共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1.
Vey WangChung-Hui Lai 《Economic Modelling》2011,28(5):2090-2099
This paper introduces the different kinds of franchise contract bargaining into a macroeconomic model and accordingly researches the relationship between competition and economic growth. In Nash bargaining model/vertical integration we find an inverted-U shaped or a monotonically increasing relationship between the competitive degree of the intermediate goods market and economic growth. In bargaining of the right to manage model/vertical non-integration our result shows an inverted-U shaped or a monotonically decreasing relationship between the competitive degree of the intermediate goods market and economic growth. In addition, there is an overall negative relationship between the competitive degree of the final goods market and economic growth. Especially, our interesting findings that the pricing rule for intermediate goods firm depends not only on market power but also bargaining power are more general. Therefore, we can further explain the firms' vertical control strategy. 相似文献
2.
In this paper, we explore the dynamic properties of an endogenous growth model with finite patent length. We show that there exists a unique equilibrium growth path and that this path exhibits damped oscillations in contrast to the equilibrium path of an endogenous growth model with infinite patent length. We also examine the effects of patent policy on social welfare and show that infinite patent length does not maximize social welfare. Furthermore, we show that, in a growth model that does not exhibit scale effects, a finite patent length maximizes social welfare on the balanced growth path. 相似文献
3.
Pietro F. Peretto 《Journal of development economics》2012,97(1):142-155
This paper takes a new look at the long-run implications of resource abundance. It develops a Schumpeterian model of endogenous growth that incorporates an upstream resource-intensive sector and yields an analytical solution for the transition path. It then derives conditions under which, as the economy's endowment of a natural resource rises, (i) growth accelerates and welfare rises, (ii) growth decelerates but welfare rises nevertheless, and (iii) growth decelerates and welfare falls. Which of these scenarios prevails depends on the response of the natural resource price to an increase in the resource endowment. The price response determines the change in income earned by the owners of the resource (the households) and thereby the change in their expenditure on manufacturing goods. Since manufacturing is the economy's innovative sector, this income-to-expenditure effect links resource abundance to the size of the market for manufacturing goods and drives how re-source abundance affects incentives to undertake innovative activity. 相似文献
4.
The diversity of technological activities that contribute to growth in labour productivity is examined in this article for manufacturing and services industries in eight major EU countries. We test the relevance of two “engines of growth”, i.e., the strategies of technological competitiveness (based on innovation in products and markets) and cost competitiveness (relying on innovation in processes and machinery) and their impact on economic performance. We propose models for the determinants of changes in labour productivity and we carry out empirical tests for both the whole economy and for the four Revised Pavitt classes that group manufacturing and services industries with distinct patterns of innovation. Tests are carried out by pooling industries, countries and three time periods, using innovation survey data from CIS 2, 3 and 4, linked to economic variables. The results confirm the specificity of the two “engines of growth”; economic performances in European industries appear as the result of different innovation models, with strong specificities of the four Revised Pavitt classes. 相似文献
5.
The supply- and demand-side impacts of credit market information 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Alain de Janvry 《Journal of development economics》2010,93(2):173-188
We utilize a unique pair of experiments to isolate the ways in which reductions in asymmetric information alter credit market outcomes. A Guatemalan microfinance lender gradually started using a credit bureau across its branches without letting borrowers know about it. One year later, we ran a large randomized credit information course that described the existence and workings of the bureau to the clients of this lender. This pairing of natural and randomized experiments allows us to separately identify how new information enters on the supply and the demand sides of the market. Our results indicate that the credit bureau generated large efficiency gains for the lender, and that these gains were augmented when borrowers understood the rules of the game. The credit bureau rewarded good borrowers but penalized weaker ones, increasing economic differentiation. 相似文献
6.
Abstract . In the Dixit-Stiglitz model of monopolistic competition, entry of firms is socially too small. Other authors have shown that excess entry is also a possibility with other preferences for diversity. We show that workers' rents also contribute to explain excess entry through a general equilibrium mechanism. Larger wages indeed raises the aggregate earnings and firms sales and profits, which entices too many firms to enter. We discuss the possibility of over-provision of varieties by comparing the equilibrium to unconstrained and constrained social optima and to other regulatory frameworks where wages are not controlled. 相似文献
7.
By allowing for investment activities by research and development (R&D) firms to prevent product obsolescence, we show that if legal patent protection is too strong, a higher R&D subsidy rate delivers insufficient investments for survival in the R&D sector, depressing innovation and growth in the long run. 相似文献
8.
The modeling of Schumpeterian competition as a process of innovation, imitation and selection was first presented by Nelson/Winter
(1982) in a simulation study and further analyzed in a similar but general analytical formulation by Iwai (1984a, 1984b).
Their results concerning the relations between the combination of the different forces of Schumpeterian competition and market
structure respectively the distributions of profits are interesting, but restricted to competitive markets. Comparing rules
of thumb and satisficing for the Ramp;D decisions the present study analyzes the process of Schumpeterian competition in a
heterogeneous oligopoly. Firstly, the authors find for the Ramp;D-concentration relation results contrary to the traditional
interpretation of Schumpeter. Secondly, Iwai’s (1984a, 1984b) qualitative results hold in this less restrictive modeling. 相似文献
9.
Abstract Evidence on the effect of product market competition on unionized wages is mixed. In this paper we show theoretically that the result may reflect genuine heterogeneity in the response of union wages to product market conditions. For low levels of unionization, union bargaining power may actually be enhanced by market competition, as firms have more to lose when there is a strike. Using recent data from the UK, we explore interactions between the level of industry competition and unionization, and find supporting evidence for this hypothesis. 相似文献
10.
While most of the literature explaining the change in consumption composition has focused on the role of relative prices and non-homothetic preferences, this paper examines the importance of preference shifts. I introduce dynamics in preferences and find that they play a relevant role and that their exclusion worsens model performance at least as much as the exclusion of allowing non-homothetic preferences. 相似文献
11.
Naveen Khanna 《Journal of Economic Theory》2010,145(1):156-188
We show how competition in oligopolies, with the possibility of failure and exit of a levered incumbent, affects the ex-ante design of optimal debt contracts. When a levered firm's profits are unobservable, a debt contract imposes the threat of nonrenewal to induce truthful revelation. Because nonrenewal impacts the future profitability of the surviving competitor, the contract influences the competitor's pricing strategy and the equilibrium profits of both firms. The optimal contract is quite different from a standard debt contract, and induces the competitor to be less aggressive, resulting in higher equilibrium prices and profits, and higher returns for investors. 相似文献
12.
Countries with intermediate levels of institutional quality suffer larger output contractions following sudden stops of capital inflows than less developed nations. However, countries with strong institutions seldom experience significant falls in output after capital flow reversals. We reconcile these two observations using a calibrated DSGE model that extends the financial accelerator framework developed in Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999). The model captures financial market institutional quality with creditors' ability to recover assets from bankrupt firms. Bankruptcy costs affect vulnerability to sudden stops directly but also indirectly by affecting the degree of liability dollarization. Simulations reveal an inverted U-shaped relationship between bankruptcy costs and the output loss following sudden stops. 相似文献
13.
Gilad Sorek 《Journal of Macroeconomics》2011,(4):690-699
This paper shows how heterogeneity in patent ownership across generations and lifecycle saving considerations qualitatively change the conventional implications of patent policy for quality growth. We study a close Overlapping Generations economy that grows through sequential quality improvements (“quality-ladder”), to show that for plausible values of the Inter-temporal Elasticity of Substitution (a) shorter patent length enhances growth (b) under exogenous innovation size loosening patent breadth protection spurs R&D investment and quality growth and (c) the effect of loosening lagging breadth protection on R&D investment and quality growth under endogenous innovation size depends on patents length. Our findings explore a new channel through which strong patents may hinder innovation and emphasize the importance of coordination in patent-policy across the different dimensions of the patents system. 相似文献
14.
Incumbent firms have two basic possibilities to improve their competitive position in the product market: Investment in R&D and the creation of entry barriers to the disadvantage of potential rivals, e.g. through lobbying activities, campaign contributions, bribes or the adoption of incompatible technologies. This paper proposes a simple oligopoly model which raises the possibility that such anti-competitive conduct and R&D investment are complementary activities for incumbents. Consequently, an institutional framework or technological possibilities which encourage anti-competitive conduct, although impeding entry of potential rivals and accentuating standard oligopoly distortions, may foster R&D-based growth and welfare. However, this outcome is less likely if entrants exert technological spillover effects, e.g. through foreign direct investment. Stronger protection of intellectual property rights, although triggering anti-competitive conduct and thereby impeding market entry as well, is more likely to foster economic growth. 相似文献
15.
H. Murat Özbilgin 《Journal of development economics》2010,92(2):125-137
I explore the implications of limited participation in financial markets on a standard small open economy business cycle model. Despite its parsimony, the limited participation model developed in this paper improves over the standard model in terms of explaining two important features of business cycle facts of developing countries: high volatility of consumption, and high negative correlation between the trade balance and output. Limited participation model is then used to inspect the effects of financial development and integration on macroeconomic volatility. Under a standard calibration, limited participation model leads to the conclusion that financial development and integration are associated with higher investment and output volatility. Effect of more participation on consumption volatility is dependent on the specification of the risk premium function. 相似文献
16.
André L. Faria 《Journal of Economic Theory》2008,138(1):71-100
In this paper, mergers are an equilibrium outcome in which acquirers “marry” targets so as to gain access to their organization capital. Firms with lower learning costs about the new technology are not necessarily those that manage it best once it is mature. Since there are gains from trade, a market for organization capital can arise through mergers. This model generates a merger wave after a shock to technology and is consistent with several other stylized facts on mergers documented in the literature. 相似文献
17.
Phases of economic development and the transitional dynamics of an innovation-education growth model
Maurizio Iacopetta 《European Economic Review》2010,54(2):317-330
This paper extends earlier analysis of the transitional dynamics of a growth model in which both human capital and innovation drive income expansion. Funke and Strulik [2000. On endogenous growth with physical capital, human capital and product variety. European Economic Review 44, 491-515] suggest that the typical advanced economy follows three development phases, characterized in a temporal order by physical capital accumulation, human capital formation, and innovation, and that the transitional dynamics of the model reproduce such a sequencing. I argue that other sequences of the phases of development are possible and show that the model can generate a trajectory in which innovation precedes human capital formation. This trajectory accords with the observation that the rise in formal education followed with a considerable lag the process of industrialization. U.S. income and educational time series data are used to corroborate the innovation-education trajectory. 相似文献
18.
We revisit the relation between product market competition and leading-edge growth in a model where horizontal and vertical innovations simultaneously occur. We show that competition exerts an important effect on the composition of aggregate R&D (vertical versus horizontal). In fact, when product market competition gets more intense, a larger fraction of R&D is engaged in improving the quality of products; this occurs at the expense of a lower rate of horizontal innovation. This effect, which is absent in the basic endogenous growth model with only vertical innovations, may overturn the inverse relation between product market competition and leading-edge growth found in prior theoretical models. 相似文献
19.
Credit agents in microfinance institutions (MFIs) must be given incentives to acquire information on potential borrowers and select them in accordance with the MFI's objectives. We show that while giving incentives has no cost in for-profit MFIs, it is costly in pro-poor MFIs: When repayment and wealth are positively correlated, a pro-poor MFI cannot obtain the selection of poor clients in the proportion it wishes with incentives based solely on repayment. It then becomes necessary to audit the share of very poor borrowers selected by an agent in order to provide the latter with adequate incentives. When audit costs are large, pro-poor MFIs may have to forego selection on wealth — and use other targeting devices such as working in impoverished geographical locations. Driven by donor concerns with ‘mission drift’ away from the poor, audits on the wealth status of clients have been introduced at the level of MFIs. We show that introducing pro-poor incentives requires extending such audits to the level of credit agents. 相似文献
20.
We investigate the relationship between process and product R&D and compare the incentives for both types of R&D under different modes of market competition (Bertrand versus Cournot). It is shown that: (i) process R&D investments increase with the degree of product differentiation and firms invest more in product R&D when they can do process R&D than when they cannot; (ii) Bertrand firms have a stronger incentive for product R&D whereas Cournot firms invest more in process R&D; and (iii) cooperation in product R&D promotes both types of R&D relative to competition whereas cooperation in both types of R&D discourages R&D relative to cooperation in just product R&D. 相似文献