CEO tenure and audit pricing

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting - We examine the relationship between CEO tenure and audit fees. After controlling for client and auditor attributes in the analyses, we find that...     

A note on assessing the relation between CEO characteristics and stock performance: Alpha Above Replacement

Many studies examine the relation between stock performance and CEO characteristics. We approach the topic in a different way, using the alphas generated by the Fama‐French three‐factor model as the dependent variable in a CEO characteristic model. We find several traits are significantly related to alpha. CEOs who are younger, own a larger fraction of firm equity and hold a graduate degree provide greater alphas. CEOs who are also the founder of the firm deliver larger alphas. Our results provide useful information for boards assessing the performance of CEOs and considering CEO succession.     

Housing tenure choice

This article revisits the microeconomics of housing tenure choice. It asks, How does a rational consumer make housing tenure decisions? The article builds on earlier papers on the subject in two ways. First, it brings together all relevant components of the portfolio decision in a single and coherent analytical framework. Second, it presents numerical analysis with carefully chosen national data and post-1986 tax reform tax provisions. The conclusion is that occupancy required for ownership to be rational is probably somewhat longer than it was during the 1970s and early 1980s, and is probably longer than many economists suspect. It seems apparent from the numerical analysis that substantial segments of the U.S. population should not be owner-occupiers regardless of anticipated occupancy.     

Changes in CEO compensation structure and the impact on firm performance following CEO turnover

We document changes in compensation structure following CEO turnover and relate them to future performance. Compared to outgoing CEOs, incoming CEOs derive a significantly greater percentage of their compensation from option grants and new stock grants. The voluntary turnover sample shows similar changes in compensation structure while the forced turnover sample results suggest that new stock grants drive the significant increase in incentive compensation following turnover. Post-turnover performance is positively associated with new stock grants as a percentage of total compensation in the full sample and when analyzing forced and voluntary turnovers separately. We find limited evidence that future operating income is positively associated with option grants following forced turnover. Post-turnover improvement in operating income is positively associated with an increase in new stock grants for the incoming relative to the outgoing CEO.

Risk and CEO turnover

This paper investigates how performance risk impacts a board's ability to learn about the unknown talent of a chief executive officer (CEO). We theorize that the information content of performance is increasing in idiosyncratic risk and decreasing in systematic risk. We provide robust empirical evidence that the likelihood of CEO turnover is increasing in idiosyncratic risk and decreasing in systematic risk and that turnover-performance-sensitivity is also increasing in idiosyncratic risk and decreasing in systematic risk. We further investigate relations between the threat of termination and CEO compensation, showing that for retained CEOs, both subsequent pay-performance-sensitivity and pay levels decrease in the probability of turnover.     

Don't hire the wrong CEO

A disturbing trend is going on in corporate America--CEO churning. Top executives are rapidly coming and going, keeping their jobs for increasingly shorter periods of time. The reason? Most boards are so unclear about the definition of leadership, they are picking the wrong people. CEO churning needn't be, say leadership experts Warren Bennis and James O'Toole. Boards can reverse the trend by following several guidelines. First, boards must come to a shared, accurate definition of leadership. Simply put, leaders must be able to move human hearts--to challenge people and make them want to scale steep peaks. Second, boards should strengthen the CEO selection process by resolving strategic and political conflicts amongst themselves. An agreed-upon strategic direction will make choosing the CEO with the right vision for the company that much easier and can clarify the job for the new CEO. Third, the board needs to measure every CEO candidate's soft qualities. Economic measures are important, but integrity, the ability to provide meaning, and the talent for creating other leaders are critical. Fourth, boards should beware of candidates who act like CEOs. Charisma and glossy pitches can be enticing, but they're rarely the stuff of true leadership. Fifth, boards should accept that real leaders will more than likely overturn the status quo. Sixth, boards need to know that insider heirs usually aren't apparent, and finally, boards should always avoid making a hasty decision. Hiring the right CEO is a slow process at best. Ultimately, the surest way for boards to pick the right CEO is to cultivate and nurture talent in the making.     

优秀CEO的领导之道

亚力克斯·莫利曾这样说：“做领导就是要调动其他人从事更伟大的事业。照我做的去做比照我说的去做更令人信服。内在的热情是最有力的鼓动因素”。做一个优秀的CEO应该具备哪些特质？怎样才能成为一个优秀的CEO？在澳洲会计师公会CEO亚力克斯·莫利先生来京参加他的新书《没有不挫折的人生》（中文版）发布会之际,《国际融资》杂志记者专程采访了他,请他分享职业成功的经验以及对企业领导者的建议。     

Bank CEO incentives and the credit crisis

We investigate whether bank performance during the recent credit crisis is related to chief executive officer (CEO) incentives before the crisis. We find some evidence that banks with CEOs whose incentives were better aligned with the interests of shareholders performed worse and no evidence that they performed better. Banks with higher option compensation and a larger fraction of compensation in cash bonuses for their CEOs did not perform worse during the crisis. Bank CEOs did not reduce their holdings of shares in anticipation of the crisis or during the crisis. Consequently, they suffered extremely large wealth losses in the wake of the crisis.     

Ending the CEO succession crisis

The CEO succession process is broken. Many companies have no meaningful succession plans, and few of the ones that do are happy with them. CEO tenure is shrinking; in fact, two out of five CEOs fail in their first 18 months. It isn't just that more CEOs are being replaced; it's that they're being replaced badly. The problems extend to every aspect of CEO succession: internal development programs, board supervision, and outside recruitment. While many organizations do a decent job of nurturing middle managers, few have set up the comprehensive programs needed to find the half-dozen true CEO candidates out of the thousands of leaders in their midst. Even more damaging is the failure of boards to devote enough attention to succession. Search committee members often have no experience hiring CEOs; lacking guidance, they supply either the narrowest or the most general of requirements and then fail to vet eitherthe candidates or the recruiters. The result is that too often new CEOs are plucked from the well-worn Rolodexes of a remarkably small number of recruiters. These candidates may be strong in charisma but may lack critical skills or otherwise be a bad fit with the company. The resulting high turnover is particularly damaging, since outside CEOs often bring in their own teams, can cause the company to lose focus, and are especially costly to be rid of. Drawing on over 35 years of experience with CEO succession, the author explains how companies can create a deep pool of internal candidates, how boards can consistently align strategy and leadership development, and how directors can get their money's worth from recruiters. Choosing a CEO should be not one decision but an amalgam ofthousands of decisions made by many people every day over years.     

Goodwill impairments and chief executive officer tenure

The purpose of this paper is to examine the tenure of the chief executive officers of publicly held companies and their corresponding goodwill impairment decisions. An opportunity for managers to manage earnings exists via the Financial Accounting Standards Board's (FASB) goodwill accounting rules. It is hypothesized that CEOs will recognize this impairment in the early years of their tenure because blame can be placed on prior management's acquisition decisions, expensing goodwill early will make future earnings look better, or an objective evaluation of the reporting unit increases impairments.     

CEO Ownership and Discretionary Investments

Abstract:  This study investigates empirically the relationship between CEO ownership and discretionary investments such as R&D and capital expenditures. We assert that the under-investment problem is high for R&D-intensive projects, while the over-investment problem is high for capital expenditures because of differences in risk between the two types of investments. Building on the linkages between investments and investment-related agency problems, we hypothesize that the relationship between CEO ownership and investments depends on whether increasing ownership mitigates or exacerbates the under- or over-investment problem. We find a non-linear association between CEO stock ownership and R&D investments; R&D investments increase and then decline across increasing levels of ownership. Further, we find that R&D investments and CEO stock options are positively associated at high levels of option holdings. In contrast, capital expenditures do not vary with CEO ownership (stock or options). Finally, consistent with our underlying assumption, we find that the influence of R&D investments on future firm risk is significantly larger than that of capital expenditures. Our findings indicate that managerial risk aversion affects discretionary investments.     

CEO Compensation and Board Structure

In response to corporate scandals in 2001 and 2002, major U.S. stock exchanges issued new board requirements to enhance board oversight. We find a significant decrease in CEO compensation for firms that were more affected by these requirements, compared with firms that were less affected, taking into account unobservable firm effects, time-varying industry effects, size, and performance. The decrease in compensation is particularly pronounced in the subset of affected firms with no outside blockholder on the board and in affected firms with low concentration of institutional investors. Our results suggest that the new board requirements affected CEO compensation decisions.     

Board Independence and CEO Turnover

This paper analyzes how board independence affects the CEO's ability to extract rents from the firm. The CEO is assumed to possess private information about his ability, which the board needs in order to decide whether to replace him. If the board is more active in removing low quality CEOs, the incumbent is better able to use his information advantage to extract rents. Since the board cannot commit not to renegotiate the contract, a board that is fully independent from the CEO is more active than is efficient ex ante. For this reason, shareholders are better off if the board of directors lacks some independence. The model predicts that a trend toward greater board independence is associated with subsequent trends toward higher CEO turnover, more generous severance packages, and larger stock option grants.     

Remuneration committees,shareholder dissent on CEO pay and the CEO pay–performance link

We provide evidence on whether the adoption of the full Australian Securities Exchange recommendations for remuneration committee formation and structure are associated with a lower shareholder dissenting vote or a stronger CEO pay–performance link. We find some evidence that a minority‐ and majority‐independent remuneration committee and a committee size of at least the recommended three members are associated with lower shareholder dissent. Companies with an independent committee have a stronger CEO pay–performance link. In addition, a majority‐independent committee strengthens the link between performance and growth in CEO pay.     

Restricting CEO pay

We analyze several proposals to restrict CEO compensation and calibrate two models of executive compensation that describe how firms would react to different types of restrictions. We find that many restrictions would have unintended consequences. Restrictions on total realized (ex-post) payouts lead to higher average compensation, higher rewards for mediocre performance, lower risk-taking incentives, and the fact that some CEOs would be better off with a restriction than without it. Restrictions on total ex-ante pay lead to a reduction in the firm's demand for CEO talent and effort. Restrictions on particular pay components, and especially on cash payouts, can be easily circumvented. While restrictions on option pay lead to lower risk-taking incentives, restrictions on incentive pay (stock and options) result in higher risk-taking incentives.     

The ambidextrous CEO

Although most managers publicly acknowledge the need to explore new businesses and markets, the claims of established businesses on company resources almost always come first, especially when times are hard. When top teams allow the tension between core and speculative units to play out at lower levels of management, innovation loses out. At best, leaders of core business units dismiss innovation initiatives as irrelevancies. At worst, they see the new businesses as threats to the firm's core identity and values. Many CEOs take a backseat in debates over resources, ceding much of their power to middle managers, and the company ends up as a collection of feudal baronies. This is a recipe for long-term failure, say the authors. Their research of 12 top management teams at major companies suggests that firms thrive only when senior teams lead ambidextrously--when they foster a state of constant creative conflict between the old and the new. Successful CEOs first develop a broad, forward-looking strategic aspiration that sets ambitious targets both for innovation and core business growth. They then hold the tension between innovation unit demands and core business demands at the very top of the organization. And finally they embrace inconsistency, allowing themselves the latitude to pursue multiple and often conflicting agendas.     

CEO Influence and Executive Compensation

The sales-maximization hypothesis and the shareholder wealth-maximization hypothesis have been suggested in prior finance literature to explain the determinants of CEO pay. This paper proposes that CEO influence over the board is an additional explanation for the size of CEO pay. Evidence from the 1989–1991 period indicates that CEO pay is positively related to measures of CEO influence over the board. Results of this study suggest that CEO salary levels are mostly a function of CEO influence over the board, the growth in sales and the size of the firm.     

CEO turnover and bondholder wealth

We examine the impact of CEO turnover announcements on bondholder wealth, stockholder wealth, and overall firm value. Using publicly traded data for the period from 1973 to 2000, we find evidence consistent with both the wealth transfer and signaling hypotheses. Specifically, we find that CEO turnover events are associated with lower bondholder values, higher stockholder values, and that net changes in firm value are a function of turnover type (forced vs voluntary and outside vs inside firm replacements) and the riskiness of the firm’s debt (investment vs non-investment grade). Overall, the results contribute to the understanding of the effects of corporate governance mechanisms, of which CEO turnover is an extreme form, on bondholders.     

CEO incentives and earnings prediction

This study investigates whether information about Chief Executive Officer (CEO) incentives is useful for predicting future earnings. We find that in companies with higher CEO equity incentives, current year earnings are more informative of future earnings than in other companies. Additionally, in an earnings prediction setting, CEO incentives are shown to provide information about future earnings that is incremental to current earnings or earnings components. The predictive power of CEO incentives for future earnings is robust to the inclusion of other predictors of future earnings. Furthermore, we find that CEO incentives are predictive of “real” future earnings, as represented by operating cash flow and non-discretionary accruals, but not predictive of future discretionary accruals. Finally, we find that financial analysts do not incorporate information about CEO incentives when they forecast future earnings. This result suggests that incorporating CEO incentives can potentially improve analyst forecasts of future earnings.