Canadian Strike Replacement Legislation and Collective Bargaining: Lessons for the United States

Opponents of U.S. and Canadian strike replacement legislation contend that restricting the use of strike replacements significantly alters bargaining power and increases strike activity. This article uses data on Canadian manufacturing collective-bargaining agreements to investigate these hypotheses. Although a general ban on strike replacements is found to be associated with longer strikes, little evidence is found to suggest that banning permanent strike replacements significantly influences strike incidence, strike duration, or negotiated wages.     

The Effects of Multi-unionism: a Survey of Large Manufacturing Establishments

Multi-unionism is a distinctive feature of British industrial relations, which is often criticized for reducing the effectiveness of trade unions and also for reducing the efficiency of British business. It is commonly argued that multi-unionism increases strikes, leads to inefficient working practices and complicates the conduct of collective bargaining, although evidence to support this is sparse. This article investigates the process by which multi-unionism reduces business efficiency by a random sample survey of large manufacturing establishments in the North-West of England. Semi-structured interviews with the manager responsible for dealing with trade unions were held in those establishments that were multi-union. It was found that the typical pattern of multi-unionism is for each union to represent distinct groups of workers, rather than competing to represent the same group of workers, and this restricted union competition for members. Even in the minority of establishments that did experience union competition for members, the nature of this competition meant that multi-unionism did not reduce competitiveness. Nor did multi-unionism prevent most employers from introducing efficient working practices. The main implications of multi-unionism are for the conduct of collective bargaining, but any view that this necessarily reduces a firm's efficiency is far too simplistic.     

The Licensing of Market Development Rights within Technology Alliances: A Shareholder Value Perspective*

Technology alliances create market development rights that are shared between partners in an alliance relative to codeveloped product technology. Alliance partners will often manage the shared market development rights in a cooperative manner by forming an agreement in which one partner (i.e., the licensor) licenses its market development rights to the other partner in the alliance (i.e., the licensee). The real options and bargaining power literatures provide opposing recommendations regarding whether a licensor creates greater shareholder value by licensing its market development rights to the licensee on a more or less restrictive basis. Empirical analysis of technology alliance contracts reveals that the restrictiveness by which a licensor should license its market development rights to a licensee depends on the licensee's strategic marketing emphasis. Specifically, a licensee will create greater value by following a more restrictive distribution strategy when its partner's marketing strategy emphasizes value creation. Alternatively, a licensee will create greater value when its partner's marketing strategy emphasizes value appropriation by following a less restrictive distribution strategy. From a theoretical perspective, the paper's findings provide early evidence regarding the contribution of marketing strategy toward value creation in technology alliances and help resolve the differing expectations offered by the real options and bargaining power literatures. Managerially, the paper identifies an alliance partner's strategic marketing emphasis as a hitherto unrecognized factor determining when managers should follow a more or less restrictive distribution strategy when licensing marketing development rights within technology alliances.     

Mergers in Medicare Part D: Assessing market power,cost efficiencies,and bargaining power

We empirically examine horizontal mergers amongst Part D insurers with the aim of assessing how market power, cost efficiencies, and bargaining power affect premiums and coverage characteristics, including drug access and out-of-pocket (OOP) cost. Our results reveal that market power raises premiums, but this is only a local effect that occurs in markets where the merging firms overlap. Mergers alter the bargaining process with upstream suppliers at both local and national levels, affecting drug access and OOP cost. We find evidence of cost efficiencies when firms restructure by consolidating their plan offerings.     

Vertical Contracts and Downstream Entry*

We study the implications of different contractual forms in a market with an incumbent upstream monopolist and free downstream entry. We show that traditional conclusions regarding the desirability of linear contracts radically change when entry in the downstream market is endogenous rather than exogenous. By triggering more entry than two-part tariffs, wholesale price contracts can generate higher aggregate output, consumer surplus, and welfare. In light of this, the upstream monopolist may prefer to trade with wholesale price contracts as well as to give up part of its bargaining power when it is high.     

Inclusion or Dualization? The Political Economy of Employment Relations in Italian and Greek Telecommunications

Recent literature argues that trade unions in restructuring service industries have responded to the challenges of the post‐industrial era by accepting different forms of labour market dualization. This article examines two case studies from Italy and Greece, in which unions adopted divergent responses to intensified market pressures unleashed by the liberalization of national telecommunications markets. In the Italian case, collective bargaining was successfully centralized, resulting in the inclusion of traditional labour market ‘outsiders’. In contrast, bargaining centralization failed in Greek telecommunications, leading to intensified dualization. These different paths of institutional change are explained as resulting from differences in ideological cleavages among unions and distinct legacies in employers’ associations.     

On the Assessment of Default Risk in Commercial Mortgage Lending

This paper takes an initial step toward the development of an empirically-based model of default risk assessment in the commercial mortgage market. A review of existing empirical studies of residential mortgage and commercial loan default provides evidence for appropriate model specification and estimation. A simple default risk model for commercial mortgages is then developed based upon the generalized default risk models of Jackson and Kaserman [1980] and Vandell [1981]. The model is then examined for its ability to successfully handle a variety of situations and used to test the validity of traditional ratio analysis "rules-of-thumb" employed in commercial lending. Ratio tests are found generally to be inconsistent with an objective of constraining default risk below some maximum. Finally, a modified ratio analysis consistent with the model and with a constrained default risk strategy is introduced.     

Microfoundations for stakeholder theory: Managing stakeholders with heterogeneous motives

Instrumental stakeholder theory proposes a positive relationship between fairness toward stakeholders and firm performance. Yet, some firms are successful with an arms‐length approach to stakeholder management, based on bargaining power rather than fairness. We address this puzzle by relaxing the assumption that all stakeholders care about fairness. Empirical evidence from behavioral economics and social psychology suggests that firms face a population of potential stakeholders that consists not only of so‐called ‘reciprocators,’ who do care about fairness, but also of self‐regarding stakeholders, who do not. We propose that a fairness approach is more effective in attracting, retaining, and motivating reciprocal stakeholders to create value, while an arms‐length approach is more effective in motivating self‐regarding stakeholders and in attracting and retaining self‐regarding stakeholders with high bargaining power. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Straight to the Core — Explaining Union Responses to the Casualization of Work: The IG Metall Campaign for Agency Workers

The existing literature provides different accounts on the strategies of unions regarding marginal workers. It has been argued that under increasing labour market segmentation, unions have either to prioritize their core constituencies and to seek compromises with management, or to adopt inclusive strategies towards peripheral workers to counterbalance eroding bargaining power. This article shows that both strategies represent equally viable options to protect the interests of unions' core members. The strategic choice depends on the (perceived) competition between core and peripheral employees related to employers' personnel strategies; this affects the possible alignment of interests between unions' core members, on the one hand, and either management or peripheral employees, on the other. Our historical analysis of union strategies towards agency workers in the German metal sector illustrates this mechanism, and identifies institutional change towards liberalization as the trigger for aggressive segmentation strategies by employers and for inclusive union strategies.     

Productivity Coalitions and the Future of European Corporatism

This paper argues that new technology, the recession, and changing condition in the world market have transformed the ogranization of work and the system of industrial relations in many European countries. Many show a tendency toward decentralized collective bargaining at he firm level. the growing strength of workers' representative at the firm level has weakend the highly centralized bargaining systems (corporatism) which have contributed much to the stability of industrial relations. Case studies, one of west German works councils and one of Italian labormanagement committees, support the argument.     

Communication in vertical markets: Experimental evidence

An upstream monopolist supplying competing downstream firms may fail to monopolize the market because it is unable to commit not to behave opportunistically. We build on previous experimental studies of this well-known commitment problem by introducing communication. Allowing the upstream firm to chat privately with each downstream firm reduces total offered quantity from near the Cournot level (observed in the absence of communication) halfway toward the monopoly level. Allowing all firms to chat together openly results in complete monopolization. Downstream firms obtain such a bargaining advantage from open communication that all of the gains from monopolizing the market accrue to them. A simple structural model of Nash-in-Nash bargaining fits the pattern of shifting surpluses well. Using third-party coders, unsupervised text mining, among other approaches, we uncover features of the rich chat data that are correlated with market outcomes. We conclude with a discussion of the antitrust implications of open communication in vertical markets.     

Bargaining over employment as a firm strategic choice

This paper develops a simple model as to why unionized Cournot firms acting non-cooperatively in the product market may find it optimal to commit to bargaining outcomes with their specific union, which are off the labor demand curve, hence restricting their behavior to non-profit maximizing practices in their product markets. The prediction that power over labor conceded strategically to the union by the firm is negatively linked to union wage power is not rejected on a panel of Belgian firms as well as the prediction that the union bargaining power can be affected by product market structure and other variables affecting union wages.     

No News Is Good News: The Relationship Between Media Attention and Strike Duration

Media attention has been overlooked as a potential determinant of strike duration. This study analyzed the impact of media attention on strike duration using a sample of the 90 largest U.S. strikes that occurred from 1980 to 1991. Results indicated that a strong positive relationship exists between prestrike media attention and strike duration, even while controlling for strike size, organizational fame, the occurrence of a federal intervention, the involvement of a famous union, history of conflict, and broad industry categories. A possible social psychological explanation—bargaining parties behave rigidly in response to increases in public attention—is discussed.     

Economics at the Antitrust Division: 2017–2018

This article describes some of the work of Antitrust Division economists over the past year, with a focus on modeling. It begins by illustrating the mapping from evidence to prediction using tools for assessing the effects of mergers using Bertrand, Cournot, and auction models. It then turns to two hot topics in competition policy: the implications of claims of increasing margins for merger enforcement and the validity of claims of increasing concentration. Finally, it considers how mergers affect prices in bargaining models.     

Purchasing as market-shaping: The case of component-based software engineering

The efforts to address markets as socio-technical orders have hitherto focused on the role of marketing in shaping demand. However, in many markets the role of purchasing is just as important. This paper uses a case study to examine how a single buying company can attempt to shape an emerging market through its purchasing practices. As a result, the study identifies five types of market-shaping actions. Within each action type, the market-shaping behavior of a buyer in an emerging market can be very diverse and include internal actions as well as actions aimed at influencing other market actors. While agency on the purchasing side is often associated with large size organizations, namely government and public sector agencies, our case study shows that agencies on the purchasing sides can be deployed in a variety of ways rather than merely through raw bargaining power. The findings indicate that buying firms do not simply adjust their own purchasing processes according to existing offerings, but actively attempt to drive market evolution in particular directions.     

The Impact of Collective Bargaining Legislation on Strike Activity and Wage Settlements

We examine the effects of collective bargaining legislation, such as (among others) bans on replacement workers and reinstatement rights, on private sector strike activity and wage settlements using Canadian data from 1978 to 2008. Our estimates indicate that this legislation does not have a statistically significant effect on the incidence of strikes. However, we do find that some of the policy variables have a statistically significant effect on strike duration and wage settlements.     

Bargaining Structure and Wage Outcomes in the British Coal Industry

The arguments below use case study and time series data to investigate the relationship between bargaining structure and wage settlements in the British coal industry. Consideration of the different bargaining structures in this industry suggests that bargaining power and wage outcomes are very sensitive to market conditions when the negotiating structure is decentralized; when negotiations are centralized in industry-wide bargaining, power and wage outcomes are quite insensitive to market conditions. These conclusions may help in understanding recent events in this industry and perhaps can be generalized to other cases where bargaining structures are undergoing change.     

Why Do Vacant Houses Sell for Less: Holding Costs,Bargaining Power or Stigma?

This article introduces Nash bargaining into a search model to identify various channels through which vacancy affects selling price and liquidity in the resale market for houses. The model shows the various vacancy effects in the form of greater seller holding cost, lower seller bargaining power and unobserved negative attributes or stigma. We use a 20‐year data series on house transactions to test for these effects in a simultaneous model of price and liquidity, using the long data series to allow for variation across market phases. The robust vacancy effects on price and liquidity across all market phases primarily reflect greater seller holding cost and diminished bargaining power. Repeatedly, vacant houses also exhibit significant stigma effects in the rising market but not in stable or declining market phases. At the same time, vacant houses enjoy stronger shopping externality effects from surrounding houses for sale than do their occupied counterparts.     

Estimating the Wage Premium of Collective Wage Contracts: Evidence from Longitudinal Linked Employer–Employee Data

Using a large‐scale linked employer–employee dataset from western Germany, this paper presents new evidence on the wage premium of collective bargaining contracts. In contrast to previous studies, we seek to assess the extent to which differences in wages between workers in covered and uncovered firms arise from the nonrandom selection of workers and firms into collective bargaining coverage. By measuring the relative wage changes of workers employed in firms that change contract status, we obtain estimates that depart considerably from previous results relying on cross‐sectional data. Results from analyzing separate transitions show that leaving industry‐level contracts is associated with subsequent wage losses. However, the results from a trend‐adjusted difference‐in‐difference approach indicate that particularly the transitions to no coverage appear to be associated with negative shocks. Overall, our findings provide no evidence of a “true” wage effect of leaving wage bargaining, once we account for differences in pretransition wage growth.     

The Microeconomic Impacts of Employee Representatives: Evidence from Membership Thresholds

Employee representatives in firms are a potentially key but not yet studied source of the impact of unions and works councils. Their actions can shape multiple drivers of firm performance, including collective bargaining, strikes, and training. This article examines the impact of union representative mandates by exploiting legal membership thresholds present in many countries. In the case of Portugal, which we examine here, while firms employing up to forty‐nine union members are required to have one union representative; this increases to two (three) union reps for firms with fifty to ninety‐nine (100–199) union members. Drawing on matched employer–employee data on the unionized sector and regression discontinuity methods, we find that a one percentage point increase in the legal union representative/members ratio leads to an increase in firm performance of at least 7 percent. This result generally holds across multiple dimensions of firm performance and appears to be driven by increased training. However, we find no effects of union representatives on firm‐level wages, given the predominance of sectoral collective bargaining.