Internationalization in the Reinsurance Industry: An Analysis of the Net Financial Position of U.S. Reinsurers

In today's global marketplace, the extent of internationalization has become increasingly relevant. We use the framework of the eclectic paradigm to empirically investigate internationalization by U.S. reinsurers using the net financial position in foreign markets to proxy for the level of internationalization. Our sample includes both developed and developing nations to provide a more complete analysis of internationalization of U.S. reinsurers. We find that the factors related to reinsurers’ net financial positions vary based on the characteristics of the countries, the reinsurers, and the industry.     

A Reexamination of the Corporate Demand for Reinsurance

This study examines the effect of the state of the international reinsurance market on the demand for reinsurance by U.S. insurers using data from the years 1993 through 2000. Both the overall demand for reinsurance and the utilization of foreign reinsurance by U.S. insurers are explored. In addition to supporting the findings of prior literature related to the traditional motives for the corporate demand for insurance, evidence indicates that the state of the U.S. reinsurance industry impacts the amount of reinsurance demanded by U.S. insurers. The study also investigates reasons why U.S. insurers utilize a reinsurance program composed of both U.S. and foreign reinsurers. The results indicate that the decision to utilize some percentage of foreign reinsurance is driven primarily by the financial and operational characteristics of the ceding company such as firm size, group affiliation, and organizational form. However, no support is found for the hypothesis that possible differences between the foreign and U.S. reinsurance markets impact the decision to utilize foreign reinsurance.     

U.S. Reinsurance Prices, Financial Quality, and Global Capacity

The puzzle of underwriting cycles and insurance crises in property‐liability insurance has led to numerous economic hypotheses and analyses, yet no single theory seems capable of explaining all of its aspects. Reinsurance is hypothesized to be a potential factor in observed cycles in the primary market; despite this, few underwriting cycle studies focus on reinsurance. The purpose of this research is to investigate determinants of reinsurance prices in the U.S. Nonproportional reinsurance is highlighted, since it is designed to cover the tail of the loss distribution and is considered to be relatively riskier than proportional reinsurance as a result. Separate samples of professional U.S. reinsurers for property and for casualty are studied, based upon the reinsurers' writings of property versus casualty nonproportional reinsurance. The sample period is 1991–1995. The results support both the capacity constraint hypothesis and the risky debt hypothesis, and this is the first research to support both. A major innovation in this study is the use of capacity variables that are broken down by major region of the world.     

The structure of the global reinsurance market: An analysis of efficiency,scale, and scope

We estimate economies of scale and scope as well as cost and revenue efficiency to explain the structure of the global reinsurance market, where large reinsurers dominate but both diversified and specialized reinsurers are competitive. The costs and benefits of size and product diversification are particularly relevant to the reinsurance industry, as risk diversification is central to the industry's business model. We find that reinsurers with total assets less than USD 2.9 billion exhibit scale economies, while those with total assets greater than USD 15.5 billion do not. Large reinsurers are characterized by high cost efficiency, while small reinsurers exhibit superior efficiency only when specialized. Large reinsurers also exhibit revenue scope economies when operating both life and nonlife reinsurance. Moreover, the evidence is in line with the efficient structure hypothesis: cost-efficient reinsurers can charge lower prices without sacrificing profitability.     

On the Corporate Demand for Insurance: Evidence From the Global Reinsurance Market

In this article, we view the demand for reinsurance as a “special case” of the corporate demand for insurance. We analyze the extent to which reinsurance purchases by the global property–liability insurance industry vary across countries and assess the relative importance of country‐level factors compared with firm‐level factors. Using a data set consisting of 21,814 firm‐year observations from 33 (developed and developing) countries during the period 2000–2012, we find that after controlling for firm‐level factors, country‐level factors have economically as well as statistically significant effects on the demand for reinsurance.     

The U.S. Property and Liability Insurance Industry: Firm Growth,Size, and Age

The relationship between firm size, age, and growth is tested for the U.S. property and liability (P‐L) insurance industry, and the determinants of firm characteristics on firm growth are analyzed. Using Heckman's two‐stage methodology, this article examines the relationship between corporate growth and firm size. The relationship between firm growth and firm age is also investigated. Furthermore, to determine time‐varying effects, the analysis is conducted for the different subperiods. The results of this article strongly support Gibrat's Law in the U.S. P‐L insurance market for the testing periods. The results are consistent for longer time periods and for shorter subperiods. It also finds that young firms grow faster than old firms during the sample periods. Related to the determinants of firm characteristics on firm growth, insurers using less input cost tend to grow fast. Economies of scope are positively related to firm growth as well.     

Optimal Reciprocal Reinsurance Treaties Under the Joint Survival Probability and the Joint Profitable Probability

A reinsurance treaty involves two parties, an insurer and a reinsurer. The two parties have conflicting interests. Most existing optimal reinsurance treaties only consider the interest of one party. In this article, we consider the interests of both insurers and reinsurers and study the joint survival and profitable probabilities of insurers and reinsurers. We design the optimal reinsurance contracts that maximize the joint survival probability and the joint profitable probability. We first establish sufficient and necessary conditions for the existence of the optimal reinsurance retentions for the quota‐share reinsurance and the stop‐loss reinsurance under expected value reinsurance premium principle. We then derive sufficient conditions for the existence of the optimal reinsurance treaties in a wide class of reinsurance policies and under a general reinsurance premium principle. These conditions enable one to design optimal reinsurance contracts in different forms and under different premium principles. As applications, we design an optimal reinsurance contract in the form of a quota‐share reinsurance under the variance principle and an optimal reinsurance treaty in the form of a limited stop‐loss reinsurance under the expected value principle.     

Catastrophe Bonds and Reinsurance: The Competitive Effect of Information-Insensitive Triggers

We identify a new benefit of index or parametric triggers. Asymmetric information between reinsurers on an insurer's risk affects competition in the reinsurance market: reinsurers are subject to adverse selection, since only high-risk insurers may find it optimal to change reinsurers. The result is high reinsurance premiums and cross-subsidization of high-risk insurers by low-risk insurers. A contract with a parametric or index trigger (such as a catastrophe bond) is insensitive to information asymmetry and therefore alters the equilibrium in the reinsurance market. Provided that basis risk is not too high, the introduction of contracts with parametric or index triggers provides low-risk insurers with an alternative to reinsurance contracts, and therefore leads to less cross-subsidization in the reinsurance market.     

The Design of Private Reinsurance Contracts

This article examines the effect of asymmetric information on the trading of underwriting risk between insurers and reinsurers and how it is mitigated in a context of long-term relationships. It begins by explaining how information problems affect the efficiency of the allocation of risk between insurers and reinsurers and how long-term implicit contracts allow the inclusion of new information in the pricing of reinsurance coverage. A key feature of these relationships is the reliance on loss-contingent rebates and commissions in the pricing of reinsurance coverage. We argue that when information is revealed only over time, long-term implicit contracts between insurers and reinsurers allow the inclusion of new information into reinsurance pricing. Because of this feature, the allocation of risk between insurers and reinsurers is more efficient. Specifically, such arrangements lead to more reinsurance coverage, higher insurer profits, and lower expected distress in the industry. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: G22, G13, L15, D81.     

On the economics of the longevity risk transfer market

We present a model of a longevity risk transfer market with different market players (primary insurers, reinsurers, and capital market investors) and investigate how market dynamics and the market players' roles evolve with progressing market saturation. We find that reinsurers' appetite for longevity risk is the key driver in the early stage of market development. Since diversification benefits with other businesses decrease with every transaction, the reinsurance market is intrinsically antimonopolistic. With the increasing saturation of the reinsurance sector as a whole, its competitiveness shrinks leading to rising expected risk-adjusted returns for capital market investors. We show that in a saturated market, reinsurers should assume the entire longevity risk from primary insurers, diversify it within their business mix, and subsequently pass on only specific (nondiversifiable) components of the longevity risk to the capital markets. Our findings provide valuable suggestions on how to make the best use of the market's limited risk absorption capacity.     

Risk Management, Capital Budgeting, and Capital Structure Policy for Insurers and Reinsurers

This article builds on Froot and Stein in developing a framework for analyzing the risk allocation, capital budgeting, and capital structure decisions facing insurers and reinsurers. The model incorporates three key features: (i) value‐maximizing insurers and reinsurers face product‐market as well as capital‐market imperfections that give rise to well‐founded concerns with risk management and capital allocation; (ii) some, but not all, of the risks they face can be frictionlessly hedged in the capital market; and (iii) the distribution of their cash flows may be asymmetric, which alters the demand for underwriting and hedging. We show these features result in a three‐factor model that determines the optimal pricing and allocation of risk and capital structure of the firm. This approach allows us to integrate these features into: (i) the pricing of risky investment, underwriting, reinsurance, and hedging; and (ii) the allocation of risk across all of these opportunities, and the optimal amount of surplus capital held by the firm.     

THE REINSURANCE DECISION IN LIFE INSURANCE FIRMS: AN EMPIRICAL TEST OF THE RISK-BEARING HYPOTHESIS

Several explanations have been advanced in the financial economics literature to explain the reinsurance decision in insurance firms. Prominent amongst these is the risk-bearing hypothesis which holds that reinsurance is motivated by the ability of residual claimants to effectively hedge against operational risk. Since the efficiency of risk-bearing is influenced by organisational factors, such as ownership structure and firm size, the amount of reinsurance should also vary according to the characteristics of insurance firms. This study tests empirically the hypothesis that reinsurance is related to firm-specific factors. Using 1988–1993 data gathered from New Zealand's life insurance industry, a fixed-effects covariance regression model is estimated. Consistent with expectations, the results indicate that reinsurance is associated with smaller and more highly leveraged life insurance entities, and companies with greater underwriting risk. However, contrary to predictions, it also appears that it is stocks and companies with diversified production that tend to reinsure. The risk-bearing hypothesis thus receives only partial support.     

A constraint-free approach to optimal reinsurance

Reinsurance is available for a reinsurance premium that is determined according to a convex premium principle H. The first insurer selects the reinsurance coverage that maximizes its expected utility. No conditions are imposed on the reinsurer's payment. The optimality condition involves the gradient of H. For several combinations of H and the first insurer's utility function, closed-form formulas for the optimal reinsurance are given. If H is a zero utility principle (for example, an exponential principle or an expectile principle), it is shown, by means of Borch's Theorem, that the optimal reinsurer's payment is a function of the total claim amount and that this function satisfies the so-called 1-Lipschitz condition. Frequently, authors impose these two conclusions as hypotheses at the outset.     

Reinsurance premium principles based on weighted loss functions

ABSTRACT

In this paper, we propose new reinsurance premium principles that minimize the expected weighted loss functions and balance the trade-off between the reinsurer's shortfall risk and the insurer's risk exposure in a reinsurance contract. Random weighting factors are introduced in the weighted loss functions so that weighting factors are based on the underlying insurance risks. The resulting reinsurance premiums depend on both the loss covered by the reinsurer and the loss retained by the insurer. The proposed premiums provide new ways for pricing reinsurance contracts and controlling the risks of both the reinsurer and the insurer. As applications of the proposed principles, the modified expectile reinsurance principle and the modified quantile reinsurance principle are introduced and discussed in details. The properties of the new reinsurance premium principles are investigated. Finally, the comparisons between the new reinsurance premium principles and the classical expectile principle, the classical quantile principle, and the risk-adjusted principle are provided.     

Catastrophic Losses and Insurer Profitability: Evidence From 9/11

We examine the effects of 9/11 on the insurance industry, hypothesizing a short‐run claim effect, resulting from insufficient premium ex ante for catastrophic losses, and a long‐run growth effect, resulting from ex post insurance supply reductions and risk updating. Following Yoon and Starks (1995) we use short‐ and long‐run abnormal forecast revisions to measure both effects, analyzing them as a function of firm‐specific characteristics. We find that firm type, loss estimates, reinsurance use, and tax position are important determinants of the short‐run position. Firm type, loss estimates, financial strength, underwriting risk, and reinsurance are key determinants of the firm's long‐run position.     

The U.S. Share of Trading Volume in Cross‐Listings: Evidence from Canadian Stocks

I analyze the firm‐specific determinants of the U.S. share of trading volume for 126 U.S.‐listed Canadian firms. I find that the U.S. share of volume is directly related to the mass of informed and liquidity traders in the United States relative to Canada, as proxied by relative analyst following, relative duration of listing, and the U.S. share of sales. Evidence also supports the market liquidity argument that the market with lower spreads and greater depths has greater volume. Finally, the U.S. share is directly related to the relative sensitivity of the stock's value to information in the United States.     

Pricing Double-Trigger Reinsurance Contracts: Financial Versus Actuarial Approach

This article discusses various approaches to pricing double‐trigger reinsurance contracts—a new type of contract that has emerged in the area of ‘‘alternative risk transfer.’’ The potential coverage from this type of contract depends on both underwriting and financial risk. We determine the reinsurer's reservation price if it wants to retain the firm's same safety level after signing the contract, in which case the contract typically must be backed by large amounts of equity capital (if equity capital is the risk management measure to be taken). We contrast the financial insurance pricing models with an actuarial pricing model that has as its objective no lessening of the reinsurance company's expected profits and no worsening of its safety level. We show that actuarial pricing can lead the reinsurer into a trap that results in the failure to close reinsurance contracts that would have a positive net present value because typical actuarial pricing dictates the type of risk management measure that must be taken, namely, the insertion of additional capital. Additionally, this type of pricing structure forces the reinsurance buyer to provide this safety capital as a debtholder. Finally, we discuss conditions leading to a market for double‐trigger reinsurance contracts.     

Adverse Selection in Reinsurance Markets

This paper looks for evidence of adverse selection in the relationship between primary insurers and reinsurers. We test the implications of a model in which informational asymmetry—and therefore, its negative consequences—decline over time. Our tests involve a data panel consisting of U.S. property-liability insurance firms that reported to the National Association of Insurance Commissioners during the period 1993–2012. We find that the amount of reinsurance, insurer profitability, and insurer credit quality all increase with the tenure of the insurer–reinsurer relationship.     

Foreign Affiliates of the Largest Insurance Groups: Location-Specific Advantages

This article has two objectives. The first is the documentation of the relative importance of the largest insurance or reinsurance companies in the world and changes that may have occurred in the past 15 years. The second objective is to identify some of the factors that may explain the increased internationalization and most‐favored locations of the world's largest insurance groups in transition and developing economies. The results of this study have important implications. First, they indicate that as expected, location‐specific factors such as the size of a market, human capital, and good governance do provide an explication of the internationalization of insurance groups. Second, they also show that other factors, such as cultural distance, regulatory barriers, and competitiveness have a significant impact on the choice of countries.     

Die Aufsicht über Rückversicherungsunternehmen nach Solvency II

The impacts of the new regulatory system “Solvency II” on the reinsurance sector are not foreseeable in all details yet. This is true especially with regard to the business aspects of insurance and reinsurance. The legal consequences can be summarized as follows: (1) Solvency II for reinsurers and for primary insurers likewise stands for a paradigm shift in regulation. (2) With Solvency II primary insurance regulation and reinsurance regulation will be more aligned as has been the case according to the Solvency I system so far. (3) The specifics of reinsurance business will be taken into account in the Solvency II-directive as well. Many special provisions which are known from the reinsurance directive will remain in place.