The Value of Household Water Service Quality in Lahore,Pakistan

Most existing literature focuses on the benefits of establishing basic drinking water access for unserved populations, the extensive water supply margin. In contrast, this article examines the intensive margin—the benefits of improving water service to under-served households, a growing population in developing country cities. We use contingent valuation to estimate willingness to pay (WTP) for improved piped water quality and reductions in supply interruptions among a sample of 193 households in Lahore, Pakistan. The distribution of WTP is described using parametric and non-parametric models. Results indicate that households in Lahore are willing to pay about 7.50 to7.50 to 9 per month for piped water supply that is clean and drinkable directly from the tap—comparable to the monthly cost of in-home water treatment, and about three to four times the average monthly water bill for sample households using piped water. Estimates of WTP for reducing supply interruptions are both smaller and more difficult to interpret, since a significant fraction of the estimated WTP distribution for supply improvements is negative. All of our WTP estimates are well below 4% of monthly household income, the World Bank’s benchmark upper bound for affordable water service.     

Asking for Individual or Household Willingness to Pay for Environmental Goods?

The aggregate welfare measure for a change in the provision of a public good derived from a contingent valuation (CV) survey will be higher if the same elicited mean willingness to pay (WTP) is added up over individuals rather than households. A trivial fact, however, once respondents are part of multi-person households, it becomes almost impossible to elicit an “uncontaminated” WTP measure that with some degree of confidence can be aggregated over one or the other response unit. The literature is mostly silent about which response unit to use in WTP questions, and in some CV studies it is even unclear which type has actually been applied. We test for differences between individual and household WTP in a novel, web-administered, split-sample CV survey asking WTP for preserving biodiversity in old-growth forests in Norway. Two samples are asked both types of questions, but in reverse order, followed by a question with an item battery trying to reveal why WTP may differ. We find in a test between samples that the WTP respondents state on behalf of their households is not significantly different from their individual WTP. However, within the same sample, household WTP is significantly higher than individual WTP; in particular if respondents are asked to state individual before household WTP. Our results suggest that using individual WTP as the response unit may overestimate aggregate WTP. Thus, the choice of response format needs to be explicitly and carefully addressed in CV questionnaire design and further research in order to avoid the risk of unprofitable projects passing the benefit-cost test.

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Do price-tags influence consumers’ willingness to pay? On the external validity of using auctions for measuring value

This paper considers the external validity of the growing corpus of literature that reports the use of laboratory auctions to reveal consumers’ willingness to pay for consumer goods, when the concerned goods are sold in retail stores through posted price procedures. The quality of the parallel between the field and the lab crucially depends on whether being informed of the actual field price influences a consumer’s willingness to pay for a good or not. We show that the elasticity of the WTP revision according to the field price estimation error is significant, positive, and can be roughly approximate to one quarter of the error. We then discuss the normative implications of these results for future experiments aimed at eliciting private valuations through auctions.     

Contingent valuation of inhaled insulin: a Canadian perspective

Summary

The objective of this study was to assess the preference and willingness-to-pay (WTP) for inhaled insulin from a random sample of general public perspective in Ontario, Canada. This was carried out using a mail survey using the contingent valuation method. Significantly more respondents preferred inhaled insulin (n=114) over subcutaneous insulin (n=6; p<0.001). The mean monthly WTP for inhaled insulin was CAN$68.59 ± 44.65 (95% confidence interval CAN$58.87–78.07), significantly more than the average subcutaneous insulin cost in Ontario of CAN$50. The WTP for inhaled insulin in the diabetic subgroup was CAN$98.52 ± 48.57, which is significantly higher than that of the general public (p<0.001). Multiple regression analysis showed a strong association between respondents’ income and diagnosis of diabetes and their WTP for inhaled insulin (p<0.001). Major influencing factors were convenience and household budget. The results of this study suggest that the general public in Ontario prefer inhaled insulin and are willing to pay significantly more per month than the current cost of subcutaneous insulin.     

Pareto improving financial innovation in incomplete markets

Summary. In this paper we develop a differential technique for investigating the welfare effects of financial innovation in incomplete markets. Utilizing this technique, and after parametrizing the standard competitive, pure-exchange economy by both endowments and utility functions, we establish the following (weakly) generic property: Let S be the number of states, I be the number of assets and H be the number of households, and consider a particular financial equilibrium. Then, provided that the degree of market incompleteness is sufficiently larger than the extent of household heterogeneity, S−I≥2H−1 [resp. S−I≥H+1], there is an open set of single assets [resp. pairs of assets] whose introduction can make every household better off (and, symmetrically, an open set of single assets [resp. pairs of assets] whose introduction can make them all worse off ). We also devise a very simple nonparametric procedure for reducing extensive household heterogeneity to manageable size, a procedure which not only makes our restrictions on market incompleteness more palatable, but could also prove to be quite useful in other applications involving smooth analysis. Received: August 14, 1995; revised version: April 14, 1997     

A class of multiattribute utility functions

A function u(z) is a utility function if u′(z) > 0. It is called risk averse if we also have u′′(z) < 0. Some authors, however, require that u ⁽ⁱ⁾(z) > 0 if i is odd and u ⁽ⁱ⁾(z) < 0 if i is even. The notion of a multiattribute utility function can be defined by requiring that it is increasing in each variable and concave as an s-variate function. A stronger condition, similar to the one in case of a univariate utility function, requires that, in addition, all partial derivatives of total order m should be positive if m is odd and negative if m is even. In this paper, we present a class of functions in analytic form such that each of them satisfies this stronger condition. We also give sharp lower and upper bounds for E[u(X ₁,... , X _s )] under moment information with respect to the joint probability distribution of the random variables X ₁,... , X _s assumed to be discrete and representing wealths. Partially supported by OTKA grants F-046309 and T-047340 in Hungary.     

Balanced Contributions Axiom in the Solution of Cooperative Games

In a gamevin characteristic function form, suppose the Banzhaf value ψ is used to pay a coalitionSalready formed. Then coalitionSno longer receivesv(S); instead it receivesR^ψ(S) = ∑_{i ∈ S}ψ_i(v_s), wherev_Sdenotes the subgame of coalitionS. Surprisingly, the Shapley value of this new game Sh(N, R^ψ) is equal to the Banzhaf value ofv. In this paper we establish a similar result for all values satisfying balanced contributions axiom. Additionally, we introduce player's weights to obtain the corresponding result in the nonsymmetric case.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Number: C71     

The affectionate society: does competition for partners promote friendliness?

We study household formation in a model where collective consumption decisions of a household depend on the strategic choices of its members. The surplus of households is determined by individual choices of levels of friendliness to each other. A strategic conflict arises from a coupling condition that ceteris paribus, a person’s friendlier attitude reduces the individual’s influence in the household’s collective decision on how to divide the ensuing surplus. While partners in an isolated household choose the minimum level of friendliness, competition for partners tends to promote friendliness. We find that affluence does not buy affection, but can lead to withholding of affection by an affluent partner who can afford to do so. In general, the equilibrium degree of friendliness proves sensitive to the socio-economic composition of the population. We would like to thank Clive Bell, Edward Glaeser, Roger Lagunoff, Eva Terberger and seminar audiences in Berlin, Birmingham, Blacksburg, Exeter, Heidelberg, Manchester and at IHS in Vienna for helpful comments. We greatly appreciate the thoughtful comments of a referee.     

Private provision of a discrete public good: efficient equilibria in the private-information contribution game

We study the voluntary provision of a discrete public good via the contribution game. Players independently and simultaneously make nonrefundable contributions to fund a discrete public good, which is provided if and only if contributions cover the cost of production. We characterize nonconstant continuous symmetric equilibria, giving sufficient conditions for their existence. We show the common normalization by which players’ values are distributed over [0, 1] is not without loss of generality: if the distribution over this interval has continuous density f with f(0) >  0, then no (nonconstant) continuous symmetric equilibrium exists. We study in detail the case in which players’ private values are uniformly distributed, showing that, generically, when one continuous equilibrium exists, a continuum of continuous equilibria exists. For any given cost of the good, multiple continuous equilibria cannot be Pareto ranked. Nevertheless, not all continuous equilibria are interim incentive efficient. The set of interim incentive efficient equilibria is exactly determined. The authors thank Manfred Dix, George Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite, and an anonymous referee for their comments.     

Topological upper limits of mixed Nash equilibria

Our purpose in this article is to prove that given any integer n ≥ 2 and any non-empty compact Polish spaces S ₁, ..., S _n , if for any u ∈ C( S ₁ × ... × S _n , R) ⁿ , we denote by MNE(u) the set of mixed Nash equilibria of (S ₁, ..., S _n , u), then MNE(u) is a non-empty compact subset of P(S ₁) × ... × P(S _n ) and if u ^k → u in C(S ₁ × ... × S _n , R) ⁿ as k → ∞, then lim sup _{k → ∞} MNE (u ^k ) MNE(u). The author would like to thank the referee for offering critical comments on this paper.     

Use of Contingent Valuation to Elicit Willingness-to-Pay for the Benefits of Developmental Health Risk Reductions

We report the results of several contingent valuation (CV) surveys to elicit willingness-to-pay values from the general public for risk reductions associated with decreases in exposure to a chemical, PCBs, in the environment. We also develop Quality Adjusted Life Years (QALYs) from the survey using both standard gamble and time-tradeoff elicitation methods to explore the relationship between QALYs and willingness-to-pay (WTP), and to develop QALY weights for subtle developmental effects. The results of the CV surveys are designed for incorporation into a case study of an integrated risk model to monetize the benefits of predicted risk reductions. Respondents showed a nearly proportional, positive relationship between decreasing the risk of a 6-point reduction in IQ (a standard measure of “intelligence”) and WTP, but showed a negative relationship between risk reduction and WTP for reading comprehension as an outcome. The range of mortality risks that respondents would accept on behalf of their (hypothetical) 10-year-old child is 2 in 10,000 to 9 in 1,000 per IQ point, and WTP per IQ point is $466 ($380, $520). QALY weights elicited via time tradeoff (reduction in life expectancy) were significantly different from QALY weights elicited via a standard gamble (p = 0.001). Respondents who answered questions about ecological endpoints first were willing to pay a small additional amount when asked about human health effects, but those respondents who answered questions about human health endpoints first were not willing to pay any additional amount when subsequently asked about ecological effects. This paper has not been submitted elsewhere in identical or similar form, nor will it be during the first three months after its submission to the Publisher.     

In search of an evolutionary edge: trading with a few, more, or many

Consider a population of farmers who live around a lake. Each farmer engages in trade with his m adjacent neighbors, where m is termed the “span of interaction.” Trade is governed by a prisoner’s dilemma “rule of engagement.” A farmer’s payoff is the sum of the payoffs from the m prisoner’s dilemma games played with his ^m/₂^m/_2 neighbors to the left, and with his ^m/₂^m/_2 neighbors to the right. When a farmer dies, his son takes over. The son who adheres to his father’s span of interaction decides whether to cooperate or defect by considering the actions taken and the payoffs received by the most prosperous member of the group comprising his father and his father’s m trading partners. Under a conventional structure of payoffs, it is shown that a large span of interaction is detrimental to the long-run coexistence of cooperation and defection, and conditions are provided under which the social outcome associated with the expansion of trade when individuals trade with a few is better than that when they trade with many. Under the stipulated conditions it is shown, by means of a static comparative analysis of the steady state configurations of the farmer population, that an expansion of the market can be beneficial in one context, detrimental in another.     

A STABLE NASH MECHANISM FOR QUASI-ADDITIVE PUBLIC-GOOD ENVIRONMENTS*

In this paper we present a simple game form implementing Lindahl allocations as Nash equilibrium outcomes, which has nice stability properties. we show that if the preferences of eaach consumer are representable by a utility function of the form a(y)x_i+b_i(y), where x_i(y), where x_i is the amount of private good and y, the amount of public good, then the Nash equilibrium of our geme is locally stable under the gradient adjustment process. This restriction on the preferences has been known in hte literature as the necessary and sufficient condition for the Pareto optimal amount of pukic goods to be independent of the private goods distribution. This type of preference includes quasi-linear preferences as a special case. but unlike quasi-linearity, this allows a non zero income effect of demand for public goods as well as private goods, which is often supported by empirical evidence. Our result shows how an equilbirium can be achieved over time by a decentralized strategy adjustement process for a fairly general class of environments, even in the absence of a dominant-strategy equilibrium.     

Reference Dependence Effects on WTA and WTP Value Functions and Their Disparity

In this study we investigate two reference dependence effects in a choice experiment. The first is the effect of the well-known distinction between gains and losses, the second is the effect of changing the reference value on willingness to pay (WTP) and willingness to accept (WTA). The latter has to our knowledge not been studied before. We hypothesize that there are differences between WTA and WTP, and that both value functions and their disparity are affected by the absolute value of the reference point. We test our hypotheses using a choice experiment with trade-offs between changes in flood probabilities and costs. The choice experiments elicit WTP and WTA, using two flood probability reference values, yielding four separate value functions. Our findings show that a substantial WTA–WTP disparity exists, and that this disparity increases when moving away from the reference point. Also, both WTA and WTP value functions are affected by the flood probability reference value, and the WTA–WTP disparity increases when the flood probability reference point increases. Both findings suggest that welfare effects caused by changes in public good provision depend not only on the direction of change (loss aversion), but also the reference value. Moreover, our results show that the latter effect is larger for losses than for gains. We introduce the concept of reference point updating as a possible explanation for these findings.     

Dissertation abstract: A status theory of collective action

The “collective action problem” describes situations where each person in a group can individually profit more by withholding contributions to group goals. However, if all act in their material self-interest no public good is produced and all are worse off. I present a new solution to the collective action problem based on status. I argue that contributions to collective action increase an individual’s status in the group because contributions create perceptions of high group motivation, defined as the relative value an individual places on group versus individual welfare. Individuals are predicted to receive a variety of social and material benefits for their contributions to the group. These rewards can help explain why individuals contribute to collective action. Four laboratory studies tested the theory. In Study 1, following interaction in a 6-person public goods game, participants reported viewing higher contributors as more group motivated and higher status. Higher contributors also wielded more interpersonal influence in task interactions with participants. Participants also cooperated with higher contributors more, and allocated greater altruism to them in a Dictator game. Study 2 addressed an exchange-theoretic alternative explanation for the findings of Study 1, showing that observers of collective action who did not benefit from higher contributors’ contributions to the public good, nonetheless rated them as higher status, cooperated with them more, and gave them greater altruistic gifts. These results show that collective action contributors can earn social and material benefits even outside the group. Study 3 more directly tested the mediating role of group motivation. Contributors who sacrificed a greater proportion of resources for the collective action were rated as more group motivated and higher status than a moderate proportional contributor, even though the amounts they contributed were the same. These findings support the theory, and underscore the significance of self-sacrifice in the acquisition of status in collective action. Study 4 investigated the effects of status rewards on contributors’ behavior towards and perceptions of the group. Participants who received positive status feedback for their contributions subsequently contributed more than those who did not. Rewarded participants also identified more with the group and saw it as having greater solidarity and cohesion. I conclude by discussing theoretical implications and future research. JEL Classification C71     

Distribution-free estimation with interval-censored contingent valuation data: troubles with Turnbull?

Contingent valuation (CV) surveys frequently employ elicitation procedures that return interval-censored data on respondents’ willingness to pay (WTP). Almost without exception, CV practitioners have applied Turnbull’s self-consistent algorithm to such data in order to obtain nonparametric maximum likelihood (NPML) estimates of the WTP distribution. This paper documents two failings of Turnbull’s algorithm; (1) that it may not converge to NPML estimates and (2) that it may be very slow to converge. With regards to (1) we propose starting and stopping criteria for the algorithm that guarantee convergence to the NPML estimates. With regards to (2) we present a variety of alternative estimators and demonstrate, through Monte Carlo simulations, their performance advantages over Turnbull’s algorithm.

Social learning and costly information acquisition

Summary. Short-lived agents want to predict a random variable q\theta and have to decide how much effort to devote to collect private information and consequently how much to rely on public information. The latter is just a noisy average of past predictions. It is shown that costly information acquisition prevents an unbounded accumulation of public information if (and only if) the marginal cost to acquire information is positive at zero (C￠(0) > 0)(C^\prime (0) > 0). When C￠(0) = 0C^\prime (0) = 0 public precision at period n, _boxclose_boxclose\tau_n, tends to infinity with n but the rate of convergence of public information to q\theta is slowed down with respect to the exogenous information case. At the market outcome agents acquire too little private information. This happens either with respect to a (decentralized) first best benchmark or, for n large, with respect to a (decentralized) second best benchmark. For high discount factors the limit point of market public precision always falls short of the welfare benchmarks whenever C￠(0) > 0C^\prime (0) > 0. In the extreme, as the discount factor tends to one public precision tends to infinity in the welfare-optimal programs while it remains bounded at the market solution. Otherwise, if C￠(0) = 0C^\prime (0) = 0 public precision accumulates in an unbounded way both at the first and second best solutions. More public information may hurt at either the market or second best solutions.     

The Effect of Risk Characteristics on the Willingness to Pay for Mortality Risk Reductions from Electric Power Generation

The objective of this study is to estimate willingness to pay (WTP) for the reduction of mortality risks caused by fossil fuel (natural gas, coal and oil) versus nuclear electric power generation systems and to examine the influence of risk characteristics involved with electric power generation on WTP. A choice experiment was conducted to achieve these objectives. The attributes for nuclear risks in the experiment included the probability of disasters and the expected losses if a disaster occurs. We find evidence of (i) a baseline effect (where WTP is sensitive to hypothetical versus actual baseline expected mortality); (ii) a ‘labeling effect,’ where, surprisingly, the term ‘nuclear’ has no effect on WTP, but the term ‘fossil-fueled power generation’ results in lower WTP; and (iii) disaster aversion, meaning that people focus on the conditional loss from a nuclear disaster, not the probability. We also find that the WTP for reducing deaths from a nuclear disaster is about 60 times the WTP for routine reducing fossil-fuel generation-related deaths.     

Remarks on the application of statistical games to technological development forecasting

This work presents the probability of determining a quantitative forecast of technological development S(t) defined by a set m of parameters S⁽¹⁾(t),S⁽²⁾(t),…,S^(m)(t), based on statistical game theory. Assuming that the coordinates S⁽ⁱ⁾(t) (i = 1, 2,…,m) of a forecasted vector S(t) are stochastic processes with given probabilistic characteristics, a formula of a function forecasting the value of a coordinate S⁽ⁱ⁾(t) of this vector can be obtained. This formula permits to determine a vector of forecasts _τT(x) of technological development S(t) at a given moment t = τ+T.     

Numerical Computation of Equilibrium Bid Functions in a First-Price Auction with Heterogeneous Risk Attitudes

We use numerical methods to compute Nash equilibrium (NE) bid functions for four agents bidding in a first-price auction. Each bidderi is randomly assigned:r _i [0,r _max], where 1 –r _i is the Arrow-Pratt measure of constant relative risk aversion. Eachr _i is independently drawn from the cumulative distribution function (·), a beta distribution on [0,r _max]. For various values of the maximum propensity to seek risk,r _max, the expected value of any bidder's risk characteristic,E (r _i ), and the probability that any bidder is risk seeking,P (r _i > 1), we determine the nonlinear characteristics of the (NE) bid functions.