联盟收益分配和成本分摊中得到了广泛应用,但一般都是单产品问题,而多产品合作生产的成本分摊问题相关研究却很少。本文从合作博弈的视角研究了企业战略联盟中各参与企业合作生产多种产品时的成本分摊问题,构建了一个多人多产品合作博弈模型,给出了博弈应满足的公理化性质,并基于夏普利法给出了该博弈的解函数表达式,同时还给出了单位产品成本函数的表达式。使用该博弈模型首先可以实现战略联盟的总成本在各参与企业间的分摊,还可以将总生产成本在该联盟生产的各产品之间进行分摊。最后用算例证明了该方法的可行性及合理性。     

The new communication age in Japan

Moriya Koyama, Japanese Vice-Minester of Posts and Telecommunications, outlines the need for and format of the recent reforms in Japan's telecommunications. Importantly, the principle of competition has been introduced throughout Japanese telecommunications, with private enterprises now able to provide main categories of service. The principles of impartiality between domestic and foreign suppliers and of fairness in competition have been enshrined in the reform. Further, Japan wishes to promote cooperation in the Pacific basin area to develop economic growth throughout the region.     

Economic growth,telecommunications development and productivity growth of the telecommunications sector: Evidence around the world

This paper studies the relationships between economic growth, telecommunications development and productivity growth of the telecommunications sector in different countries and regions of the world. In particular, this study assesses the impact of mobile telecommunications on economic growth and telecommunications productivity. The results indicate that there is a bidirectional relationship between real gross domestic product (GDP) and telecommunications development (as measured by teledensity) for European and high-income countries. However, when the impact of mobile telecommunications development on economic growth is measured separately, the bi-directional relationship is no longer restricted to European and high-income countries. This study also finds that countries in the upper-middle income group have achieved a higher average total factor productivity (TFP) growth than other countries. Countries with competition and privatization in telecommunications have achieved a higher TFP growth than those without competition and privatization. The diffusion of mobile telecommunications services is found to be a significant factor that has improved the TFP growth of the telecommunications sector in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE).     

Political and economic processes in the privatization of the Korea telecommunications industry: A case study of Korea Telecom, 1987–2003

The Korean government completed its privatization of Korea Telecom (KT) in May 2002. Privatization was undertaken at a gradual pace at first mainly because the Korean government did not want to hand over its managerial power to the privatized telecommunications service company, although it announced its plan in 1987. However, the inauguration of the World Trade Organization (WTO) system and the Korean economic crisis of 1997 forced the government to accelerate its full privatization plan. During this process, several main players such as the Korean government, transnational corporations, international organizations, and large domestic conglomerates played important roles. The full privatization of KT is the result of the political, social, and economic demands of these players.     

Riding the US wave: spectrum auctions in the digital age

Given its significant technological advantages compared to analog broadcasting, digital television (DTV) will be the television system of the future. However, it requires a full replacement of analog television sets by digital receivers, as DTV can only be watched with special equipment. In order to make this transition happen smoothly without losing the analog television audience, both signals have to be simulcasted until a substantial coverage with DTV broadcasting has been achieved. Australia and the US meanwhile have established a regulatory framework to lead this transition towards the end of analog broadcasting, the so-called analog switch-off. Part of the US regime is the FCC's obligation to reassign analog frequencies after the switch-off has taken place by means of auction. Spectrum auctions, however, originate not from the US but from New Zealand, where they have been used since the end of 1989 and ever since been subject to legal and political criticism. The article outlines the principles of both the DTV and spectrum auctions regulation and shows the links between both areas of telecommunications regulation. It concludes by suggesting that the analog switch-off is a unique opportunity to reconsider current spectrum policies, as it frees large amounts of the radio spectrum that are today occupied by analog broadcasting and will soon be subject to one of the biggest frequency reassignment processes in the history of telecommunications regulation.     

A comparative analysis of greening policies across supply chain structures

In this paper, we examine an apparel serial supply chain whose players initiate product “greening.” We consider situations in which the players cooperate or act individually. Our problem is motivated by recent developments in the supply chains of global apparel players. We build game theoretic models and show how greening levels, prices and profits are influenced by channel structures. We also study the impact of greening costs and consumer sensitivity towards green apparels. We propose a two-part tariff contract to coordinate the green channel. Our key contribution lies in the model of decision making of various supply chain structures and analyzing its impact on the players and supply chain. The problem throws interesting insights into the strategies of apparel players and their key decisions.     

China's information superhighway: What is it and who controls it?

This paper focuses on China's telecommunications sector from a national perspective, and summarizes the structure of the country's information superhighway. It then analyzes the changing regulatory and policy framework, and the competition among current and potential players in the market. This leads to a final discussion on the implications and likely outcome - who will control the superhighway in China.     

Value co-creation and appropriation of platform-based alliances in cooperative advertising

Digital platforms help develop the open value co-creation strategic alliances, reshape traditional B2B relationships, and promote inclusive social innovation. This research explores the nature of coopetition between the digital platform and its participants. The focus is on how the platform-based alliance balances the contradiction between value creation and appropriation. The support evidence derives from a Stackelberg game in the context of cooperative advertising. Either the platform or the participant supporting advertising in the alliance prompts a Pareto improvement for all players. But the increased profit would be mainly occupied by the dominant platform. The incentive mechanism of profit sharing can promote the alliance to co-create value in a sustainable manner. The game illustrates the significance of cooperative relationships to co-create a larger total value and the existence of an unequal win-win relationship in the strategic alliance. The contradictory logic of cooperation and competition can be accommodated in the platform-based alliance. The dynamic coopetition is involved in a partially convergent interest structure and impacted by power asymmetry. The results highlight the balance between the tensions and harmonies through value creation and appropriation.     

Municipal support of wireless access network rollout: A game theoretic approach

Next generation access networks are expected to bring ubiquitous broadband access and have attracted interest of municipal governments. This paper investigates the support by municipal authorities for the rollout of such a city-wide wireless broadband access network. Different business cases for 3G and WiFi operators are developed and it is indicated how to model the specificities for commercial versus public players. Furthermore, a game theoretic approach is used to investigate the investment options of the municipal player. It is shown that a partnership between a commercial and public player is the most likely investment strategy. However, bringing more players into the competitive environment reduces the intention of the commercial partner to engage in the public–private partnership (PPP).     

Competitive dynamics in Polish telecommunications, 1990–2000: growth,regulation, and privatization of an infrastructural multi-network

This paper analyzes the relationship between governmental regulatory policies and competitive dynamics amongst private operators and the national monopolist, TP SA, in three network segments of the Polish telecommunications sector. Special attention is paid to the evolution of organizational strategies in a regulatory environment characterized by constant strategic indecision and reorientations of national policy makers. The paper finds that regulatory/competition coevolution has taken diverse forms in the three network subsegments, with asymmetric duopoly operating in the local fixed network, hidden competition at work in the long-distance fixed network, and oligopolistic technology-driven competition characterizing the high-growth cellular network. The conclusion reached is that Polish telecommunications to date has been stuck in a broad stage of pre-competitive market maneuverings by domestic and international capital, in preparation for privatization of the national operator and for full liberalization as part of EU integration.     

Global and political strategies in deregulated industries: the asymmetric behaviors of former monopolies

In deregulated industries former monopolies often adopt asymmetric behaviors: these firms impede the entry of foreign competitors in their home market, especially using defensive political strategies, and, at the same time, aggressively develop international strategies in foreign markets. To account for this behavior, I develop a game theoretic model involving three players: the former monopoly, its home government, and the host government of the country into which the firm wants to enter. I show first that there are in fact different asymmetric strategies that former monopolies can use in such a setting, and that a global strategy cannot always be implemented by those firms because of cooperation issues between the two governments. I also study the conditions under which these issues can be solved and show that this can happen only when the firm develops a political strategy that integrates both defensive and offensive activities. Overall, this paper therefore argues that asymmetric strategies are not always adopted to maintain monopoly rents but are also dictated by the nature of the international relationships between the governments involved. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

2011 ChinaJoy七月盛装起航

第九届中国国际数码互动娱乐展览会（2011 ChinaJoy）又一次进入了盛装起航的倒计时。作为全球展览规模最大、展示内容最全面、参与观众最多的综合性游戏动漫展会,ChinaJoy已成为聚集百余家参展厂商、十余万现场观众以及来自全球数亿目光关注的狂欢盛宴。不仅有无数对动漫、游戏的玩家和追随者,更有来自全球的游戏研发商、运营商、渠道商以及产业精英,汇聚在ChinaJoy以及中国游戏商务大会（CGBC）、中国游戏开发者大会（CGDC）、中国游戏外包大会（CGOC）中。     

Infrastructure investment and optimal access regulation in the different stages of telecommunications market liberalization

In this paper, we compare the optimal access regulation under three different market configurations that approximate the different stages of telecommunications market liberalization. We show that in the first stage of market liberalization the regulator has to balance between static efficiency and investment and that the optimal access price may be above marginal cost. In the second stage, two different outcomes are possible. If entrants tend to underinvest, the regulator balances between static efficiency and investment. If entrants tend to overinvest, the regulator sets the access price as low as possible in order to prevent or limit infrastructure duplication. Interestingly, we find that in the third stage of market liberalization the regulator may decide to promote infrastructure duplication and to set the access price above the price in the first stage of market liberalization, even if telecommunications network operators tend to overinvest in infrastructure duplication.