The transmission of euro area monetary policy to financially euroized countries

This paper provides a comprehensive analysis of the interest rate pass-through of euro area monetary policy to retail rates outside the euro area, contributing to the literature on the consequences of unofficial financial euroization and on the transmission channels of monetary policy spillovers. The results suggest that in the long run, more than the one-third of all euro retail rates in euroized countries of central, eastern, and south-eastern Europe is linked to the euro area shadow rate. Compared with euro area monetary policy, the share of cointegration of the domestic monetary policy rate is on average lower, suggesting that domestic central banks in euroized countries with independent monetary policy can only partially control the “euro part” of the interest rate channel. Furthermore, euro area monetary policy shocks are fast and persistently transmitted into euro retail rates outside the euro area, which constitutes an additional channel of international shock transmission.     

Financial market fragmentation and monetary transmission in the euro area: what do we know?

We provide a survey on the literature examining financial market fragmentation in the euro area and discuss the policy options how to reduce it. The fragmentation has increased markedly since the outbreak of the global financial crisis in 2007. It declined somewhat from late 2012 onwards, but is still above the pre-crisis level. Interest rate pass-through has become less efficient primarily because of increased mark-ups and, to a certain extent, the lower responsiveness of bank interest rates to policy rates. The effectiveness of interest rate pass-through has become more heterogeneous across euro area countries, making a common monetary policy more difficult. The unconventional monetary policy conducted by the European Central Bank has reduced financial market fragmentation notably; however, this policy was not without side effects. Enhancing financial and fiscal stability in the euro area is key for the efficient functioning of the monetary transmission mechanism.     

Competition among banks and the pass-through of monetary policy

This paper introduces monopolistically competitive financial intermediaries into the New Keynesian DSGE setting. Modelling bank market power explicitly contributes to understanding two empirical facts: (i) The short-run transmission of changes in money market rates to bank retail rates is far from complete and heterogeneous. (ii) Stiffer competition among commercial banks implies that loan rates correlate more tightly with the policy rate. In my model, the degree of monopolistic competition in the banking sector has a sizeable impact on the pass-through of changes in the policy rate. In particular, a more competitive market for bank credit amplifies the efficiency of monetary policy.     

Bank behavior, incomplete interest rate pass-through, and the cost channel of monetary policy transmission

This paper employs a New Keynesian DSGE model to explore the role of banks within the cost channel of monetary policy transmission for shaping the interest rate pass-through from money market rates to loan rates. Banks extend loans to firms in an environment of monopolistic competition by setting their loan rates in a staggered way, which means that the adjustment of the aggregate loan rate to a monetary policy shock is sticky. We estimate the model for the euro area by adopting a minimum distance approach. Our findings exhibit that (i) financial costs are an important factor for price changes, (ii) frictions in the loan market have an effect on the propagation of monetary policy shocks as the pass-through from a change in money market rates to loan rates is incomplete, and (iii) the strength of the cost channel is mitigated as banks shelter firms from monetary policy shocks by smoothing loan rates.     

Interest Rate Pass-Through: Empirical Results for the Euro Area

Abstract. This paper empirically examines the interest rate pass‐through at the euro area level. The focus is on the pass‐through of official interest rates, approximated by the overnight interest rate, to longer‐term market interest rates, which, in turn, are a proxy for the marginal costs for banks to attract deposits or grant loans, and therefore passed through to retail bank interest rates. Empirical results, on the basis of a (vector) error‐correction and vector autoregressive model, suggest that the pass‐through of official interest to market interest rates is complete for money market interest rates up to three months, but not for market interest rates with longer maturities. Furthermore, the immediate pass‐through of changes in market interest rates to bank deposit and lending rates is found to be at most 50%, whereas the final pass‐through is typically found to be close to 100%, in particular for lending rates. Empirical results for a sub‐sample starting in January 1999 show qualitatively similar findings and are supportive of a quicker interest rate pass‐through since the introduction of the euro. It is shown that the difference between the adjustment speed of bank deposit and lending rates (typically around one versus three months since the common monetary policy) can to a large extent significantly be explained by credit risk considerations.     

Are there asymmetries in the response of bank interest rates to monetary shocks?

This article examines the velocity and asymmetry of the response of bank interest rates to monetary policy shocks. Using an asymmetric vector error correction model, it analyses the pass-through of changes in money market rates to retail bank interest rates in Italy in the period 1985–2002. The main results of the article are: (1) the speed of adjustment of bank interest rates to monetary policy changes increased significantly after the introduction of the 1993 Consolidated Law on Banking; (2) interest rate adjustment in response to positive and negative shocks is asymmetric in the short run, but not in the long run; (3) banks adjust their loan (deposit) rate faster during periods of monetary tightening (easing); (4) this asymmetry almost vanished since the 1990s.     

EMU and the transmission of monetary policy: evidence from business lending rates

This paper analyses the pass-through of money market rates to short-term and long-term business lending rates in the four largest euro area countries. The main findings of the paper are (1) that since the start of EMU loan rates appear to have become more responsive to money market rate changes in France, Italy and Spain, but not in Germany, and (2) that German loan rates are significantly more sluggish than loan rates in the other three large euro area countries. I also test for non-linear pass-through based on an asymmetric error-correction model but do not find much evidence of non-linearity in euro area interest rate pass-through.The views expressed in this paper do not necessarily represent the views of the Deutsche Bundesbank.     

Financial systems and the cost channel transmission of monetary policy shocks

We study the role of financial systems for the cost channel transmission of monetary policy in a calibrated business cycle model. We characterize financial systems by the share of bank-dependent firms and by the degree of the pass-through from policy to bank lending rates, for which we provide empirical estimates for the euro area and the US. For plausible calibrations of the dynamics of the lending rate we find that the cost effects directly related to interest rate movements have only a limited effect on the transmission mechanism.     

Monetary transmission in three central European economies: evidence from time-varying coefficient vector autoregressions

We study the transmission of monetary policy to macroeconomic variables with structural time-varying coefficient vector autoregressions in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, in comparison with that in the euro area. These three countries have experienced changes in monetary policy regimes and went through substantial structural changes, which call for the use of a time-varying parameter analysis. Our results indicate that the impact on output of a monetary shock changed over time. At the point of the last observation of our sample, the fourth quarter of 2011, among the three countries, monetary policy was most powerful in Poland and not much less strong than the transmission in the euro area. We discuss various factors that can contribute to differences in monetary transmission, such as financial structure, labour market rigidities, industry composition, exchange rate regime, credibility of monetary policy and trade openness.     

欧债危机成因与前景的制度分析

希腊等欧元区国家的主权债务危机可以说是欧洲区域一体化建设中的独特现象,其折射的是欧元区所存在的一个结构性问题：奉行单一货币政策和各国分散的财政政策,集中暴露出了欧洲货币一体化与欧洲福利资本主义的不相容、以及统一货币运行所要求的财政紧缩与欧元成员国经济增长和福利制度之间的矛盾与冲突;欧元不会就此瓦解,但欧债问题的最终解决困难重重;欧元的未来取决于自由与市场的回归欧洲,取决于欧盟的制度完善与欧式福利资本主义改革的成功与否。     

Determinants of Interest Rate Pass-through for Emerging Market Economies: The Role of Financial Market Structure

It is essential for central banks to assess whether or not the pass-through from monetary policy rates to credit and deposit interest rates is complete in order to ensure price stability. In this article, we analyze interest rate pass-through process for emerging market economies. Since emerging market countries lack large panel data sets that are typically available for developed countries, it is hard to analyze the determinants of pass-through coefficients for emerging market countries. To overcome the data issue, we developed a country selection procedure that minimizes heterogeneity among the countries included in the analysis. Our findings indicate that banking sectors?? competition plays a more important role for emerging market countries than their developed counterparts.     

Differences in exchange rate pass-through in the euro area

This paper focuses on the pass-through of exchange rate changes into the prices of imports made by euro area countries originating outside the area. Using data on import unit values for 13 different product categories for each country, we estimate industry-specific rates of pass-through across and within countries for all euro members. In the short-run, pass-through rates differ across industries and countries and are less than one. In the long-run neither full pass-through nor equality of pass-through rates across industries and countries can be rejected. Differences exist across euro area countries in the degree that a common exchange rate movement gets transmitted into consumer prices and costs of production indices. Most of these differences in transmission rates are due to the distinct degree of openness of each country to non-euro area imports rather than to the heterogeneity in the structure of imports.     

Financial market imperfections and monetary policy strategy

In a model with imperfect money, credit and reserve markets, we examine if an inflation-targeting central bank applying the funds rate operating procedure to indirectly control market interest rates also needs a monetary aggregate as policy instrument. We show that if private agents use information extracted from money and financial markets to form inflation expectations and if interest rate pass-through is incomplete, the central bank can use a narrow monetary aggregate and the discount interest rate as independent and complementary policy instruments to reinforce the credibility of its announcements and the role of inflation target as a nominal anchor for inflation expectations. This study shows how a monetary policy strategy combining inflation targeting and monetary targeting can be conceived to guarantee macroeconomic stability and the credibility of monetary policy. Friedman's k-percent money growth rule, which can generate dynamic instability, and two alternative stabilizing feedback monetary targeting rules are examined.     

Inside the bank lending channel

This paper tests cross-sectional differences in the effectiveness of the bank lending channel. The results, derived from a comprehensive sample of Italian banks, suggest that heterogeneity in the monetary policy pass-through exists. After a monetary tightening the decrease in lending is lower for well-capitalized banks that are perceived as less risky by the market and are better able to raise uninsured deposits. Liquid banks can protect their loan portfolio against monetary tightening simply by drawing down cash and securities. The presence of internal capital markets in bank holding companies also contributes to insulate monetary shocks. Bank size is never relevant.     

The Liquidity Premium in the Money Market: A Comparison of the German Mark Period and the Euro Area

Abstract. This paper investigates to what extent the expectations hypothesis of the term structure (EHTS) of interest rates receives some support since the launch of the European single currency. Empirical evidence shows that in general this theory applies to most European countries, and to Germany in particular. The objective of this paper thus is twofold. First, the EHTS for the German money market and for a larger sample including the German mark period and the euro money market is tested in order to check whether the results for the former are affected by the new financial environment since January 1999. Second, the implications of the results for the monetary policy assessment are discussed. We estimate cointegrating vector autoregressive models in order to quantify the level of the liquidity premium. The results suggest that financial markets do not consider the monetary policy of the European Central Bank simply as the one prevailing during the German period.     

The effectiveness of monetary policy in steering money market rates during the financial crisis

The financial crisis has deeply affected money markets and thus, potentially, the proper functioning of the interest rate channel of monetary policy transmission. Therefore, we analyze the effectiveness of monetary policy in steering euro area money market rates by looking at (i) the predictability of money market rates on the basis of monetary policy expectations and (ii) the impact of extraordinary central bank measures on money market rates. We find that during the crisis money market rates up to 12 months still respond to revisions in the expected path of future rates, even though to a lesser extent than before August 2007. We attribute part of the loss in monetary policy effectiveness to money market rates being driven by higher liquidity premia and increased uncertainty about future interest rates. Our results also indicate that the ECB’s non-standard monetary policy measures as of October 2008 were effective in addressing the disruptions in the euro area money market. In fact, our estimates suggest that non-standard monetary policy measures helped to lower Euribor rates by more than 80 basis points. These findings show that central banks have effective tools at hand to conduct monetary policy in times of crises.     

The effect of ECB monetary policies on interest rates and volumes

This article assesses the transmission of ECB monetary policies, conventional and unconventional, to both interest rates and lending volumes or bond issuance for three types of different economic agents through five different markets: sovereign bonds at 6-month, 5-year and 10-year horizons, loans to nonfinancial corporations and housing loans to households, during the financial crisis, and for the four largest economies of the euro area. We look at three different unconventional tools: excess liquidity, longer-term refinancing operations and securities held for monetary policy purposes following the decomposition of the ECB’s Weekly Financial Statements. We first identify series of ECB policy shocks at the euro area aggregate level by removing the systematic component of each series and controlling for announcement effects. We second include these exogenous shocks in country-specific structural VAR, in which we control for credit demand. The main result is that only the pass-through from the ECB rate to interest rates has been effective. Unconventional policies have had uneven effects and primarily on interest rates.     

The role of labor markets for euro area monetary policy

In this paper, we explore the role of labor markets for monetary policy in the euro area in a New Keynesian model in which labor markets are characterized by search and matching frictions. We first investigate to which extent a more flexible labor market would alter the business cycle behavior and the transmission of monetary policy. We find that while a lower degree of wage rigidity makes monetary policy more effective, i.e. a monetary policy shock transmits faster onto inflation, the importance of other labor market rigidities for the transmission of shocks is rather limited. Second, having estimated the model by Bayesian techniques we analyze to which extent labor market shocks, such as disturbances in the vacancy posting process, shocks to the separation rate and variations in bargaining power are important determinants of business cycle fluctuations. Our results point primarily towards disturbances in the bargaining process as a significant contributor to inflation and output fluctuations. In sum, the paper supports current central bank practice which appears to put considerable effort into monitoring euro area wage dynamics and which appears to treat some of the other labor market information as less important for monetary policy.     

Capital Controls,Global Liquidity Traps,and the International Policy Trilemma*

The zero bound on interest rates introduces a new dimension to the trilemma in international policy. The openness of the international financial market might render monetary policy ineffective, even within a system of fully flexible exchange rates, because shocks that lead to a liquidity trap in one country are propagated through financial markets to other countries. However, the effectiveness of monetary policy can be restored by the imposition of capital controls. We derive the optimal response of monetary policy to a global liquidity trap in the presence of capital controls. We show that, even though capital controls might facilitate effective monetary policy, capital controls are not generally desirable in terms of welfare.