Generalized method of moments and present value tests of the consumption-capital asset pricing model under transactions costs: evidence from the UK stock market

In this paper we test for the inclusion of the bid–ask spread in the consumption CAPM, in the UK stock market over the time period of 1980–2000. Two econometric models are used: first, Fisher’s (in J Appl Econometrics 9:S71–S94, 1994) asset pricing model is estimated by GMM. We obtain plausible values of all the structural parameters and transactions costs. We subsequently test the robustness of our results by extending the VAR approach proposed by Campbell and Shiller (in Rev Financ Stud 1:195–228, 1988). This is achieved with the inclusion of the normalised bid–ask spread as an independent variable in the pricing equation. Overall, the statistical tests are unable to reject the bid–ask spread as an independent explanatory variable in the C-CAPM. In addition, in the VAR specification we find that both the normalised and the absolute bid–ask spread is a significant predictor of the dividend to price ratio. The paper’s main conclusion is that transaction costs should be included in asset pricing models, as they possess independent explanatory power.      

Market share instability and stock price volatility during the industry life-cycle: the US automobile industry

Market share instability, during certain stages of the industry life-cycle, has become a stylized fact in the industrial organization literature. In the finance literature, volatility in the form of excess volatility, i.e. the much larger volatility of stock prices than dividends (although stock prices should in theory trace the present value of future dividends), has given rise to controversies regarding stock price determination (Campbell and Shiller, 1988; Shiller, 1989). Recent evolutionary models, both theoretical and empirical, have tied the presence of market share instability to industry specific variables, such as specific periods in the industry life-cycle and specific “technological regimes”. The object of the paper is to explore whether there is a relationship between market share instability and stock price volatility and to what degree this relationship is connected to the concept of the industry life-cycle, and hence to industry specific factors. To do so, we explore the relationship in one particular industry, the US automobile industry. Since neither life-cycle nor finance theories attack this problem directly, we use insights from both approaches to build hypotheses which guide the data analysis. The empirical results confirm many of these hypotheses, suggesting that the degree of excess volatility is indeed partly affected by industry specific factors.     

Real exchange rates and real interest rate differentials: A present value interpretation

Although the real exchange rate-real interest rate (RERI) relationship is central to most open economy macroeconomic models, empirical support for the relationship is generally found to be rather weak. In this paper we re-investigate the RERI relationship using bilateral US real exchange rate data spanning the period 1978-2007. Instead of testing one particular model, we build on Campbell and Shiller [1987. Cointegration tests of present-value models. Journal of Political Economy 95, 1062-1088] to propose a metric of the economic significance of the relationship. Our empirical results provide robust evidence that the RERI link is economically significant and that the real interest rate differential is a reasonable approximation of the expected rate of depreciation over longer horizons.     

Quantitative easing and asset bubbles

Expansionary monetary policy is necessary to respond to financial crises. However, if Central Bank asset purchase initiatives are too large or last too long, they can lead to explosive increases in asset prices which add to the risk of a future crisis. This article employs two models including the Campbell–Shiller and Generalized Supremum Augmented Dickey Fuller techniques to search for bubbles in the US equity, housing and bond markets over the past eight years. Although, we find that prices in equities and housing have risen following Federal Reserve intervention, there is little indication of asset price bubbles. There is evidence of explosive bond price increases from September of 2011 to February of 2013.     

A distributed lag estimator derived from Shiller's smoothness priors: An extension

In this paper we consider a polynomial distributed model with varying coefficients and Shiller's smoothness priors. It has been shown that the Bayes estimator under this specification produces a less smooth lag pattern than the Almon and Shiller estimators for the fixed coefficients case.     

Empirical Asset Pricing: Eugene Fama,Lars Peter Hansen,and Robert Shiller

The Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences for 2013 was awarded to Eugene Fama, Lars Peter Hansen, and Robert Shiller for their contributions to the empirical study of asset pricing. Some observers have found it hard to understand the common elements of the laureates' research, preferring to highlight areas of disagreement among them. In this paper, I argue that empirical asset pricing is a coherent enterprise, which owes much to the laureates' influential contributions, and that important themes in the literature can best be understood by considering the laureates in pairs. Specifically, after summarizing modern asset‐pricing theory using the stochastic discount factor as an organizing framework, I discuss the following: the joint hypothesis problem in tests of market efficiency, which is as much an opportunity as a problem (Fama and Hansen); patterns of short‐ and long‐term predictability in asset returns (Fama and Shiller); and models of deviations from rational expectations (Hansen and Shiller). I conclude by reviewing the ways in which the laureates have already influenced the practice of finance, and how they might influence future innovations.     

Self-enforced collusion through comparative cheap talk in simultaneous auctions with entry

Campbell (J Econ Theory 82:425–450, 1998) develops a self-enforced collusion mechanism in simultaneous auctions based on complete comparative cheap talk and endogenous entry, with two bidders. His result is difficult to generalize to an arbitrary number of bidders, since the entry-decision stage of the game is characterized by strategic substitutes. This paper analyzes more-than-two-bidder, symmetric-prior cases. Two results are proved: (1) as the number of objects grows large, a full comparative cheap talk equilibrium exists and it yields asymptotically fully efficient collusion; and (2) there is always a partial comparative cheap talk equilibrium. All these results are supported by intuitive equilibria at the entry-decision stage (J Econ Theory 130:205–219, 2006; Math Soc Sci 2008, forthcoming). Numerical examples suggest that full comparative cheap talk equilibria are not uncommon even with few objects.     

Reviews

Book reviewed in this article:
Empirical Analytics of Demand Systems. By A. A. Powell.
Unemployment and Wage Inflation: with Special Reference to Britain and the U.S.A. By J. Taylor.
The Economics of Inflation. By J. A. Trevithick and C. Mulvey.
Economics and Australian Industry. By F. G. Davidson and B. R. Stewardson.
Agricultural Marketing and Prices. By K. O. Campbell.
Population in Economic Growth. By J. D. Pitchford.
Depression and Recovery in Western Australia 1928'29–1938'39: A Study In Cyclical and Structural Change. By G. D. Snooks.     

Economics in Institutional Perspective,Memorial Essays in Honor of K. William Kapp

In the past, the standard discussions of market failures in economics textbooks confined themselves to issues involving externalities, public goods, and common property (open access). Subsequent to George Akerlof’s famous article “The Market for ‘Lemons,’” discussions of the problems created by asymmetric information gradually became standard fare, but the issues raised by thinking of asymmetric information in economic matters extend far beyond the used car and health insurance markets that are normally used as the paradigm cases. In fact, consideration of the problems of information will inevitably lead to an examination of the problems of market manipulation and fraud, especially in light of the 2008 financial crisis. Akerlof has travelled this path himself as indicated by his recent book with Robert Shiller, Phishing for Phools (2015). Akerlof and Shiller provide a litany of examples of manipulation and deception in advertising and in many markets including financial markets. They also have a chapter on “The Resistance and its Heroes” that highlights some of the people and agencies that have worked to expose and reduce phishing, but this chapter is remarkably sparse. What this article attempts to do is to fill out some of this history by focusing on the work of American institutional economists from Veblen to Galbraith, who critically examined the issues of manipulation and deception in advertising, salesmanship, and finance. Some general considerations relating to the problem of fraud are also discussed.     

A Nobel Prize for the Empirical Analysis of Asset Prices

Abstract

The 2013 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics was awarded to Eugene Fama, Robert Shiller, and Lars Peter Hansen for their empirical analysis of asset prices. The paper reviews critically the work of the three economists and highlights the differing conclusions that the three researchers reached on the relatively narrow question of the rationality of individual investors. The paper argues that there is a time inconsistency in the idea that markets reveal information about the future and concludes that, despite the sophistication of their statistical analysis, the laureates have been unable to demonstrate how a sophisticated financial economy can produce their empirical results.     

Clever agents in adaptive learning

Saez-Marti and Weibull (J. Econom. Theory 86 (1999) 268) investigate the consequences of letting some agents play a myopic best reply to the myopic best reply in Young's (J. Econom. Theory 59 (1993) 145) bargaining model, which is how they introduce “cleverness” of players. I analyze such clever agents in general finite two-player games and show Young's (Individual Strategy and Social Structure, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1998) prediction to be robust: adaptive learning with clever agents does select the same minimal curb set as in the absence of clever agents, if their population share is less than one. However, the long-run strategy distribution in such a curb set may vary with the share of clever agents.     

A limit characterization of belief-free equilibrium payoffs in repeated games

The present paper studies repeated games with private monitoring, and characterizes the set of belief-free equilibrium payoffs in the limit as the discount factor approaches one and the noise on private information vanishes. Contrary to the conjecture by Ely et al. [J.C. Ely, J. Hörner, W. Olszewski, Belief-free equilibria in repeated games, Econometrica 73 (2005) 377-415], the equilibrium payoff set is computed by the same formula, no matter how many players there are. As an application of this result, a version of the folk theorem is established for N-player prisoner's dilemma games.     

On the existence of pure-strategy equilibria in large games

Over the years, several formalizations and existence results for games with a continuum of players have been given. These include those of Schmeidler [D. Schmeidler, Equilibrium points of nonatomic games, J. Stat. Phys. 4 (1973) 295-300], Rashid [S. Rashid, Equilibrium points of non-atomic games: Asymptotic results, Econ. Letters 12 (1983) 7-10], Mas-Colell [A. Mas-Colell, On a theorem by Schmeidler, J. Math. Econ. 13 (1984) 201-206], Khan and Sun [M. Khan, Y. Sun, Non-cooperative games on hyperfinite Loeb spaces, J. Math. Econ. 31 (1999) 455-492] and Podczeck [K. Podczeck, On purification of measure-valued maps, Econ. Theory 38 (2009) 399-418]. The level of generality of each of these existence results is typically regarded as a criterion to evaluate how appropriate is the corresponding formalization of large games.In contrast, we argue that such evaluation is pointless. In fact, we show that, in a precise sense, all the above existence results are equivalent. Thus, all of them are equally strong and therefore cannot rank the different formalizations of large games.     

The cyclical behavior of job creation and job destruction: A sectoral model

Summary Three key features of the employment process in the U.S. economy are that job creation is procyclical, job destruction is countercyclical, and job creation is less volatile than job destruction. These features are also found at the sectoral (goods and services) level. The paper develops, calibrates and simulates a two-sector general equilibrium model that includes both aggregate and sectoral shocks. The behavior of the model economy mimics the job creation and destruction facts. A non-negligible amount of unemployment arises due to the presence of aggregate and sectoral shocks.We thank Jeffrey Campbell, Richard Rogerson and two referees for helpful comments. We are grateful to M.J.D. Powell for providing us with his GETMIN FORTRAN subroutine.     

A belief-based approach to the repeated prisoners' dilemma with asymmetric private monitoring

This paper extends the belief-based approach to the repeated prisoners' dilemma with asymmetric private monitoring. We first find that the previous belief-based techniques [T. Sekiguchi, Efficiency in repeated prisoners' dilemma with private monitoring, J. Econ. Theory 76 (1997) 345-361; V. Bhaskar, I. Obara, Belief-based equilibria in the repeated prisoners' dilemma with private monitoring, J. Econ. Theory 102 (2002) 40-69] cannot succeed when players' private monitoring technologies are sufficiently different. We then modify the previous belief-based approach by letting the player with smaller observation errors always randomize between cooperate and defect along the cooperative path of the play. We show that with vanishing observation errors, efficiency and a folk theorem can be approximated using our modified belief-based strategies.     

Bounding the inefficiency of equilibria in nonatomic congestion games

Equilibria in noncooperative games are typically inefficient, as illustrated by the Prisoner's Dilemma. In this paper, we quantify this inefficiency by comparing the payoffs of equilibria to the payoffs of a “best possible” outcome. We study a nonatomic version of the congestion games defined by Rosenthal [Int. J. Game Theory 2 (1973) 65], and identify games in which equilibria are approximately optimal in the sense that no other outcome achieves a significantly larger total payoff to the players—games in which optimization by individuals approximately optimizes the social good, in spite of the lack of coordination between players. Our results extend previous work on traffic routing games.     

Corrigendum to “School choice: An experimental study” [J. Econ. Theory 127 (1) (2006) 202-231]

We correct an inconsistency in the efficiency comparison reported in [Y. Chen, T. Sönmez, School choice: An experimental study, J. Econ. Theory 127 (1) (2006) 202-231]. The efficiency comparison of the three school choice mechanisms in our paper is based on recombinant estimation with an identical set of 10 tie-breakers, while the statistics reported in Table 7 is computed using 14,400 tie-breakers.     

Coalitions, agreements and efficiency

If agents negotiate openly and form coalitions, can they reach efficient agreements? We address this issue within a class of coalition formation games with externalities where agents’ preferences depend solely on the coalition structure they are associated with. We derive Ray and Vohra's [Equilibrium binding agreements, J. Econ. Theory 73 (1997) 30-78] notion of equilibrium binding agreements using von Neumann and Morgenstern [Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1944] abstract stable set and then extend it to allow for arbitrary coalitional deviations (as opposed to nested deviations assumed originally). We show that, while the extended notion facilitates the attainment of efficient agreements, inefficient agreements can nevertheless arise, even if utility transfers are possible.     

A necessary and sufficient condition for non-emptiness of the core of a non-transferable utility game

It is well-known that a transferable utility game has a non-empty core if and only if it is balanced. In the class of non-transferable utility games balancedness or the more general π-balancedness due to Billera (SIAM J. Appl. Math. 18 (1970) 567) is a sufficient, but not a necessary condition for the core to be non-empty. This paper gives a natural extension of the π-balancedness condition that is both necessary and sufficient for non-emptiness of the core.     

Hierarchies of ambiguous beliefs

We present a theory of interactive beliefs analogous to Mertens and Zamir [Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information, Int. J. Game Theory 14 (1985) 1-29] and Brandenburger and Dekel [Hierarchies of beliefs and common knowledge, J. Econ. Theory 59 (1993) 189-198] that allows for hierarchies of ambiguity. Each agent is allowed a compact set of beliefs at each level, rather than just a single belief as in the standard model. We propose appropriate definitions of coherency and common knowledge for our types. Common knowledge of coherency closes the model, in the sense that each type homeomorphically encodes a compact set of beliefs over the others’ types. This space universally embeds every implicit type space of ambiguous beliefs in a beliefs-preserving manner. An extension to ambiguous conditional probability systems [P. Battigalli, M. Siniscalchi, Hierarchies of conditional beliefs and interactive epistemology in dynamic games, J. Econ. Theory 88 (1999) 188-230] is presented. The standard universal type space and the universal space of compact continuous possibility structures are epistemically identified as subsets.