First price package auction with many traders

This paper studies a first price package auction in which multiple sellers participate in addition to multiple buyers. We generalize the notion of the profit-target strategy which is first introduced as a truthful strategy in a first price package auction with a single seller by Bernheim and Whinston (1986b). We then show that the set of equilibrium payoffs in profit-target strategies is equal to the bidder-optimal core, and is also equal to the set of coalition-proof Nash equilibria. Using this result, we find that any equilibrium payoff vector is weakly Pareto-dominated by the VCG payoff vector for buyers, and that the Walrasian competitive equilibrium payoff vector is weakly Pareto-dominated by some equilibrium payoff vector for buyers, even if goods are substitutes. This contrasts with the first price package auction with a single seller, in which it is shown that if goods are substitutes, then those three outcomes are payoff-equivalent.     

Systems Competition, Vertical Merger, and Foreclosure

We address the possibility of foreclosure in markets where the final good consists of a system composed of a hardware good and complementary software and the value of the system depends on the availability of software. Foreclosure occurs when a hardware firm merges with a software firm and the integrated firm makes its software incompatible with a rival technology or system. We find that foreclosure can be an equilibrium outcome where both the merger and compatibility decisions are part of a multistage game which permits the foreclosed hardware firm to play a number of counter-strategies. Further, foreclosure can be an effective strategy to monopolize the hardware market.     

基于信息共享的供应链定价策略及利润增值研究

基于单一制造商和单一零售商构成的供应链系统,在非线性市场需求的前提下,应用博弈理论对供应链系统的定价策略进行了分析,分别得出信息共享时的博弈均衡解和信息不共享时的博弈均衡解;进一步分析了信息共享程度的大小与批发价、零售价以及双方利润之间的关系,得出信息共享程度越高,制造商和零售商的利润越大,信息共享实现了帕累托改进。最后,通过实例对结论进行了验证。     

基于cournot Model与Bertrand Model寡头竞争模型的药品最优定价策略

本文将竞争博弈模型引用到药品定价策略中,分别从制造商利润最大化,销售商利润最大化以及总体药品市场价值最大化的角度,研究了在Cournot Model下,制造商应该对销售商采取如何定价策略,而销售商应该如何应对才能达到总体利润最大化;在Bertrand Model下,论证多个药品制造商应该采取一体化的价格管理体系,并在文章最后给出Cournot Model以及Bertrand Model的寡头竞争模型在药品流通渠道管理中的应用。     

Optimal pricing for new and remanufactured products

This work investigates the optimal pricing of new and remanufactured products using a model of consumer preferences based on extensive experimentation. The experimental investigation reveals two distinct segments of consumers. One segment is relatively indifferent between new and remanufactured products and displays high sensitivity to price discounts. The second segment shows strong preferences for new products—with an accompanying aversion to remanufactured products—and realtively low sensitivity to price discounts. The pricing analysis examines several scenarios involving a new product manufacturer, ranging from a simple monopolist scenario to a more complex scenario involving competition with third-party remanufacturers. In contrast to the usual finding that new product prices should decrease when competitive remanufactured products enter the market, the introduction of market segments reveals a robust finding across all scenarios: when remanufactured products enter the market, the optimal price of the new product should increase. Through appropriate pricing of new products, the OEM can mitigate the effects of cannibalization and increase profitability.     

Integration, Complementary Products, and Variety

This paper examines the incentives for integration when the market for consumer durables (hardware) is oligopolistic and the market for complementary services (software) is monopolistically competitive. We find that the equilibrium industry structure will depend on the magnitude of the fixed costs of software development. If the software development costs are relatively large, the equilibrium industry structure is unintegrated, that is, neither hardware firm integrates; if the software development costs are relatively small, the equilibrium industry structure is integrated, that is, both hardware firms integrate. Under the integrated industry structure, hardware profits are lower, less varieties are provided, and hardware prices are lower than under the unintegrated industry structure. The game has a prisoners' dilemma structure when the software development costs are relatively small because of a foreclosure effect. Strategically increasing the number of software varieties provides an avenue for an integrated hardware firm to increase its market share and profits by reducing the number of software varieties available for an unintegrated rival technology. Although consumer surplus is higher under an integrated industry structure, the total surplus associated with the unintegrated industry structure exceeds that of the integrated industry structure.     

基于不同类型消费者的再制造策略研究

本文对一个垄断制造商的再制造策略进行了研究。首先根据消费者对于再制造产品的接受程度把消费者分为两类，然后根据不同类型消费者的特点，给出了在不同的价格策略下，再制造产品和新产品的需求函数。据此本文建立了制造商的最优决策模型，并分别给出了制造商的最优价格策略。最后通过数值分析对结果进行了进一步的验证。     

Imperfect competition à la Negishi,also with fixed costs

The paper studies equilibria for economies with imperfect competition and non-convex technologies. Following Negishi, firms maximise profits under downward-sloping perceived demand functions. Negishi’s assumptions, in particular the assumption of a single monopolistic competitor in each market, are relaxed. Existence of equilibria is obtained, under otherwise standard assumptions, for productions sets defined in each firm by the union of a convex technology and a technology subject to fixed costs. In the light of a counterexample, it is assumed that fixed factors are distinct from variable factors. Technically, the proof rests on pricing rules.     

Regional foreclosures and Mexican remittances: Evidence from the housing market crisis

This study investigates the extent to which Mexican workers’ remittances are affected from the recent housing market decline in the United States. Results from a multivariate model reveal that an increase in the national U.S. foreclosure rate has a negative and statistically significant impact on Mexican remittances. At the regional level, foreclosure rates of the South and the West have a significant impact on workers’ remittances in the same negative direction. However, foreclosure rates from the North Central and East Central regions do not appear to have this statistically significant impact. Lastly, in contrast to previous results in the literature, real exchange rate movements and Mexican remittances seem to be insensitive to one another once the housing market is accounted for in the analysis.     

Supply chain decisions and coordination in the presence of an imperfect spot market

This study considers a supply chain consisting of a commodity supplier and a final product manufacturer with uncertain demand. In addition to purchasing from the supplier through a forward contract, the manufacturer can adjust their inventory by trading the commodity in an online spot market after observing the actual demand. However, the spot market is imperfect in that transactions cannot be certainly realized and come with additional transaction costs. Furthermore, the spot price is volatile such that overly relying on the spot market is unwise. To investigate how the spot market affects the decisions and coordination in a supply chain, we develop a game-theoretical model incorporating spot trading. We derive the optimal ordering decision in a centralized supply chain, as well as the supplier's and manufacturer's equilibrium pricing and ordering decisions in a decentralized supply chain. The impact of the imperfect spot market on the optimal decisions and profits is analyzed. This study also demonstrates how the supply chain can be coordinated in the presence of an imperfect spot market. Finally, a numerical analysis is performed to examine the analytical results. Our results indicate that the spot market can generally improve the performance of the centralized supply chain and benefit the manufacturer in the decentralized one. However, it can be detrimental to the supplier. The supply chain can be coordinated by a revenue-sharing contract, and both parties' profits can be improved. Our findings suggest that the manufacturer could take advantage of the spot market, and the supplier should attempt to integrate or coordinate the supply chain to share the benefits of spot trading.     

Optimal selling mechanisms for multiproduct monopolists: incentive compatibility in the presence of budget constraints

We analyze the nonlinear pricing problem faced by an incomplete information monopolist operating in a market populated by agents with budget constraints. We show that if other goods are available and if the monopolist's goods are nonessential relative to other goods, then there exists an optimal, individually rational, and incentive compatible selling mechanism for the monopolist (Theorem 1). Moreover, we show that a solution to all such nonlinear pricing problems exists if and only if the monopolist's goods are nonessential (Theorem 2). In the absence of nonessentiality, we show that if the monopolist's profit function is independent of quantity (e.g., if all costs are fixed), then an optimal selling mechanism exists (Theorem 3). Finally, we show that if there is reporting (of types by agents) and partial recognition of types (by the monopolist), then an optimal selling mechanism exists, even in the absence of nonessentiality, provided agents' utility functions are affine and continuous in goods (Theorem 4).     

The foreclosure discount: Myth or reality?

Foreclosed properties sell at lower prices than do nearby non-distressed properties. Of particular concern, is whether there is a “stigma” foreclosure discount whereby REO properties sell at lower prices simply because they have been involved in foreclosure proceedings. To the extent that such a discount exists, arbitrage opportunities exist and the associated market failure has significant policy implications. We examine the foreclosure discount from a different perspective than prior researchers by comparing holding period returns earned by purchasers of REOs with those earned by purchasers of similar non-distressed properties. Our results show that the majority of REO purchasers do not earn economically significant excess returns. On average, the implied market discount is less than typical transaction costs. We also find evidence that REO properties and buyers vary systematically from their counterparts in the non-distressed market segment and that REO attribute prices differ from those of non-distressed properties. Overall, our evidence suggests that the market for REOs operates efficiently: lenders are not irrationally dumping REO properties and REO investors are not reaping extraordinary profits.     

An Econometric Analysis of Brand-Level Strategic Pricing Between Coca-Cola Company and PepsiCo.

We investigate market structure and strategic pricing for leading brands sold by Coca-Cola Company and PepsiCo. in the context of a flexible demand specification (i.e., nonlinear AIDS) and structural price equations. Our flexible and generalized approach does not rely upon the often used ad hoc linear approximations to demand and profit-maximizing first-order conditions, and the assumption of Nash-Bertrand competition. We estimate a conjectural variation model and test for different brand-level pure strategy games. This approach of modeling market competition using the nonlinear Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) estimation method provides insights into the nature of imperfect competition and the extent of market power. We find no support for a Nash-Bertrand or Stackelberg Leadership equilibrium in the brand-level pricing game. Results also provide insights into the unique positioning of PepsiCo.'s Mountain Dew brand.     

Entry limiting agreements: First‐mover advantage,authorized generics,and pay‐for‐delay deals

During patent litigation, pay‐for‐delay (P4D) deals involve a payment from a patent holder of a branded drug to a generic drug manufacturer to delay entry and withdraw the patent challenge. In return for staying out of the market, the generic firm receives a payment, and/or an authorized licensed entry at a later date, but before the patent expiration. We examine why such deals are stable when there are multiple potential entrants. We combine the first‐mover advantage for the first generic with the ability of the branded manufacturer to launch an authorized generic (AG) to show when P4D deals are an equilibrium outcome. We further show that limiting a branded firm's ability to launch an AG before entry by a successful challenger will deter such deals. However, removing exclusivity period for the first generic challenger will not.     

British Bus Deregulation: Competition and Demand Coordination

Our framework formally explains some of the recent curious events surrounding deregulation of the British local bus industry. The winner-takes-all nature of this market induces competitive providers to engage in predatory or preemptive behavior in scheduling and pricing. Unlike previous works, we explicitly model consumers' responses to firms' schedule announcements. We show that the market is unstable if demand is uncoordinated, but stable otherwise. Our results highlight the important role played by demand-coordinating mechanisms in local bus markets and our results suggest that pure-strategy Nash equilibria exist in models à-la-Hotelling (1929) whenever demand is effectively coordinated.     

考虑企业社会责任的工业园区废弃物定价策略

考虑制造商承担企业社会责任,构建了工业园区内两个制造商和政府之间的三阶段博弈模型,研究了工业园区废弃物的均衡定价决策。通过模型仿真分析了企业社会责任水平和共生系数对制造商定价、利润和社会福利的影响,并比较了不同废弃物处理情形下制造商的利润。     

Randal Heeb Innovation and Vertical Integration in Complementary Markets

This paper studies vertical integration by an essential-good monopolist into complementary markets. Unlike previous studies of complementary products, consumers are allowed to purchase some components of a complementary basket, but not others. Two different pricing strategies by the integrated firm may emerge. In mass-market equilibria, the price of the complement under integration is zero and it is given away with the essential good. Niche-market equilibria have more conventional pricing. This dichotomy is consistent with consumer software pricing. Integration enhances consumer and total surplus, unless it leads to exit by the higher-quality rival, in which case welfare is reduced. Exit is most likely when it is least damaging to consumer welfare. Integration reduces innovation by the rival firm. The effect on innovation by the integrated firm is ambiguous, but numerical computation of an extended model indicates that integration increases the innovation of the integrated firm and enhances welfare.     

The saving,human wealth and asset pricing nexus: Evidence from around the world

The present study examines the dynamics of the saving, human wealth and asset pricing nexus across developed and emerging economies. We introduce two equilibrium asset pricing models in an intertemporal capital asset pricing framework, including the priced factors human wealth and market portfolio in the first framework and the saving and market portfolio in the second framework. Both asset pricing frameworks consist of two-factor, four-factor and five-factor asset pricing models. We control for size and value factors in the four-factor model and size, value and momentum factors in the five-factor model. The IV-GMM estimation and GRS test results indicate that human wealth and market portfolio for the first framework and saving and market portfolio in the second framework are primary priced factors in explaining the average returns for developed economies and the aggregate level. On the contrary, both frameworks fail to yield significant results explaining the average returns for emerging economies.     

Differential pricing and production strategies for heterogeneous products under cannibalization and promotional effects

This study examines the optimal pricing and production strategy of a closed-loop supply chain consisting of a manufacturer, a recycler, and consumers. Considering the cannibalization and promotion effects of remanufactured products on new and secondhand products, we constructed Stackelberg game models under different scenarios. We analyze the impact of the changes in the two effects on the optimal prices and production strategies of the manufacturer and recycler, as well as their countermeasures. We find that (i) how the cannibalization and promotional effects influence the manufacturer and the recycler's pricing and production strategies differ under different scenarios; (ii) when the two effects exceed a threshold, the manufacturer abandons new or remanufactured products, and the recycler prefers to stop production on its new products or continue to remanufacture products; and (iii) the two effects always reduce the profits of the manufacturer and increase the profits of the recycler.     

Measure preserving derivatives and the pricing kernel puzzle

Recent empirical studies have found evidence of nonmonotonicity in the pricing kernels for a variety of market indices. This phenomenon is known as the pricing kernel puzzle. The payoff distribution pricing model of Dybvig predicts that the payoff distribution of a direct investment of $1 in a market index may be replicated by investing less than $1 in some derivative written on that market index whenever the associated pricing kernel is nondecreasing. Using the Hardy–Littlewood rearrangement inequality, we obtain an explicit solution for the cheapest replicating derivative, which we refer to as the optimal measure preserving derivative. The optimal measure preserving derivative is the permutation appearing in Ryff’s decomposition of the pricing kernel with respect to the market payoff measure. We compute optimal measure preserving derivatives corresponding to the estimated physical and risk neutral distributions in the paper by Jackwerth (2000) that first brought attention to the pricing kernel puzzle.