Trade, Wages and Unemployment in the Presence of Hiring and Firing Costs

This paper offers a new explanation of the recent Australian wage inequality and unemployment experience. Building on a standard international trade model, it is argued that trade affects wage inequality and unemployment through changes in the bargaining power of different groups of workers in the presence of hiring and firing costs. This allows previously puzzling aspects of the trends to be explained, including the inconsistency of the existing Stolper-Samuelson trade explanation with rising relative skilled wages at the same time as rising skilled labour intensity of production. Considering differences in labour market institutions, in particular hiring and firing costs and minimum wages, allows differences between the experiences of Australia, the USA and Europe to be explained.     

Trade, technology, and unemployment: the role of endogenous skill formation

Abstract .  This paper analyses trade in an asymmetric  2 × 2 × 2  world, where the two countries ('Europe' and 'America') differ in their preferences towards wage inequality. Fair wage considerations compress wage differentials in both countries. European workers are more averse to wage inequality, and Europe is characterized by lower wage differentials and higher unemployment. Allowing for endogenous skill formation, the effects of a globalization shock, global technological change, and a change in the educational capital stock on skill premia and employment levels are derived. In contrast to a model with exogenous factor supplies, international wage and unemployment differentials are affected by global shocks.     

Must we choose? European unemployment, American inequality, and the impact of education and labor market institutions

In the last 15 years, two equilibria have arisen in the advanced world. On the one hand, wage dispersion has widened in those countries where unemployment has remained low (with cyclical variations). On the other hand, wherever income inequality has remained unchanged, unemployment has shot upwards. To account for these distinct patterns, we develop a political–economic model showing that, controlling for the skills of the population, the effects of technological and trade shocks (that have affected OECD nations) that are contingent on the institutional rules in place. Economies with generous unemployment allowances adjust through subsidized unemployment. By contrast, low levels of social protection lead to less unemployment but wider wage dispersion. The level of qualifications of the labor force determines the extent of the adjustment for a given institutional arrangement. We derive, in turn, the institutional structure of each country from the political conditions in place at the time of the shock. The empirical part successfully tests the model for the sample of European regions and US states.     

Wage bargaining and turnover costs with heterogenous labor and perfect history screening

We study effects of mobility costs in a model of (Nash) wage bargaining between workers and firms, with instantaneous matching, heterogeneous workers, identical firms and free firm entry, and where firms can screen workers perfectly according to their previous work history but not their actual productivity. We derive the employment level and the minimum worker quality standard, in the market solution, and in the efficient solution established by a social planner. When workers have positive bargaining power, there is always some inefficient unemployment among desired workers in the market solution. The lowest hiring standard chosen by firms is higher than the planner's standard when firing costs are high relative to hiring costs, but may be lower in the opposite case. We show that any higher established hiring standard corresponds to a market equilibrium. The model explains a tendency for a high initial unemployment rate to remain high, particularly for low-skilled workers.     

Labour market outliers: Lessons from Portugal and Spain

Spain has the highest unemployment rate (22.2%) of any European Union country, Portugal one of the lowest (7.3%). Superficially, these countries share many labour market features: the toughest job security rules in the OECD, an apparently similar architecture of wage bargaining, and comparable generosity of their unemployment insurance systems, at least since 1989. We address the puzzle by examining Portuguese and Spanish labour market institutions, in particular job security, unemployment benefits and the system of wage bargaining. We then conduct empirical analysis of Spanish and Portuguese unemployment outflows and wage distributions, using micro data. We find differences in unemployment benefits (non-existent in Portugal until 1985, and less generous nowadays), differences in wage flexibility (wage floors by category established by collective agreements are set at a lower relative level in Portugal), and, in practice, higher firing costs in Spain. A key explanation of the difference in Portuguese and Spanish unemployment rates is the wage adjustment process. Generous benefit levels may have been necessary for the path Spanish unions took, but this was not the sole explanation of different wage setting in Spain and Portugal.     

Schooling, Training, Growth and Minimum Wages

We examine how the long-run growth performance of an economy is affected by a labor market distortion. In our model, growth occurs through skill formation, and skills are generated through schooling and training of unskilled workers. We analyze how a minimum wage legislation affects long-run growth. In general, the effects are ambiguous. The reason is that while a minimum wage discourages training, it also encourages schooling. The net effect then depends on whether training or schooling dominates the long-run increases in labor productivity.
JEL classification : I 20, J 31, O 40     

Migration and Wage‐setting: Reassessing the Labor Market Effects of Migration*

In this paper we employ a wage‐setting approach to analyze the labor market effects of immigration into Germany from 1980 to 2004. This enables us to consider labor market rigidities, which are prevalent in Europe. We find that the elasticity of the wage‐setting curve is particularly high for young workers. Moreover, natives and foreigners are imperfect substitutes. The wage and employment effects of immigration depend on the skill structure of the immigrant workforce. Because the foreign labor supply shift has mainly affected the high‐skilled labor market segment, the 4 percent increase of the workforce through immigration has not increased either aggregate or foreign unemployment.     

Wage inequality in Turkey, 2002–10

This paper studies the evolution of wage inequality in Turkey using household labour force survey data from 2002 to 2010. Between 2002 and 2004, the relative supply of more‐educated workers to less‐educated workers remained constant while their relative wages decreased in favour of less‐educated workers. However, between 2004 and 2010, the relative supply of more‐educated workers to less‐educated workers rose, while their relative wages remained constant or kept increasing in favour of more‐educated workers. This suggests factors other than those implied by a simple supply‐demand model are involved, such as skill‐biased technical change or minimum wage variations. The decomposition of wage inequality reveals that the price (wage) effect dominates the composition effect particularly in the first period. Our results show that the real minimum wage hike in 2004 corresponds to a major institutional change, which proved to be welfare‐increasing in terms of wage inequality. The upper‐tail (90/50) wage inequality decreased between 2002 and 2004 and stayed constant thereafter, whereas the lower‐tail (50/10) wage inequality decreased throughout the period. Our findings thus provide evidence supporting the institutional argument for explaining wage inequality.     

Wage inequality in a developing country: decrease in minimum wage or increase in education returns

In this paper we analyze the increase in wage inequality observed in the Uruguayan labour market during the last decade, by studying how the changes in minimum wage and returns to education affected the wage structure. Although in most developed countries a significant proportion of the increase in wage inequality is explained by a fall in the real minimum wage, this is not the case for the Uruguayan labour market. We observe that returns to education increased significantly, which could explain the increase of wage dispersion by its effects on the upper tail of the wage distribution. To derive these conclusions we follow a parametric and nonparametric quantile regression approach.     

Trade between symmetric countries,heterogeneous firms,and the skill premium

Abstract This paper examines the effects of trade liberalization between symmetric countries on the skill premium. I introduce skilled and unskilled labour in a model of trade with heterogeneous firms à la Melitz (2003) and assume a production technology such that more productive firms are more skill intensive. I show that the effects of trade liberalization on wage inequality crucially depend on the type of trade costs considered and on their initial size. While fixed costs of trade have a potentially non‐monotonic effect on the skill premium, a drop in variable trade costs unambiguously and substantially raises wage inequality.     

Labour-market institutions, (un)employment,wages, and growth: theory and data

We analyse the implications of labour-market institutions on wage inequality in favour of skilled labour, on relative unemployment of unskilled labour, and on the economic growth rate in two clusters resulting from 27 OECD countries: Cluster 1, closely related with the Anglo-Saxon model, and Cluster 2, dominated by the Continental-European model. By linking the unskilled wage to the skilled one in Cluster 2, due to the indexation of social benefits to per-capita income, we accommodate the observed paths of the three variables in both clusters between 1991 and 2008: Cluster 1 presents a higher wage inequality in favour of skilled labour, a lower unemployment of the unskilled labour, and a better economic growth rate.     

Institutionalist Theories of the Wage Bargain: Beyond Demand and Supply

I distill an integrated structure of institutionalist theories of wage determination, linked by overarching views of reality and key principles, and show that three fundamental propositions connect these into one “extended family.” I then outline ten principles that reflect the models and propositions. While very different in form than the familiar Walrasian price-auction model, this relatively succinct approach to wage determination leads to many testable hypotheses. It also explains questions, such as: Why can the minimum wage not often be raised without causing unemployment? Why has wage inequality increased within occupations and educational levels, as well as between? Why does high pay tend to be accompanied by better benefits, working conditions, and on-the-job training (rather than compensating for the lack of one of these)? The insights of many contemporary institutional economists, including Robert Prasch, are particularly important to this analysis, along with earlier work of John R. Commons, John Dunlop, Lloyd Reynolds, and Lester Thurow.     

Stick,Carrot and Skill Acquisition*

We evaluate the impact of specially designed youth unemployment programmes (YUPs), intended to provide young unemployed unskilled workers with skills. If unemployment among skilled workers is lower than among unskilled workers, YUPs imply that unemployment falls. However, YUPs potentially crowd out ordinary training. We set up an equilibrium matching model with endogenous skill choice and examine the impact of an increase in programme participation. We derive a condition for crowding out of ordinary training, as well as a condition for an increase in the skilled labour force and thereby reduced unemployment. The impact of YUPs on welfare and wage dispersion is also considered.     

International fragmentation: Boon or bane for domestic employment?

In this paper, we introduce the fairness approach to efficiency wages into a standard model of international fragmentation. This gives us a theoretical framework in which wage inequality and unemployment rates are co-determined and therefore the public concern can be addressed that international fragmentation and outsourcing to low wage countries lead to domestic job-losses. We develop a novel diagrammatic tool to illustrate the main labour market effects of international fragmentation. We also explore how preferences for fair wages and the size of unemployment benefits govern the employment effects of outsourcing and critically assess the role of political intervention that aims to reduce unemployment benefits under internationally fragmented production.     

Full wages,part-time employment and the minimum wage

The economic effects of the minimum wage have become increasingly ambiguous. Historically, economists have asserted that increases in the minimum wage result in increases in unemployment. This relationship has been challenged recently by Card and Krueger, Katz and Krueger, and Card. These authors have provided empirical evidence that seems to indicate that there is no relationship between various economic variables (such as level of employment, and product price, among others) and the minimum wage. In addition, these authors have not provided a cogent presentation of the effects of the minimum wage on part-time employment. This study examines, from a theoretical standpoint, the effects of the minimum wage on employment. Furthermore, we emphasize the distinction between money wages and full wages; and the role that part-time employmentplays in the analysis. After incorporating these factors into a theoretical presentation, we provide empirical evidence by way of an OLS regression. We conclude that firms respond to increases in the minimum wage by altering the level of part-time employment. By doing this, firms are able to absorb the minimum wage increase because part timers receive fewer fringe benefits.     

A New Specification of Labour Supply in the MONASH Model with an Illustrative Application

MONASH is a dynamic general equilibrium model of the Australian economy. This article describes a new labour-market specification for MONASH in which people are allocated in year t to categories according to their labourmarket activities in year t – 1. People in each category plan their labour supplies by solving an optimisation problem. Via these problems, we introduce the assumption that people in employment categories supply labour more strongly to employment activities than do people in unemployment categories. Thus we find that employment-stimulating policies in t – 1 increase labour supply in t by shifting the composition of the labour force in t in favour of employment categories and away from unemployment categories. We illustrate this idea by using MONASH to simulate the Dawkins proposal to combine a freeze on award wage rates with tax credits for low-wage workers in low-income families. We find that the Dawkins policy would generate a significant short-run increase in employment. With the increase in employment generating an increase in labour supply, the employment benefits of the policy would persist over many years. However, in the long run, we would expect the effect of the policy on aggregate employment to be small and to depend on how the policy affected the ratio of real after-tax wage rates to unemployment benefits.     

On economic growth and minimum wages

We offer an analysis of the existence of a positive relationship between minimum wages and economic growth in a simple one-sector overlapping generations economy à la Romer (J Polit Econ 94:1002–1037, 1986), in the case of both homogeneous and heterogeneous labour and without considering any growth-sustaining externalities which the minimum wage can generate. Assuming also the existence of unemployment benefits financed with balanced-budget consumption taxes not conditional upon age, we show that the minimum wage can promote economic growth and welfare despite the occurrence of unemployment. There may also exist a growth- and welfare-maximising minimum wage.     

Minimum wages and the wage distribution in Estonia

Abstract: This article studies how changes in the statutory minimum wage have affected the wage distribution in Estonia, a post-transition country with little collective bargaining and relatively large wage inequality. The analyses show that the minimum wage has had substantial spillover effects on wages in the lower tail of the distribution; the effects are most pronounced up to the twentieth percentile and then decline markedly. The minimum wage has contributed to lower wage inequality and this has particularly benefitted low-wage segments of the labour market such as women and the elderly. Interestingly, the importance of the minimum wage for the wage distribution was smaller during the global financial crisis than before or after the crisis.     

Institutional quality and skilled–unskilled wage inequality

This paper establishes two-sector general equilibrium models in the presence of unproductive activities to investigate how an improvement of the institutional quality influences the skilled–unskilled wage inequality. We find that an improvement of the institutional quality will affect the interest rate, and then the interest rate combining with the capital intensity will generate an impact on the skilled–unskilled wage inequality. Specifically, both the interest rate and comparisons of the capital–labor relative distributive shares between two sectors play an important role in determining the skilled–unskilled wage gap in an economy featured with unproductive activities. The above results are robust even when we extend the basic theoretical model in several different ways.     

Financial Development and Inequality in the Global Economy

We build a heterogeneous firms model with firm‐specific wages and credit frictions to study the role of financial development for inequality in the global economy. If there are many small (non‐exporting) firms, better access to external funds reduces wage and profit inequality as well as unemployment. In contrast, if there are many large (exporting) firms, financial development might have opposite effects – especially if trade costs are low. In summary, the implications of financial development for inequality depend on the size distribution of firms and on the costs of exporting. Trade liberalization, however, raises inequality unambiguously.