新形势下产融结合之道

就产融结合来看,东部地区的金融业比较发达,应该重点发展金融主导型的合作模式,而在中西部地区则应该发展产业主导型的合作模式。     

金融效率理论框架与我国金融效率实证考察

金融效率相对低下是对中国 2 0余年金融改革与发展历程的最好注解 ,提高金融效率是实现中国金融可持续发展的核心目标。本文首先以金融效率为线索对金融发展理论进行了简要的梳理 ,认为金融效率研究应在赋予了全新金融效率观的金融可持续发展理论的框架下展开 ,由此界定并提出金融效率的涵义与有效的研究方法 ;同时 ,对中国金融效率 ( 1 990～ 2 0 0 1 )实证分析的结果验证了中国金融效率相对低下的结论 ,其根源可归结为高层金融资源的严重缺乏 ;最后 ,本文建议不仅要建立合理的多层次的金融体系 ,更应从系统的视角加强各层次金融系统内部、各层次金融系统之间以及金融系统与经济系统之间的协调。     

UNDERWRITING SPREADS AND REPUTATIONAL CAPITAL: AN ANALYSIS OF NEW CORPORATE SECURITIES

When entering a new security market, investment banks must establish their reputation. This is done through direct experience in the security market or through reputational capital established in existing security markets. I examine the effects of underwriters' market reputation in publicly underwritten offerings in forty-three financial innovations and find more significant entry barriers for less prestigious underwriters. An analysis of underwriting spreads reveals first-issue pricing advantages due to reputational capital. Unlike the more prestigious underwriters, the less prestigious underwriters reduce spreads upon first entry into each new security market to overcome their lack of market reputation.     

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND CAPITAL STRUCTURE DYNAMICS: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY

Consistent with theoretical predictions, we find that both a higher level of financial leverage and a faster speed of adjustment of leverage toward the shareholders' desired level are associated with better corporate governance quality as defined by a more independent board featuring CEO–chairman separation and greater presence of outside directors, coupled with larger institutional shareholding. In contrast, managerial incentive compensation on average discourages use of debt or adjustments toward the shareholders' desired level, consistent with its entrenchment effect. The effect of corporate governance on leverage adjustments is most pronounced when initial leverage is between the manager's desired level and the shareholders' desired level where the interests of managers and shareholders conflict.