Efficient Contests

In their seminal contribution, Lazear and Rosen (1981) show that wages based upon rank induce the same efficient effort as incentive‐based reward schemes. They also show that this equivalence result is not robust toward heterogeneity in worker ability, as long as ability is private information because it is not possible to structure contests to simultaneously satisfy self‐selection constraints and first‐best incentives. This paper demonstrates that efficiency can be achieved by a simple modification of the prize scheme in a mixed (heterogenous) contest where contestants learn their type after entry. If contestants know their type before entering the contest, rent extraction becomes an issue. Implications for optimal contest design are also explored. Finally, the relationship between effort maximizing contests and profit maximizing contests are discussed.     

Information Sharing in Contests

We study the incentives to share private information ahead of contests, such as markets with promotional competition, procurement contests, or research and development (R&D). We consider the cases where firms have (i) independent values and (ii) common values of winning the contest. In both cases, when decisions to share information are made independently, sharing information is strictly dominated. With independent values, an industry‐wide agreement to share information can arise in equilibrium. Expected effort is lower with than without information sharing. With common values, an industry‐wide agreement to share information never arises in equilibrium. Expected effort is higher with than without information sharing.     

Government Time Discounting and Required Rates of Return: UK History and Current Issues

The UK government first set financial objectives for the nationalised industries in 1961 and subsequently promoted the use of ‘discounted cash flow’ for investment appraisal. The nationalised industry regime evolved until, in the 1990s, it was succeeded by economic regulation regimes for the privatised utilities. Meanwhile discounting conventions emerged and have continued to evolve for wider government policy analysis, including aspects of climate change. Issues about the size and functions of public expenditure notwithstanding, UK government conventions are currently fairly uncontroversial: however, in the world at large, government discounting remains subject to many academic and international controversies and misunderstandings.     

Contests with investment

Perfectly discriminating contests (all pay auctions) are widely used as a model of situations where individuals devote resources to win some prize. In reality such contests are often preceded by investments of the contestants into their ability to fight in the contest. This paper studies a two stage game where in the first stage, players can invest to lower their bid cost in a perfectly discriminating contest, which is played in the second stage. Different assumptions on the timing of investment are studied. With simultaneous investments, equilibria in which players play a pure strategy in the investment stage are asymmetric, exhibit incomplete rent dissipation, and expected effort is reduced relative to the game without investment. There also are symmetric mixed strategy equilibria with complete rent dissipation. With sequential investment, the first mover always invests enough to deter the second mover from investing, and enjoys a first mover advantage. I also look at unobservable investments and endogenous timing of investments. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

企业战略管理会计中的时间管理研究

战略管理会计主要通过产品生命周期法、作业成本管理法、价值链分析法等研究方法来对企业的经济效益作出判断.管理会计认为,时间管理是实施企业战略的重要手段.企业战略管理要求把改进生产周期时间看做是改进企业所有工作质量过程中的一个主要中心,要求所有的目标、工作流程设计以及生产经营活动都要包括对生产周期时间的度量和控制.     

Contests with endogenous deadlines

This paper analyzes the problem of a contest designer who chooses a starting time and a deadline of the contest to maximize discounted total effort by the contestants. Each contestant secretly decides how much effort to exert between the starting time and the deadline. At the deadline, the contestant who exerted most effort wins a prize, which consists of the endowment of the designer and collected interest. The contest has a unique Nash equilibrium. In the main model, the designer should announce the contest immediately with a short deadline to promote intense competition. I analyze how the optimal starting time and deadline change for a variable contest prize, different types of asymmetries, a Tullock lottery contest success function, and different goal functions of the designer.     

Contests for catch shares

Review of Economic Design - We study contests in which fishers (or players), in a fishery managed under a catch-share program, compete over catch shares by expending irreversible effort, and the...     

Heterogeneity of Players and Aggregate Effort in Contests

We explore the systematic effects of variation in players' heterogeneity on aggregate effort in contests. We show that if costs of effort are convex, a mean‐preserving increase in the variation of players' abilities can lead to an increase or decrease in aggregate effort, both in contests of complete and incomplete information, depending on the curvature of the effort cost function. Specifically, if effort costs are not too steep, aggregate effort increases in ability variation, whereas if effort costs are sufficiently steep, aggregate effort decreases in ability variation.     

Time Series Analysis of Strategic Pricing Behavior in the US Airline Industry

A positive relationship betweencompetitive pressure and technical efficiency has been demonstratedby several studies; other studies hold forth that airline marketsbehave strategically. We bring these two literatures togetherby presenting a time series methodology to examine strategicpricing behavior and discussing the implications for airlineefficiency. We find evidence of dynamic, route-level, parallel( i.e. strategic) pricing despite highly variable price structures.A stable price relationship is consistent with successful coordinationof dynamic oligopolists and may highlight those routes wheresignificant market power exists. In light of previous research,this indicates that the airlines on these routes may not be attainingmaximum technical efficiency. For policy makers, this methodologyis useful for analyzing other markets which behave strategically.     

Allocation of Prizes in Contests with Participation Constraints

We study all‐pay contests with an exogenous minimal effort constraint where a player can participate in a contest only if his effort (output) is equal to or higher than the minimal effort constraint. Contestants are privately informed about a parameter (ability) that affects their cost of effort. The designer decides about the size and number of prizes. We analyze the optimal prize allocation for the contest designer who wishes to maximize either the total effort or the highest effort. It is shown that if the minimal effort constraint is relatively high, the winner‐take‐all contest in which the contestant with the highest effort wins the entire prize sum does not maximize the expected total effort or the expected highest effort. Rather, a random contest in which the entire prize sum is equally allocated to all the participants yields a higher expected total effort as well as a higher expected highest effort.     

Contests over joint production on networks

We consider a network of heterogeneous agents where each edge represents a two‐player contest between the respective nodes. In these bilateral contests, agents compete over an endogenous prize jointly produced using their own contest efforts. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of Nash equilibrium and characterize the equilibrium total effort for every agent. Our model has insightful results regarding the network type, that is, depending on whether the network is bipartite or nonbipartite. Finally, considering the sum of all expected utilities as an efficiency notion, we investigate the optimal network structure.     

Discounting inflation — a note

The aim of this paper is to clarify the confused issue of the effect of inflation on the discounting procedure for investment appraisal. The standard approach is considered, together with the impact of inflation, and the problem of how to adjust the standard approach to take account of inflation. The point is made that it is usually easiest to estimate expected returns in current prices, in which case the discount rate should reflect the real opportunity cost of capital, to avoid mixing real returns and nominal interest in a manner which leads to the rejection of worthwhile projects. An example is given of how the real rate of interest can be computed from the nominal rate of interest and the rate of inflation, and the difference this makes to discounting a sample project. The paper then illustrates how real rates of interest have frequently been negative over the past decade and how this implies that projects may be acceptable even if the sum of future undiscounted returns is less than the initial outlay. The conclusion drawn is that investors should maximize economic profit defined as the surplus over opportunity cost, which reduces the deterrent of nominally high interest rates, for the maximization of surplus over opportunity cost has the corollary of minimization of opportunity loss.     

Discounting models for outcomes over continuous time

Events that occur over a period of time can be described either as sequences of outcomes at discrete times or as functions of outcomes in an interval of time. This paper presents discounting models for events of the latter type. Conditions on preferences are shown to be satisfied if and only if the preferences are represented by a function that is an integral of a discounting function times a scale defined on outcomes at instants of time.     

Endogenous Group Formation in Contests: Unobservable Sharing Rules

We study contests in which players compete by expending irreversible effort to win a prize, the prize is awarded to one of the players, the winner shares the prize with other players in his group, if any, and each group's sharing rule is unobservable to the other groups and the singletons, if any, when the players expend their effort. The number of groups, their sizes, and the number of singletons are exogenous in the first model, whereas they are endogenous in the second model. We show that group formation occurs if the number of players is four or smaller, but does not occur otherwise. We examine the effect of endogenous group formation on total effort level and the profitability of endogenous group formation. In each of the two models, comparing the outcomes of the case of unobservable sharing rules with those of the case of observable sharing rules, we show that the two cases yield quite different outcomes.     

Patient Decision Making: Exponential versus Hyperbolic Discounting

Evidence strongly indicates that human decision makers discount the future using a hyperbolic function instead of following an exponential, which has been the long‐standing assumption. We compare the exponential and hyperbolic models in evaluation of a simple research and development project selection problem, finding that the exponential function favors short‐term choices, while the hyperbolic function favors the long‐term. We demonstrate applications of the hyperbolic function, concluding that the traditional exponential—which does not faithfully represent typical human preferences—leads toward myopic decision making when compared to the hyperbolic. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Tax Discounting in a High‐debt Economy*

This paper estimates a consumption function for Belgium that allows for government debt discounting and for the overall discounting of the future (reflecting the consumers’ planning horizon or precautionary savings). It also allows for substitutability or complementarity effects from government expenditures. Results suggest that consumers do take into account (future) government activity. Ricardian Equivalence is rejected however, since we cannot reject a relatively short planning horizon or a precautionary savings motive for the consumers. We use bootstrapped distributions for inference since the instrumental variables estimators used may have non‐standard distributions. This procedure also helps to tackle potential endogeneity and sample size problems.     

大学生数学建模竞赛在能力培养中的作用

文章介绍了全国大学生数学建模竞赛,分析了数学建模的一般步骤和讨论了大学生数学建模竞赛在能力培养中的作用.     

我国发展战略规划的时代特征及其变迁

本文回顾和梳理了我国发展战略规划实践与研究过程中的时代特征及其变迁,对发展战略规划的内涵、理念、特点、形式以及研究方法的发展趋势进行了展望,提出发展战略规划对于实现区域互补协调,提高竞争力,促进可持续发展具有关键作用。希冀为区域和城市制定实施发展战略规划,促进我国区域统筹协调发展提供理论依据和经验借鉴。     

Endowment Origin,Demographic Effects,and Individual Preferences in Contests

In modern firms the use of contests as an incentive device is ubiquitous. Nonetheless, experimental research shows that in the laboratory subjects routinely make suboptimal decisions in contests even to the extent of making negative returns. The purpose of this study is to investigate how earning the endowment, demographic differences, and individual preferences impact behavior in contests. To this end, we conduct a laboratory experiment in which subjects expend costly resources (bids) to attain an award (prize). In line with other laboratory studies of contests, our results show that subjects overbid relative to theoretical predictions and incur substantial losses as a result. Making subjects earn their initial resource endowments mitigates overbidding and thus increases efficiency. Overbidding is linked to gender, with women bidding higher than men and having lower average earnings. Other demographic information, such as religiosity, and individual preferences, such as preferences toward winning and risk, also influence behavior in contests.     

大学生数学建模竞赛在能力培养中的作用

文章介绍了全国大学生数学建模竞赛，分析了数学建模的一般步骤和讨论了大学生数学建模竞赛在能力培养中的作用。