On Antitrust Enforcement and the Deterrence of Collusive Behaviour

This paper examines an antitrust enforcement policy of using significant price changes in an industry as a sorting mechanism for the allocation of resources devoted to policing collusion. That is, in either responding to complaints or initiating investigations on their own, I examine the issue of whether an antitrust enforcement policy of inferring possible collusion from significant prices changes is effective in deterring collusion given that antitrust officials have no direct knowledge of the costs of individual firms. Using the imperfect information repeated game of Green and Porter (1984), I show that this investigation strategy if coupled with uniform costs being borne by firms, can reduce the expected profits from the collusive agreement: however, unless the punishment is large enough, it will be ineffective in reducing the frequency of collusion. More importantly, it can have the undesirable effect of reducing the output agreed to by firms, if firms choose quantities, or raise collusive prices if firms are choosing price. Moreover, if the enforcement policy is anticipated by firms, the punishment mechanism adopted to support collusion will be altered to offset the policy.     

Antitrust Sanctions and a Firm's Ability to Pay

Review of Industrial Organization - Gallo et al. (1994) analyze the sanctions imposed on firms convicted of criminal price-fixing under the antitrust laws. An element not included explicitly in...     

Recent Antitrust Enforcement Actions by the U.S. Department of Justice: A Selective Survey of Economic Issues

This paper discusses some of the most interesting economic issues raised by U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust Division proceedings that had significant developments between June 1, 2001 and May 31, 2002. The paper reviews six recent merger enforcement actions and three actions involving unilateral anticompetitive conduct.     

Selected Economic Analysis at the Antitrust Division: The Year in Review

Of the many activitiesof the Antitrust Division of theU.S. Department of Justice, we havesummarized some that raise interestingeconomic issues. We describe recentimprovements in the methodology to beused in ``coordinated effects' analysisof mergers. We also discuss four casesbrought by the DOJ that raise issues ofmarket definition, the influence ofcommon partial ownership of competitors,and the effects of fringe suppliers inconstraining collusion by large firms.     

After The Fall: Stock Price Movements and the Deterrent Effect of Antitrust Enforcement

In this paper, we utilize data on stock price movements of firms indicted on price-fixing charges to infer expectations of antitrust recidivism. Specifically, a return of the firm's (market-adjusted) asset value to its pre-indictment level in the post-indictment period is taken as evidence of stockholders' expectations of a return to collusive behavior. From these data, we are able to make direct inferences about the effectiveness of antitrust enforcement actions. Importantly, we find that the stock prices of 85 percent of the firms in our sample had regained 100 percent of their pre-indictment levels within one year of the antitrust action. Such widespread and rapid stock price appreciation casts doubt on the durability of thedeterrent effect of Section 1 enforcement.     

Commitment to Competition: An Assessment of Antitrust Agency Budgets since 1970

In these remarks to the Industrial Organization Society, I discuss the adequacy of antitrust enforcement resources in the U.S. Relevant resources are measured by the competition budgets of the Justice Department and the Federal Trade Commission. Since 1970 these have been influenced by the overall economy, its changing structure, and politics, but they have not kept up with the pace of mergers or other measures of the need for antitrust. Thus at present, the resources devoted to antitrust fall well short of what is required for continued vigilance over our growing and changing economy.     

Economic Analyses of Mergers at the FTC: The Cruise Ships Mergers Investigation

This paper provides an overview of how economists atthe Federal Trade Commission assess the potentialcompetitive effects of mergers, with a focus on thetypes of quantitative analyses frequently employed.The paper first outlines the general approach employedat the Federal Trade Commission to review mergers.The paper then describes analyses done in theinvestigation of proposed mergers in the cruiseline industry as a specific example. Of particularinterest in this example are the analyses used toassess the potential for coordinated interaction asa result of the merger.     

Antitrust,the Rule of Reason,and Democracy

Professor Barnes responds to William Curran's fictional dialogue between Senator John Sherman and philosopher John Rawls, with a fictional letter from Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas. Professor Barnes discusses the importance of the anarcho-socialist movement of the late nineteenth century to the adoption of the Sherman Act, the historical and logical inevitability of adoption of a rule of reason in antitrust law, the relevance of efficiency to the rule of reason, and the relationship between competition and the promotion of democratic ideals.     

Department of Justice Antitrust Enforcement, 1955—1997: An Empirical Study

This is an empirical study of Department of Justice(DOJ) enforcement of the antitrust laws. Its purposeis fourfold:1. To update Posner's study ``A Statistical Study ofAntitrust Enforcement' (Posner, 1970, pp. 365–419).2. To provide consistent andcomparable measures of antitrustenforcement effortby the Department of Justice.3. To report these measurements in a concise andsystematic way inorder to encourage empiricalstudies of antitrust issues.4. To explore some implications for antitrustissues.The purpose is to present the overall historicalrecord of DOJ antitrust activity as well as somepatterns in that history. More detailed analysis isleft for future work.The following information for cases undertaken by theDOJ are reported: number of cases, choice of civil orcriminal remedies, alleged violations, corporateofficials prosecuted, won-loss record, civil andcriminal sanctions imposed, and length of theproceedings. The principal source of data is theCCH Trade Regulation Reporter, commonly referred toas the CCH Bluebook which contains briefsummaries of all DOJ antitrust cases in order of theirfiling.     

Current Economic Issues at the FTC

This paper provides a summary of recent economic issues ofparticular interest in the Bureau of Economics (``BE') of the FTC. Further developmentof empirical analyses suitable for antitrust investigations is currently of particularinterest to BE. This paper outlines several areas where BE has focused in the past yearincluding: (1) Unilateral effects; (2) coordinated interaction; (3) mergerretrospectives; (4) natural experiments; (5) price discrimination; (6) intellectual property; (7) healthcare;and (8) energy. For each area, we discuss the issues under consideration, the work thatis being done, and what additional research would be useful.     

Present at the Beginning of a New Era for Antitrust: Reflections on 1982–1983

The early 1980s were an important time of transitionfor antitrust policy for the Antitrust Division of theU.S. Department of Justice. I had the privilege to beselected to serve as the first ``Chief Economist' forthe newly installed Assistant Attorney General forAntitrust, William F. Baxter. In this essay I discusssome of the important achievements of that period, aswell as some missed opportunities.     

Delusions Regarding the Proper Role of Markets and Antitrust Policy

William Curran and Donald Wellington have criticized capitalism,neoclassical economics and antitrust policy. This article defendscapitalistic institutions against both the strong forms ofsocialism as practiced in the former Soviet Union and againstits milder forms as practiced in the welfare states of Europe.The article endorses some of Curran's and Wellington's concernsabout neoclassical economics, but recommends that neoclassicaleconomics be adapted to make it more useful for scientificresearch rather than abandoned outright. Some suggestions areoffered in this direction. The article totally rejects the notionthat antitrust policy can be a tool for correcting the ills ofcapitalism as Curran and Wellington see them, and argues that thegoal of antitrust policy should be to improve capitalism not todestroy it.     

The Supreme Court and Beer Mergers: From <Emphasis Type="Italic">Pabst/Blatz</Emphasis> to the DOJ–FTC Merger Guidelines

The beer industry in the U.S. has undergone significant structural change in the post-WWII period. The industry also was the object of prominent antitrust challenges to horizontal mergers proposed during this time frame. This paper documents the trend of increasing seller concentration in the brewing industry and assesses the role that mergers played in this structural transformation. We also analyze the change in merger policy that has taken place since the Supreme Court originally addressed mergers in the beer industry as compared to current antitrust enforcement under the DOJ–FTC Merger Guidelines and recent judicial decisions.     

The Year in Review: Economics at the Antitrust Division, 2007–2008

This paper covers the activities of the Economic Analysis Group (EAG) of the Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice, during 2007–2008. It describes the economic analysis undertaken by EAG in several important investigations, and in other activities as an advocate for competition. The views in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Antitrust Division.     

企业集团引发的反垄断难题

本文从企业集团的界定、性质和域外管辖权三个角度提出了其所引发的反垄断难题。本文的主要观点是企业集团作为一种企业间组织。兼有“企业性”与“市场性”二重属性：企业集团的“二重性”是导致企业集团垄断行为隐蔽性和复杂性的根本原因；处理企业集团的反垄断问题需要准确判断企业集团行为属性。本文通过案例研究．分析了美国和欧盟处理企业集团反垄断难题时的一些典型做法：提出了处理企业集团反垄断难题的基本原则。     

United Shoe Machineryand the Antitrust Significance of “Free” Service

In United States v. United Shoe MachineryCorp., United Shoe Machinery was found guilty ofillegal monopolization due to its leasing practices. Existing scholarship on this case largely focuses onthe issue of leasing versus selling. In contrast,we examine a particular practice of United's thatwas condemned: its policy of providing service forits leased machines without a separate servicecharge. Our analysis demonstrates that thispractice served an important insurance function byshifting risk from the shoe manufacturers to United,a more efficient bearer of risk, and concludes thatthis practice was efficiency enhancing.     

Predatory Pricing and the Speed of Antitrust Enforcement

A common complaint is that in certain industries antitrust action against predation istoo slow to ensure that a true victim can survive until the antitrust process has beenconcluded. This paper discusses, in the context of two recent antitrust cases, the sources of delay in the antitrust process, and different policy reforms aimed at speeding up the process or otherwise protecting a true victim.     

Markets,Morals, or Wealth? Delusions of a Standardized Antitrust Value

Since the 1980s, courts have chosen corporate wealth generation as antitrust's sole value, justifying their choice under``Chicago School' economics, while abandoning counter-values like justice and democracy. The difficult consequences of``Chicago's' univocal corporate wealth generating ``value' are explored in this article, while a broader, multi-valued, antitrust alternative is discussed and proposed.     

法的建立、法的实施与权益资本成本

本文以上市公司的权益资本成本为衡量指标,分别从法的建立和法的实施两个方面研究我国中小投资者法律保护的作用。研究结果发现,法的建立作用有限,中小投资者保护立法仅在某些特定阶段对权益资本成本产生影响;而法的实施作用明显,有关法律实施的典型事件和地区差异对权益资本成本具有显著的降低作用。     

The Year in Review: Economics at the Antitrust Division, 2005–2006

This paper covers the activities of the Economic Analysis Group (EAG) of the Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice, during 2005–2006. It describes the economic analysis undertaken by EAG in several important investigations, appellate matters, and other activities as an advocate for competition.The views contained herein are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the U.S. Department of Justice.