Liberty and Economic Growth in Adam Smith’s Possible World

Constitutional economics proposes and pursues a solution to public-policy problems, one that supplies rules designed to narrow the opportunity set of rational politicians. This work proposes and pursues “rational policy” as a complementary strategy to solve public-policy problems, where rational policy is public-policy that actualizes Adam Smith’s simple system of natural liberty. When individuals pursue their objectives by means of exchange in Smith’s simple system of natural liberty, they foster the growth of per-capita income. By contrast, all limitations on liberty limit the growth of per-capita income. The paper concludes by presenting two implications that follow from these conclusions. JEL classification: B31, H1     

Effluent taxes,market structure,and the rate and direction of endogenous technological change

This paper studies the effects of effluent taxes on firms’ allocation of resources to cost-reducing and emission-reducing R&D, and on entrepreneurs’ decisions to develop new goods and enter the market. A tax set at an exogenous rate that does not depend on the state of technology reduces growth, the level of consumption of each good, and raises the number of firms. The induced increase in the variety of goods is a benefit not considered in previous analyses. In terms of environmental benefits, the tax induces a positive rate of pollution abatement that offsets the “dirty” side of economic growth. A tax set at an endogenous rate that holds constant the tax burden per unit of output, in contrast, has ambiguous effects on growth, the scale of activity of each firm and the number of firms. Besides being novel, the potential positive growth effect of this type of effluent tax is precisely what makes this instrument effective for welfare-maximizing purposes. The socially optimal policy, in fact, requires the tax burden per unit of output to equal the marginal rate of substitution between the growth rate of consumption and abatement. Moreover, a tax/subsidy on entry is needed, depending on whether the contribution of product variety to pollution dominates consumers’ love of variety.      

CAPACITY UTILISATION IN THE LONG RUN: SOME FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS

The variability of long-run capacity utilisation has to be consideredas an expression of the determining role played by aggregatedemand in the process of growth. This paper discusses the modelproposed by Serrano in which such a determining role is apparentlyreconciled with the condition of normal utilisation of existingcapacity in the long run. It is shown that Serrano's conclusionslie on the hypothesis of the constancy of the growth rate ofautonomous demand, an assumption which seems to originate froman erroneous interpretation of the property of ‘relativepersistence’ of ‘normal’ magnitudes. The paperargues that if that assumption is abandoned, the autonomy ofaggregate demand necessarily shows itself through the variabilityof capacity utilisation in the long run as well as in the shortrun.     

Growth Rate and Level Effects,the Stability of the Adjustment of Capacity to Demand and the Sraffian Supermultiplier

Abstract

The paper presents a simple but complete formal version of the Sraffian supermultiplier model in which (i) growth is led by the autonomous components of demand that do not create capacity; (ii) private productive investment is an induced expenditure; and (iii) income distribution is exogenous. We show that the main results of the long-period and fully adjusted versions of the model in terms of growth rate and level effects are quite similar and therefore that such results in no way require the full adjustment of capacity to demand. We then analyze a simple set of sufficient dynamic local stability conditions that allow the long-period positions to gravitate towards the fully adjusted position in which capacity is adjusted to demand and that also provide the upper limit to demand-led growth paths. Finally, we show how some critics of the model have misinterpreted it as being supply-led and how this has led to a further confusion between the analysis of the tendency towards a constant value of the capacity-saving-determined warranted rate of growth and the proper stability analysis of the opposite process of adjusting capacity to demand (which tends to adjust the warranted rate endogenously to the growth rate of autonomous demand).     

When economic growth is less than exponential

This paper argues that growth theory needs a more general notion of “regularity” than that of exponential growth. We suggest that paths along which the rate of decline of the growth rate is proportional to the growth rate itself deserve attention. This opens up for considering a richer set of parameter combinations than in standard growth models. Moreover, it avoids the usual oversimplistic dichotomy of either exponential growth or stagnation. Allowing zero population growth in three different growth models (the Jones R&D-based model, a learning-by-doing model, and an embodied technical change model) serves as illustration that a continuum of “regular” growth processes fill the whole range between exponential growth and complete stagnation.     

Book production and the onset of modern economic growth

We provide a new data set on per capita book production as a proxy for advanced literacy skills, and assess this relative to other measures. While literacy proxies very basic skills, book production per capita is an indicator for more advanced capabilities. Growth theory suggests that human capital formation plays a significant role in creating the ‘wealth of nations.’ This study tests whether human capital formation has an impact on early-modern growth disparities. In contrast to some previous studies which denied the role of human capital as a crucial determinant of long-term growth, we confirm its importance.      

A Dynamic Model of the Environmental Kuznets Curve: Turning Point and Public Policy

We set up a simple dynamic macroeconomic model with (i) polluting consumption and a preference for a clean environment, (ii) increasing returns in abatement giving rise to an EKC and (iii) sustained growth resulting from a linear final-output technology. There are two sorts of market failures caused by external effects associated with consumption and environmental effort. The model is employed to investigate the determinants of the turning point and the cost effectiveness of different public policies aimed at a reduction of the environmental burden. Moreover, the model offers a potential explanation of an N-shaped pollution–income relation. It is shown that the model is compatible with most empirical regularities on economic growth and the environment.      

Endogenous structural change and crisis in a multiple time-scales growth model

The slow and endogenous twist of economic macro-structure makes up an important evolutionary feature of capitalist economies, and may be at the root of structural crisis. In this line, a Goodwinian growth model with increasing returns and profit-sharing that tries to picture a simple scenario of the seventies crisis is considered. It is shown that the exhaustion of the Kaldor-Verdoorn “productivity law” can entail, in a nonlinear framework, a “catastrophic” bifurcation from a “high” to a “low” growth path. Slow/fast dynamical systems then allow one to formalize a multiple time-scales dynamics where the growth path is shaped by the structural framework in which it takes place, but has also a long -un feedback. Structural change and crisis appear as long term and endogenous outcomes.     

Public Policy for Growth and Poverty Reduction

In this paper, I would like to outline an approach to publicpolicy that focused on fighting poverty and is based on an understandingof growth and development. Such a public policy requires answeringtwo key questions. First, what are key determinants of a developmentthat benefits poor people – or what has been labelled"pro-poor growth"? And second, we need to answer the policyquestion: how can public action influence the key determinantswe identify? In putting the questions this way, we are settingourselves the task of building a dynamic public economics –a public economics of development. Given that development isthe objective, this task will require a better understandingof how to measure it. And we must also achieve a better graspof changes of behaviour in the process of development, sincechanging perspectives and behaviour are usually an integralpart of the development story. In laying our task of advancinga dynamic public economics, however, let me emphasise that shouldbe building – on – not overturning – pasttheory. In much of the work I will describe, the empirics seemto be ahead of theory. Thus one of my purposes is to highlightsome elements of an agenda for theoretical research. (JEL E6)     

The Economics of Non-Convex Ecosystems: Introduction

The word “convexity” is ubiquitous in economics, but absent fromeconomics. In this paper we explain why, and show what differenceit makes to economic analysis if ecosystem non-convexities aretaken seriously. A simple proof is provided of the connectionbetween “self-similarity” and “power laws”. We also provide anintroduction to each of the papers in the Symposium and draw outthe way in which they form a linked set of contributions.     

An index of political support for decentralization: the Spanish case

This paper presents a method to make measurable what was not: the discourses of politicians regarding decentralization. For this purpose, we develop a “matrix of arguments” and a set of indexes, and apply them to provide a snapshot of the politicians’ views on the “General Law of Budgetary Stability”, a landmark for the process of decentralization in Spain.     

Reliving the 1950s: the big push, poverty traps, and takeoffs in economic development

The classic narrative of economic development—poor countries are caught in poverty traps, out of which they need a Big Push involving increased investment, leading to a takeoff in per capita income—has been very influential in foreign aid debates since the 1950s. This was the original justification for foreign aid. The narrative lost credibility for a while but has made a big comeback in the new millennium. Once again it is invoked as a rationale for large foreign aid programs. This paper applies very simple tests to the various elements of the narrative. Evidence to support the narrative is scarce. Poverty traps in the sense of zero growth for low-income countries are rejected by the data in the whole period 1950–2001 and for most sub-periods. The poorest quintile also does not have significant negative growth of the relative income ratio to the world’s richest country over 1950–2001, nor is relative growth for the lowest quintile significantly different than other quintiles. The claim that “well-governed poor nations” are caught in poverty traps is rejected by simple regressions that control for both initial income and quality of government (instrumenting for the latter). The idea of the takeoff also does not garner much support in the data. Takeoffs are rare in the data, most plausibly limited to the Asian success stories. Even then, the takeoffs are not associated with aid, investment, or education spending as the standard narrative would imply.     

The Influence of Socioeconomic Factors on Economic Growth

The main goal of this paper is to analyse the relationship between social capital and economic growth taking into account the role of fiscal policy from theoretical and empirical points of view. To achieve this goal, “Human Capital and Public Capital Effects on Economic Growth” is focused on the effects of two traditional factors: human capital and public capital effects on economic growth. “Social Capital Effects on Economic Growth” considers qualitative variables introducing some socioeconomic effects on economic growth process analysis. In this case, social capital the main variable will be considered. “Empirical Analysis,” an empirical analysis is developed considering the case of European countries prior to the EU enlargement. Finally, in Conclusions,” the main conclusions will be resumed.      

Learning-by-doing in R&D, knowledge threshold, and technological divide

This paper presents a simple R&D-based growth model of the “technological divide,” in which learning-by-doing (investing) in R&D and a threshold level of technological knowledge jointly determine the pattern of economic growth. Specifically, the model generates differences in the growth pattern primarily by modifying the underlying parameters that govern the evolution of economy-wide technological competence or dynamic R&D productivity. The technological divide arises at the threshold level of technological knowledge, which is largely affected by the quality of socio-technological infrastructure. Government policies aimed at enhancing the quality of socio-technological infrastructure can help countries escape from the “technology divide” trap by lowering the knowledge threshold. While the model preserves the spirit of the R&D-based endogenous growth model in the sense of its policy effects and the endogenous evolution of technological competence, the model does not need to reach the scale effect directly, where an increase in the size of an economy generates more rapid growth.     

The bargaining set in strategic market games

This paper presents a hybrid equilibrium notion that blends together the ‘cooperative’ and the ‘noncooperative’ theories of competition. In particular, the Mas-Colell bargaining set has been modified in order to accommodate the features of strategic market games. In other words, allocations, objections and counter objections of the standard bargaining set theory are described for an economy, where trades among groups of individuals are conducted via the Shapley–Shubik mechanism. In the main part of the paper, it is proved that in atomless economies the allocations resulting from this equilibrium notion are competitive.     

Subjective ambiguity, expected utility and Choquet expected utility

Summary. Using the Savage set up, this paper provides a simple axiomatization of the Choquet Expected Utility model where the capacity is an inner measure. Two attractive features of the model are its specificity and the transparency of its axioms. The key axiom states that the decision-maker uses unambiguous acts to approximate ambiguous ones. In addition, the notion of ‘ambiguity’ is subjective and derived from preferences. Received: March 23, 2000; revised version: April 24, 2001     

FDI and growth in transition economies: Does the mode of transition make a difference?

The countries of Central and Eastern Europe are a unique group of countries. In the process of transformation to market economies, some of them adopted the “shock therapy” while others the “gradualism” mode. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) plays an important role in economic growth through the addition of physical capital, technological know-how, management skill and marketing network. This paper empirically demonstrates that the mode of transformation definitely affects the effectiveness of FDI in promoting growth. (JEL: P3, P33)     

The Arrow-Debreu model: How math can hide a fatal conceptual error

I argue that math, like love, can cover a multitude of sins, and I use the neoclassical object of adoration, the Arrow-Debreu model, as the case in point. It is commonplace that the Arrow-Debreu (AD) model of general equilibrium does not describe the real world, but it is equally commonplace to accept it as representing the pure logic of the competitive capitalist economy in an idealized world free of transactions costs. I show that the AD model fails even as an idealized model; it actually mistakes the logic of pure capitalism. Unlike McKenzie’s model of idealized general equilibrium under constant returns to scale, Arrow and Debreu claim to have shown the existence of competitive equilibrium under decreasing returns to scale and positive pure profits. The AD model (again unlike the McKinzie model) needs to assign the profits to individuals and this is done using the notion of “ownership of the production set.” But this notion suffers from a fatal ambiguity. If Arrow and Debreu interpret it to mean “ownership of a corporation” then a simple argument in the form “labor can hire capital or capital can hire labor” defeats the alleged necessity of assigning residual claimancy to the corporation. A given corporation may or may not end up exploiting a set of production opportunities (represented by a production set) depending on whether it hires in labor and undertakes production or hires out its capital to others (all by assumption at the parametrically given prices). In the latter case, residual claimancy is elsewhere. There is no such property right as “ownership of a production set” in a private property market economy. The legal party which purchases or already owns all the inputs used up in production has the defensible legal claim on the outputs: there is no need to also “purchase the production set.” At any set of prices that allow positive pure profits, anyone in the idealized AD model could bid up the price of the inputs and thus try to reap a smaller but still positive profit. Therefore,pace Arrow and Debreu, there could be no equilibrium with positive pure profits. In the Appendix, the property rights fallacy that afflicts the AD model is shown to also afflict orthodox capital theory and corporate finance theory. World Bank The findings, interpretations and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the author and should not be attributed in any manner to the World Bank, to its affiliated organizations or to the members of its Board of Directors or the countries they represent.     

Bargaining and Devolution in the Upper Guadiana Basin

Increasingly, central governments approach contentious natural resource allocation problems by devolving partial decision-making responsibility to local stakeholders. This paper conceptualizes devolution as a three-stage process and uses a simulation model calibrated to real-world conditions to analyze devolution in Spain’s Upper Guadiana Basin. The Spanish national government has proposed spending over a billion euros to reverse a 30 year decline in groundwater levels. We investigate how the government can most effectively allocate this money to improve water levels by utilizing its power to set the structure of a local negotiation process. Using a numerical Nash model of local bargaining, we find that if the national government creates appropriate incentives, local bargaining can produce water stabilization. The actual water levels that will emerge are highly dependent on the central government’s decisions about the budget available to local stakeholders and the default policy, which will be influenced by the relative value the government places on various financial and environmental outcomes. Our paper concludes by determining the relationship between these relative valuations and the government’s preferences over water levels.