Looking Attractive until You Sell: Earnings Management,Lockup Expiration,and Venture Capitalists

Earnings management occurs when managerial discretion allows managers to influence reported earnings and thus mislead some investors about the underlying economic performance and quality of the firm. This study considers how potential investors may guard against earnings management by observing negative stock price reaction at the lockup expiration period of initial public offering (IPO) firms as a negative signal. Findings from a sample of 160 newly public firms show that earnings management behaviour is stronger in IPO firms backed by venture capitalists (VCs). Moreover, VC reputation negatively moderates this relationship such that IPO firms backed by reputable VCs are less likely to manage earnings, suggesting that reputable VCs serve an auditing function following an IPO. Overall, we provide insights into signalling theory by examining negative signals arising from the behaviour of multiple agents in an IPO firm.     

盈余管理的概念及辨析

本文对盈余管理的概念作了界定,并对相关的概念——会计政策选择和财务舞弊作了辨析。本文认为,盈余管理是在法律和会计准则的范围内进行的,其方法主要是会计方法,但也包括非会计方法。盈余管理与会计政策选择的主要区别在于实施盈余管理的企业管理当局有操纵盈余的动机,而盈余管理与财务舞弊的区别在其合法性上。     

Can Government Policies Induce Earnings Management Behavior? ‐Evidence from Chinese Public Listed Firms

Earnings management behavior is a concern of standard setters, regulators, and investors. This study predicts that government policies can induce earnings management behavior. Based on a sample of 8,765 firm years ranging from 2002 to 2009, this study uses two methods to detect the effect of government policies on managers' earnings management behavior. One is the earnings distribution method developed by Burgstahler and Dichev (1997), and the other is the modified Jones model proposed by DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994). We find that policies issued by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) can induce managers of listed firms to engage in earnings management to either avoid negative consequences (e.g., delisting) or to meet requirements (e.g., refinancing). So, although the purpose of government is to protect investors as well as to promote the healthy development of the securities market, its policies are a double‐edged sword: if there is no strict and effective control mechanism, government policies can harm investors and disturb the normal order of the securities market.     

A cross‐country study on the relationship between financial development and earnings management

This study investigates whether a country's level of financial development is associated with earnings management in an international setting. Financial development is likely to heighten the monitoring and scrutiny of accounting numbers because of strengthened investor protection laws and regulations as well as sophisticated market participants. Therefore, we first hypothesize that both accrual‐based and real earnings management decrease with greater financial development. However, research shows that managers tend to apply real earnings management, instead of accrual‐based earnings management, under strict accounting standards, regulations, and close auditor scrutiny. Thus, we explore the alternative hypothesis that accrual‐based earnings management decreases but real earnings management increases along with higher financial development. We examine the relationship between financial development and both types of earnings management using 56,830 observations in 37 countries covering the period 2009–2012. The results indicate that both types of earnings management are more restrained under higher levels of financial development.     

Earnings Management Around Zero: A motivation to local politician signalling competence

Abstract

Literature earnings management aims to determine what causes/motivates managers to disclose earnings close to zero and to use this as an instrument to influence users' decisions. However, limited research has been carried out on this subject in the public sector. Therefore, the main purpose of this paper is to evaluate whether local politicians (in Portuguese municipalities), aiming to demonstrate their high level of competence and skills, engage in earnings management in such a way as to ensure that earnings are positive but close to zero. We examined whether political competition is a determining factor of earnings management close to zero and if managers use discretionary accruals in order to do this. Results indicate that, in order to report positive net earnings close to zero, discretionary accruals are used. This study identified the overriding tendency to avoid the reporting of losses in those municipalities where political competition is greatest.     

Earnings Management to Exceed the Threshold: A Comparative Analysis of Consolidated and Parent‐only Earnings*

This paper examines whether consolidated earnings are managed to a greater extent than parent‐only earnings or vice versa in an attempt to exceed the threshold in Japanese firms. The analysis reveals that earnings management to avoid earnings decreases is more pronounced in parent‐only earnings for the period 1980–1999. Further, it reveals that the management of parent‐only earnings has been less pervasive following the introduction of the new consolidated reporting system in March 2000. In addition, this paper provides evidence suggesting that earnings management in consolidated earnings increased after March 2000. These results indicate that the new consolidated reporting system and principles might affect the earnings management behaviors of Japanese firm managers.     

实现办公室行政管理精细化的思路与对策

怎样才能将办公室的行政管理做到精细化,现已成为很多企业高层管理人员探讨的重要话题之一,因为只有将办公室的行政管理做到精细化,才可有效提升整个办公室的行政管理水平。本文将对行政管理这一概念做一详细阐述,并提出一些意见和建议,从根本上使办公室行政管理做到精细化。     

The contractual and value relevance of reported earnings in a dividend-focused environment

This study investigates the relevance of reported earnings in the context of an institutional environment, i.e., Switzerland, in which investors focus on dividends. In conjunction with a dividend focus, the financial reporting environment faced by Swiss firms provides their managers with more accounting discretion than managers of Anglo-Saxon firms typically have. From a contractual perspective, dividendbased earnings management is expected since Swiss corporate law explicitly states that dividends, which must be voted on by stockholders, are to be based upon a firm's reported earnings. From a value perspective, thin trading conditions and a long-term investment horizon are expected to increase the importance of dividend payments and to influence the informativeness of reported earnings. Results indicate that Swiss managers do engage in dividend-based earnings management, that earnings quality signals are used by managers to voluntarily constrain their accounting choices and that the value relevance of earnings is conditional upon dividend payments.     

How Top Management HR Beliefs and Values Affect High‐Performance Work System Adoption and Implementation Effectiveness

What explains why high‐performance work systems (HPWSs) are not adopted more widely by firms that would appear to benefit economically by adopting them? We address this question by drawing on the upper‐echelons perspective to consider the role of the top managers’ beliefs concerning the financial payoffs from investments in HR (“HR cause‐effect belief”) as well as their employee‐centered value‐based beliefs (labeled “HPWS values”). We propose a conceptual model in which top management HPWS values moderate the relationship between HR cause‐effect beliefs and the intensity of HPWS programs reported by managers as well as the relationship between HPWS programs and employees’ perceptions of implemented HPWS practices. We test our model using a unique multisource data set collected from 120 hotel franchisees that includes survey responses from 648 managers and 1,293 employees. We find that firms’ ability to translate top managers’ cause‐effect beliefs about the economic value of HR investments into adoption of HPWS programs, as well as their ability to effectively implement these HPWS programs, is significantly affected by the value‐based HR beliefs held by top managers. © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

盈余管理与企业竞争力

本文以盈余管理的客观性和中性的价值取向为基础,初步探讨了目前我国盈余管理的相关问题及对策,认为盈余管理对提高企业竞争力有着积极的作用,只有认识盈余管理的积极作用并加以正确的引导,对其有害的部分加以监控或治理,才有利于提高企业的竞争力,以确保企业可持续发展的战略。     

不同视角下的盈余管理

文章以财务会计理论的基本问题为起点,对盈余管理存在的普遍性、管理者的行为动因与投资者的市场反应,以及盈余管理对会计信息披露质量进行分析,以期解决运用盈余管理协调会计信息时财务呈报与有效契约之间的矛盾,以满足企业管理者与市场投资者的利益需求。     

The Impact of the Asian Financial Crisis on Conservatism and Timeliness of Earnings: Evidence from Hong Kong,Malaysia, Singapore,and Thailand

This paper examines conservatism and timeliness of earnings in the period surrounding the 1997 Asian financial crisis in Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand. Prior research suggests that managers tended to be more aggressive in reporting good news and delayed recognition of bad news during the financial crisis (less conservative and less timely in financial reporting). After the crisis, these four countries implemented corporate governance measures to stabilize their financial systems and improve regulation and supervision (that should improve conservatism and timeliness). We examine and find that conservatism and timeliness of earnings during the crisis period are low, but improved in the post‐crisis period. More importantly, conservatism and timeliness in the post‐crisis period is even greater than in the pre‐crisis period. We measure conservatism using Basu's model and the accumulation of non‐operating accruals suggested by Givoly and Hayn. The findings from both measures are consistent with an increase in conservatism after the crisis period. Overall, the results indicate that corporate governance reforms in these four countries had a positive impact on conservatism and timeliness of earnings.     

盈余管理、关联交易与审计师特征

上市公司利用关联交易进行盈余管理必须得到会计师事务所的"配合"才有可能顺利实施,而与之"配合"的审计师因承担更高的审计风险,必以收取更高的审计费用作为补偿.实证研究表明,关联交易是上市公司盈余管理的重要手段,上市公司关联交易量越大,会计师事务所的品牌、规模越有利于抑制公司盈余管理行为,审计任期过长不利于抑制公司盈余管理行为.上市公司关联交易量越大,就越倾向于选择非国际"四大"和国内非"十大"会计师事务所,即小规模会计师事务所是上市公司的选择目标,因盈余管理进行关联交易的上市公司支付了更高水平的审计费用.     

How entrenched managers beat earnings expectations before and after SOX

This study investigates the relationship between managerial entrenchment and how firms meet or beat earnings forecasts. It further examines whether this relationship changes before and after the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX). We find that, in the pre-SOX era, entrenched managers meet or exceed analyst forecasts more often than their unentrenched counterparts when analysts’ initial forecasts are high. This is mainly due to the drop in analysts’ consensus rather than earnings management. These results nearly disappear in the post-SOX era.     

The Effect of CEO Stock-Based Compensation on the Pricing of Future Earnings

This paper examines whether CEO stock-based compensation has an effect on the market’s ability to predict future earnings. When stock-based compensation motivates managers to share their private information with shareholders, it will expedite the pricing of future earnings in current stock prices. In contrast, when equity-compensated managers attempt to temporarily manipulate the stock price to maximize their own benefit rather than that of shareholders, the market may not fully anticipate future performance. We find that a CEO’s stock-based compensation strengthens the association between current returns and future earnings, indicating that more information about future earnings is reflected in current stock prices. In addition, we find that the positive effect is weaker for firms that have a high level of signed discretionary accruals or a low management forecast frequency. Overall, our study suggests that on average, equity-based compensation improves the informativeness of stock prices about future earnings, while opportunistic discretionary accruals or lowered earnings guidance hamper this improvement.     

Evidence on the motivation for management forecasts of corporate earnings

A multivariate model of the process by which managers decide to release public forecasts of their firms' earnings is developed, based on factors that are hypothesized to affect the demand for and the willingness to supply such forecasts. We test the model on data from a comprehensive sample of earnings forecasts, and find support for our hypotheses about the likely joint influence of those factors. Larger firm size, greater leverage, higher and more stable earnings rates and less rapid growth rates are found to be associated with an increased propensity for management to provide earnings forecasts for their firms.     

Insider Trading, Earnings Management and Corporate Governance: Empirical Evidence Based on Hong Kong Firms

We document positive association between earnings management and insider selling after the fiscal year‐end for Hong Kong firms. This positive association is especially evident before the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. Our findings suggest that Hong Kong executives manage reported earnings to maximize their private benefits from insider selling. Additionally, we find that a higher proportion of independent directors (INED) on corporate boards moderate the positive association between insider selling and earnings management. Stricter monitoring of earnings management by INED is especially evident when no member of the family with majority ownership is present on corporate boards as a director. This suggests that the presence of family members with majority ownership on corporate boards significantly reduces INED's monitoring effectiveness. Our findings suggest that strict regulations are needed to control insider trading, and independence of corporate boards is important for monitoring of earnings management associated with insider trading. Furthermore, appointment of family members with majority shareholdings should be avoided to enhance independence and to monitor effectiveness of corporate boards.     

城市网格化管理的特点及启示

城市网格化管理是一种数字化城市管理模式.其特点是在控制论基础上,综合利用移动通讯和网络地图等高科技手段,实行全方位、高效率的城市管理活动.其主要方法是对应城市实体空间建立网格化电子地图,并在上面把城区划分成细密的网格,然后按照一定的管理幅度划定若干控制区.区内的公共部件和事件,均按其地理位置编码标定在电子地图上.每个管理区都设人轮班巡查,对区内所辖城市设施、市容卫生、治安状况进行全时段监控,一旦发现问题,立即通报指挥中心,指挥中心核实后再发往相关职能部门并限时解决.城市网格化管理是我国数字城市技术应用领域的重大突破,在国际上处于领先地位.     

Real and Accrual‐Based Earnings Management in the Pre‐ and Post‐IFRS Periods: Evidence from China

The purpose of this study is to investigate the prevalence of both accrual‐ and activities‐based earnings management for Chinese A‐share firms surrounding the adoption of substantially IFRS‐convergent accounting standards. Since 2007, all listed A‐share firms in China have been required to comply with a new set of accounting standards that have substantially conformed to IFRS. The new reform also produced a set of new auditing standards and internal control reporting requirements. Based on a sample of 4,050 firm‐year observations from 2002 to 2011, we find that Chinese firms in the post‐IFRS period (2007–2011) are less likely to engage in accrual‐based earnings management. The magnitude of discretionary accruals also declines after IFRS adoption. In response, we see firms turning to real activities manipulation as a substitute for upward earnings management. The reduction in accrual‐based earnings management could stem from higher quality accounting standards associated with IFRS adoption and/or concurrent changes in the governance regimes introduced with the IFRS mandate. A further analysis, however, indicates that the benefits of IFRS adoption in curbing upward accrual‐based earnings manipulation are not evenly distributed across firms. Specifically, the benefit diminishes for firms that are controlled by Chinese central or local governments, are located in less developed regions, and that have weak financial performance and therefore subject to delisting status. We also find that the benefit is less pronounced for manufacturing firms than for their non‐manufacturing counterparts.     

‘FAMILY’ OWNERSHIP,TUNNELLING AND EARNINGS MANAGEMENT: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Abstract In this review paper, we bring together a number of aspects of family firms that are ubiquitous in a number of institutional contexts, often as part of larger business groups. We pay particular attention to the mechanisms by which families retain control over firms, and the incentives of the families in control to expropriate other stakeholders by way of tunnelling. We examine the role of earnings management in facilitating tunnelling, and evidence about the incidence of earnings management in family firms. Our review suggests that while the literature on these aspects of family control is rich, the contexts in which the empirical exercises are undertaken are relatively few, and hence there is considerable opportunity to expand it to other contexts, in particular in the form of cross‐country comparisons of the relative impact of agency conflicts and institutions on these issues.