A model of “coupled” technology transfer : A logistic curve approach

This article presents a mathematical model relating to the technology transfer problem. The origin of the problem stems from the existing trade-offs between the strategies of “technological progressiveness” and “static efficiency” employed by firms or countries defined as “leaders” and “followers,” respectively. The formulation of the model is based on the assumption that the technological development of a firm or a country follows a logistic growth curve when related to a specific technology. During the process of a “coupled” technology transfer, the development of the follower changes and its behavior is described by a first order nonhomogenous deferential equation. Different scenarios of the “coupled” technology transfer between the leader and the follower are being discussed.     

Modeling internal commitment mechanisms and self-control: A neuroeconomics approach to consumption–saving decisions

We provide a new model of consumption–saving decisions which explicitly allows for internal commitment mechanisms and self-control. Agents have the ability to invoke either automatic processes that are susceptible to the temptation of ‘over-consuming,’ or alternative control processes which require internal commitment but are immune to such temptations. Standard models in behavioral economics ignore such internal commitment mechanisms. We justify our model by showing that much of its construction is consistent with dynamic choice and cognitive control as they are understood in cognitive neuroscience.The dynamic consumption–saving behavior of an agent in the model is characterized by a simple consumption–saving goal and a cut-off rule for invoking control processes to inhibit automatic processes and implement the goal. We discuss empirical tests of our model with available individual consumption data and we suggest critical tests with brain-imaging and experimental data.     

Risk-Sensitive Dynamic Market Share Attraction Games

We present partial results showing that risk-sensitive oligopolists would spend less on advertising than would their risk-neutral counterparts. The model is an infinite-horizon stochastic game in which each firm's “goodwill” is a random function of both its own and its competitors' current and past advertising expenditures. Single-period firm profits have a market share attraction form. Each firm seeks to maximize its expected exponential utility of the sum of discounted profits. We analyze the impact that risk sensitivity and other parameters have on equilibrium advertising strategies by exploiting the special structure of the stochastic game model.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Number: C73.     

Voluntary provision of a pure public good as the game of ‘chicken’

The voluntary exchange model, where the amount of a public good and contributions to its cost are simultaneously determined, is treated as a (2×2) non-cooperative non-constant-sum game. Three conceptually different types of games emerge. One of them is ‘Chicken’; each player can gain by pre-emptively threatening to pay nothing—unless the other player acts likewise. ‘Zero public goods’ is thus a possible outcome of voluntary exchange, even though it is Pareto inferior.     

Wealth and the capitalist spirit

The wealth distribution in the U.S. is more unequal than either the income or earnings distribution, a fact current models of saving behavior have difficulty explaining. Using Max Weber’s [Weber, M. (1905). The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. Charles Scribners’ and Sons (1958 translated edition)] idea that individuals may have a ‘capitalist spirit’, I construct and simulate a model where individuals accumulate wealth for its own sake rather than as deferred consumption. Including capitalist spirit preferences in a simple life cycle model, with no other modifications, generates a skewness of wealth consistent with that observed in the U.S. economy. Furthermore, capitalist spirit preferences provide a way to generate decreasing risk aversion with increases in wealth without resorting to idiosyncratic rates of time preference.     

The so-called “transformation problem” revisited: A comment

This comment shows that Lipietz's Marxist transformation theorem represents but a simple, though useful reinterpretation of obvious mathematical consequences of a standard Sraffa model—by making appropriate use of its known degree of freedom. Labor values are not involved in this new interpretation of conventional prices of production. A proposal is therefore made how their role in Marx's transformation may be investigated further on the basis of Lipietz's theorem and its interpretation of the “value of labor power”.     

Modelling price pressure in financial markets

We present experimental evidence that, unlike traditional assumptions in economic theory, security prices do not respond to pressure from their own excess demand. Instead, prices respond to excess demand of all securities, despite the absence of a direct link between markets. We propose a model of price pressure that explains these findings. In our model, agents set order prices that reflect the marginal valuation of desired future holdings, called “aspiration levels.”In the short run, as agents encounter difficulties executing their orders, they scale back their aspiration levels. Marginal valuations, order prices, and hence, transaction prices change correspondingly. The resulting price adjustment process coincides with the Global Newton Method. The assumptions of the model as well as its empirical implications are fully borne out by the data. Our model thus provides an economic foundation for why markets appear to search for equilibrium according to Newton’s procedure.     

Pragmatism, not ideology: Historical perspectives on IBM’s adoption of open-source software

We track IBM’s approach to software production and commercialization between 1950 and the present. We find that in the 1950s IBM followed what today would be called an open-source model – its software source code was open, free of charge, and written collaboratively with its users. By the mid 1980s, all of these attributes had been reversed – IBM’s software was closed source, sold or leased independently of hardware sales, and written without the collaboration of its users. More recently, the company has been in a state of transition, achieving a balance between free, open-source software and proprietary software that still generates 20% of its revenues. We interpret these radical swings in light of the substantial changes that have taken place since the 1950s in the costs and benefits of open source, bundled, and collaborative software vis-à-vis the alternatives.     

Risk and decentralization in the theory of economic policy

In this note, uncertainty is incorporated into Tinbergen's model of economic policy. If the Central Planning Authority's preferences amomg subjective probability distributions can be described by a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, and if certain restrictions are imposed on these probability distributions, then the Authority can delegate control over partitions of the instrument vector to its Agencies and so decentralize its decision process.     

Exploitation and Growth

I develop a model of exploitation—coercive wealthtransfer—and growth based on social importance. Exploitationreduces growth since the return to capital falls with exploitationcosts. Initial relative wealth across groups—the measureof social importance—determines which group is the exploiterand how costly exploitation will be. The exploiter selects anexploitation path that maintains its dominant position and rarelymaximizes current transfers. Productive minorities and fast-growinggroups are most prone to exploitation. International sanctions,if strong, end exploitation; otherwise they increase exploitationand reduce growth. Segregation and apartheid are broadly consistentwith the theory.     

On the value of human resources

One challenge for planners is to discover conditions under which a society has a positive and growing “net worth” in terms of its human resources and to bring about and maintain those conditions. We discuss the utility and validity of the concept of people as “assets” or “liabilities”, the structure and cultural contexts for a proposed model of the dynamics of value that account for opportunity costs; and links between information technologies and human resources management, including planned development of these resources.     

Does market value maximization affect the order of resource exploitation?

This paper develops a dynamic model in which the marginal cost of production utilizing inexhaustible natural resources exceeds the marginal cost of production using any kind of exhaustible natural resources. The production capacity of the facility utilizing inexhaustible natural resources is finite in this model. We point out that–under certain assumptions–it is worth utilizing the more expensive inexhaustible natural resources strictly before the depletion of exhaustible natural resources, even if the objective of the decision-maker company is to maximize its market value.     

Partial and system forecasts in scientometrics

Science itself can be considered as a “fuzzy system.” In attempting to deal with possible laws of scientific development we formulate a simple, partial model and illustrate its use as a means to control the strategy of investments in science.     

Competition, cooperation, and the neighboring farmer effect

In this paper we propose a model that explains how cooperation can emerge spontaneously between firms in a highly competitive market environment. The basic idea is that the more competitive is the market, the less costly it is for firms to help each other like good neighbors. Cooperation takes the form of sharing technical know-how, which speeds up the adoption of new technologies (normally developed elsewhere) that spur industrial development. The model comports with the development history of Japan's first example of successful industrial development – its cotton spinning industry – whose conditions match those of firms in small open economies today.     

Information processing and jury decisionmaking

We develop a model to explore the information processing function that jury deliberation and its analogues perform. The central question we ask is: How much better could a jury possibly perform if it optimally used the collective information available to it than if it decides cases by a simple majority vote before any deliberation or information sharing occurs? It is shown how the answer depends on a number of considerations, including the correlation among jurors' observations, the jurors' assessments of the relative importance of type I and type II errors compared with society's assessment of those errors, and differences in jurors' abilities.     

Capacity constraints, asymmetries, and the business cycle

We study how an occasionally binding capacity constraint affects the properties of business cycles. A real business cycle model is constructed where production takes place at individual plants and the number of plants operated varies over the cycle. The capacity constraint binds in states where all plants are operated. We derive the aggregate production function for this economy, which turns out to differ from the standard Cobb–Douglas function while retaining its desirable properties. The business cycle features of this one-sector growth model are similar to those of a standard real business cycle model in most respects. Our model does, however, display some properties of actual economies that standard models do not. In particular, business cycles in our model are asymmetric—troughs are deeper on average than peaks are tall. Also, labor's share of income is counter-cyclical, as it is in US data.     

Candidate reputations and the ‘incumbency effect’

A major shortcoming of the classical median voter model is that its central prediction — convergence of platforms to the median voter's ideal — is seldom observed. One reason is that the classical model neglects the importance of voter expectations as a determinant of votes. Here we associate voters' expectations about candidates with past as well as current candidate pronouncements, and assume that incumbents whose actions are consistent with their ‘reputations’ are perceived as less risky than challengers. In equilibrium candidates choose distinct platforms. Typically neither adopts the median voter's ideal point. Either candidate may win depending on how well the incumbent's reputation reflects current voter tastes and how relatively ‘risky’ the electorate perceives the challenger to be.     

Transient and asymptotic dynamics of reinforcement learning in games

Reinforcement learners tend to repeat actions that led to satisfactory outcomes in the past, and avoid choices that resulted in unsatisfactory experiences. This behavior is one of the most widespread adaptation mechanisms in nature. In this paper we fully characterize the dynamics of one of the best known stochastic models of reinforcement learning [Bush, R., Mosteller, F., 1955. Stochastic Models of Learning. Wiley & Sons, New York] for 2-player 2-strategy games. We also provide some extensions for more general games and for a wider class of learning algorithms. Specifically, it is shown that the transient dynamics of Bush and Mosteller's model can be substantially different from its asymptotic behavior. It is also demonstrated that in general—and in sharp contrast to other reinforcement learning models in the literature—the asymptotic dynamics of Bush and Mosteller's model cannot be approximated using the continuous time limit version of its expected motion.     

On the effects of human capital and R&D policies in an endogenous growth model

We introduce an external effect of existing technologies in human capital accumulation in an endogenous growth model and describe its steady-state and transition. We numerically solve the model to compare the quantitative effects of R&D policy with the quantitative effects of human capital policy in wealth and welfare. Although R&D subsidies have now an overall positive effect on growth, wealth and welfare, the calibration exercise shows that for plausible values for the parameters, human capital policy is simultaneously the most income and welfare-improving and the less expensive to the government.     

State and religion

State and religion have historically had an uneasy relationship, at times being close allies, at others harsh adversaries, and at still others largely independent. This paper develops an economic model of this relationship, where the state’s objective is to maximize net tax revenue. Religious goods benefit the state in two ways: first, they provide utility to citizens, thus allowing the state to extract more taxes before running up against citizens’ reservation utility (the point at which they would revolt), and second, they potentially provide legitimacy to the state, thereby lowering the costs of tax collection. If the latter effect is strong enough, the state may find it optimal to take control of religion, either to enhance its legitimizing effect, or to suppress its de-legitimizing effect. Greater competition in the religion market and democratic polity make it less likely for the state to control religion. To evaluate the model’s implications, we use recent cross-country data on the relationship between religion and state, including variables from the “Religion and State Project” and measures coded from the 2001, 2003, and 2005 International Religious Freedom reports. We also examine in more detail some of the paradigmatic cases indicated by the model, presenting various types of evidence from current and historical examples of each case.