Feature Article: A Resource‐Based Perspective on Business Strategies of Newly Founded Subsidiaries: The Case of German Pensionsfonds

Diversification by firms into unfamiliar areas of business is achieved either by acquisition of an existing business in the destination industry or a greenfield start‐up. This article focuses on the business strategy of greenfield start‐ups. We theorize and find that firms entering a market by establishing a new subsidiary rely solely on their own preexisting internal resources, making it favorable to align the business strategy of the start‐up with the firm's value‐generating competencies. Our empirical results, which are based on a sample of German Pensionsfonds and their parent companies, are consistent with the view that the business strategy choice of a newly founded subsidiary is substantially directed by the internal resources and competencies of the parent firm.     

Pre‐packin' in the UK

A pre‐pack administration is one where a deal has already been agreed prior to the company entering administration. The company's business will commonly be sold to the incumbent management team immediately the company is placed into administration. The business survives relatively intact but will have managed to jettison its unsecured debt. The business is saved and jobs are saved. The pre‐pack will usually require the support of the company's bankers. Recent research suggests that pre‐packs may constitute between 50% and 80% of all insolvent going concern sales. The UK version of a pre‐packaged administration appears to have been rare until the administration process under the Insolvency Act 1986 was significantly amended in 2002, permitting a company to be placed into administration without a court order. The UK version of pre‐packaged administration does not involve any plan being approved by different classes of creditor nor for the court to be involved in approving activities of the administrator before or after the plan is put into effect. The paper considers whether or not pre‐pack administrations fit into the statutory framework of the Insolvency Act, the professional ethics requirements of being an insolvency practitioner and the equitable rules governing fiduciaries. Some aspects of the policy underpinning pre‐packs are also considered in particular the decision to allow insolvency practitioners to claim pre‐appointment fees as an expense of the administration. This decision appears to herald a change in government policy. This policy change is also considered. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A Comparative Analysis of Anglo‐Australian Pre‐packs: Can the Means Be Made to Justify the Ends?

Whereas pre‐packaged administrations have been prevalent in the UK for years, Australia's voluntary administration regime has been more restrictive of the practice. This article analyses the evolution of UK pre‐packs, why UK‐style pre‐packs are not prevalent in Australia and the challenges for UK and Australian lawmakers in striking the right balance with pre‐packs in their respective administration regimes. Building upon this analysis, the article proposes a mechanism that might make ‘connected‐party’ pre‐pack business sales work more fairly for stakeholders—that is, by obligating a connected‐party purchaser to make a future‐income contribution in favour of the insolvent company whose business has been ‘rescued’ by a pre‐packaged sale in administration. Copyright © 2012 INSOL International and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Valuing Companies with Cash‐Flow@Risk

The classic DCF approach to capital budgeting—the one that MBA students in the world's top business schools have been taught for the last 30 years—begins with the assumption that the corporate investment decision is “independent of” the financing decision. That is, the value of a given investment opportunity should not be affected by how a company is financed, whether mainly with debt or with equity. A corollary of this capital structure “irrelevance” proposition says that a company's investment decision should also not be influenced by its risk management policy—by whether a company hedges its various price exposures or chooses to leave them unhedged. In this article, the authors—one of whom is the CFO of the French high‐tech firm Gemalto—propose a practical alternative to DCF that is based on a concept they call “cash‐flow@risk.” Implementation of the concept involves dividing expected future cash flow into two components: a low‐risk part, or “certainty equivalent,” and a high‐risk part. The two cash flow streams are discounted at different rates (corresponding to debt and equity) when estimating their value. The concept of cash‐flow@risk derives directly from, and is fully consistent with, the concept of economic capital that was developed by Robert Merton and Andre Perold in the early 1990s and that has become the basis of Value at Risk (or VaR) capital allocation systems now used at most financial institutions. But because the approach in this article focuses on the volatility of operating cash flows instead of asset values, the authors argue that an internal capital allocation system based on cash‐flow@risk is likely to be much more suitable than VaR for industrial companies.     

BUILDING AND EVOLVING DATA WAREHOUSING AND BUSINESS INTELLIGENCE ARTEFACTS: THE CASE OF SYSCO

This paper investigates use of data warehouse and business intelligence capabilities to integrate with customers in the supply chain and improve insights into customer sales. By making internal data warehouse sales information available to customers, additional value to those customers is created, eliminating asymmetries of information in the supply chain. In addition, the evolution of data warehousing into business intelligence is investigated, expanding sales information to include marketing associate performance analysis generated for internal use. Further, a methodology that was used for building a business intelligence system is also examined. Finally, what appears to be a business‐intelligence‐driven focus on enterprise resource planning systems is analyzed. These issues are illustrated using real‐world data warehousing and business intelligence artefacts developed at SYSCO. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Does emotional intelligence matter to academic work performance? Evidence from business faculties in Australia

Using data collected through survey questionnaire across 15 universities, we examine the effect of emotional intelligence on academic work performance (in research, teaching and service) in Australian business faculties. We find academics’ ability to use emotion enhances performance across research, teaching and service, while ability to regulate emotion enhances performance for teaching and service only. We also find support for a process‐based model of emotional intelligence in which appraisal of emotion is a necessary antecedent to emotion’s use and regulation. The results have implications for management in appointment decisions and professional development programmes in business/accounting faculties.     

Expectations‐Based Management

The authors begin by summarizing the results of their recently published study of the relation between stock returns and changes in several annual performance measures, including not only growth in earnings and EVA, but changes during the year in analysts' expectations about future earnings over three different periods: (1) the current year; (2) the following year; and (3) the three‐year period thereafter. The last of these measures—changes in analysts' expectations about three‐ to five‐year earnings—had by far the greatest explanatory “power” of any of the measures tested. Besides being consistent with the stock market's taking a long‐term, DCF approach to the valuation of companies, the authors' finding that investors seem to care most about earnings three to five years down the road has a number of important implications for financial management: First, a business unit doesn't necessarily create shareholder value if its return on capital exceeds the weighted average cost of capital—nor does an operation that fails to earn its WACC necessarily reduce value. To create value, the business's return must exceed what investors are expecting. Second, without forecasting returns on capital, management should attempt to give investors a clear sense of the firm's internal benchmarks, both for existing businesses and new investment. Third, management incentive plans should be based on stock ownership rather than stock options. Precisely because stock prices reflect expectations, the potential for prices to get ahead of realities gives options‐laden managers a strong temptation to manipulate earnings and manage for the short term.     

“Non‐Financial” Is a Misnomer,but Doesn't Have to Be a Missed Opportunity

With enterprise values now representing increasing multiples of companies' net book assets, investors are clearly looking beyond financial reporting for enhanced insights and understanding of when and how companies are adding value. This shift includes growing attention to environmental, social, and governance (ESG) information. Although ESG data presents its own unique challenges, dismissing it as “non‐financial” can be misleading. When explicitly linked to a company's long‐term value creation strategy, ESG information can serve as a valuable input to more farsighted financial analysis. Market‐driven initiatives, notably that of the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB), aim to standardize a subset of business‐critical, industry‐specific sustainability data for investors. Research indicates such approaches can generate positive outcomes not only for providers of financial capital, but for their portfolio companies and markets in general. In illustrating these concepts, the authors explore ESG impacts in three sectors and industries, while examining how access to consistent, comparable, reliable sustainability information in those sectors can augment an analysis of traditional business fundamentals. One example focuses on water management in the Oil & Gas Exploration & Production industry, a major environmental issue where geographic considerations can shed light on company‐specific exposures to cost increases, production disruptions, increased CapEx and R&D spending, as well as the potential for asset write‐downs. In the Food & Beverage sector, health and nutrition concerns are shown to be changing consumer preferences, triggering regulatory action, and reshaping companies' product portfolios—with significant implications for the companies' brand values and ability to compete for market share. Finally, in Aerospace & Defense, lapses in business ethics such as bribery of government officials present a governance challenge that comes with the risk of value‐destroying fines and penalties and, even more significant, associated reductions in revenues.     

Board 3.0: What the Private‐Equity Governance Model Can Offer Public Companies∗

The authors view board structures as an adaptive institution that responds to the key challenges faced by public companies: helping management solve the problems of production and organization of large‐scale enterprise; limiting managerial agency costs; serving as a delegated monitor of the firm's compliance obligations; and responding to the governance environment of changing shareholder ownership patterns. U.S. company board structures are shown to have evolved over time, often through discontinuous lurches, as particular functions have waxed and waned in importance. This article is part of a larger project that traces two iterations of the public company board, what the authors call Board 1.0 (the “advisory board”) and Board 2.0 (the “monitoring board”). The authors argue in particular that Board 2.0, as embedded in both current practice and regulation, now fails the functional fit test for many companies. First, it does not scale to match the dramatic increase in the size and complexity of many modern public corporations. Second, at a time of reconcentrated ownership achieved through institutional investors and increased activism, it does not have the expertise and commitment needed to resolve the tension between managerial or market myopia, or “short‐termism,” and managerial “hyperopia.” This article holds out an optional alternative, Board 3.0, which would bring to the public company board some strategies used by private equity firms for their portfolio company boards. Such “Portco” boards consist of directors who are “thickly informed,” “heavily resourced,” and “intensely interested.” Bringing such “empowered directors” to public company boards could facilitate evolution of the public company board model in response to dramatic changes in the corporate business environment. The authors also suggest possible routes for implementing Board 3.0, including the enlisting of PE firms as “relational investors” that would have both capacity and incentives to engineer changes in board structure.     

The Dempster‐Shafer Theory: An Introduction and Fraud Risk Assessment Illustration

This article introduces the Dempster‐Shafer theory (DS theory) of belief functions for managing uncertainties, specifically in the auditing and information systems domains. The use of DS theory is illustrated by deriving a fraud risk assessment formula for a simplified version of a model developed by Srivastava et al. (2007). In this formulation, fraud risk is the normalised product of four risks: risk that management has incentives to commit fraud; risk that management has opportunities to commit fraud; risk that management has an attitude to rationalise committing fraud; and risk that an auditor's special procedures will fail to detect fraud. The article demonstrates how to use such a model to plan for a financial audit where management fraud risk is assessed to be high. In addition, it discusses whether audit planning is better served by an integrated audit/fraud risk assessment as now suggested in SAS 107 (AICPA 2006a, see also ASA 200 in AUASB 2007) or by the approach illustrated here where a parallel, but separate, assessment is made of audit risk and fraud risk.     

UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA ROUNDTABLE ON: Enterprise‐Wide Risk Management

For many years, MBA students were taught that there was no good reason for companies that hedge large currency or commodity price exposures to have lower costs of capital, or trade at higher P/E multiples, than comparable companies that choose not to hedge such financial price risks. Corporate stockholders, just by holding well‐diversified portfolios, were said to neutralize any effects of currency and commodity price risks on corporate values. And corporate efforts to manage such risks were accordingly viewed as redundant, a waste of corporate resources on a function already performed by investors at far lower cost. But as this discussion makes clear, both the theory and the corporate practice of risk management have moved well beyond this perfect markets framework. The academics and practitioners in this roundtable begin by suggesting that the most important reason to hedge financial risks—and risk management's largest potential contribution to firm value—is to ensure a company's ability to carry out its strategic plan and investment policy. As one widely cited example, Merck's use of FX options to hedge the currency risk associated with its overseas revenues is viewed as limiting management's temptation to cut R&D in response to large currency‐related shortfalls in reported earnings. Nevertheless, one of the clear messages of the roundtable is that effective risk management has little to do with earnings management per se, and that companies that view risk management as primarily a tool for smoothing reported earnings have lost sight of its real economic function: maintaining access to low‐cost capital to fund long‐run investment. And a number of the panelists pointed out that a well‐executed risk management policy can be used to increase corporate debt capacity and, in so doing, reduce the cost of capital. Moreover, in making decisions whether to retain or transfer risks, companies should generally be guided by the principle of comparative advantage. If an outside firm or investor is willing to bear a particular risk at a lower price than the cost to the firm of managing that risk internally, then it makes sense to lay off that risk. Along with the greater efficiency and return on capital promised by such an approach, several panelists also pointed to one less tangible benefit of an enterprise‐wide risk management program—a significant improvement in the internal corporate dialogue, leading to a better understanding of all the company's risks and how they are affected by the interactions among its business units.     

Managerial ability and bank‐loan pricing

This paper examines the impact of borrowers’ managerial ability on lenders’ bank‐loan pricing and the channels through which managerial ability affects bank‐loan pricing. Using a large sample of US bank loans, we provide evidence that higher managerial ability is associated with lower bank‐loan prices. This effect is stronger in firms with high information risk, suggesting that an important channel for managerial ability to affect bank‐loan pricing is through improved financial disclosure to mitigate information asymmetry. The relationship is also stronger for firms with weak business fundamentals, implying that another channel is through improved business performance. Of these two mechanisms, path analysis suggests that the business‐fundamentals mechanism is the more important channel through which managerial ability affects bank‐loan pricing.     

Development of a case‐based decision support system for process modeling in BPR

This paper presents a knowledge‐based methodology for business process reengineering that uses a case‐based reasoning paradigm to provide decision support to its users in the modeling of a current problem and a redesign of critical business processes. As a process modeling tool for representing the business process, the event process chain (EPC) modeling method is used in this paper. We developed a CAPMOSS (CAse‐based Process MOdeling Supporting System) to support our proposed methodology. To reengineer a new business process problem, CAPMOSS retrieves from its case base the case that is most similar to the current problem. CAPMOSS uses a retrieved case to guide the structuring of AS‐IS models and TO‐BE models of a target business process. Using the transformational knowledge of a retrieved case, CAPMOSS helps the user to transform an AS‐IS model into a TO‐BE model for the target process with ease and the purchasing process in a government R&D institute is explained as an application of this approach. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Discipline‐Informed Approaches to Water Accounting

Recent decades have witnessed demands for greater transparency and more clearly defined lines of responsibility and accountability in the management of natural resources. Consequently, various approaches to recording and reporting data relating to such resources have emerged, particularly in relation to water. We explore international water accounting developments where different water accounting systems are being developed in different settings, with different origins, and influenced by different disciplines. Australia is developing a general‐purpose water accounting system with its genealogy in financial reporting. We explore its development and implications for regulators and professionals in accounting and water‐related business. We also contemplate the potential for a global water accounting system.     

Reorganizing Czech Businesses: A Bankruptcy Law Reform under a Recession Stress‐Test

The new Czech Insolvency Act, featuring a brand new reorganization option for business debtors, has now been in force for over 3 years—a period of a severe downturn in the Czech (and the global) economy. This presents an opportunity to observe the workings of the new insolvency law on a “recession‐loaded” empirical dataset extracted from the on‐line insolvency register also introduced as part of the reform. This is the goal of this article, the subject matter of which is an initial empirical look at insolvency proceedings conducted over debtors whose reorganization attempts had been allowed in the years 2008 and 2009. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Leading by feel

Like it or not, leaders need to manage the mood of their organizations. The most gifted leaders accomplish that by using a mysterious blend of psychological abilities known as emotional intelligence. They are self-aware and empathetic. They can read and regulate their own emotions while intuitively grasping how others feel and gauging their organization's emotional state. But where does emotional intelligence come from, and how do leaders learn to use it? In this article, 18 leaders and scholars (including business executives, leadership researchers, psychologists, an autism expert, and a symphony conductor) explore the nature and management of emotional intelligence--its sources, uses, and abuses. Their responses varied, but some common themes emerged: the importance of consciously--and conscientiously--honing one's skills, the double-edged nature of self-awareness, and the danger of letting any one emotional intelligence skill dominate. Among their observations: Psychology professor John Mayer, who co-developed the concept of emotional intelligence, warns managers not to be confused by popular definitions of the term, which suggest that if you have a certain set of personality traits then you automatically possess emotional intelligence. Neuropsychologist Elkhonon Goldberg agrees with professors Daniel Goleman and Robert Goffee that emotional intelligence can be learned--but only by people who already show an aptitude for it. Cult expert Janja Lalich points out that leaders can use their emotional intelligence skills for ill in the same way they can for good. "Sometimes the only difference is [the leader's] intent," she says. And business leaders Carol Bartz, William George, Sidney Harman, and Andrea jung (of Autodesk, Medtronic, Harman International, and Avon respectively) describe situations in which emotional intelligence traits such as self-awareness and empathy have helped them and their companies perform at a higher level.     

Credit Scoring and the Availability of Small Business Credit in Low‐ and Moderate‐Income Areas

This paper estimates that credit scoring is associated with about a $3,900 increase in small business lending per sample banking organization, per low‐ and moderate‐income (LMI) area served, and this effect is roughly equivalent to that estimated for higher‐income areas. For our sample, this corresponds to a $536 million increase in small business credit in LMI areas in 1997 than otherwise would have been the case. This effect appears to be driven by increased out‐of‐market lending by banking organizations, as in‐market lending generally declines. Overall, it does not appear that credit scoring has a disparate impact on LMI areas.     

A knowledge‐based framework for incorporating investor's preference into portfolio decision‐making

This paper describes a framework for the integration of a rule‐based system capable of identifying an investor's risk preference into a quantitative portfolio model based on risk and expected return. By inferring rules consisting of an investor's objective and subjective risk preferences, the integrated methodology provides the assets suitable for the preferences. Through investment in the portfolio composed of the assets, the investor is able to obtain the following bene?ts: reduction of costs and time spent to determine target assets, and alleviation of anxiety from ‘out‐of‐favor’ assets. The framework is applied to the development of a knowledge‐based portfolio system for constructing an investor's preference‐oriented portfolio. In the procedure of the system for ?nding an optimal portfolio, the system uses an arti?cial intelligence method of a case‐based reasoning to obtain preference thresholds for an investor when the investor's past investment records are available. Experimental results show that the framework contributes signi?cantly to the construction of a better portfolio from the perspective of an investor's bene?t/cost ratio than that produced by the existing portfolio models. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Defining personalized concepts for XBRL using iPAD‐drawn fuzzy sets

An efficient and effective analysis of business data requires a better understanding of what the data represents, and to what degree. A human‐like way of accomplishing that without being too detailed yet learning more about data content is to summarize and map the data into concepts familiar to a person performing analysis. Processes of summarization help identify the most essential facts that are embedded in the data. All this is of significant importance for analysis of large amounts of business data required to make good and sound financial decisions. There are two aspects enabling more comprehensive yet easier processing of data: a standardized representation format of financial data; and a human‐friendly way of defining concepts and using them for building personalized models representing processing data. The first of the aspects has been addressed by the eXtensible Business Reporting Language (XBRL)—a standardized format of defining, representing and exchanging corporate and financial information. The second aspect is related to providing individuals with the ability to gain understanding of data content via determining a degree of truth of statements summarizing data based on their own perception of concepts they are looking for. In this paper, we introduce a tablet application—Tablet‐based input of Fuzzy Sets (TiFS)—and demonstrate its usefulness for entering personalized definitions of concepts and terms that enable a quick analysis of financial data. Such analysis means utilization of soft queries and operations of aggregation that extract and summarize the data and present it in a form familiar to analysts. The application allows for defining concepts and terms with ‘finger‐made’ drawings representing a person's perception of concepts. Further, these definitions are used to build summarization statements for exploring XBRL data. They are equipped with ‘drawn’ definitions of linguistic terms (e.g. LARGE, SMALL, FAST) and linguistic quantifiers (e.g. ALL, MOSTLY), and enable summarization of data content from the perspective of a user's interests. The ‘drawn’ linguistic terms and quantifiers represent membership functions of fuzzy sets. Utilization of fuzzy sets allows for performing operations of data summarization in a human‐like way. The application of TiFS illustrates ease of inputting personalized definitions of concepts and their influence on the interpretation of data. This introduces aspects of personalization and adaptation of artificial intelligence systems to perceptions and views of individuals. The proposed application is used to perform a basic analysis of an XBRL document.     

Small Business Financial Distress and the “Phoenix Syndrome”—A Re‐evaluation

In a typical “phoenix syndrome” scenario, a small business entrepreneur who controls the financially distressed Company A registers Company B, to which the assets of Company A are transferred in what appears to be fraudulent conveyance. Company B serves as a vehicle through which the business is kept running, without the pressures of the business creditors. If necessary, the entrepreneur will also register Company C and repeat the process. The law usually considers the execution of a “phoenix syndrome” scheme (“phoenixizing”) to be fraud against Company A's unaware creditors. Two major problems undermine, however, the efficient regulation of “phoenix syndrome” schemes. First, although criminal sanctions are available, “phoenixizing” entrepreneurs are not regularly prosecuted and are usually only subject to monetary sanctions (e.g., personal civil liability to creditors). Because defrauders tend to be judgment proof, the result is sub‐optimal deterrence. Second, lawmakers have not considered a more sympathetic explanation to account for the “phoenix syndrome” phenomenon: an entrepreneur resorting to a “phoenix syndrome” scheme might actually be arranging for a last‐resort “home‐made” bankruptcy proceeding, that is, the entrepreneur might be mimicking the role of a formal bankruptcy stay on unsecured creditors' collection efforts, against the background of a cost prohibitive formal bankruptcy proceeding. Put simply, the “phoenix syndrome” scheme is, occasionally, “a poor man's” bankruptcy proceeding. Deterring a “phoenixizing” entrepreneur attempting to rescue a viable business is, of course, unwarranted, as the result is viable businesses being lost. These two problems of under‐deterrence and over‐deterrence mandate a re‐evaluation of the manner in which “phoenix syndrome” schemes are regulated. Obviously, the main question concerns implementation: How can “good” entrepreneurs, attempting to rescue a viable business, be separated from “bad” ones, who attempt to defraud or to rescue a non‐viable business? The paper discusses and evaluates several solutions. Copyright © 2012 INSOL International and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.