Upstream and downstream pollution taxations in vertically related markets with imperfect competition

When two markets are vertically related, the government can control pollution at the upstream as well as the downstream market levels. This paper employs the stylized model of input price discrimination and compares the effectiveness of upstream and downstream pollution taxations. We consider the situation in which downstream firms have heterogeneous abatement technologies and an upstream monopolist performs input price discrimination against them. In order to mitigate pollution, the government imposes input tax on the intermediate inputs and emission tax on the pollutant. We show that the degree of input price discrimination decreases with a rise in the input tax and increases with a rise in the emission tax. We further examine the effect of a green tax reform in which the government changes the source of taxation from input tax to emission tax. We argue that although this green tax reform may reduce the tax revenue of the government, it will certainly increase social welfare.      

Tradable performance standards in a dynamic context

Many sectors of the economy that are targets of emissions reduction policy exhibit price-responsive demand, long-lived capital, capacity constraints, and foresighted decision-making. I explore how these features affect the efficiency and dynamics of tradable performance standards (TPS) using analytical and numerical equilibrium models. While I show these dynamic considerations alone do not lead to conflicts with existing theory on the overall efficiency and cost-effectiveness of the TPS relative to a first-best policy, they do affect the transition path and steady state. Most notably, under all but the smallest discount rates, the TPS can lead to a more cost-effective post-transition steady state than the equivalent emissions cap. Given the intergenerational transition that comes with decarbonization, this result suggests some classes of present and future consumers may prefer a TPS to an emissions cap.     

Habit formation in an endogenous growth model with pollution abatement activities

This paper studies how habit formation in consumption affects pollution abatement activities and the steady-state growth rate, in the context of an endogenous growth model in which agents derive disutility from the habit stock and pollution. The paper also examines how the effect of technological change in abatement on the optimal growth rate is enhanced or weakened by habit formation. We show that if agents persist in and care about their habits, sustained growth is only possible with rapid technological progress.      

Technological standards with local externalities and decentralized behaviour

We model a situation in which agents must choose between two technologies that operate under local, positive network externalities. We find that decentralized behaviour can lead to the emergence of a technical standard, but can also result in a variety of other equilibria. Policy to eliminate non-standardized equilibria can be effected, but in some cases it may be very costly.     

Pollution abatement with limited enforcement power and citizen suits

Federal environmental laws in the U.S. can be enforced by government agencies or by private parties through citizen suits against polluters. Here, I extend the standard enforcement model to examine the role played by citizen suits. The main results from the paper suggest that in a model with limited enforcement power and citizen suits the regulator fully exercises his enforcement power when the expected penalty from a citizen suit is low, but increases his reliance on citizen suits as the expected penalty rises. Whether an enforcement regime that allows private enforcement is efficient depends not only on the relative costs of private and agency enforcement, but also on the changes in inspection costs that may be caused by private enforcement and the expected penalty from losing a citizen suit. These results suggest that in practice private enforcement may lower social costs as long as relatively inexpensive agency enforcement options, such as administrative proceedings, do not preclude citizen suits.      

Analysing pollution by way of vertically integrated coefficients, with an application to the water sector in Aragon

In this paper, we adopt Pasinetti's approach of vertically integratedsectors in order to disaggregate pollution into its most significantcomponents. Vertical integration allows us to obtain five components(and at least five measurement indices) corresponding to eachsector and each type of pollution. These indices overcome someof the deficiencies of the traditional Rasmussen-type coefficients.The empirical application is carried out by reference to thewater sector in Aragon, a region which lies in north-easternSpain, for five polluting factors, namely: water returns, biologicaloxygen demand at five days (BOD5), suspended solids (SS), nitratesand phosphates.     

Minimum Quality Standards under Asymmetric Duopoly with Endogenous Quality Ordering: A Note

In this note, we revisit minimum quality standards (MQS) under a vertically differentiated duopoly. We generalize the model in Ronnen (1991) and Valletti (2000) by introducing asymmetry into the fixed cost of quality improvement and by explicitly taking into account the endogeneity of quality ordering. In the generalized model, we show that the results derived by Ronnen (1991) and Valletti (2000) are largely robust.     

The impacts of innovations and standards on trade of measurement and testing products: empirical results of Switzerland’s bilateral trade flows with Germany, France and the UK

Nowadays, the impact of the measurement and testing infrastructure on economic performance and trade is theoretically and even politically widely accepted. However, there are no empirical studies on this issue. The purpose of this paper is to elucidate the impact of innovative capacity and technical standards as one important part of the measurement and testing infrastructure on international trade flows and competitiveness. In order to focus on the direct causality between innovative technology and measurement and testing standards and the respective market, the empirical analysis concentrates on the trade of measurement and testing products of a country with a top position in measurement and testing technology. In its empirical analysis of Switzerland’s trade flows with Germany, France and the UK, the paper follows the approach of the pioneering paper of Swann et al. (Economic Journal 106 (1996) 1297), who integrated for the first time technical standards as a technology indicator in the estimation of UK trade performance. The trade flows in measurement and testing products from 1980 until 1995 are explained by both an indicator for innovative capacity and for the degree of standardisation. The first indicator is based on the patent applications at the European patent office. The latter uses the stocks of technical standards in the countries differentiated by their regional scope. Four different trade equations are analysed, besides an export and an import function, the trade balance and the intra-industry trade. The results clearly show that both Switzerland’s innovative capacity and its stocks of standards are able to explain its export performance in the three countries. Secondly, especially the stocks of international standards in Switzerland have a positive impact on imports into Switzerland from the three countries, confirming their positive role for fostering trade in general. Thirdly, Switzerland’s export surplus concerning the three trade partners is positively affected by the stocks of international standards in Switzerland, which seem to be an important factor for international competitiveness. Finally, the results of the intra-industry model underline the common view of the general trade-fostering effect of even national standards in the case of the trade with the three countries.