Service Sector Protection: Considerations for Developing Countries

The inclusion of services in the Uruguay Round of multilateraltrade negotiations has focused attention on the protection ofdomestic service suppliers against competition from foreignsuppliers. Issues arising from these negotiations, however,may obscure another and more important issue: the case for unilateralliberalization. This article first surveys methods of protectionin the service sector, and then examines the likely cost ofprotection. Particular attention is given to developing countries.What evidence there is suggests that the costs of protectionmay be high. The article also discusses economic principlesthat could guide a review of policy toward international transactionsin the service sector. Quantitative restrictions or bans onforeign service suppliers—whether they wish to supplythrough trade or establishment—cannot easily be defendedin economic terms, and provide an obvious first target.     

Can foreign suppliers act as “innovation springboards” for firms? Evidence from China

This study provides a new approach for measuring supplier characteristics by distinguishing the countries where they are located. Using data of Chinese listed companies, we explore how firms' R&D investment and innovation efficiency (patents and citations) are affected by having foreign suppliers in their top five suppliers. Our findings suggest that foreign suppliers acting as transmitters of international technology increase firms' innovation efficiency based on organizational learning theory. Moreover, a series of uncertainties caused by foreign suppliers encourages firms to invest more in R&D based on strategic growth option theory. Mechanism tests show that foreign suppliers from countries with high innovation capacity and a similar Eastern culture have a greater impact on corporate innovation. Firms conduct more R&D activities to mitigate the uncertainties caused by foreign suppliers when they have insufficient overseas channels to acquire international knowledge and a high degree of dependence on foreign suppliers. These results are consistent with a series of robustness tests after accounting for endogeneity.     

Customer value propositions in business markets

Examples of consumer value propositions that resonate with customers are exceptionally difficult to find. When properly constructed, value propositions force suppliers to focus on what their offerings are really worth. Once companies become disciplined about understanding their customers, they can make smarter choices about where to allocate scarce resources. The authors illuminate the pitfalls of current approaches, then present a systematic method for developing value propositions that are meaningful to target customers and that focus suppliers' efforts on creating superior value. When managers construct a customer value proposition, they often simply list all the benefits their offering might deliver. But the relative simplicity of this all-benefits approach may have a major drawback: benefit assertion. In other words, managers may claim advantages for features their customers don't care about in the least. Other suppliers try to answer the question, Why should our firm purchase your offering instead of your competitor's? But without a detailed understanding of the customer's requirements and preferences, suppliers can end up stressing points of difference that deliver relatively little value to the target customer. The pitfall with this approach is value presumption: assuming that any favorable points of difference must be valuable for the customer. Drawing on the best practices of a handful of suppliers in business markets, the authors advocate a resonating focus approach. Suppliers can provide simple, yet powerfully captivating, consumer value propositions by making their offerings superior on the few elements that matter most to target customers, demonstrating and documenting the value of this superior performance, and communicating it in a way that conveys a sophisticated understanding of the customer's business priorities.     

Financial Safety Nets: Lessons from Chile

Should governments ever override bank regulators who are attemptingto close down insolvent financial institutions? An analysisof Chile's history shows that time after time from the 1850sto the 1980s, prudential banking regulations were abandonedduring economic crises when attempts to impose tight solvencystandards proved impossible to enforce. Chile's current stringentbanking regulations may prove more durable, but mounting financialdistress is equally likely to lead the government to adopt policiesthat prevent bank failure but undermine the authority of regulators. Bank regulators, including the central bank, are responsiblefor creating a financial safety net to protect depositors againstloss and for enforcing the rules of prudent behavior that arerequired for a stable financial system. Because safety netsoften additionally cover losses to bank owners and borrowers,the support they offer encourages risk-taking by the privatesector an action that may promote financial deepening, but ata high budgetary cost to the government. Poorly designed safetynets may have to be suspended during crises to prevent lossesfrom mounting and to limit the government's liability.      

Feedback from Stock Prices to Cash Flows

Feedback from financial market prices to cash flows arises when a firm's nonfinancial stakeholders, for example, its customers, employees, and suppliers, make decisions that are contingent on the information revealed by the price. Complementarities across stakeholders result in cascades, wherein relatively small stock price moves trigger substantial changes in asset values. This paper analyzes the relation between such feedback effects and parameters such as the information cost, the volatility of existing projects, the risk aversion of liquidity suppliers, and the precision of managerial information.     

Reliance on R&D Partnerships: The Influence of Short-Term R&D Bias and The Nature of Competition

Reports indicate that capital markets frequently focus on short-term corporate financial performance. Arguments suggest that the R&D projects of many firms are skewed towards short-term, low-risk projects with relatively modest expected benefits, reflecting both a response by companies to financial market pressure to maintain short-term returns and a short-term R&D bias. Anecdotal evidence suggests that one response to short-term R&D bias by firms is for them to seek R&D partnerships with customers and suppliers. A theory is developed which suggests that when firms compete on the basis of product costs, they are likely to seek partnerships with customers and suppliers in order to respond to short-term R&D pressures. In contrast, when competition is innovation-based, firms are unlikely to pursue R&D partnerships in response to short-term R&D bias. The results of an empirical study provide support for this proposition.     

Sourcing parts of complex products: evidence on transactions costs, high-powered incentives and ex-post opportunism

This paper revisits evidence on the correlates of sourcing decisions in the US auto industry to see whether adoption of new contracting terms and early involvement of suppliers in design activities (e.g. “relational contracting”) yields different results as compared to previous findings. Previous studies find that US auto firms insource complex parts that require investments in specific assets. Absent large differences in production costs, the results suggest that transactions costs associated with external suppliers exceed transactions costs associated with internal suppliers (e.g. loss of high powered incentives). Using data on 156 sourcing decisions for process tooling (dies) of a new car program we find that under the new relational contracting regime, transaction cost theory continues to have explanatory power for sourcing decisions; however, attributes that favored insourcing in previous studies favor outsourcing in this setting. Moreover, more complex subassemblies are associated with fewer distinct suppliers than expected — evidence of a tendency to co-locate decision rights to reduce transactions costs related to system interactions. After controlling for transaction characteristics that are associated with the sourcing decision, we find no evidence that outsourcing is associated with increased ex post opportunism by the firm (e.g. agreement about contract completion); however, outsourced parts are submitted by suppliers for evaluation significantly later than insourced parts (e.g. delivery holdup).     

DETERMINANTS OF CAPITAL STRUCTURE IN BUSINESS START‐UPS: THE ROLE OF NONFINANCIAL STAKEHOLDER RELATIONSHIP COSTS

According to the finance literature, nonfinancial stakeholders (NFS), such as customers, suppliers, and employees, take into account their expected liquidation costs when dealing with a firm. In this framework, firms can influence their probability of liquidation by choosing an appropriate capital structure. Also, the literature suggests NFS bargaining power may affect firm financing decisions. In the current article we investigate these ideas for initial financing decisions by business start‐ups, where ex ante failure risk is high and NFS must decide whether to make relationship‐specific investments. We find that start‐ups imposing larger costs on their NFS following liquidation significantly reduce leverage. This effect is strengthened when suppliers have greater bargaining power. We also document a marginally negative effect of NFS liquidation costs on the proportion of bank loans. Finally, business start‐ups rely less on bank loans when customers and suppliers are in a powerful bargaining position.     

The effect of social connections on capital structure in supplier-customer relationships

Suppliers socially connected to major customers with relation-specific investments have higher leverage ratios compared to unconnected suppliers. The presence of connections partially reduces supplier underleverage observed in supplier-customer relationships with relation-specific investments. Consistent with the role of connections in bonding trading parties' commitment, connections to major customers help to increase customer purchases, and supplier leverage increases are primarily observed in firms with high intensity of customer purchases. Additionally, connected suppliers are associated with higher leverage primarily when information asymmetry between parties is high. Overall, connections help strengthening implicit contracts through establishing trust between trading parties.     

Interest Rates in Trade Credit Markets

All things equal, interest rates should increase with the borrower's risk. And yet, Klapper, Laeven, and Rajan (2012) cannot find such a positive relation in a broad sample of trade credit contracts. We shed some light on this puzzle by arguing that competition between informed and uninformed suppliers weakens the link between the trade credit cost and the borrower's creditworthiness. Our model implies that trade credit rates are more likely to increase with the borrower's risk if suppliers are less profitable, have high cost of funds, or sell inputs to firms plagued by moral hazard and financial distress.     

Investor valuations of suppliers' major customer disclosures

I investigate whether or not investors in suppliers to retailers find the major customer disclosure value-relevant. Major customer retailers have buyer power because the retailer represents a significant portion of a supplier's sales. Buyer power can indicate reliance on one customer where the supplier is at a disadvantage in negotiating transaction terms. Alternatively, the existence of major customers may suggest the supplier is in a mutually-benefiting partnership with the retailer. I hypothesize that investors find the major customer disclosure value-relevant; however, the direction depends on whether the investor focuses on the partnership aspect or sales concentrated with one customer. My valuation results are consistent with investors focusing on the sales concentration for larger suppliers (higher risk) and the mutually benefiting partnership for smaller suppliers (lower risk). The findings provide insight on valuation implications of having and disclosing a major customer.     

Trade Credit Use as Firms Approach Default

Using a sample of distressed firms with information about suppliers, we document an average fall in the use of trade credit as firms approach bankruptcy compared to a control sample of nonbankrupt firms. However, we uncover a large degree of heterogeneity across suppliers. Suppliers facing high switching costs maintain their business ties with the distressed firms as they approach bankruptcy, and provide them more trade credit. Suppliers in concentrated markets provide temporary support to their clients. Overall, the findings of this paper suggest that switching costs are fundamental to explain whether suppliers provide liquidity to their distressed clients or not.     

Do firms' relationships with principal customers/suppliers affect shareholders' income?

In this paper, we examine whether a firm's relationship with its principal customers/suppliers affects its payout policies. A firm has customer–supplier relationships when its business depends on a small number of major customers/suppliers. The extant literature indicates two channels through which customer–supplier relationships might negatively affect a firm's dividend payments: 1) the high financial distress costs associated with relationship-specific investments and 2) the information certification effect of the principle customer. Consistent with expectations, our study reveals a negative relationship between a firm's dependence on customer–supplier relationships and its dividend payments. This result is robust to various model specifications and consistent with evidence regarding the time-series properties of dividends. Moreover, we find that high financial distress costs associated with relationship-specific investments are the key channel through which a firm's customer–supplier relationship affects its dividend payments. Overall, our results suggest that a firm's relationship with its non-financial stakeholders, such as principal customers/suppliers, is an important determinant of its shareholders' income.     

Beyond the exchange--the future of B2B

Using the Internet to facilitate business-to-business commerce promises many benefits, such as dramatic cost reductions and greater access to buyers and sellers. Yet little is known about how B2B e-commerce will evolve. The authors argue that changes in the financial services industry over the past two decades provide important clues. Exchanges, they say, are not the primary source of value in information-intensive markets; value tends to accumulate among a diverse group of specialists that focus on such tasks as packaging, standard setting, arbitrage, and information management. Because scale and liquidity are vitally important to efficient trading, today's exchanges will consolidate into a relatively small set of mega-exchanges. Originators will handle the origination and aggregation of complex transactions before sending them on to mega-exchanges for execution. E-speculators, seeking to capitalize on an abundance of market information, will tend to concentrate where relatively standardized products can be transferred easily among a large group of buyers. In many markets, a handful of independent solution providers with well-known brand names and solid reputations will thrive alongside mega-exchanges. Sell-side asset exchanges will create the networks and provide the tools to allow suppliers to trade orders among themselves, sometimes after initial transactions with customers are made on the mega-exchanges. For many companies, traditional skills in such areas as product development, manufacturing, and marketing may become relatively less important, while the ability to understand and capitalize on market dynamics may become considerably more important.     

Asset Pricing Implications of Firms' Financing Constraints

We use a production-based asset pricing model to investigatewhether financing constraints are quantitatively important forthe cross-section of returns. Specifically, we use GMM to explorethe stochastic Euler equation imposed on returns by optimalinvestment. Our methods can identify the impact of financialfrictions on the stochastic discount factor with cyclical variationsin cost of external funds. We find that financing frictionsprovide a common factor that improves the pricing of cross-sectionalreturns. Moreover, the shadow cost of external funds exhibitsstrong procyclical variation, so that financial frictions aremore important in relatively good economic conditions. (JELE22, E44, G12)     

Nondisclosure and adverse disclosure as signals of firm value

We present a model in which some of the firm's information ('news')can be disclosed verifiably and some information ('type') cannot,to show that some firms may voluntarily withhold good news anddisclose bad news. We describe an equilibrium in which high-typefirms withhold good news and disclose bad news, whereas low-typefirms disclose good news and withhold bad news. Under some parametervalues, this equilibrium exists when other more traditionalequilibria are ruled out by standard equilibrium refinements.The model explains some otherwise anomalous empirical evidenceconcerning stock price reactions to disclosure, provides somenew empirical predictions, and suggests that mandatory disclosurerequirements may have the undesirable consequence of makingit more difficult for firms to reveal information that cannotbe disclosed credibly.     

The demand for stocks: an analysis of IPO auctions

We analyze a unique dataset that includes the full demand schedulesof 27 Israeli IPOs that were conducted as nondiscriminatory(uniform price) auctions. To the best of our knowledge, thisis the first time the whole demand schedule for any asset isdescribed. The demand schedules are relatively flat around theauction clearing price: The average elasticity is 27. The elasticityis low when the return distribution contains a large uniquecomponent. We also find a significant average abnormal returnof 4.5% on the first trading day and a positive correlationbetween the abnormal return and the elasticity of demand.     

Corporate Leverage and Specialized Investments by Customers and Suppliers

A company's performance in the product market depends in part on the willingness of its suppliers and customers to invest in the relationship—to make specialized investments of human as well as financial capital that may have no value outside that relationship. Consistent with Stewart Myers's concept of debt overhang and underinvestment, the authors hypothesize that companies can encourage their suppliers and other key stakeholders to make such specialized investments by limiting their use of debt financing, thereby addressing their stakeholders' concerns about their long‐term performance and staying power. In this article, the authors report the findings of a recently published study of a sample of U.S. industrial companies during the period 1984‐2003. Using the benchmark input‐output accounts for the U.S. economy, the authors identified supplier and customer industries for each company in their sample while also collecting data on the firm's actual suppliers and customers from Compustat's segment files. Using empirical proxies for the intensity of specialized investments, they find that companies that operate in environments requiring specialized investments by suppliers and customers tend to operate with lower levels of debt. At the same time, the authors report evidence suggesting that the suppliers and customers of highly leveraged companies make lower levels of specialized investment than the suppliers and customers of less leveraged firms.     

Competition and market power in option demand markets

We call markets in which intermediaries sell networks of suppliers to consumers who are uncertain about their needs "option demand markets." In these markets, suppliers may grant the intermediaries discounts in order to be admitted to their networks. We derive a measure of each supplier's market power within the network; the measure is based on the additional ex ante expected utility consumers obtain from the supplier's inclusion. We empirically validate the WTP measure by considering managed care purchases of hospital services in the San Diego market. Finally, we present three applications, including an analysis of hospital mergers in San Diego.     

Government contracts and US bond yield spreads: A study on costs and benefits of materialized political connections

In a 1991–2013 sample of bonds issued by US public firms, we find that the cost of debt (yield spread relative to comparable Treasuries) of suppliers to government agencies is contingent on the strategic importance of the supplier's industry. The yield spreads for strategically unimportant government suppliers are higher than for firms that are not government suppliers. If government contracts serve as tangible evidence of political connections, these higher yield spreads indicate that weaker corporate governance as a cost of political connections outweighs the benefits of said connections. For the subsample of government suppliers from strategically important industries, where the benefits of implicit bailout guarantees and revenue stability outweigh the corporate governance problems, the cost of debt is lower than for firms that are not government suppliers. The higher (lower) cost of debt for strategically unimportant (strategically important) suppliers is confined to contracting with the federal government. Our findings are robust to alternative variable and sample specifications, and to endogeneity concerns.