Costs or gross benefits? – What mainly drives cross-sectional variance in Internet adoption

In this paper, we propose an empirical model of Internet adoption which takes into account the household’s desire to adopt the Internet. Our research supports three central findings. First, we determine the main factors that explain the cross-sectional variance in gross benefits. Second, we estimate the predicted probabilities that a household does not desire to adopt the Internet and that a household desires to adopt the Internet but does not because its adoption costs are higher than its gross benefits. We show that while the cross-sectional variance in the first predicted probability is high, the cross-sectional variance in the second one is low (except for the age factor). Third, we compute the predicted adoption probability assuming that the adoption costs are homogeneous across households. We show that, for a given dimension (except for the age factor), the adoption rate will be only slightly modified if the adoption costs are homogeneous across households. Our results support the argument that the digital divide is mainly due to differences in gross benefits of adoption.     

Cropping system diversification,conservation tillage and modern seed adoption in Ethiopia: Impacts on household income,agrochemical use and demand for labor

The type and combination of sustainable agricultural practices (SAPs) adopted have a significant effect on agricultural productivity and food security. This study develops a multinomial endogenous switching regression model of farmers' choice of combination of SAPs and impacts on maize income and agrochemicals and family labor use in rural Ethiopia. Four primary results were found. First, adoption of SAPs increases maize income and the highest payoff is achieved when SAPs are adopted in combination rather than in isolation. Second, nitrogen fertilizer use is lower in the package that contains system diversification and conservation tillage. Third, conservation tillage increased pesticide application and labor demand, perhaps to compensate for reduced tillage. However, when it is used jointly with system diversification, it does not have a significant impact on pesticide and labor use. Fourth, in most cases adoption of a package of SAPs increases women workload, suggesting that agricultural intensification technology interventions may not be gender neutral. This implies that policy makers and other stakeholders promoting a combination of technologies can enhance household food security through increasing income and reducing production costs, but need to be aware of the potential gender related outcomes.     

SELLING A LEMON UNDER DEMAND UNCERTAINTY

We consider a seller who has private information about the quality of her good but is uncertain about buyer arrivals. Assuming that the high‐quality seller insists on a price, we show that the low‐quality seller's surplus and pricing strategy crucially depend on buyers' knowledge about the demand state. If they are also uncertain about demand, then demand uncertainty increases the low‐quality seller's expected payoff, and her optimal strategy is to lower the price after some time. If buyers know the demand state, then demand uncertainty does not affect the low‐quality seller's payoff, but she must employ a sophisticated pricing strategy.     

The optimal pricing of computer software and other products with high switching costs

The paper studies the determinants of the optimum prices of computer programs and their upgrades. It is based on the notion that because of the human capital invested in the use of a computer program by its user, this product has high switching costs, and on the finding that pirates are responsible for generating over 80% of new software sales. A model to maximize the present value of the program to the program house is constructed to determine the optimal prices of initial programs and for those upgrading their programs. It is shown that an upward shift of the demand function of upgrades leads to an increase in the optimum price of upgrades and to a decline in that of initial copies. However, and upward shift of the demand function of initial copies increases their optimal price without affecting that of upgrades. The price of upgrades is higher, the smaller (greater) the absolute value of the derivative of the initial copy demand with respect to the upgrade price (its own price), the smaller the number of pirates purchasing their initial legitimate copies and, normally, the later they do it. The prices of these goods often move in opposite directions despite the fact that the goods can best be characterized as complements. Copy-protection is generally not optimal with standard programs having competing unprotected products, and it is normally optimal to use a drug pusher's strategy in pricing and in other respects: get the user hooked and cash in on the upgrades.     

The value of information in monotone decision problems

We study the information preferences and information demand of decision-makers facing uncertainty. We focus on monotone decision problems in which the posterior beliefs induced by the decision-maker’s information can be ordered so that higher actions are chosen in response to higher signal realizations. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for decision makers with different classes of payoff functions to prefer one information structure to another. We also provide conditions under which two decision-makers in a given class can be ranked in terms of their information demand. Applications and examples are given.     

DISTRIBUTIONAL CONFLICT, FINANCIAL ADAPTATION AND DELAYED STABILIZATIONS

In this paper we model delayed stabilizations as the rational outcome of a distributional conflict between two risk averse groups in the presence of post-stabilization payoff uncertainty and costly policy reversion. We show that in the initial stages of an extreme inflation episode there is a bias towards maintaining the current inefficient (but certain) revenue collection system which prevents the adoption of the required fiscal adjustment program. The access by those with higher income to a financial adaptation technology increases the average rate of inflation through time for any given government deficit, raising the welfare costs of not reaching an agreement and increasingly redistributing the burden of inflation to those with lower income. This process, if strong enough, will eventually trigger the necessary political support for the required fiscal adjustment. Delayed stabilizations will, nevertheless, induce the poor into accepting conditions that they did not find optimal before.     

Laws and authority

A law prohibiting a particular behavior does not directly change the payoff to an individual should he engage in the prohibited behavior. Rather, any change in the individual׳s payoff, should he engage in the prohibited behavior, is a consequence of changes in other peoples׳ behavior. If laws do not directly change payoffs, they are “cheap talk,” and can only affect behavior because people have coordinated beliefs about the effects of the law. Beginning from this point of view, we provide definitions of authority in a variety of problems, and investigate how and when individuals can have, gain, and lose authority.     

HOW DO SPEED AND SECURITY INFLUENCE CONSUMERS' PAYMENT BEHAVIOR?

The Federal Reserve named improvements in the speed and security of the payment system as two of its policy initiatives for 2012–2016. Using new data from the 2013 Survey of Consumer Payment Choice (SCPC) and models from earlier research, we estimate how various aspects of speed and security influence consumers' decisions to adopt and use payment instruments. Some aspects of speed and security have a statistically significant influence on the adoption and use of selected payment instruments, but not as much as other characteristics of payment instruments. Using econometric models to simulate selected policies proposed by the Fed, we show that faster speed of payment deduction for Automatic Clearing House (ACH) transactions would slightly increase consumers' adoption of ACH‐based payment methods, while enhanced security of payment cards would marginally increase the use of credit and debit cards. However, neither improvement is likely to increase consumer welfare much because consumer demand for payments is very inelastic with respect to speed and security. Our analysis focuses exclusively on consumers' behavior and does not include potential benefits of improvements to the payment system that would directly benefit businesses or financial institutions. In addition, preventing security breaches may preserve public confidence in the payment system, benefitting consumers even if they do not change their payment behavior. (JEL D12, D14, E58)     

Excess payoff dynamics and other well-behaved evolutionary dynamics

We consider a model of evolution in games in which agents occasionally receive opportunities to switch strategies, choosing between them using a probabilistic rule. Both the rate at which revision opportunities arrive and the probabilities with which each strategy is chosen are functions of current normalized payoffs. We call the aggregate dynamics induced by this model excess payoff dynamics. We show that every excess payoff dynamic is well-behaved: regardless of the underlying game, each excess payoff dynamic admits unique solution trajectories that vary continuously with the initial state, identifies rest points with Nash equilibria, and respects a basic payoff monotonicity property. We show how excess payoff dynamics can be used to construct well-behaved modifications of imitative dynamics, and relate them to two other well-behaved dynamics based on projections.     

A welfare analysis of tariffs and equivalent quotas under demand uncertainty: Implications for tariffication

Under market demand uncertainty, we show that quotas can result in a welfare advantage over tariffs for an importing country despite that its government does not capture any quota rents. Specifically, the conditions under which an equivalent quota yields higher expected welfare than a tariff are shown to depend on a set of economic variables. These variables include the initial tariff rate, the relative efficiency in production between home and foreign firms, the probability distribution of random demand shocks that make the quota binding or non-binding under uncertainty, as well as the variance of the stochastic market demand. The analysis of this paper has welfare implications for tariffication.     

Learning with noiseless information and payoff-relevant signals

Summary. In models of active learning or experimentation, agents modify their actions to affect the distribution of a signal that provides information about future payoffs. A standard result in the experimentation literature is that agents experiment, if at all, to increase information. This finding is a direct consequence of Blackwell's theorem: one experiment is more informative than another if and only if all expected utility maximizers prefer to observe the first. Blackwell's theorem presupposes, however, that the observed signal only conveys information and does not directly affect future payoffs. Often, however, signals are directly payoff relevant, a phenomenon that we call signal dependence. For example, if a firm is uncertain about its demand and uses today's sales as a signal of tomorrow's demand, then that signal may also directly affect tomorrow's profit if the good is durable or if consumers form consumption habits. Datta, Mirman and Schlee [9] and Bertocchi and Spagat [4] show that, if the signal is payoff relevant, experimentation may indeed reduce information. Here we show that, despite the inapplicability of Blackwell's Theorem, agents always experiment to increase information if the information structure is noiseless: given the true value of the unknown parameter, the signal realization is deterministic. We then apply our framework to analyze Lazear's [16] model of retail clearance sales, a model with both signal dependence and noiseless information. Received: February 19, 1999; revised version: August 11, 1999     

UNIQUENESS OF EQUILIBRIUM PAYOFFS IN FINITELY REPEATED GAMES WITH IMPERFECT MONITORING*

This paper examines when a finitely repeated game with imperfect monitoring has a unique equilibrium payoff vector. This problem is nontrivial under imperfect monitoring, because uniqueness of equilibrium (outcome) in the stage game does not extend to finitely repeated games. A (correlated) equilibrium is equilibrium minimaxing if any player's equilibrium payoff is her minimax value when the other players choose a correlated action profile from the actions played in the equilibrium. The uniqueness result holds if all stage game correlated equilibria are equilibrium minimaxing and have the same payoffs. The uniqueness result does not hold under weaker conditions.     

基于简化利润函数的伯川德博弈模型的技术创新扩散讨论

通过在伯川德模型利润函数中引入学习影响、溢出因子等,实现了该模型的改进和简化.结合简化后的支付矩阵对企业创新采用策略进行了分析,得出了在学习能力强、溢出度高的环境下,延迟采用策略可以减低企业的采用成本.     

The economics of posted prices in a concentrated market where demand is uncertain

This paper analyses the theory of the optimal output decision for a firm whose policy is to post a non-negotiable price for a good or service in a concentrated market where the demand facing the firm is determined, in part, by a random variable. The theoretical findings are the opposite of those in competitive markets; Proposition 1 states that the optimal output of a risk-averse firm is expected to be larger than that of a risk-neutral firm if the expected payoff of its marginal profit is less than or equal to 1. Proposition 2 states that the optimal output of a risk-seeking firm is expected to be smaller than that of a risk-neutral firm if the expected payoff of its marginal profit is greater than 1.     

The Impact of Transfer Fees on Professional Sports: An Analysis of the New Transfer System for European Football*

We evaluate the effect of the recently approved transfer system for European professional football which will replace the current system (implemented by the Bosman judgment in 1995). The focus is on the comparison of wages, profits, the length of contracts and investment incentives. Our main findings are that (i) the new regime reduces a player's overall payoff because it increases the new club's renegotiation payoff, and (ii) since training generates a general skill, the new regime will also diminish incentives to invest in the education of young talents, because a new club benefits more from the initial club's investment.     

Forecasting sales and product evolution: The case of the hybrid/electric car

We present a model that forecasts sales and product evolution, based on data on market and industry, which can be collected before the product is introduced. Product evolution can be incremental but can also take place by releasing new generations. In our model adoption of a new product is motivated by attribute improvements (enabled by technology evolution), and firms' attribute improvements strategies are motivated by market growth and directed by market preferences. The interdependency between attributes' improvements and cumulative adoption level makes the problem inherently dynamic. The dependency of attribute levels on adoption levels is assessed using industry and technology analysis. Market preferences and purchase intention response to attribute levels changes are assessed based on a conjoint study. The option of collecting and interpreting data about both demand and supply aspects, before the new product is introduced, enables us to estimate sales and technology progress endogenously rather than to require them as inputs. We demonstrate the method on the hybrid car market.     

Effort and performance in group contests

We study contest performance by focusing on the per capita payoffs of the contestants in an important class of asymmetric two-group contests. The group with the higher valuation has a greater chance of winning the contest whenever the rent-seeking technology is increasing and concave. We note that equilibrium efforts and payoffs per capita are uniquely defined and can be subjected to a comparative statics analysis. We show that payoff per capita for a group increases with its own valuation but decreases with the valuation of the opposing group. Per capita payoff for a group increases with its population.     

The cournot duopoly model reconsidered in the presence of costly communication and enforcement agreements

Recently I proposed a general notion of equilibrium for n-person games which is based on mutual threats and promises (responses), and which leads, in general, to a determinate solution with respect to the order of choice moves. The nature of the solution set in our model is a function of the action sets, the payoff functions, and the cost of ‘communication and enforcement of agreements’ (C&E). The main concern of this paper is to show that the Cournot duopoly solution, for the case of a linear demand function facing two identical firms, can be regenerated by our solution concept under a certain assumption about a high cost C&E. On the other hand, it is shown that under a relatively low cost of C&E the Cournot/Nash solution does not belong to our solution set, because it is Pareto inferior for both duopolists relative to some solutions in our set, among them, the standard monopoly solution.     

新生代农民工参与养老保险约束条件及路径设计

新生代农民工作为一个庞大的社会群体进入城市,推动着中国工业化、城市化进程加快,他们有着强烈的市民化需求却因养老保险的缺失而严重受阻,不但有损新生代农民工切身利益,也不利于和谐社会构建。基于新生代农民工养老保险构建过程中所面临的各种约束,应以新生代农民工可持续就业为核心、以政府为主导、以土地流转为途径、以自身保障意识为前提的发展模式,确保新生代农民工养老效益得到有效保障。     

Irreversible investment with uncertainty and strategic behavior

The paper provides a model of technology adoption in the case where adopting alone is more expensive than adopting when others have already done so (network effect). In addition, if each agent gains at the expense of his rivals, he may also have an incentive for ‘preemptive adoption’. We deal with these two issues in a dynamic programing framework, where adoption is seen as a strategic switching time decision problem for agents facing an ongoing stochastic operating benefit plus sunken investment costs. The model defines the option value of investing for a continuous time stochastic game. In the case of network benefits alone, agents follow a stationary bandwagon strategy, representing the effect caused by a war of attrition. Yet, as network benefits reduce adoption costs after an agent has switched, rivals may follow suit. In the opposite case, where going first gives the innovator a higher payoff the bandwagon rule is turned over and the option value of investing first may be lower than that of going second. This gives rise to sequential adoption.