评估者故意误差来源分析

评估故意误差一直是组织绩效考核中人们关注的焦点问题.本文针对评估者故意误差中的宽大效应,通过文献综述的方法,从评估者动机、受评者因素、评估者与受评者二元关系、组织情境四个方面分析其来源.评估者动机主要包括和谐动机、激励动机和评估者印象管理;受评者因素主要包括受评者印象管理和其社会网络;评估者与受评者二元关系主要包括领导成员交换关系和评估者喜爱;组织情境主要包括组织文化、组织政治和绩效考核制度.研究首先指出评估者故意误差存在的合理性,同时给予企业管理者在实践工作中可以采取的减少评估故意误差的方法,最后指出未来研究方向.     

Rater Rating‐Level Bias and Accuracy in Performance Appraisals: The Impact OF Rater Personality,Performance Management Competence,and Rater Accountability

We studied the problem of rating‐level bias and rating accuracy among retail managers of a Fortune 500 retailer. Hypotheses were tested regarding the relationship among managers’ Five‐Factor Model (FFM) personality characteristics, their competence in performance management, and their levels of bias and accuracy in appraisals made in situations differing on levels of rater accountability. Associate store managers (N = 125) rated subordinates, peers and managers under conditions of high and low rater accountability. We found support for the stability of rating‐level bias across rating situations. Raters’ levels of agreeableness and assertiveness were related to mean rating levels across situations, and U‐shaped relationships were found in predicting one measure of rating accuracy such that high and low levels of these two traits were related to greater rating inaccuracy. Conscientiousness scores were significantly (and negatively) correlated with highly accountable mean ratings of subordinates. Performance management competence was related to rating‐level bias in both high‐ and low‐accountability conditions and contributed incremental validity in the prediction of rating level and rating accuracy. Our results indicate that the most lenient raters are more agreeable, less assertive, and less competent in performance management. These raters may also be less accurate. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

人力资源管理中的评分者偏差及其控制方法

在所有人力资源管理涉及主观评价的环节,常常会受到评分者个体差异或个体差异与情境交互作用影响而产生偏差,这些主观偏差往往会影响人力资源管理的科学性和公正性.当前,评分者宽容误差和晕轮误差是研究领域关注最多的两类主观偏差,大量的研究揭示可以采用多质多法、概化理论以及项目反应理论等测量理论对人力资源管理中的评分者偏差进行甄别,有效降低评分者偏差对人力资源管理的负作用.     

股票期权激励与传统激励方式的比较分析

本文在简单介绍股票期权激励的相关概念后，应用信息经济学的委托一代理理论模型，分析了在股票期权激励和传统激励方式中公司经营者的努力程度，并对激励效果进行了比较静态分析，最后得出的结论是：由于公司经营者的努力程度对公司盈利的影响比对股票价格的影响更直接，在其他条件相同时，股票期权的激励效果不如传统激励方式。     

Public and Private Provision of Health Care

One of the mechanisms that are implemented in the cost containment movement in the health care sectors in western countries is the definition, by the third-party payer, of a set of preferred providers. The insured patients have different access rules to such providers when ill. The rules specify the copayments patients must pay when using an out-of-plan care provider. This paper studies the competitive process among providers in terms of both prices and qualities. Competition is influenced by the status of providers as in-plan or out-of-plan care providers. Also, there is a moral hazard of provider choice related to the trade-off between freedom to choose and the need to hold down costs. It is possible to achieve the first-best allocation by an appropriate definition of the reimbursement scheme when decisions on prices and qualities are taken simultaneously (as in primary health care sectors). In contrast, some type of regulation is needed to achieve the optimal solution when decisions are sequential (as in specialized health care sectors). We also derive normative conclusions on how price controls should be implemented in some European Union member states.     

Bias and Sensitivity of Multipliers

Multipliers measure the derivatives of endogenous variables with respect to exogenous shocks and are functions of the structural parameters of an economic model. Substitution of the structural parameter estimates yields a so-called derived estimate for a multiplier or any reduced-form parameter. Derived estimates are biased. This paper presents first-order approximations to the biases and sensitivities of multipliers. The good performance of a flawed formula in input–output analysis is illuminated.     

The Social Provision of Punishment and Incarceration

Standard economic theory proposes that public goods (equally available to everyone) will be underprovided by private markets. Individuals can benefit without having to pay, so there is little incentive to invest or manage resources efficiently. The punishment of criminals is an example of this, since everyone in a society benefits from reduced crime whether they pay to apprehend criminals or not. On that basis, it is widely presumed that governments must provide criminal justice services, including prisons. But the evidence in favor of that view is ambiguous. Stateless societies throughout history have found ways to maintain public order without ever building a prison. Nations with adequate social safety nets and a high degree of equality are also likely to rely on alternatives to incarceration. Strong forms of public goods theory, when applied to punishments and prisons, are shown to be false, since crime control does exist without a centralized state. Furthermore, the available evidence suggests that centralized government provision and management can also suffer inefficiencies from overproduction. Only comparative institutional analysis can speak to the efficiency potentials of punishment, wherein the costs of underproduction are assessed against the likely consequences of overproduction.     

审计委员会海归背景与商誉减值计提

审计委员会中海归成员日益增多,其对审计委员会治理的有效性有何影响值得关注。基于此,以商誉减值计提为切入点,选择2008—2016年间中国资本市场发生商誉事项的A股上市公司为样本,试图通过检验审计委员会海归背景与商誉减值计提之间的关系来分析审计委员会治理的有效性。研究发现:(1)审计委员会海归背景能够显著促进商誉减值计提程度的提高;(2)盈余管理程度越高,审计委员会海归背景对商誉减值计提程度的正向促进作用越显著;(3)审计质量弱化了审计委员会海归背景对商誉减值计提程度的正向促进作用;(4)审计委员会海归背景增加审计费用,且商誉减值计提在这一过程中发挥了中介作用。研究结论丰富了海归人员经济后果领域的相关文献,有助于明晰审计委员会海归背景对商誉减值计提的影响机理。     

财务呈报动因与盈余信息质量

财务报告是报告编制者在会计准则和呈报动因驱动下权衡成本和收益的一个产物。中国上市公司独特的外部制度环境和内部治理结构,形成了其独特的财务呈报动因,本文通过上海和深圳证券交易所1998-2005年上市公司的财务数据,全面考察了我国上市公司财务呈报动因对其盈余信息质量的影响。研究结果表明:上市公司所在地的法制环境和市场化程度等外部环境,以及公司治理结构等内部因素在很大程度上决定了公司盈余信息的质量。由此进一步指出:政府监管机构应该有针对性地优化上市公司所处的信息报告环境,建立健全法律制度,深入公司治理机制的改革,才能有效地提高上市公司的财务报告质量。     

Forecast Bias and MSFE Encompassing

We show that the standard condition for MSFE encompassing is no longer valid when the forecasts to be compared are biased. We propose a simple modification of such a condition and of tests for its validity. The theoretical results are illustrated by an empirical example on inflation and deficit forecasts, key variables for the formulation of monetary and fiscal policy.     

The Suppression of Private Provision

The contention that only the slate can equitably provide such public goods' education, sanitation, and law and order, is based on a misleading of history. The evidence is re-examined by Stephen Davies, Lecturer in the Department of English and History at Manchester Polytechnic, to levcal that state provision was urged by vested interests, rather than a genuine concern for the poor, tor whom the market was increasingly providing.     

Social Efficiency and the Provision of Collective Services

Abstract . Government inefficiency arises from failure of preference, production, and delivery The first occurs when government produces a different mix of collective services than is socially desirable; the second when government produces services less efficiently than it could at given cost levels; the third when the targeted beneficiaries fail to receive the intended level of services. A taxonomy of causes of each type of failure is developed and the conclusion drawn that some inefficiency is inevitable when collective services are provided. At issue is how much inefficiency should be tolerated when the gains to society from the provision of collective services outweigh the costs and how existing inefficiencies can be reduced to lower levels.     

Beyond Publication Bias

Abstract.  This review considers several meta‐regression and graphical methods that can differentiate genuine empirical effect from publication bias. Publication selection exists when editors, reviewers, or researchers have a preference for statistically significant results. Because all areas of empirical research are susceptible to publication selection, any average or tally of significant/insignificant studies is likely to be biased and potentially misleading. Meta‐regression analysis can see through the murk of random sampling error and selected misspecification bias to identify the underlying statistical structures that characterize genuine empirical effect. Meta‐significance testing and precision‐effect testing (PET) are offered as a means to identify empirical effect beyond publication bias and are applied to four areas of empirical economics research – minimum wage effects, union‐productivity effects, price elasticities, and tests of the natural rate hypothesis.     

科研人员激励机制与措施

变革是适应环境变化要必须做出的调整。从产权、资产、科学设置股权结构等方面,给人才创造更大发展空间和良好的用人制度,才能有效提高和增强改制科研机构的创新能力。科研机构的竞争是科技人员技术创新能力的竞争,其核心是技术创新的竞争。建立一套客观、公正、量化和长效的创新能力激励机制,调动科技人员的积极性,是提升科研机构自主知识产权水平和综合竞争力行之有效的措施。     

国有企业开展科技人员股权和分红激励的相关政策、实践和建议

国有企业科技创新能力的提升关键在“人”.当前对于国有企业科技人员的激励普遍存在方式不够灵活多样、激励水平有限等问题.导致国有企业科技人员创新活力不足,促进科技成果产业化的动力不强,科技人员离职率高等问题频发.本文就当前国有企业科技人员激励的现状、问题以及导致这些问题的原因进行深入分析.着重针对市场化股权和分红激励方式运用不足的问题,对国家出台的相关政策进行系统梳理,分析国有企业的市场化激励实践案例经验,对国有企业开展科技人员的市场化激励提出政策建议.     

Incentive pay and rent in oligopoly

Our purpose is to examine strategic delegation in nonlinear Cournot oligopoly. The findings generalize earlier results and show that managerial contracts reward sales under the condition of a fixed input price. Alternatively, under a variable input price, owners might punish sales even when goods are strategic substitutes. We conclude that optimal strategic motivation depends critically on the input price. For example, motivation that supports positive owner profit under a fixed input price nullifies owner-profit if an upstream monopolist with convex costs sets the input price. In a vertical relationship between a duopoly and an upstream monopolist, strategic delegation punishes sales.     

不确定性与激励关系的研究综述

传统的代理理论研究表明激励与不确定性存在负相关关系,但大量的实证研究却发现二者之间的关系十分复杂。文章在对相关研究回顾的基础上,指出对不确定性的深入探究是研究激励问题特别是高度不确定环境下激励问题的重点。     

奖励旅游:奖励创造效率

什么样的奖励既能够使员工们力争上游,又能满足他们的幻想,并足以维持他们旺盛的工作热情?     

Addressing Unobserved Selection Bias in Accounting Studies: The Bias Minimization Method

This note explains the minimum-biased estimator (MBE), which accounting researchers can use to analyze the robustness of regression or propensity score-matched treatment estimates to unobserved selection (endogeneity) bias. Based on the principles of the Heckman treatment model, the MBE entails estimating matched treatment effects within a range of propensity scores that minimizes unobserved selection bias. A major advantage of the MBE is that an instrumental variable is not required. The potential utility of the MBE in accounting studies is highlighted, and a familiar empirical illustration is provided.