What matters in audit pricing: industry specialization or overall market leadership?

Ferguson et al. (2003) report that audit industry fee premia primarily reside with joint national and city‐specific industry leadership as opposed to merely firm‐wide (national) industry expertise, suggesting auditor choice among the Big 5 is best conceptualized on joint industry specialization in city‐specific markets and nationally. The present study examines whether the prior results could be confounded by the presence of city‐specific overall market leadership effects. Our findings reaffirm that joint local and national auditor industry expertise is valued by audit clients. Furthermore, overall city‐specific leadership, by itself, also matters in fee determination and results in higher fees, although at a slightly weaker level of statistical significance.     

Large audit firm premium and audit specialisation in the public sector

The outsourcing of public‐sector audits to the private sector is an important issue. This study examines the fee premium in the public sector by comparing audit fees between the government auditor and the Big5. The study (i) statistically adjusts for self‐selection bias, (ii) allows the slope coefficients in the audit fee model to vary between the Big5 and the government audit and (iii) estimates the counterfactual audit fee premium. The Big5 premium is around 23 percent. However, the variation in premium depends on whether the Big5 auditor is an industry or city specialist.     

Effects of audit committee chair characteristics on auditor choice,audit fee and audit quality

We investigate whether the characteristics of audit committee (AC) chairs are associated with decisions about auditor choice, audit fees and audit quality. Using hand-collected Australian data, firms with AC chairs who have longer tenure and multiple AC memberships across several boards are found to be more likely to choose Big 4 and/or industry specialist auditors, pay higher audit fees and have lower discretionary accruals. Those AC chairs with higher business qualifications are more likely to hire a Big 4 auditor, pay higher audit fees and have lower discretionary accruals, while AC chairs with professional qualifications are more likely to hire a Big 4 and/or industry specialist auditor. In contrast, firms with AC chairs who are executive directors are less likely to hire a Big 4 auditor and have higher discretionary accruals. Our findings contribute to the literature by documenting that various characteristics of AC chairs are important for enhancement of auditor selection and audit quality.     

The effects of audit firm rotation on perceived auditor independence and audit quality

Our study explores loan officers’ perceptions of auditors’ independence and audit quality under three experimental audit firm rotation scenarios. We use a case experiment with a between-subjects design to determine whether rotation of the audit firm impacts financial statement users’ perceptions of auditor’s independence and quality. Findings based on 212 useable responses indicate that loan officers do perceive an increase in independence when the company follows an audit firm rotation policy. However, the length of auditor tenure within rotation fails to significantly change loan officers’ perceptions of independence. Findings also indicate that neither the presence of a rotation policy nor the length of the auditor tenure within rotation significantly influences the loan officers’ perceptions of audit quality.     

The influence of the CEO's value perception towards auditing on audit demand in private firms

Audit demand is generally considered to be a direct reflection of the level of agency conflicts. This study examines the CEO's value perception towards auditing as additional driver for both auditor reputation demand (appointing a Big 4 auditor or not) and audit effort demand in private firms. Examining the CEO's value perception in a multidimensional way, the regression results indicate that the CEO's functional value perception towards auditing positively affects the demand for audit effort, while the CEO's social value perception towards auditing negatively affects the demand for audit effort but positively affects the demand for auditor reputation.     

Auditor specialization, perceived audit quality, and audit fees in the local government audit market

Prior governmental research implies a positive relation between auditor specialization and audit quality, but the effect of specialization on audit fees is mixed. However, no single governmental study investigates the effect of auditor specialization on both audit quality and audit fees. Also, prior studies focus on either large- or small audit firms and often employ indirect proxies for audit quality. We study the effects of auditor specialization on perceived audit quality and audit fees. Our data represent both Big 5 and smaller audit firms and include three market-based measures of specialization. We survey 241 Florida local government finance directors and find that specialization is positively associated with perceived audit quality but not with audit fees. We also find that Big 5 auditors, often used as a proxy for higher audit quality in prior research, are not uniformly associated with increased perceived audit quality but consistently charge higher audit fees. Our results confirm a relation between measures of audit firm specialization and audit quality and raise questions regarding audit firm size and audit quality in the municipal sector. Our findings suggest that engaging specialized auditors may be good policy for many local governments.     

Institutional investor inattention and audit quality

We hypothesize and provide empirical evidence that higher institutional investor inattention is associated with lower audit quality. We employ an inattention measure that captures the extent to which institutional investors are distracted by attention-grabbing events irrelevant to the focal firm. Results suggest that a higher degree of institutional investor inattention is associated with a lower propensity of a going-concern opinion, a lower probability of the auditor reporting a material internal control weakness, and a higher likelihood of the audit client misstating the financial statements. Further analyses show that these associations vary by auditor litigation risk, their workload pressure, auditor industry expertise, and analyst coverage. Overall, our findings reveal that while institutional investors play an important monitoring role, the distractions they face undermine the quality of monitoring they provide.     

The role of audit evidence in a strategic audit

This study examines how audit risk (the probability of false acceptance) and its components change when the auditor obtains audit evidence in an acceptance sampling model. Inherent risk and audit risk increase with audit evidence if the auditee has a sufficiently strong incentive for committing fraud. Detection risk always increases when audit evidence is introduced. If the auditor has a sufficiently strong incentive for avoiding false rejection, audit risk also increases with audit evidence. The analysis indicates that requiring auditors to obtain information is not effective in preventing material misstatements in at least some instances.     

What do we know about audit quality?

This paper reviews empirical research over the past 25 years, mainly from the United States, in order to assess what we currently know about audit quality with respect to publicly listed companies. The evidence indicates that outright audit failure rates are infrequent, far less than 1% annually, and audit fees are quite small, less than 0.1% of aggregate client sales. This suggests there may be an acceptable level of audit quality at a relatively low cost. There is also evidence of voluntary differential audit quality (above the legal minimum) along a number of dimensions such as firm size, industry specialization, office characteristics, and cross-country differences in legal systems and auditor liability exposure. The evidence is very positive although there is some indication that audit quality may have declined in the 1990s, in which case there could be merit in recent reforms such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 in the US. However, we do not know from research the optimal level of audit quality and therefore whether we currently have ‘too little’ or ‘too much’ auditing? Despite this lacuna we are entering an era of more mandated auditing in response to high-profile corporate governance failures including the Enron–Andersen affair. Finally, while recent reforms have scaled back the scope of non-audit services due to independence concerns, a case can be made that audit quality will always be somewhat suspect if other services are provided that are perceived to potentially compromise the auditor's objectivity and skepticism. For this reason public confidence in audit quality may be increased by proscribing all non-audit services for audit clients. Recommendations are also proposed with respect to legal liability reform and changes in partner compensation arrangements.     

The association between characteristics of audit committee accounting experts,audit committee chairs,and financial reporting timeliness

We investigate the association between audit committee (AC) members' financial expertise and financial reporting timeliness, and extend the discussion by investigating how the source of accounting expertise (e.g., public accounting or CFO) differentially influences financial reporting timeliness. We predict and find that AC accounting financial expertise is associated with timelier accounting information. Further, we find that accounting expertise gained from public accounting experience is associated with timelier financial reporting; however, accounting expertise gained from CFO experience is not. We also find that AC chairs (ACCs) with accounting expertise from public accounting experience are significantly associated with timelier financial reporting while ACCs with CFO-sourced accounting expertise are not. Our results are important for two reasons. First, our results suggest that AC accounting financial expertise contributes to AC effectiveness by improving the timeliness of financial information. Second, our findings highlight how personal characteristics of accounting financial experts influence contributions toward AC effectiveness.     

Auditors’ scepticism in response to audit committee oversight behaviour

We use two experiments and a survey to examine how audit committee (hereafter, AC) oversight behaviour, particularly AC sceptical attitude and proactive behaviour, affects auditor scepticism, and whether the influence is driven by the risk aspect of auditors’ assessment of AC oversight behaviour. We find that when ACs exercise insufficient scepticism, auditors (junior auditors, managers, and partners) perceive AC oversight as weak, and increase their scepticism. However, AC proactive behaviour does not significantly influence auditor scepticism. Our findings suggest auditors view weak AC oversight as a risk indicator and respond by exercising greater scepticism.     

Measuring audit quality of local governments in England and Wales

The purpose of this paper is to model and test the audit quality provided to local governments in England and Wales. A key question is: are there major differences in audit quality provided? The Audit Commission, a national public body under Parliament, regulates the audits. It sets audit standards, appoints the auditors, and (although each auditor and client local government set the specific audit fee for that client) it establishes a formula to determine standard audit fees. The Audit Commission also conducts an annual review of the audit quality provided by the selected auditors, as well as a survey of client satisfaction. The majority of audits are conducted by District Auditors (public sector employees of the Audit Commission). About a quarter of local governments are audited by one of six private sector auditors (including three of the Big 4). Actual results indicate that audit quality differences are associated with the number of governmental audit clients and local government type. Generally, there were modest quality differences by auditor category.     

Audit report lag: the role of auditor type and increased competition in the audit market

This study investigates the effect of auditor type (private vs. state) and increased competition in an audit market on audit report lag (ARL). This is the first study to provide evidence regarding the effect of audit market competition on ARL. Utilising structure–conduct–performance theory, we predict that competition pressures private auditors to be more efficient and to have less reporting lag than state auditors. We also predict that competition among auditors after a liberalisation period forces auditors to be more efficient and to record less ARL than before. We use a unique data set in Iran, whereby the audit market liberalisation (an audit market where services were previously provided primarily by a state entity) has resulted in both state and private auditors simultaneously providing audit services. The findings are consistent with the following hypothesis, that is ARL is shorter for private auditors than it is for state auditors, and ARL decreases as competition increases in the Iranian audit market. Consistent with the structure–conduct–performance theory, the findings suggest that increased competition in the audit market results in higher efficiency, as reflected by a shorter ARL.     

An examination of the relation between market structure and the profitability of audit engagements

Due to increasing supplier concentration, there is growing concern regarding the lack of competition in the audit market. Theory based on Cournot oligopoly predicts that increasing concentration will facilitate monopolistic behaviour. Conversely, if the market for audit services has more in common with a Bertrand oligopoly, concentration may not lead to higher fees. We evaluate whether increased audit supplier concentration leads to economic rents by investigating audit profitability. Using proprietary data from a (then) Big 6 audit firm, we find that local market structure has a significant and positive association with audit profitability, but not auditor effort for large clients.     

Trade-offs in audit testing

This case is designed to help you to understand one of the fundamental concepts underlying audits of financial statements: the impact of testing controls on the substantive audit testing to be conducted. When determining the nature, timing and extent of substantive testing, the auditor must consider the costs involved in testing controls and compare that cost to the savings in substantive testing that can occur by relying on the tested controls. In other words, the auditor trades off control testing and substantive testing to determine the best mix of procedures. Similarly, for substantive evidence, the auditor must determine the best mix of substantive analytical procedures and tests of details. In this case, you will assess the trade-offs between the various types of auditing procedures (tests of controls, substantive analytical procedures and tests of details) to determine the optimal audit strategy.     

Audit market concentration,audit fees,and audit quality: A cross-country analysis of complex audit clients

Regulators around the world are concerned about the potentially harmful effects of high audit market concentration on audit pricing and quality. However, results in the overall literature have failed to reach consensus on this issue. We contribute to this debate by arguing that the audit market is segmented and that concentration in the Big 4 segment of the market leads to higher audit pricing. Accordingly, our analyses use international data and focus on concentration within the Big 4 group of firms across countries. We find that audit fees are increasing in our concentration measure for clients where the barriers to entry by competing auditors are higher, as proxied by client size, international operations, and IFRS use. Finally, we find evidence that audit quality is decreasing in Big 4 market concentration for these types of engagements. This indicates a wealth transfer from shareholders to audit firms when auditor concentration is high because these complex clients are charged more, but receive audits that are of lower quality.     

How individual auditor characteristics impact the likelihood of audit failure: Evidence from China

Audit failure imposes a severe loss on investors and damages market participants' confidence in financial reporting quality. This study investigates the impacts of individual auditor characteristics on the likelihood of audit failure. Chinese regulators mandate listed firms to disclose the engagement auditors' identity. Furthermore, the information regarding individual auditor characteristics in China is also publicly available. Utilizing this unique setting, we examine the relationship between individual auditor characteristics and the likelihood of audit failure in China during the period from 2000 to 2009. We document that individual auditors with more auditing experience are less likely associated with audit failure. We also find a weaker negative relationship between auditor education level and audit failure. Our study has important implications for both auditors and regulators by shedding lights on the determinants of audit failure and by providing guidance to the human resource management in audit firms.     

Disclosure of fair value measurement in goodwill impairment test and audit fees

Recent increases in the occurrence and magnitude of goodwill impairment charges highlight the increasing importance of the role of the auditor in goodwill accounting. This study examines the association between disclosures about the fair value measurement of goodwill and audit fees. We find that goodwill-related disclosures are positively related to audit fees, consistent with the idea that auditors increase their audit efforts to mitigate potential reputational and litigation losses (“audit risk effect”). Additionally, our results indicate that the information asymmetry and investor scrutiny moderate the association between goodwill-related disclosures and audit fees. One possible explanation is that auditors take goodwill-related disclosures as a signal of truthful goodwill accounting and this “signaling effect” partially offsets the “audit risk effect” of goodwill-related disclosures when information asymmetry or investor scrutiny is perceived as high.     

Audit Effort and Stock Price Crash Risk

We examine how stock price crash risk is affected by audit effort, as measured by audit hours. Using a unique dataset of audit hours in China, we find that audit effort is negatively related to crash risk. The negative impact of audit effort on crash risk is more pronounced for listed firms that have higher inherent risks and weaker external monitoring of their information environment. Our findings are robust to various tests, including a two-stage regression analysis, controlling for listed firm-fixed effects and audit firm-fixed effects, and using alternative measures of crash risk. In addition to audit output measures, audit effort has an incremental influence on crash risk. The effects of audit effort on crash risk continue to hold after controlling for auditor industry expertise and auditor tenure.     

Audit fee lowballing: Determinants,recovery, and future audit quality

Prior research on the link between lowballing (LB) of audit fees and audit quality is inconclusive. Using more recent data and an innovative design, we define LB engagements as those where the audit fee discount is at least 30 percent. We consider three research questions to understand the possible link between LB and audit quality. First, we investigate whether the two variables that are often associated with auditor independence in the literature—non-audit fees and client importance—are related to LB. Second, we test whether lowballing auditors recoup initial audit fee discounts in the future period. Lastly, we investigate the relation between recovery of audit fees and future audit quality. We find that non-audit fees in the first year of engagement are negatively related to the propensity to LB. LB is significantly positively related to client importance for client firms switching from a non-Big N to another non-Big N auditor while the relation is insignificant for client firms switching from a Big N to another Big N auditor. The results of non-audit fees and client importance indicate that economic dependence does not motivate audit firms to lowball. Further, lowballing auditors tend to recoup their initial fee discounts in subsequent periods via increases in audit fees. Using multiple measures of audit quality, we do not find a significant relation between recovery of audit fees and future audit quality. Overall, contrary to regulators’ concerns, our results suggest that LB does not impair audit quality.