Public Procurement Auctions and Competition in Turkey

This paper empirically investigates the effect of the competitive environment (number of participants) on the cost of procurement. We use a unique dataset provided by the Public Procurement Authority (PPA) of Turkey that covers all of the government procurement auctions for the years 2004–2006. First, after controlling for possible endogeneity, we show that the number of bidders significantly and negatively affects the procurement price. Thus, the existence of a more competitive environment significantly decreases procurement costs in Turkey. Second, when auctions are open to foreign participation, the auction price tends to be lower. Finally, prices in services and goods sectors are more sensitive to changes in the number of bidders than is true for the construction sector. The results of this paper have several policy implications for e-procurement and efficient procurement design.     

Bid Roundness Under Collusion in Japanese Procurement Auctions

We analyze the “roundness level” of bids—defined as the number of zeros at the end of the bid—in public procurement auctions for construction works in Okinawa Prefecture, Japan, where a bid-rigging case was filed. We hypothesize that bid rigging increases the roundness of bids through the bid coordination process. Specifically, winners choose round numbers to avoid any miscommunication when they announce their planned bids to other ring members, and losers prefer round numbers when they arbitrarily bid above the winning bid. We find that (1) there is a positive relationship between the roundness of a bid and its relative value as a fraction of the reserve price, (2) the roundness of bids is higher when collusion is active than when it is inactive, (3) among the ring bids, the roundness of the lowest bids is even higher than that of the other bids, and (4) bids by non-ring members are also round when collusion is active.     

Single Bidders and Tacit Collusion in Highway Procurement Auctions

Collusion in auctions can take different forms, such as refraining from bidding. Certain aspects of highway procurement auctions facilitate collusive outcomes. We collect data on asphalt paving auctions conducted in Kentucky from 2005-2007. We determine the potential service area of each asphalt plant and potential bidders for each paving project. We analyze firms’ bid participation decisions, including variables affecting costs as well as competitive and strategic effects. In many geographic markets where firms face only a few identifiable rivals, county boundaries serve as a coordinating mechanism for softening competition, significantly influencing firms’ decisions whether and how much to bid.     

Bid Coordination in Sponsored Search Auctions: Detection Methodology and Empirical Analysis*

Bid delegation to specialized intermediaries is common in internet ad auctions. When the same intermediary bids for competing advertisers, its incentive to coordinate client bids might alter the functioning of the auctions. This study develops a methodology to detect bid coordination and presents a strategy to estimate a bound on the search engine revenue losses imposed by bid coordination. When the method is applied to data from auctions held on a major search engine, coordination is detected in 55% of the cases of delegated bidding and the search engine's revenue loss ranges between 5.3% and 10.4%.     

The Impact of Timing on Bidding Behavior in Procurement Auctions of Contracts with Private Costs

We provide a comparison of bidding behavior between multi-round and single-round auctions considering bid lettings for asphalt construction contracts that are known to have primarily private costs. Using a reduced-form difference-in-difference approach as well as the nonparametric estimation technique that was proposed by Racine and Li (J Econom 119(1):99–130, 2004) we find that bidding is more aggressive in a sequential multi-round setting than in a simultaneous single-round format. We explore potential causes for the bidding difference across formats that are related to synergies and the level of bidder participation.     

Beyond Illinois Brick: The Law and Economics of Cost Pass-Through in the ADM Price Fixing Case

This article reviews the legal standards and theeconomics of pass-through to indirect purchasers andillustrates these principles with a case involving ADMin the market for high fructose corn syrup (HFCS).With three assumptions about production technologies,buyers of HFCS experience a 100 percent pass throughof the direct overcharge. The extent of pass throughof the increase by buyers is shown to dependcritically upon the market structure of the purchasingindustry and the shape of the retail demand curve. Flexible demand functional forms are needed to avoidconstraining estimated pass through rates.     

A Multinomial Logit Framework to Estimate Bid Shading in Procurement Auctions: Application to Cattle Sales in the Texas Panhandle

We develop an empirical methodology based upon multinomial probability models to estimate the magnitude of bid shading in cattle procurement in the Texas Panhandle region. The methodology works well in settings where data allow a good estimation of a bidder’s probability of winning, but the approach does not rely upon the bidding process following any particular structural framework or on the existence of a control group. Estimated markdowns of price from the competitive level are in the range of 5–10% and are somewhat larger than estimates of oligopsony markdowns from previous studies of cattle procurement in the U.S.     

Auctions with toeholds: An experimental study of company takeovers

We run experiments on English Auctions where the bidders already own a part (toehold) of the good for sale. The theory predicts a very strong (“explosive”) effect of even small toeholds. While asymmetric toeholds do have an effect on bids and revenues in the lab, which gets stronger the larger the asymmetry, it is not nearly as strong as predicted. We explain this by analyzing the flatness of the payoff functions, which leads to large deviations from the equilibrium strategies being relatively costless. This is a general fundamental weakness of this type of explosive equilibria, which makes them fail when human players are involved. Our analysis shows that a levels of reasoning model explains the results better where this equilibrium fails. Moreover, we find that although big toeholds can be effective in a takeover battle, the cost to acquire them might be higher than the strategic benefit they bring.     

Transaction Cost, Social Capital and Firms' Synergy Creation in Chinese Business Networks: An Integrative Approach

Overseas Chinese business networks have been a powerful growth engine propelling local economies in Southeast Asia and the Greater China region. However, relatively little research has been conducted on the relationship between social capital and a firm's synergy creation in overseas Chinese business networks. To narrow this knowledge gap, this study adopts an integrative approach drawing on two complementary theories of transaction cost economics (TCE) and social capital to investigate how a firm creates synergy in overseas Chinese business networks. A multiple regression method was used to test hypotheses. The results indicate that repeat transactions and close ties with government offices and financial institutions contributed positively towards a firm's synergy creation while other variables such as trust, transaction uncertainty and information sharing did not show any significant relationship with synergy creation. Data from 108 Hong Kong-based Chinese manufacturing firms provide evidence that the integrative approach is rather effective in studying a firm's synergy creation in the context of interorganisational relationships.     

Price Commitments in Standard Setting under Asymmetric Information*

Standards may create market power for the holders of standard essential patents (SEPs). To address these concerns, the literature advocates price commitments, whereby SEP holders commit to the maximum royalty they would charge were their technology included in the standard. We consider a setting in which a technology implementer holds private information about profitability. In this setting, price commitments increase efficiency not only by curbing SEP holders' market power, but also by alleviating distortions in the design of the royalty scheme. We derive conditions under which price commitments can be implemented using a simple royalty cap as used in practice.     

Price Adjustment Policies in Procurement Contracting: An Analysis of Bidding Behavior

The fluctuations in fuel prices over the past decade led a number of government agencies to introduce price adjustment clauses in procurement contracting. Those clauses were primarily designed to reduce contractors’ uncertainty without considering the impact of such initiatives on bidding and the budget. We analyze a newly constructed, detailed panel of observations on bids for construction contracts and compare bidding behavior across periods and projects, and across items within projects. Estimates from a difference‐in‐differences approach, indicate that bidding becomes more aggressive and less dispersed after the implementation of this policy. The difference is more pronounced when we consider itemized bids than overall project bids. Alternative techniques of regression discontinuity and nonparametric estimation are applied and yield consistent results.     

An Empirical Analysis of Entrant and Incumbent Bidding in Road Construction Auctions

This paper explores differences in the bidding patterns of entrants and incumbents in road construction auctions. We find that entrants bid more aggressively and win auctions with significantly lower bids than incumbents. The differences in their bidding patterns are consistent with a model of auctions in which the distribution of an entrant's costs exhibits greater dispersion than that of an incumbent's and relations of stochastic dominance in the distributions do not persist for the entire range of estimated costs. We also find that more efficient firms bid, on average, more aggressively and firms with greater backlogs bid less aggressively.     

Interorganizational Collaboration and Innovation: Toward a Portfolio Approach*

In the literature on innovation, interorganizational collaboration has been advanced as beneficial for the innovative performance of firms. At the same time, large‐scale empirical evidence for such a relationship is scarce. This article examines whether evidence can be found for the idea that interorganizational collaboration supports the effectiveness of innovation strategies. This article empirically addresses this research question by analyzing data on Belgian manufacturing firms (n=221) collected in the Community Innovation Survey, a biannual survey organized by Eurostat and the European Commission aimed at obtaining insights into the innovation practices and performance of companies within the various European Union (EU) member states. Tobit analyses reveal a positive relationship between interorganizational collaboration and innovative performance. At the same time, the impact on innovative performance differs depending on the nature of the partner(s) involved. These findings strongly suggest the relevance of adopting a portfolio approach to interorganizational collaboration within the context of innovation strategies.     

Tacit Collusion in Repeated Auctions: Uniform Versus Discriminatory

Within an infinitely repeated game, I compare the level and conduct of collusion under uniform and discriminatory auctions. For this purpose, I characterize the optimal collusive schemes and sets of sustainable profits under these auction formats. I show that uniform auctions facilitate collusion more than discriminatory auctions: the optimal penal code is equally severe under the two formats; but bidders' deviation incentives are weaker in uniform auctions given that the pay-off irrelevant bids can be used to relax the enforcement problem. This discussion is particularly relevant after the recent reforms in the electricity industry in England & Wales, and elsewhere.     

Major Innovation as a Dynamic Capability: A Systems Approach*

Major innovation (MI), composed of both radical and really new innovation, is an important mechanism for enabling the growth and renewal of an enterprise. Yet it is poorly managed in most established firms, and success stories are rare. This conceptual article draws on systems theory, recent advances in dynamic capabilities theory, and the management of innovation literature to offer a framework for building an MI dynamic capability. The framework is composed of seven elements that together form a management system rather than a process‐based approach to nurturing radical innovation. These system elements are (1) an identifiable organization structure; (2) interface mechanisms with the mainstream organization, some of which are tightly coupled and others of which are loose; (3) exploratory processes; (4) requisite skills and talent development, given that entrepreneurial talent is not present in most organizations; (5) governance and decision‐making mechanisms at the project, MI portfolio, and MI system levels; (6) appropriate performance metrics; and (7) an appropriate culture and leadership context. It is argued that dynamic capabilities for phenomena as complex as MI must be considered in a systems fashion rather than as operating routines and repeatable processes as the literature currently suggests. A set of propositions is offered regarding how each element should play out in this parallel management system. Finally, each element's role in the major innovation system is justified in terms of four criteria required by systems theory: (1) The system is identifiable, and its elements are interdependent; (2) the effect of the whole is greater than the sum of the parts; (3) homeostasis is achieved through interaction and networking with the larger organization; and (4) there is a clear purpose in the larger system in which the MI management system is embedded. Examples are given to demonstrate these criteria. Systems theory offers a new way of thinking about dynamic capability development and management.     

Geographical Cost of Living Differences: An Update

This article develops a method for estimating current geographical differences in the cost of living index for all states for 1981–1990. These estimates based on BLS data are shown to correspond closely to statewide cost of living estimates for 1989 based on the American Chamber of Commerce Research Association data for selected cities.
Living costs are highest in Hawaii, Alaska, Connecticut, Washington D.C., New Jersey, Massachusetts, New York, and California. They are lower in Mississippi, West Virginia, Arkansas, Idaho, and Utah. The basic pattern persists since 1977 with shifts related to economic growth rates.     

Loan Subsidy Valuation: An Alternative Approach

In a recent paper, Jennergren analyzed four loan subsidy valuation methods suggested in authoritative textbooks. He showed that the first three can be derived from a unique formula whose value depends on the nonsubsidized loan amount that is assumed to be replaced by the subsidized loan. When the WACC method is used, this debt replacement must implicitly take into account the target debt-to-value ratio set by the firm. In this article, we suggest an alternative approach that allows us to clearly incorporate the corresponding debt constraint and to determine the resulting adjustment to be made. This adjustment appears to be different from that recommended by Jennergren. More generally, we suggest an alternative view of the consistency of the methods.     

Efficiency in Second-Price Auctions: A New Look at Old Data

Experiments on second-price sealed-bid private value auctions have established that subjects typically bid more than their value, despite the fact that value bidding is a dominant strategy in such auctions. Moreover, the laboratory evidence shows that subjects do not learn to bid their values as they gain more experience. In the present paper, we re-examine the second-price auction data from Kagel and Levin’s (Econ J 103:868–879, 1993) classic paper. We find that auction efficiency increases over time, even though the frequency of overbidding is unchanged. We argue that the rise in efficiency is due to a decline in the variability of overbidding. This is consistent with subjects’ learning to bid more like each other.