Relational venture capital financing of serial founders

I study how often and why a serial founder receives financing for his new company from a venture capital (VC) firm that also invested in his previous company. One in 10 VC investments leads to a repeated relationship and one in three serial founders enters into a repeated relationship with any previous VC firm. A repeated relationship is more likely when the relational VC firm has acquired more private information about the founder, but less likely if the founder’s new venture has a bad fit with the VC firm’s geographic or industry focus. My findings add to the literature on relational financing by showing that the preservation of information is an important motivation for relational financing when screening and monitoring costs are high. Yet, repeated relationships are discontinued because investors also respond to information problems by specializing in certain types of firms. Finally, I find evidence of non-relational investments being passed onto trusted VC syndication partners.     

Investor abilities and financial contracting: Evidence from venture capital

Using a large, new database of contractual provisions governing the allocation of cash flow rights in venture capital (VC) financings, we investigate how contract design is related to VC abilities to monitor and provide value-added services to the entrepreneur. We find that more experienced VCs, who have superior abilities and more frequently join the boards of their portfolio companies, obtain weaker downside-protecting contractual cash flow rights than less experienced VCs. Several pieces of evidence suggest that this relation is unlikely to be driven by selection effects. The results suggest that VCs with better governance abilities focus less on obtaining downside protections, which entail risk-sharing costs, and more on other aspects of the contract (such as obtaining board representation) during negotiations with entrepreneurs. The results also imply that previous estimates of the amount entrepreneurs pay for affiliation with high-quality VCs are overstated.     

The dynamics of earnings management in IPOs and the role of venture capital

We investigate the dynamics of earnings management (EM) in IPOs and the role of venture capitalist (VC) in hampering such practice. We study the behavior of EM in four phases: Pre-IPO, IPO, Lock-up and Post-lock-up. We find that VC-sponsored firms tend to do more EM in the Pre-IPO period, and less in two subsequent periods. These results are distinct for those of Wongsunwai (2013), for which, VC-sponsored firms do less EM only in the IPO period. We also find that VC and non-VC-sponsored firms do EM around the IPO in distinct fashions. Non-VC-sponsored firms inflate earnings during the IPO period and deflate in the Lock-up and Post-lock-up periods. VC-sponsored firms inflate earnings in the Pre-IPO period and deflate earnings only in the Lock-up period. Our results are robust with respect to how one measures EM and the statistical methods used.     

The optimal portfolio of start-up firms in venture capital finance

Venture capitalists (VCs) not only finance but also add value to start-up companies. Advising firms is time consuming and creates a trade-off between intensity of advice and portfolio size. We jointly determine the optimal number of portfolio companies and the intensity of managerial advice. Diminishing returns to advice per firm call for a larger portfolio. With progressively increasing managerial effort cost, however, a larger number crowds out advice to each individual firm. As they receive less support, entrepreneurs request a larger profit share, making further portfolio expansion eventually unprofitable. Comparative static analysis shows how optimal portfolio size responds to venture returns and other parameters.     

The value of ongoing venture capital investment to newly listed firms

We examine whether the market values continuing venture capital (VC) investor involvement in firms post-IPO. Compared to the US, Australian VC investors exit their investments post-IPO by on-market sales rather than distribution of holdings to their investors. Lockup periods tend to be longer and ownership thresholds for reporting trades lower. We find that the market responds positively to buy transactions, negatively to sell transactions of VC investors and negatively to the resignation of VC directors. These results are consistent with VC investors in the firm having a positive influence and creating value from which the VCs and other shareholders benefit.     

Public policy and venture capital: Pursuing the disclosure goal

Using a sample of US firms that went public between 2000 and 2011, we conduct a textual analysis of 10-K filings to jointly evaluate the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and venture capital (VC) on the disclosure practices of both VC- and non-VC-backed IPOs. We find that the annual reports of VC-backed IPOs are much more readable than the annual reports of their peers. This finding suggests that VCs introduce more clarity into financial reporting to improve the reaction in the firm market price to create value and feed their own reputation. On the contrary, we find that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act forces firms to produce longer 10-Ks consistent with the aim of the reform (Title IV) to enhance financial disclosures. In turn, this ends up to negatively impact on the readability.     

Do venture capitalists imitate portfolio size?

Venture capitalists face the challenge of determining how many entrepreneurial ventures they should invest in. Kanniainen and Keuschnigg (J Corp Finance 9:521–534, 2003) develop a theoretical model based on economic factors that shows how a venture capital fund should set its portfolio size in order to achieve optimal returns. Determining the required economic inputs to this model is difficult in practice however, given the informational asymmetries, uncertainties and ambiguities present in the decision-making environment of venture capitalists. Hence, we contend that general partners of venture capital funds also use their prior venture capital fund management experience, which we refer to as social capital, to overcome the difficulties they face in solving the above optimization problem. Our results support our hypotheses that portfolio size is explained by the interplay of economic and social factors.      

Staged venture capital contracting with ratchets and liquidation rights

This paper uses real options analysis to study later round financing in the presence of two standard venture capital contracting provisions: anti-dilution (ratchet) and liquidation preference. We argue that such provisions can preclude financing of a positive NPV venture in the case of a large follow-on financing relative to firm value. Liquidation preference contracting at multiples greater than one is not feasible in the later round if the financing is small relative to firm value. We highlight an interaction effect between the two provisions: increasing the liquidation multiple can help to avoid dilution and the need for the prior venture capitalist to waive ratchet provisions.     

Financial contracting with strategic investors: Evidence from corporate venture capital backed IPOs

We analyze financial contracting in start-ups backed by corporate venture capitalists (CVCs). CVCs' strategic goals can economically hurt or benefit the start-ups, depending on product market relationships between start-ups and CVC parents. Empirically, start-ups receive funding from both complementary and competitive CVC parents. However, start-up insiders commonly limit the influence of competitive CVCs, awarding them lower board power, while retaining higher board representation for themselves. Second, lead CVCs receive lower board representation, indicating heightened concerns about their greater influence in start-ups' early stages. Finally, start-ups extract higher valuations from competitive CVCs, reflecting greater moral hazard problems. Overall, CVC strategic objectives affect their early inclusion in VC syndicates, their control rights and share pricing.     

The role of venture capital in SME loans in China

We examine the role of venture capital (VC) in small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) loans through samples on the National Equities Exchange and Quotations (NEEQ) in China. We find that VC backup can effectively improve SMEs’ access to bank loans, especially short-term loans, at lower costs, and loans without collateral. VC backed loans are also less likely to default and positively related to SMEs’ performance. Our findings further suggest that VC backup reduces the information asymmetry between banks and SMEs through both “hard” information of better-quality financial statement and “soft” information of SMEs’ creditability. Evidenced by enhanced SME financing conditions and bank efficiency in loan allocation, the combined debt-equity financing scheme can be a meaningful new ingredient in the financial infrastructure of the largest emerging market.     

The role of foreign and domestic venture capital in innovation: evidence from China

This paper analyses the different effects of foreign venture capital (FVC) and domestic venture capital (DVC) on innovation for IPOs. Using patent counts to measure innovation, the results indicate that FVC-backed firms are less innovative than DVC-backed firms. Our findings are robust after controlling for the sample selection bias using a propensity score matching approach. One possible underlying mechanism through which FVCs nurture less innovation is their inferior geographic proximity to investment targets.     

Debt financing,venture capital,and the performance of initial public offerings

We examine the roles of two financial intermediaries, lenders and venture capitalists, in a sample of more than 6000 IPO firms during 1980–2012. Venture capitalists and lenders generally fund different types of firms and, on average, are substitutes; however, in some instances we observe interactions and complementary roles between the two funding sources. Firms with high debt have lower valuation uncertainty, and lower initial day returns than those backed by venture capital. However, firms with high debt levels underperform in the long-run, especially those without venture capital. We provide some evidence that firms backed by reputable venture capitalists perform better.     

The exit decision in the European venture capital market

This article analyses the exit decision in the European venture capital market, studying when to exit and how it interacts with the exit form. Using a competing risks model we study the impact on the exit decision of the characteristics of venture capital investors, of their investments and of contracting variables. Our results reveals that the hazard functions are non-monotonic for all exit forms and suggest that, in Europe, Initial Public Offering candidates take longer to be selected than trade sales. Moreover our results show that, in Europe, venture capitalists associated with financial institutions have quicker exits (stronger for trade sales), and highlight the importance of contracting variables on the exit decision. An unexpected result is that the presence on the board of directors leads to longer investment durations.     

Advice and monitoring in venture finance

This paper provides empirical insight into the role of contracts and legal systems for managing investor–investee relationships along two dimensions: providing advice and addressing conflict. We examine a new detailed dataset from European venture capital (VC) funds. We match very specific contractual terms in VC contracts with the effort (total time spent) and advice that VCs provide to their entrepreneurial investee firms. We also analyze VC–entrepreneur conflicts. We compare the importance of contractual versus non-contractual governance mechanisms, as well as the role of legal systems in different countries for facilitating VC–entrepreneur relationships. The data indicate VC cash-flow and control rights significantly facilitating effort and advice that VCs provide to entrepreneurs. VC–entrepreneur conflicts are closely tied to the quality of laws in which the entrepreneur resides: higher quality legal systems mitigate VC–entrepreneur conflicts. The data further indicate that non-contractual governance mechanisms significantly facilitate VC advice and mitigate VC–entrepreneur conflicts. The results provide a unique unifying look into the role of actual VC contracts and legal settings versus non-contractual governance mechanisms, risk, and success potential on VC–entrepreneur relationships in an international context.      

Spillovers of U.S. unconventional monetary policy to emerging markets: The role of capital flows

We employ a structural global VAR model to analyze whether U.S. unconventional monetary policy shocks, identified through changes in the central bank’s balance sheet, have an impact on financial and economic conditions in emerging market economies (EMEs). Moreover, we study whether international capital flows are an important channel of shock transmission. We find that an expansionary policy shock significantly increases portfolio flows from the U.S. to EMEs for almost two quarters, accompanied by a persistent movement in real and financial variables in recipient countries. Moreover, EMEs on average respond to the shock with an easing of their own monetary policy stance. The findings appear to be independent of heterogeneous country characteristics like the underlying exchange rate arrangement, the quality of institutions, or the degree of financial openness.     

The effects of private equity and venture capital on sales and employment growth in small and medium-sized businesses

We study the effects private equity (PE) and venture capital (VC) financing have on small and mid-sized single entity business establishments from 1995 to 2009. We focus on single entity establishments to cleanly examine the impact of PE and VC financing on establishments’ organic growth. This study reveals that PE and VC financing have positive impacts on single entity business establishments’ net sales and employment growth. The impact of PE financing on establishments’ growth is slower and smaller than VC financing. However, we find that the benefit of PE financing lasts longer than VC financing. We also find that ethnic minority, female, and foreign business owners are less likely to receive PE and VC financing. Finally, we find evidence that although establishments with government contracts are more likely to receive PE and VC financing, those contracts fail to produce marginal post-funding growth and employment benefits.     

Performance differentiation: cutting losses and maximizing profits of private equity and venture capital investments

Recent research has pointed out the need to differentiate between good versus poor performance of venture capital and private equity investments and to analyze the factors that determine the ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ of a fund. This study examines the different contractual and behavioral characteristics and their influence on the positive and negative performances of private equity investments. Specifically, we analyze how fund managers apply tools and investment behavior to mitigate risks and maximize returns. The empirical investigation of these questions is based on a merged dataset, which combines the Venture Economics and CEPRES databases. It includes a total of 1,011 investments made by 137 different funds that belong to 54 private equity and venture capital firms worldwide over the period from 1979 to 2003. Our results confirm that the reduction of losses and the maximization of investment profits have different antecedents. Although losses are minimized by the use of convertibles and by increasing the venture capital firms’ accumulated experience, profits are increased by the potential of the fund’s management to allocate resources to portfolio companies. Our findings contribute to the understanding of the determinants of venture capital and private equity returns by differentiating between the mitigation of risks and the maximization of profits.      

The price of rapid exit in venture capital-backed IPOs

This paper proposes an explanation for two empirical puzzles surrounding initial public offerings (IPOs). Firstly, it is well documented that IPO underpricing increases during “hot issue” periods. Secondly, venture capital (VC) backed IPOs are less underpriced than non-venture capital backed IPOs during normal periods of activity, but the reverse is true during hot issue periods: VC backed IPOs are more underpriced than non-VC backed ones. This paper shows that when IPOs are driven by the initial investor’s desire to exit from an existing investment in order to finance a new venture, both the value of the new venture and the value of the existing firm to be sold in the IPO drive the investor’s choice of price and fraction of shares sold in the IPO. When this is the case, the availability of attractive new ventures increases equilibrium underpricing, which is what we observe during hot issue periods. Moreover, I show that underpricing is affected by the severity of the moral hazard problem between an investor and the firm’s manager. In the presence of a moral hazard problem the degree of equilibrium underpricing is more sensitive to changes in the value of the new venture. This can explain why venture capitalists, who often finance firms with more severe moral hazard problems, underprice IPOs less in normal periods, but underprice more strongly during hot issue periods. Further empirical implications relating the fraction of shares sold and the degree of underpricing are presented.      

上海近期发展风险资本市场支撑科技创新的政策路径

国家自主创新能力的提升离不开多层次资本市场的支撑,资本市场是自主创新的引擎和推进器,任何科技创新成果的产业化都需要与资本有效结合才能实现。因此,加快构建一个全方位支撑科技创新的风险资本市场体系,是我国当前的一项紧迫任务,也是上海市"创新型城市"建设的迫切要求。本文在分析存在问题的基础上,进一步提出了上海市近期发展风险资本市场支撑科技创新的可行性政策路径。