Option Contracts and Vertical Foreclosure

A model of vertical integration is studied. Upstream firms sell differentiated inputs; downstream firms bundle them to make final products. Downstream products are sold as option contracts, which allow consumers to choose from a set of commodities at predetermined prices. The model is illustrated by examples in telecommunication and health markets. Equilibria of the integration game must result in upstream input foreclosure and downstream monopolization. Consumers may or may not benefit from integration.     

Vertical Foreclosure, Technological Choice, and Entry on the Intermediate Market

This paper analyzes the profitability of vertical integration for an upstream monopoly facing a potential competitor. We show that it depends on the technology used by the firm when it integrates. We distinguish two types of technologies: standard technologies, used by nonintegrated firms, and nonstandard technologies, reserved for integrated firms and implying the complete foreclosure of nonintegrated firms. Vertical integration with the adoption of a nonstandard technology dominates vertical integration with the adoption of a standard technology and is profitable, as long as the degree of competition in the downstream industry is sufficiently low.     

Vertical Foreclosure, Technological Choice, and Entry on the Intermediate Market

This paper analyzes the profitability of vertical integration for an upstream monopoly facing a potential competitor. We show that it depends on the technology used by the firm when it integrates. We distinguish two types of technologies: standard technologies, used by nonintegrated firms, and nonstandard technologies, reserved for integrated firms and implying the complete foreclosure of nonintegrated firms. Vertical integration with the adoption of a nonstandard technology dominates vertical integration with the adoption of a standard technology and is profitable, as long as the degree of competition in the downstream industry is sufficiently low.     

Foreclosure,vacancy and crime

This paper examines the impact of residential foreclosures and vacancies on violent and property crime. To overcome confounding factors, a difference-in-difference research design is applied to a unique data set containing geocoded foreclosure and crime data from Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Results indicate that while foreclosure alone has no effect on crime, violent crime rates increase by roughly 19% once the foreclosed home becomes vacant – an effect that increases with length of vacancy. We find weak evidence suggesting a potential vacancy effect for property crime that is much lower in magnitude.     

Transaction Costs and Nonlinear Adjustment Towards Equilibrium in the US Treasury Bill Market

This paper uses nonlinear error correction models to study yield movements in the US Treasury Bill Market. Nonlinear error correction arises because portfolio adjustment is an ‘on-off’ process, which occurs only when disequilibrium in the bill market is large enough to induce investors to incur the transaction costs associated with buying/selling bills. This, together with heterogeneity of transaction costs, implies that the strength of aggregate error correction depends on both the distribution of costs and the extent of disequilibrium in the market. Smooth transition models are used to describe an aggregate adjustment process which is strong when the market is distant from equilibrium, but becomes weaker as the market approaches equilibrium. Linearity tests indicate that the types of nonlinearities that would be induced by transactions costs are statistically significant, and estimated models which incororate these nonlinearities outperform their linear counterparts, both in sample and out of sample.     

资产一体化、市场均衡与资产定价--一种适用于企业资产定价的资本资产定价模型(CAPM)扩展形式

本文根据Williamson—Grossman—Hart的资产一体化研究思路，将资本资产定价模型(CAPM)扩展成为适用于异质资产定价(idiosyncratic asset pricing)的理论模型。按照资产一体化思路，定价资产的风险可分为绝对风险和相对风险贡献，定价资产的绝对风险反映了资产一体化诱取的风险积聚特征，相对风险贡献满足Shapley值的基本假说，因而可以得到在资产一体化条件下计量定价资产相对风险贡献的Shapley风险期望值。根据市场均衡条件下资产一体化总体均值一方差的消费表达形式，我们得到用Shapley风险期望值表达的企业资产风险及其预期报酬的均衡解。     

组织缺失、不完全市场与农地合约

由于农村集体经济组织的缺失,我国的土地市场不是完全竞争的,农村土地流转合约表现为农户、地方政府与土地开发商三者之间的"个性特征的竞争",即人们更多地利用关系、权力、地位、金钱或者别的什么来竞争"土地租金"。只有建立符合集体经济利益的合作经济组织,并使之成为独立的预算中心和利润中心,弥补缺失的集体产权主体,取消地方政府在土地交易市场上的垄断权力,才能真正实现土地的流转价值,保证失地农民的正当利益。     

Downstream Competition, Foreclosure, and Vertical Integration

This paper analyzes the effect of competition among downstream firms on an upstream firm's payoff and on its incentive to integrate vertically when firms in both segments negotiate optimal contracts. We argue that as downstream competition becomes more intense, the upstream firm obtains a larger share of a smaller downstream industry profit. The upstream firm may encourage downstream competition (even excessively) in response to high downstream bargaining power. The option of vertical integration may be a barrier to entry downstream and may trigger strategic horizontal spinoffs or mergers. We extend the analysis to upstream competition.     

Systems Competition, Vertical Merger, and Foreclosure

We address the possibility of foreclosure in markets where the final good consists of a system composed of a hardware good and complementary software and the value of the system depends on the availability of software. Foreclosure occurs when a hardware firm merges with a software firm and the integrated firm makes its software incompatible with a rival technology or system. We find that foreclosure can be an equilibrium outcome where both the merger and compatibility decisions are part of a multistage game which permits the foreclosed hardware firm to play a number of counter-strategies. Further, foreclosure can be an effective strategy to monopolize the hardware market.     

Equilibrium Principal‐Agent Contracts: Competition and R&D Incentives

We analyze competition between firms engaged in R&D activities and market competition to study the choice of the incentive contracts for managers with hidden productivity. Oligopolistic screening requires extra effort/investment from the most productive managers: under additional assumptions on the hazard rate of the distribution of types we obtain no distortion in the middle rather than at the top. The equilibrium contracts are characterized by effort differentials between (any) two types always increasing with the number of firms, suggesting a positive relation between competition and high‐powered incentives. An inverted U curve between competition and absolute investments can emerge for the most productive managers.     

汇率交易的非线性模型及其应用

本文通过汇率市场上交易者与投机者博弈行为分析建立汇率波动的非线性模型，这一模型揭示了汇率波动行为对初始条件的敏感依赖性、汇率波动的持久性、可控性，指出了混沌理论与方法在非线性系统的动态行为研究中的意义与应用前景。     

财政分权与市场相似性均衡

财政分权理论被视为当前财政理论前沿问题之一,由于在众多转轨和发展中国家掀起的一股财政分权潮流,使其得到理论界空前的重视。本文基于当前财政分权理论的研究与发展状况、以分权制存在的经济学基础为前提,重点讨论了促使地方公共品有效提供的途径,全国性的均衡是否存在及其条件等问题。     

非交易性资产和资本市场均衡

标准资本资产定价模型(CAPM)的一个重要假定是,所有资产都是可公开交易、具有充分流动性的。放松这一假定,Mayers最早提出了存在非交易性资产的CAPM。不同于Mayers的方法,我们在收益的均方差有效框架中推导了存在非交易性资产的资产组合理论和CAPM。     

投资者的理性、偏好、生存性与股票市场的均衡价格

投资者的理性、非理性和非理性程度以及与此相关的生存性，一直是行为金融学关注研究的热点问题。本文在既定的理性与非理性定义的基础上，运用一般均衡模型和一般效用偏好函数，分析了完全竞争市场中理性投资者理性与非理性投资者相互影响下的几种生存情况，并导证出此两类投资者的均衡红利(消费)分布、单独生存和共同生存的条件。最后在此基础上研究了股票市场的均衡价格。     

Why Lever into a Zero-Profit Industry: Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion

This paper considers the incentives of a firm with power in a market for one good to tie in the sale of a complementary good even though the complementary good is produced in a zero profit market. If the zero-profit price of the tied good is greater than the marginal cost (which occurs for example when the technology is characterized by a fixed cost and a constant marginal cost), a firm will fie in order to increase the sales of the complementary good, which at the margin is profitable. We show that such tying will lower the effective prices paid by customers and increase welfare. This incentive exists if the firm with market power is a monopolist or one of several competing oligopolists.     

市场、政府与会计信息供求博弈

本文以会计信息供求博弈为主线，从经济学的角度分析了会计信息供求双方围绕会计信息这种商品展开的博弈过程。面对市场失灵，政府管制介入到会计信息供求博弈过程中成为必然。而面对政府管制存在的成本问题，文章最后提出了“分散管制”与“适度管制”相结合的观点。     

Vertical Integration, Foreclosure, and profits in the Presence of Double Marginalization

Whether vertical integration between a downstream oligopolist and an upstream oligopolist is profitable for an integrated pair of firms is shown to depend on whether one means by this that profits increase no matter what other firms do, that all integrated firms are better off when all firms are integrated than when none are, or simply that no downstream-upstream pair of firms has an incentive to deviate from a situation where all firms are integrated. It is also shown to depend on the number of firms in each oligopoly and on the type of interaction that is assumed between firms that are integrated and firms that are not. In particular, it is shown that if no restriction is put on trade between integrated and nonintegrated firms, integrated firms may continue to purchase inputs from the nonintegrated upstream firms, with the goal of raising their downstream rivals' costs. Furthermore, even though firms are identical, asymmetric equilibria, where integrated and nonintegrated firms coexist, may actually arise as an outcome of the integration game.     

河南省物流人才供求平衡分析

根据河南省近年物流人才的培养情况,提出了河南省物流人才供求平衡模型。其中,需求模型采用逻辑斯蒂(Logistic)模型进行分析,供给模型采用二次指数平滑法进行分析。通过分析,预计在2019年河南省物流人才供求基本趋于平衡。     

河南省物流人才供求平衡分析

根据河南省近年物流人才的培养情况,提出了河南省物流人才供求平衡模型.其中,需求模型采用逻辑斯蒂(Lo-gistic)模型进行分析,供给模型采用二次指数平滑法进行分析.通过分析,预计在2019年河南省物流人才供求基本趋于平衡.     

The Coordination and Preference of Supply Chain Contracts Based on Time-Sensitivity Promotional Mechanism

To encourage retailers to submit orders as soon as possible, manufacturers usually launch a time-sensitivity promotional mechanism that the earlier you order, the cheaper the wholesale price will be in advance of the selling season. This paper aims to investigate if the mechanism can improve supply chain performance. A dyadic decentralized supply chain system comprising a single manufacturer and a single retailer is viewed as a research framework. Initially, a benchmark model is proposed to provide a criterion-referenced for coordinating the supply chain in a non-standard distribution environment. Second, a time-sensitive wholesale price contract is constructed to confirm that the mechanism can coordinate the supply chain. However, the retailer accepts the entire forecast risk under the contract. An improved contract called a time-sensitive revenue-sharing contract is constructed based on the notion that the manufacturer shares partial forecast risk. The results show that participants can arbitrarily divide the optimal supply chain’s expected profit between the constructed price contracts; however, two differences exist between the contracts, that is, participants have contract preferences. Finally, a numerical analysis and a few management insights are given.