External monetary shocks and monetary integration: Evidence from the Bulgarian currency board

Starting July the 1st 1997, Bulgaria adopted a Currency Board (CB) monetary system. This paper aims at investigating if the adoption of the CB monetary system, which involves the cost of losing monetary autonomy, has provided a relatively better (with respect to other CEEC) monetary integration of Bulgaria with the European Monetary Union (EMU). Since Bulgarian monetary variables are endogenous under a CB, we focus on the ECB and FED interest rates as the main sources on monetary volatility. First, we find that ECB shocks are more rapidly absorbed and have less significant impact of domestic variables, with respect to other external monetary shocks (FED rate changes). Second, the responses of Bulgarian variables following changes in the ECB interest rate present lower persistence and significance, with respect to what the previous literature emphasized for other CEEC with monetary autonomy. This latter result still holds when accounting for different sources of cross-country heterogeneity outlined in the literature, thus supporting that the adoption of the CB may have worked as a rather good device in terms of integration of Bulgaria into the EMU.     

Optimal monetary policy regime for oil producing developing economies: Implications for post-war Iraq

This paper theoretically investigates optimal monetary policy regime for oil producing developing countries. We analyze credibility and reputation of the Central Bank and macroeconomic dynamics under alternative monetary policy regimes. We construct a detailed and realistic model that can be used to analyze macroecomic structure and expectation dynamics of an oil producing open economy. We take into account the asymmetric information between the public and the central bank and theoretically investigate how this asymmetric information impacts the real economy and the credibility of the central bank. The simulation results indicate that central bank achieves higher credibility and lower inflation under dollarization and higher output levels under currency board regime. The model constructed in this paper has many policy implications for oil producing open economies. Using the implications of the model, we make monetary policy regime recommendations for post-war Iraq.     

Optimal delegation implications of central bank transparency

The interrelationship between monetary regime design and central bank transparency is examined. We find optimal delegation requires the central bank be either: ‘representative’, not choosing to publicly reveal its private information; or ‘ultraconservative’, deciding to be fully transparent.     

Price‐level versus inflation targeting with financial market imperfections

Abstract Price‐level targeting (PT) is compared with inflation targeting (IT) in a DSGE model augmented with imperfections in both debt and equity markets. The PT regime outperforms the IT regime, and the gain depends on the degree of financial market frictions. This is because inflation is better anchored under PT, owing to the expectation channel, and therefore the monetary authority has more leverage to deal with the financial market distortions. We also find that the gain is higher if the optimal rule reacts to asset prices instead of the output gap, and the rule requires a positive response to asset prices.     

Identical Preferences Lower Bound for Allocation of Heterogenous Tasks and NIMBY Problems

We study the allocation of collectively owned indivisible goods when monetary transfers are possible. We restrict our attention to incentive‐compatible mechanisms which allocate the goods efficiently. Among these mechanisms, we characterize those that respect the identical preferences lower bound: each agent should be at least as well off as in a hypothetical economy where all agents have the same preference as hers, no agent envies another, and the budget is balanced.     

Monetary Policy Coordination and the Level of National Debt

This paper uses the Canzoneri-Henderson benchmark framework of monetary policy coordination in interdependent economies to analyze how high levels of national debt affect monetary policy interactions. Using a two-country model, I first study how central banks interact in a flexible exchange-rate regime. I find that a low-debt country is better off interacting with a country with high debt, when both economies are affected by an aggregate inflationary shock. I also consider a political dependence scenario, in which central banks are subject to political pressure. In the case of a debt-burdened country, the political incentive to reduce interest payments on debt will spur a Gordon–Barro like inflation bias. However, under a flexible exchange-rate regime, the low-debt country will not be affected. Under a monetary union instead, political pressure may affect the low-debt country as well, and possibly create an inflation bias even greaterthan in the flexible exchange-rate regime. This scenario presents another example of how Rogoff's counterproductive monetary cooperation may arise under European Monetary Union.     

The payment mechanisms and liquidity effects

A general equilibrium model with multiple means of payment in segmented markets is constructed to study the liquidity effects. It is shown that, under certain conditions, stored value – money issued by private entrepreneurs weakens, but does not completely eliminate the liquidity effects that exist when stored value is prohibited. The Friedman rule can be optimal in the regime with floating stored value. The impact of monetary policy now depends not only on the monetary intervention of the central bank, but also on the quantity of the outstanding private money and its velocity.     

Equilibrium Determinacy under Monetary and Fiscal Policies in an Overlapping Generations Model

This paper studies the issue of equilibrium determinacy under monetary and fiscal policy feedback rules in an optimizing general equilibrium model with overlapping generations and flexible prices. It is shown that equilibria may be determinate also when monetary and fiscal policies are both 'passive'. In particular, under passive monetary rules, equilibrium uniqueness is more likely to be verified when fiscal policies are less committed to public debt stabilization.     

Macroeconomic transitions and the transmission mechanism: Evidence from Turkey

This paper investigates changes to the macroeconomic transmission mechanism in Turkey following a major reform of monetary policy in the early 2000s. We use a Threshold VAR (TVAR) framework to test for and then estimate a model with endogenous transitions between regimes. We detect two regimes, with a clear transition between them in 2003–4. The pre-reform regime is characterized by high inflation, passive monetary policy and persistent responses to shocks. The post-reform regime is characterized by low inflation, active and credible monetary policy and markedly less persistent responses to shocks. Using a model that contains sufficient variables to capture diverse transmission mechanisms, working through the real exchange rate, domestic credit and monetary policy, we find evidence of sharp changes in transmission mechanisms. Post-reform, the response of Turkey to macroeconomic shocks has changed to be similar to those in other modern, market-orientated economies.     

Monetary regimes and the co-ordination of wage setting

A recent literature argues that a strict monetary regime may reduce equilibrium unemployment by disciplining wage setters, as wage setters abstain from raising wages to avoid a monetary contraction. However, in this literature the wage setters are assumed not to co-ordinate their wage setting. The present paper argues that precisely because a strict monetary regime may discipline the unco-ordinated wage setting, thus lowering unemployment in the unco-ordinated outcome, it also reduces wage setters’ incentives to co-ordinate. It is shown that an accommodating monetary regime may reduce equilibrium unemployment, via the strengthening of the wage setters’ incentives to co-ordinate.     

Compatibility between monetary and fiscal policy under EMU

The debate over the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) as a part of European Monetary Union, has highlighted the need to assess the extent to which fiscal policies of union members should be constrained as a pre-requisite for price stability within the union. In this paper, we develop a two country open economy model, where each country has overlapping generations of finitely lived consumers who supply labour to imperfectly competitive firms which can only change their prices infrequently. We examine the case where the two countries have formed a monetary union, but where the fiscal authorities remain independent. We show that the fiscal response required to ensure stability of the real debt stock is greater when consumers are not infinitely lived. In principle, this allows for some compensating behaviour between governments, but we show that the scope for compensation is limited. The monetary authority can abandon its active targeting of inflation to stabilise the debt of at most one fiscal authority, and any other combination of policies will either result in price level indeterminacy and/or indefinite transfers of wealth between the two economies. Finally, in a series of simulations we show that fiscal shocks have limited impact on output and inflation provided the fiscal authorities meet the (weak) requirements of fiscal solvency. However, when monetary policy is forced to abandon its active targeting of inflation, then fiscal shocks have a much greater impact on both output and inflation.     

Deflationary policy under digital and fiat currency competition

I examine the implications of digital and fiat currency competition on optimal monetary policy according to the Friedman rule (a standard deflationary policy) in a Fernández-Villaverde and Sanches (2016) framework, with no search friction. Consistent with the existing literature, first, I find that monetary equilibrium under a purely private arrangement of digital currencies will not deliver a socially efficient allocation. Second, I place restrictions on the available supply of digital currencies and find that a socially efficient allocation is possible only if the upper bound on digital currency circulation is equal to the rate of time-preference, albeit some degree of government intervention is required to curb the profit-maximizing incentive of the miners. Third, I find that optimal monetary policy at the Friedman rule will be socially inefficient when digital currencies compete with government-issued fiat money. Finally, I show that the Friedman rule is a socially desirable policy only in a purely fiat monetary regime.     

Two-period cycles in a three-period overlapping generations model

We study the properties of two-period monetary cycles in simple pure exchange overlapping generations economies in which the households live for three periods. We demonstrate that these economies can support cycles under a much broader—and, arguably, more plausible—range of assumptions than the analogous two-period economies. We show that economies that fail the well-known Grandmont (Econometrica 53 (1985) 995) condition can have cycles, and that economies that satisfy the condition can fail to have cycles. In addition, we show that economies can have monetary cycles when they do not have conventional monetary steady states, and when aggregate demand for assets is not decreasing in the real return rate at a gross real rate of unity.     

The role of monetary policy credibility in explaining the decline in exchange rate pass-through in South Africa

This paper investigates the key factors that explain the documented decline in the exchange rate pass-through in South Africa over the past two decades. The paper finds that this outcome is largely due to improved monetary policy credibility. The South African Reserve Bank has become more credible since the adoption of the inflation target regime through improved communication, transparency, and independence. We show that credibility is enhanced through a gradual disinflation process and reduction of inflation volatility. As result, expectations of agents have become well-anchored at levels that are consistent with its objectives of keeping inflation within the official target range of 3–6 percent even in the presence of external shocks. This in turn reduces the exchange rate pass-through. This finding is important from a monetary policy perspective not only for South Africa but other emerging economies such as Turkey as it shows that improving monetary policy credibility is a key ingredient to reducing exchange rate pass-through.     

ARE EFFICIENCY IMPROVEMENTS IN GOVERNMENT TRANSFER POLICIES SELF-DEFEATING IN POLITICAL EQUILIBRIUM?*

This paper studies an election game between two politicians, in which each provides income transfers to special-interest groups in return for political contributions. It is shown that a move to a more inefficient form of transfers may lower the total excess burden created by these transfers, because the politicians are induced to reduce their provision of transfers. For the case in which the income transfers are indirectly provided as trade protection to import-competing industries, a switch from production subsidies to tariffs as the form of protection reduces the equilibrium level of excess burden and makes both politicians better off.     

The Limits of Transparency

This paper probes the limits of transparency in monetary policymaking along two dimensions: feasibility and desirability. It argues that, due to limited knowledge about the economy, even central banks (CBs) that are considered champions of openness are not very clear about their measurement of the output gap and about their beliefs regarding the effect of policy on inflationary expectations. Consequently, feasibility constraints on transparency are more serious than stylized models of the transmission mechanism would imply. In addition, no CB has made clear statements about its objective function, including in particular the relative weight on output versus inflation stabilization, the policy discount factor and the shape of losses from the inflation and the output gaps over the possible ranges of realizations of those variables.
The paper also argues that there is a trade-off between full transparency and full utilization of information in setting policy and that excessive transparency may facilitate the exertion of political pressures on the CB.
The last section of the paper abstracts from feasibility constraints and discusses the desirable levels of openness in various areas of the policymaking process. It is argued that the strongest case against immediate transparency arises when the CB has private information about problems within segments of the financial system. Premature release of information may, in such a case, destroy efficient risk-sharing arrangements and long-term investments by triggering a run on the financial system. This is illustrated within the context of the classic Diamond–Dybvig model of bank runs. The paper also probes the desirable levels of transparency in other areas of the policymaking process like the bank's objective function, the bank's output target, forecasts of economic shocks, disagreements within the CB board and the publication of CB interest-rate forecasts.     

The Bernanke and Blinder Model in an Open Economy: The Italian Case

Abstract. This paper analyzes the functioning of monetary policy transmission mechanisms in Italy from 1984 to 1998, highlighting the role performed by the credit system. We extend the Bernanke and Blinder model (1988) to the case of an open economy under a quasi‐fixed exchange rate regime, deriving analytically the conditions for the functioning of the three monetary policy channels generally identified in the literature (‘money’, ‘exchange rate’ and ‘credit’). These conditions explain the partial effectiveness of monetary policy in achieving price and income targets, while maintaining external equilibrium. By means of a structural VECM analysis, we evaluate the effectiveness of the transmission of monetary policy through the three channels.     

Is inflation targeting a good remedy to control inflation?

Since the 1990s inflation targeting (IT) has been adopted by several central banks as a strategy for monetary policy. It is expected that the adoption of this monetary regime can reduce inflation and inflation volatility. This article is concerned with these issues and makes use of the Propensity Score Matching methodology on a sample of 180 countries for the period from 1990 to 2007. For analysis, the sample is split into two sets of countries (advanced and developing). The findings suggest that the adoption of IT is an ideal monetary regime for developing economies and, in addition to reducing inflation volatility, can drive inflation down to internationally acceptable levels. Regarding advanced economies, the adoption of IT does not appear to represent an advantageous strategy. In brief, the empirical results indicate that the adoption of IT is useful for countries that must enhance their credibility for the management of monetary policy.     

汇率制度与货币政策——发展中国家和小国经济的思考

本文中,我们将研究在资本市场对外开放及汇率固定条件下货币政策的管理机制问题。我们的目标是探讨货币政策能否在此种情况下继续独立而有效地稳定国内经济。为此,我们建议两种制度上的约束。给定这些约束,我们证明货币政策仍然有效。同时,本文讨论了此种制度选择对发展中国家和小国经济的意义。     

Adjustment to monetary policy and devaluation under two-tier and fixed exchange rate regimes

The purpose of this paper is to determine whether a two-tier exchange rate regime is more effective than a fixed rate regime in increasing a country's ability to pursue an independent monetary policy. The analysis compares adjustment to a monetary policy and to a devaluation in the two exchange rate regimes in a portfolio model under imperfect assets substitutability. It is shown that a two-tier exchange rate regime is capable of reducing the current account effects of monetary injection or devaluation only in the long run. In the short run, however, we can get a larger current account response under a two-tier regime. These results reflect the trade-off between quantity and price adjustment.