Analysts’ forecast revisions and firms’ research and development expenses

This study examines whether reported values for firms’ research and development (R&D) affect analysts’ annual earnings forecast revisions following quarterly earnings announcements. Because R&D introduces uncertainty into earnings forecasts, analysts may benefit from additional information searches in an effort to increase forecast accuracy. Also, accounting standards mandate an immediate expensing of R&D, in essence projecting a zero value for the R&D. To the extent that R&D will produce future payoffs, the expense treatment reduces the informativeness of reported earnings for forecasting future earnings. Thus, the marginal benefit of analysts’ efforts to produce more information may increase with the magnitude of the R&D component of earnings announcements and trigger additional forecast revisions. Alternatively, if the cost of information searches exceeds the benefit, analysts’ forecast revisions may decrease. Our results show a positive relation between R&D expenses and analysts’ forecast revision activity. We also find a positive and significant association between the level of R&D expenses and the magnitude of analysts’ forecast revisions following quarterly announcements. These results point to a greater amount of analyst scrutiny when reported earnings are accompanied by high levels of R&D expenses.

Target’s earnings quality and bidders’ takeover decisions

This study examines how takeover decisions are influenced by the quality of information in target firms’ earnings. We show that bidders prefer negotiated takeovers in deals involving targets with poor earnings quality. Moreover, earnings quality and takeover premiums are negatively related in negotiated takeovers, suggesting that bidders obtain valuable private information through negotiations. We also find that bidders share information risk with target shareholders by paying with more equity for targets with poor earnings quality. These findings are driven primarily by the asymmetric information component of earnings quality (as opposed to the symmetric component) and are observed mainly in inter-industry takeovers, where asymmetric information concerns are greater, rather than in intra-industry takeovers. We conclude that targets’ earnings quality affects bidders’ takeover decisions, particularly in cases of large asymmetric information between targets and bidders.     

Directors’ and Officers’ liability insurance and bond credit spreads: Evidence from China

Using hand-collected data on purchases of D&O insurance by Chinese listed firms for the period from 2008 to 2019, we empirically find that D&O insurance negatively associates with credit spreads. The negative relationship still holds after conducting a series of robustness tests and is not driven by the eyeball effect. We also show that D&O insurance can reduce credit spreads via the channels of internal controls, external monitoring, information asymmetry and default risk. Moreover, the negative effect of D&O insurance on credit spreads is more pronounced for non-state-owned firms, those located in regions with a low level of marketization or that employ rating agencies with a bad reputation. Our study complements the literature on the credit spreads and corporate governance.     

Price presentation and consumers’ choice

Currently, regulatory authorities and consumers ask for more cost transparency with respect to financial product components. In life insurance, for instance, the premium for products should be split in its components: A premium for death benefits, the savings premium, the cost of an investment guarantee, and the administration costs. In this regard, it is important for insurance companies and regulators to know to what extent the way of presenting the prices of an offer affects consumer evaluation of the product. Based on a paper by Huber et al. (How do price presentation effects influence consumer choice? The case of life insurance products. Working paper, 2011) as presented at the annual meeting of Deutscher Verein für Versicherungswissenschaft in 2011, this article presents the effects of different forms of presenting the price of life insurance contract components and especially of investment guarantees on consumer evaluation of this product. This is done by means of an experimental study using a representative panel for Switzerland and by focusing on unit-linked life insurance products. The findings reveal that, contrary to consumer products, there is no effect of price bundling and price optic on consumer evaluation and purchase intention for life insurance products. However, there is a significant moderating effect of consumer experience with insurance products on this relationship.     

CEO stock options and analysts’ forecast accuracy and bias

This paper investigates the relationship between CEO stock options and analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy and bias. A higher level of stock options may induce managers to undertake riskier projects, to change and/or reallocate their effort, and to possibly engage in gaming (such as opportunistic earnings and disclosure management). These managerial behaviors result in an increase in the complexity of forecasting and hence, less accurate analysts’ forecasts. Analysts’ optimistic forecast bias may also increase as the level of stock options pay increases. Because forecast complexity increases with stock options pay, analysts, needing greater access to management’s information to produce accurate forecasts, have incentives to increase the optimistic bias in their forecasts. Alternatively, a higher level of stock options pay may lead to improved disclosure because it better aligns managers’ and shareholders’ interests. The improved disclosure, in turn, may result in more accurate and less biased analysts’ forecasts. Our empirical evidence indicates that analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy decreases and forecast optimism increases as the level of CEO stock options increases. This evidence suggests that the incentive alignment effects of stock options are more than offset by the investment, effort allocation and gaming incentives induced by stock options grants to CEOs.     

Striking a balance between ‘Sir’ and ‘Dude’

This postcard reflects on an issue common to many academics, whether they teach accounting, politics or—as in my case—commercial law to business and economics students. Creating an open and effective relationship with students is a balancing act undertaken by educators across the board—and no less by my accounting colleagues down the hall. In teaching commercial law to accounting students, I was recently reminded of the importance and occasional difficulty in maintaining a healthy ‘two-way’ relationship. I trust the following may connect with accounting educators and others who are also trying to achieve the right balance.     

Political patronage and analysts’ forecast precision

We test whether the channel by which the government plays the role of political patron to selected firms influences analysts’ forecast precision in Malaysia. Correcting for analysts’ self-selection bias, we find a negative relation between analysts’ forecast errors and the social dimension of political patronage, as proxied by government-controlled institutional ownership. The reverse is found for the economic dimension of political patronage, as proxied by the percentage shareholding of government-linked corporations. We find no evidence that the personal dimension of political patronage influences analysts’ forecast precision.     

Suppliers’/customers’ production efficiency uncertainty and firm credit risk

This study explores the effects of business counterparties’ (i.e. suppliers’/customers’) production efficiency uncertainty (PEU) on corporate credit risk by employing American bond observations of manufacturing firms. Empirical results of this study show that customers’ PEU is positively related to corporate bond yield spreads whereas suppliers’ has an opposite effect. The former result shows the importance of demand uncertainty while the latter one suggests that the benefits of supply chain integration or information sharing exceed the costs of supply chain uncertainty. We also find that the effects of suppliers’/customers’ PEUs on bond yield spreads are significantly affected by the information flow risk within the supply chain. In addition, the customer-side effect becomes weaker during the financial crisis period, whereas the supplier-side one is insignificantly affected. These empirical results are robust when controlling for potential endogeneity problems and employing an alternative sample which consists of the bond observations with both supplier and customer identification information. Finally, it has to be noticed that our conclusions are only applicable to manufacturing industries.     

‘Slow-burn’ spillover and ‘fast and furious’ contagion: a study of international stock markets

‘Fast and furious’ contagion across capital markets is an important phenomenon in an increasingly integrated financial world. Different from ‘slow-burn’ spillover or interdependence among these markets, ‘fast and furious’ contagion can occur instantly. To investigate this kind of contagion from the US, Japan and Hong Kong to other Asian economies, we design a research strategy to capture fundamental interdependence, or ‘slow-burn’ spillover, among these stock markets as well as short-term departures from this interdependence. Based on these departures, we propose a new contagion measure which reveals how one market responds over time to a shock in another market. We also propose international portfolio analysis for contagion via variance decomposition from the portfolio manager’s perspective. Using this research strategy, we find that the US stock market was cointegrated with the Asian stock markets during four specific periods from 3 July 1997 to 30 April 2014. Beyond this fundamental interdependence, the shocks from both Japan and Hong Kong have significant ‘fast and furious’ contagion effects on other Asian stock markets during the US subprime crisis, but the shocks from the US have no such effects.     

Income Distribution and Aggregate Saving: Theory and China’s Evidence

Using a parsimonious heterogeneous-agent general equilibrium model, this study reveals a positive causal effect of income inequality on the aggregate saving rate. In the model economy, benevolent individuals save to leave offspring bequests. Since bequests are luxury, the rich have a higher marginal propensity to save. Then, else equal, a fall in income inequality will lower the economy-wide saving rate. The model predicts an augmented aggregate saving function: the aggregate saving rate depends positively not only on the aggregate income level, but also on the dispersion of income. We find some empirical support for this hypothesis using China’s province-level longitudinal data.     

Market implied future earnings and analysts’ forecasts

This study provides evidence on market implied future earnings based on the residual income valuation (RIV) framework and compares these earnings with analyst earnings forecasts for accuracy (absolute forecast error) and bias (signed forecast error). Prior research shows that current stock price reflects future earnings and that analyst forecasts are biased. Thus, how price-based imputed forecasts compare with analyst forecasts is interesting. Using different cost of capital estimates, we use the price-earnings relation and impute firms’ future annual earnings from three residual income (RI) models for up to 5 years. Relative to I/B/E/S analyst forecasts, imputed forecasts from the RI models are less or no more biased when cost of capital is low (equal to a risk-free rate or slightly higher). Analysts slightly outperform these RI models in terms of accuracy for immediate future (1 or 2) years in the forecast horizon but the opposite is true for more distant future years when cost of capital is low. A regression analysis shows that, in explaining future earnings changes, analyst forecasts relative to imputed forecasts do not impound a significant amount of earnings information embedded in current price. In additional tests, we impute future long-term earnings growth rates and find that they are more accurate and less biased than I/B/E/S analyst long-term earnings growth forecasts. Together, the results suggest that the RIV framework can be used to impute a firm’s future earnings that are high in accuracy and low in bias, especially for distant future years.     

Textual risk disclosures and investors’ risk perceptions

We examine the association between changes in companies’ textual risk disclosures in 10-K filings and changes in stock market and analyst activity around the filings. We find that annual increases in risk disclosures are associated with increased stock return volatility and trading volume around and after the filings. Increases in risk disclosures are also associated with more dispersed forecast revisions around the filings. In contrast to prior literature documenting resolved uncertainties in response to various types of company disclosures, our findings suggest that textual risk disclosures increase investors’ risk perceptions. However, the results are less pronounced for firm-level disclosures that deviate from those of other companies in the same industry and year. These results lend support for critics’ arguments that firm-level risk disclosures are more likely to be boilerplate.     

Stock options and managers’ incentives to cheat

This paper develops a continuous-time real options’ pricing model to study managers’ incentives to cheat in the presence of equity-based compensation plans. It shows that managers’ incentives to cheat are strongly influenced by the efficiency of the justice. The model’s main result is that managers have greater incentives to commit fraudulent actions under stock options than under common stocks based compensation plans.     

Foreign residency rights and companies’ auditor choice

Recently, with the migration of wealthy Chinese elites becoming increasingly prevalent, the market has come to believe that firms with controlling persons with foreign residency rights have serious agency problems. We study the impact of controlling persons with foreign residency rights on corporate audit perspective. We find that firms whose controlling persons have foreign residency rights are more likely to use high-quality auditing services, and that this behavior is more obvious in regions with lower marketization and in firms with higher separation of ownership and control. We further study the effect of firms whose controlling persons have foreign residency rights that use high-quality Big 4 auditors and find that such firms have better corporate governance and accounting performance.     

Takeover bids and target directors’ incentives: the impact of a bid on directors’ wealth and board seats

I investigate the nature of the incentives that lead outside directors to serve stockholders’ interests. Specifically, I document the effect of a takeover bid on target directors, both in terms of its immediate financial impact and its effect on the number of future board seats held by those target directors. Directors are rarely retained following a completed offer. All target directors hold fewer directorships in the future than a control group, suggesting that the target board seat is difficult to replace. For outside directors, the direct financial impact of a completed merger is predominately negative. This documents a cost to outside directors should they fail as monitors, forcing the external control market to act for them. Future seats are related to pre-bid performance. Among outside directors of poorly performing firms, those who rebuff an offer face partial settling-up in the directorial labor market, while those who complete the merger do not.     

Comparing Malta and USA police officers’ individual and organizational support on outcomes

This paper investigates the quality of support for police officers in the USA and Malta to use as protection against stress. The authors found a significantly different organizational work context for police officers doing the same tasks. Police officers in both countries would benefit from upskilling in psychological capital and police managers require upskilling in management training as a means of increasing support for police to reduce the impact of stress.     

Relative equity market valuation conditions and acquirers’ gains

We examine whether the relative equity market valuation conditions (EMVCs) in the countries of merging firms help acquirers’ managers to time the announcements of both domestic and foreign targets. After controlling for several deal- and merging firm-specific features we find that the number of acquisitions and acquirers’ gains are higher during periods of high-EMVCs at home, irrespective of the domicile of the target. We also find that the higher gains of foreign target acquisitions realized during periods of high-EMVCs at home stem from acquiring targets based in the RoW (=World-G7), rather than the G6 (=G7-UK) group of countries. We argue that this is due to the low correlation of EMVCs between the UK (home) and the RoW group of countries. However, these gains disappear or even reverse during the post-announcement period. Moreover, acquisitions of targets domiciled in the RoW (G6) countries yield higher (lower) gains than acquisitions of domestic targets during periods of high-EMVCs at home. This suggests that the relative EMVCs between the merging firms’ countries allow acquirers’ managers to time the market and acquire targets at a discount, particularly in countries in which acquirers’ stocks are likely to be more overvalued than the targets’ stocks.     

Risk-shifting and the regulation of bank CEOs’ compensation

This paper analyzes the effects of two regulatory mechanisms, namely a regulation of the structure of bank CEOs incentive pay and sanctions for the CEOs of failed banks, on bank risk shifting. We extend a standard model of CEO compensation by incorporating leverage and an investment decision. To the extent that bank depositors and creditors are even partially protected by public guarantees, we show that it is in the interests of bank shareholders to choose more risky investments than would be socially optimal, and therefore to design a CEO contract with excessive risk taking incentives. Thus, we argue that current corporate governance arrangements in the banking sector are not efficient. In this setting, we show that putting in place one of the aforementioned mechanisms could yield the socially optimal outcome at no cost. We also identify some limitations and potential perverse effects of these mechanisms.