Liberalization, corporate governance and the performance of privatized firms in developing countries

This paper seeks to provide an answer to the following question: when and how does privatization work? Using a sample of 230 firms headquartered in 32 developing countries, we document a significant increase in profitability, efficiency, investment and output. Our analysis shows that the changes in performance vary with the extent of macro-economic reforms and environment, and the effectiveness of corporate governance. In particular, economic growth is associated with higher profitability and efficiency gains, trade liberalization is associated with higher levels of investment and output, while financial liberalization is associated with higher output changes. Further, control relinquishment by the government is a key determinant of profitability, efficiency gains and output increases. Finally, we find higher improvements in efficiency for firms in countries in which stock markets are more developed and where property rights are better protected and enforced. These results for a sample of developing countries differ from those reported in a contemporaneous study by D'Souza et al. [D'Souza, J., Megginson, W.L., Nash, R.C., 2001. Why do privatized firms improve performance? Evidence from developed countries. Unpublished working paper. University of Oklahoma] which focuses on developed countries. These diverging findings suggest that privatization in developing countries indeed obeys to particular constraints and has a dynamic of its own.     

企业“政治关联”研究述评

近年来,企业政治关联对企业业绩、财务政策和资本市场影响的相关研究已成为财务和金融领域研究的热点,但企业政治关联这一隐蔽且难以量化的因素如何对企业的各个层面产生影响,国内在这方面的研究才刚刚开始。为此,本文通过近年国内外相关学者的研究,对模糊的政治关联概念重新界定,梳理了三个主要的研究领域,凝练出五个后续研究方向。     

Ownership changes and access to external financing

This paper examines access to external financing in the privatization context and provides new evidence on the effects of financing constraints on performance and investment. Ownership reforms increase firms’ reliance on external financing. Empirically, performance and investment changes around ownership reforms are increasing in country-level measures of access to credit. The presence of a severe prior public financing constraint contributes to stronger investment growth after privatization. Privatized enterprises do not outperform publicly owned industries, all else given. Our analyses rely on new international sector- and firm-level data and correct for potential endogeneity of ownership changes.     

政治联系与公司价值——基于对万向集团的研究(英文)

通过对很多公司调查研究,我们发现私企的政治联系可以增加公司价值。本文通过对万向集团的研究,讨论公司高管的政治联系与公司价值的关系。     

政治联系与公司价值——基于对万向集团的研究

通过对很多公司调查研究,我们发现私企的政治联系可以增加公司价值.本文通过对万向集团的研究,讨论公司高管的政治联系与公司价值的关系.     

Political uncertainty and analysts’ forecasts: International evidence

This study examines the influence of political uncertainty proxied by national election on analysts’ forecasts across 28 countries. We find analysts’ forecasts’ accuracy decreases, and the optimism increases in national election years compared to these in non-election years. Further analysis supports information opacity, local political connections, politically sensitives industries and the quality of institutions channels through which political uncertainty affects the analysts’ forecasts.     

Privatization,financial development,property rights and growth

This study analyzes how prevailing institutional arrangements i.e., property rights, contracting rights, political institutions, and corporate governance practices affect privatized firms’ performance, capital markets development, and economic growth. Most of the studies surveyed show that privatization enhances privatized firms performance, efficiency, and profitability, which percolates to economic growth. Privatized firms performed better in countries with better regulatory and legal frameworks. Partial privatization may be beneficial in countries with weak institutions, namely, the French civil law countries. The stronger the economic and the governing institutions, the easier it is for privatized firms to thrive and contribute to economic growth. Overall, privatization allows firms to achieve improved efficiency while driving the development of the financial sector.     

上市公司董事会特征对公司绩效影响的分析

文章以沪深两市百强名单中的董事会作为研究对象,借助SPSS统计软件,分析上市公司董事会特征对公司绩效的影响。结果表明：四项董事会特征与公司绩效均没有明显的相关关系。这表明目前我国上市公司还未能通过优化董事会特征来提高董事会效率进而提高公司绩效,上市公司治理存在很大的改进空间。文章提出了优化董事会成员结构、优化薪酬制度、建立健全董事任用和绩效评估机制等对策建议。     

The association between cost of debt and Hong Kong politically connected firms

This paper investigates the association between Hong Kong politically connected (PCON) firms and their cost of debt and find these firms are associated with significantly lower interest rates being charged by lenders compared to other (non-PCON) firms. We compare our results with earlier investigations of Malaysian and U.S. PCON firms and find that our results are consistent with the results of the U.S. but inconsistent with that of Malaysia. Our results suggest that the economic wealth, the extent of political power, and the pervasiveness of firms having political connections could account for the cross-country differences between the cost of debt and PCON firms.     

Does political connection distort competition and encourage corporate risk taking? International evidence

We investigate the impact of political connection on corporate risk-taking by connected firms, their industry counterparts, as well as non-rival firms from 48 countries. We find that political connection induces higher risk taking by connected firms. By contrast, we do not find evidence that political connection, with the attendant potential competitive distortions in the industry, induces higher risk taking by competitors. We focus on non-financial industries. Our results are consistent with the hypothesis that the inability to avail themselves of political rents compels the non-connected rivals to adopt more conservative strategies. However, large rival firms, generally considered to be too-important-to-fail, exhibit evidence of higher risk taking. The top size quartile industry rivals take as much risk as the politically connected firms. The higher risk exhibited by large rivals of politically connected firms suggests that our baseline regression results of lower risk-taking among rivals of politically connected firms are biased upward by firms that would be considered too-big-to-fail. This finding also suggests that the too-big-to fail phenomenon is not unique to banks. Our results are robust to the use of alternative measures of risk, to the exclusion of privatized and state-owned firms, and to controlling for the effects of financial crisis.     

Political connection and leverage: Some Malaysian evidence

This paper extends prior work on the linkage between politically connected (PCON) firms and capital structure in developing countries. Specifically, this paper focuses on the association between Malaysian PCON firms and leverage, and is motivated by the results of Fraser et al. (2006) who report a positive association between leverage and political patronage. Controlling for a potential misspecification in that paper, this study documents that a significant proportion (almost 12%) of the Malaysian PCON firms have negative equity, and builds on the previous paper by providing fresh evidence that market to book ratio is positively associated with leverage, and that borrowing PCON firms have significantly lower ROA compared to non-PCON firms.     

政治关联、融资渠道与民营企业非效率投资研究

从自由现金流和银行贷款两方面考量2007~2010年沪深A股民营上市企业政治关联对企业非效率投资的影响。结果表明,存在政治关联民营企业容易利用自由现金流和银行长期贷款进行过度投资;存在地方政治关联的民营企业,其自由现金流的过度投资更严重,中央政治关联企业则存在更多利用长期贷款进行过度投资的行为。同时,投资不足的民营企业政治关联降低了企业投资对于自由现金流和银行短期贷款的依赖;中央政治关联的民营企业投资对于银行长期贷款的敏感度更高,地方政治关联企业未发现类似的显著影响。     

Competitive and value effects of bank privatization in developed countries

A special issue of the Journal of Banking and Finance (2005) devoted to the performance of privatized banks in middle- and low-income countries shows mixed results. In this paper, we present evidence that shows that privatized banks in developed countries have experienced significant improvements in operating performance. The improvement in performance remains significant after controlling for persistence in bank performance. A comparison of the performance of privatized banks in developed and developing countries suggests that privatization has encouraged excessive risk taking among privatized banks in developing countries, with the consequence that those banks carry large non-performing assets than their counterparts in the developed countries. We also observe that consistent with the competitive effects hypothesis, investors view privatization announcements as foreshadowing bad news for rival banks.     

Benefits of Downward Earnings Management and Political Connection: Evidence from Government Subsidy and Market Pricing

This paper examines the role of downward earnings management and political connection on the receipt of government subsidies and market pricing of subsidies. Using subsidies data hand-collected from Chinese listed firms over the period 2004–2014, the results show a significantly positive association between downward earnings management and the receipt of government subsidies. The results also reveal that a firm's political connection is conducive to securing subsidies for poor performers, but not for good performers. Market pricing analyses demonstrate that share markets value subsidies positively in general, but the effect is ameliorated in firms conducting downward earnings management. No discernible difference is found between the market pricing of subsidies received by firms with political connections and those without.     

What’s the value of politically connected directors?

This study examines the stock price response to Document 18, a regulation released in China in 2013 requiring independent directors with political connections to resign from the boards of directors for publicly listed firms. We document a significant positive price response in the window surrounding the directive’s promulgation date. This response is also of important economic magnitude. Our findings suggest that on average, the market views the costs of hiring politically connected directors as outweighing the associated benefits. Consistent with this view, we document that politically connected directors often shirk their board duties, as evidenced by their poor rates of attendance at board meetings. Further investigations show that the value decreasing effect of politically connected directors is apparent mainly for firms in regulated industries and varies with earnings management practices. However, the market views politically connected directors favorably if firms have significant business transactions with the government.     

政治联系、债务融资与企业研发投入——来自中国上市公司的经验证据

以2009~2012年连续四年披露研发投入的中国上市公司为样本,实证检验政治联系、债务融资对企业研发投入行为的影响。结果表明,企业的研发投入面临债务融资约束,债务融资比例(银行借款)与研发投入强度之间呈现负相关关系,长期借款对研发投入强度的债务制约作用比短期借款更大,政治联系对企业的研发投入产生了\"挤占\"效应,抑制了RD投资,虽然给企业带来了一定的长期债务资源,但并未能如预期产生显著的\"资源效应\",扭转企业债务融资困境。     

The impact of an independent inspectorate on penal governance,performance and accountability: Pressure points and conflict “in the pursuit of an ideal of perfection”

This paper examines the impact of an independent Inspectorate on the enactment, of and accountability for, penal reform in the Australian State of Western Australia. Intended to improve system wide custodial outcomes through the introduction of a privately managed operator acting as standard bearer and innovator, the reform agenda was predicated on an overhaul of governance, performance, systems and reporting practices in the sponsoring department and the state's public prison network. Insights from three credos of imprisonment, theorizations of ‘hierarchical’ and ‘intelligent’ governance and accountability, the interplay of values in changing practice, and the ways in which inspectors establish particular inspection regimes, frame analysis of reform implementation and the inspection regime in action over a ten year period. Using archival material, this research examines how the Inspectorate, in making things auditable, altered perceptions and organizational realities of a network of actors. It is contended that the governance and accountability tensions inherent in managerialism, exemplified in its reliance on ‘neutral’ accounting technologies to incentivise, manage and monitor custodial outcomes, privilege instrumental hierarchical governance and accountability regimes that ignore the rehabilitative aspects of imprisonment. Further, conflicting publicly espoused and privately held values play vital roles in moulding performance in a penal setting, and are fundamental to changing outcomes in networks. The Inspectorate's public values and intelligent accountability regime resonate with the Department's policy objectives and public values, but are shown to have been initially inconsistent with network actors’ hidden private values. The research concludes that the appointment of an independent Inspectorate has facilitated the accountability of those responsible for prison quality and positively influenced the treatment of prisoners. A secondary concern is investigating conflicting propositions about the relative governance, performance and accountability of privately and publicly operated prisons.